

# The Growing Scope of *Jian* 兼: Differences Between Chapters 14, 15 and 16 of the *Mozzi*\*

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*Jian'ai* 兼愛 – variously translated as “universal love”, “impartial caring”, “concern for everyone”, “inclusive care” and “co-love”<sup>1</sup> – has generally been considered a crucial, if not the most fundamental, concept in early Mohism. This “unifying principle of morality”, the “center of Mohism” or the “heart of their ethics”,<sup>2</sup> is traditionally opposed to the Confucian view of “graded love”, which begins with one’s relatives and respects hierarchy. This traditional view of early Mohist ethics is largely based on the assumption of the relative identity of the three chapters titled “*Jian'ai*”. While not denying some degree of similarity among chapters 14, 15 and 16 of the *Mozzi*, I shall first highlight the differences and focus on those views and arguments in the core chapters (8–39) that tend to be overlooked in this current interpretation. I argue that the most crucial differences between the three chapters are caused by an evolution in which the moral imperative of caring for others becomes stronger, and is not watered down or adapted to other views and political necessities.

This paper starts by temporarily removing the title of the triad (in 1 and 2); then it works its way through the three chapters separately (in 3, 4 and 5), and concludes with a tentative understanding of the concept of *jian'ai* (in 6) as it appears in the core chapters of the *Mozzi*. A chart of the structure of the three chapters is appended to this paper to clarify the argument.

## 1. Beyond the title: *jian'ai*

The Mohist idea of “inclusive care” is usually interpreted on the basis of the three consecutive early chapters titled “*Jian'ai*” (“shang”, “zhong” and “xia”). Similarities between these three chapters and their common title are the reasons why almost all scholars treat them as equal in philosophical content.<sup>3</sup> When discussing the concept of “inclusive caring” they indiscriminately

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1 Throughout this paper I will mainly refer to either *jian'ai* or “inclusive care” or “inclusive caring”, without insisting on the appropriateness of this translation throughout the evolution of the term. For a detailed discussion of the meaning of *jian*, see Jörg Schumacher, “An Outline of the Evolution of the concept of *jian* 兼 in Mohism” (paper presented at the 17<sup>th</sup> WSWG Conference, Leiden, September 2003), 3-12. A more traditional translation of *jian'ai* is “universal love”. See also Angus C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao* (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 41.

2 See, respectively, Graham, *Disputers*, 41; Ding Weixiang 丁为祥, “Mojia *jian'ai* guan de yanbian” 墨家兼爱观的演变, *Shaanxi shifan daxue xuebao* (*Zhexue shehui kexueban*) 28 (1999.4), 70-76, 70; and Chris Fraser, *Mohism*, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism> (Stanford University, 2002), 16. The translation “inclusive care” is inspired by his work.

3 This is the case in almost any article or book that mentions Mohism. See e.g. Fung Yu-lan, tr. Derk Bodde, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, 2 Vols. (Princeton: Princeton University, 1937/1973), 76-105; and Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1985), 135-

refer to one of these chapters or quote a line from them as generally representative of the Mohist admonition to *jian'ai*. I suggest that this habit is to a large extent inspired by the identical chapter titles.

For the core chapters of the *Mozzi*, titles are not derived from their first important words, as it is often the case in Warring States sources, nor from the most current concepts in the chapters, since the expressions of the titles often do not appear in the chapters at all.<sup>4</sup> In the whole “Jian'ai” triad, the expression *jian'ai* occurs only once, namely in the last chapter (16:19/2), in a reflection on King Wen's attitude as described in a quote from the “Grand Oath”.<sup>5</sup> While it is unclear when the chapter titles were chosen, by whom, and to what extent the editor determined the shape of the current book, including the triad chapters, the titles seem designed to indicate the central content of the three chapters of each triad.<sup>6</sup> They may have been added after or close to the formation of chapter 49, “Luwen” 魯問 (Lu's Questions), in which Mozi's doctrines are described on the basis of ten expressions that largely coincide with the titles of the triad chapters.<sup>7</sup>

In an attempt to read the *Mozzi* without being distracted by a later editor's choice of titles, I have provided them with three different working-titles on the basis of their content: “Xiang'ai” 相愛 (Caring for Each Other) for chapter 14, “Jianxiang ai, jiaoxiang li” 兼相愛·交相利 (Inclusively Caring for Each Other, Mutually Benefitting Each Other) for chapter 15 and “Quan jian” 勸兼 (Encouragement to be Inclusive) for chapter 16. Only after the completion of these three chapters, I argue, came the slogan *jian'ai* to represent their thought in later *Mozzi* chapters and in other sources. Freed from the later editor's titles, the three chapters are allowed here to make their point separately, which does not coincide with “inclusive caring”, but rather marks a step into that direction.<sup>8</sup> I will show that an evolution can be traced from chapter 14, through chapters 15 and 16, and continuing in the triad on Heaven's Will (chapters 26, 27 and 28), one of increasing radicalization in moral demands and scope.

172. He briefly refers to the triads, but dismisses the differences, stating that “the doctrine as a whole seems remarkably coherent” (p. 138). The articles mentioned in this paper are rare counterexamples to this general current.

- 4 See Nicolas Standaert, “Problems with titles: Naive questions starting from Mozi's idea of Heaven” (paper presented at the 17<sup>th</sup> WSWG Conference, Leiden, September 17-18, 2003), 1-6.
- 5 See *Mozzi zhubi suoyin* 墨子逐字索引 ICS Ancient Chinese Texts Concordance Series, no. 41 (Hong Kong: Shang wu, 2001), edited by D.C. Lau. All further references to Mozi are to that edition. For an interpretation of this passage, see below in part 6.
- 6 Graham presumes that the editors were Liu Xiang and Liu Xin of the Han. See Angus C. Graham, *Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of Mo-tzu* (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985), 1-29, 17.
- 7 In a conversation between Master Mozi and Wei Yue (49:114/8-9), Mozi advises *shang xian* 尚賢 and *shang tong* 尚同 to order a state, *jieyong* 節用 and *jiezang* 節葬 to enrich the state, *fei yue* 非樂 and *fei ming* 非命 to prevent debauchery, *zun tian* 尊天 and *shi gui* 事鬼 (neither is the literal title of the respective triad) to prevent wantonness, *jian'ai* 兼愛 and *fei gong* 非攻 to prevent military invasions. See also Mei, Yi-pao, [trans.], *The Works of Motze* (Taibei: Confucius Publ. Co., 1980), 503.
- 8 J. Schumacher, “An Outline,” 12-19, traces the ever widening scope of the concept *jian'ai* in the Mohist core chapters as one of increasing radicalization in moral demands and scope. According to Schumacher, it evolves through the following steps: (1) a global view and dualism of “I versus you” in chapter 14 (and chapter 17); (2) the golden formula aiming at everybody in chapter 15 and (3) the heavenly perspective in chapter 26, followed by chapter 16.

One of the contemporary scholars who also highlights the differences between the three chapters and traces an evolution from chapter 14 via 15 to 16 is Ding Weixiang. However, his views are radically opposite to the evolution that I shall try to establish. Indeed, he believes that the most original Mohist stance contained the challenging idea of “inclusive love” (*jian'ai*), which amounted to a radical sacrifice for everyone and a strong opposition against other trends of thought such as those of Ru and Yang Zhu. Later this ideal was weakened, according to Ding, as Mohism became a school that adapted to current values. Hence the addition of reciprocity (*jianxiang ai* 兼相爱) and utilitarian motives (*li* 利). It seems plausible, however, that Mohism did not start off in a confrontational manner – although some contemporaries may have found it quite challenging – but became more specific and mature over time. As we will see, the idea of self-sacrifice and unidirectional concern with the weak and poor is absent from 14 but most clearly present in 16, which is why, for this triad at least, characterizations of an evolution as compromising, adaptive or assimilating can be rejected.<sup>9</sup>

In order to present the three “Jian'ai” chapters as different and consecutive steps within one line of thought, I will first summarize previous research on the structure of the Mohist triad chapters, more particularly on the nature of this particular triad.

## 2. The structure of the “Jian'ai” triad

The threefold structure of the core chapters of early Mohism has long been a source of speculation, perhaps already in the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C. when the *Hanfeizi* and the *Zhuangzi* reported disputes and divisions in the Mohist school.<sup>10</sup> From the Qing dynasty onward, these reports have inspired the interpretation of the “shang”, “zhong” and “xia” chapters as representative of three different sects or stages within Mohism. Scholars such as Yu Yue 俞樾, Luan Tiaofu 樂調甫, Fang Shouchu 方授楚, Alfred Forke, Watanabe Takashi 渡邊卓, Stephen Durrant, Angus Graham, Taeko Brooks, and Chris Fraser have identified consistent differences among the triad chapters – not necessarily along the divisions “shang”, “zhong” and “xia” – on the basis of variation in particle use, vocabulary, fixed formula, rhetoric, style, references to authority, use of logic or intellectual content.

Graham believed that the differences are best explained by reference to three regionally distinguished, relatively contemporary and competing sects. On the basis of linguistic and philosophical differences, he identified them as, respectively: (1) the “Purists” in North China who defended the doctrine against rival thinkers, also called the Y group because of the dominance of the particle *yu* 於; (2) the “Compromising”, who were also from the North but adapted the doctrine to the ideology of the state, and are also called the H group because of their use of *hu* 乎 as post-verbal particle instead of *yu* 於; (3) and, finally, the “Reactionary” in

9 See Ding, “Mojia jian'ai,” 70-76; Graham, *Divisions*, 24, and *Disputers*, 35-36; Taeko Brooks “MZ 14-16: Universal Love” (Warring States Working Group Note 92 rev, Feb. 10, 1996); and Shinjirō Yoshinaga 吉永真二郎, “Jian'ai shi shenme – Jian'ai gainian de xingcheng he fazhan” 兼爱是什么 – 兼爱概念的形成和发展, *Ha'erbin shizhuan xuebao*, (1999.4), 31-34, 34.

10 See *Hanfeizi* 50 and *Zhuangzi* 33. Of the 30 core chapters – three for each dogma mentioned in *Mozzi* 49 – only 23 have been preserved. The position of “Fei ru”, following these chapters, is unclear. The extant complete triads are “Shang xian” (8, 9, 10), “Shang tong” (11, 12, 13), “Jian'ai” (14, 15, 16), “Fei gong” (17, 18, 19), “Tianzhi” (26, 27, 28) and “Fei ming” (35, 36, 37).

the South, who adapted even more to the political situation, identified as the J group because of the particle *ran* 然 following the title of a quoted source.

When applied to the “Jian’ai” triad, Graham’s hypothesis of regional diversity and doctrinal opposition boils down to the following picture: chapter 15 or “Jian’ai zhong” belongs to Y and defends the theoretical purity against rival thinkers, chapter 16 or “Jian’ai xia” belongs to H and proposes a “watered down”<sup>11</sup> version that is acceptable to the politicians in power. Because chapter 14, “Jian’ai shang”, does not contain characteristics of J, nor does it further adapt the doctrine to (Southern) political demands, it does not fit into the scheme. Its brevity, simplicity and the absence of certain formulae suggest to Graham that this chapter is a later digest of the Mohist doctrine of “concern for everyone”, added by the editor in the place of an older lost J chapter.<sup>12</sup> The “three sects”<sup>13</sup> theory has been widely accepted, whether or not in the form defended by Graham.

Other scholars before and after Graham, such as Watanabe Takashi, Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Taeko Brooks, Chris Fraser, Yoshinaga Shinjiro and Ding Weixiang explain the differences within the triads by a chronological evolution rather than synchronic alternative stances, but not necessarily along the original order of the “shang”, “zhong” and “xia” chapters. This evolution, which, according to Brooks, ranges from ca. 390 to ca. 280 B.C.,<sup>14</sup> may later have been followed by a division of the Mohist school, but that is irrelevant to the structure of the triads. Taeko Brooks has argued that the “Jian’ai” triad consists of a single evolutionary sequence, in which, for instance, chapter 14 urges for inclusive love as a preventive of war, which turns into an acceptance of just wars in chapter 16 when Mohists had achieved prominence at court.<sup>15</sup> In order to name these successive phases, Bruce Brooks tentatively suggests “original” (ch 14), “adaptive” (ch 15) and “assimilated” (ch 16).<sup>16</sup> Like the Brookses, Fraser believes that the three “Jian’ai” chapters, in their traditional order, represent the evolution of a relatively early and central idea in Mohism.<sup>17</sup>

11 See Graham, “Divisions,” 24.

12 See Graham, “Divisions,” 20-27, and *Disputers*, 36. Graham, “Divisions,” 28, explicitly ignores questions of dating; he focuses on particles, first quotation formulae, introductory and concluding formulae, and only then looks at differences in thought.

13 See Graham, *Disputers*, 51.

14 See e.g. Bruce and Taeko Brooks, “WSWG Theory Summary. Text and Event Interchronology (Sample),” *Newsletter* 12, 9 March 1999, [www.umass.edu/wsp/texts/chronology1.html](http://www.umass.edu/wsp/texts/chronology1.html). They date chapter 14 in -380 B.C., chapter 15 in -350 and chapter 16 in -310. Watanabe Takashi sees the evolution of the core chapters in a much longer time span, from the early 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C. till the Qin dynasty. See Watanabe Takashi 渡邊卓, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendar” 墨子諸篇の著作年代, *The Toyo Gakuho*, 45, 3 (Dec. 1962), 1-38 and 45. 4 (March 1963), 20-38.

15 According to Taeko Brooks, chapter 14 presumes only the doctrine of opposition to war (= *Mozzi* 17); whereas the (inferred) later *Mozzi* 16 reflects a doctrine of just war (mentioned for the first time in *Mozzi* 19). See T. Brooks, “MZ 14-16.” See also Taeko Brooks “MZ 17-19” (Warring States Working Group Note 93, Feb 22, 1996) and “Evolution of the Mician Ethical triplets” (Warring States Working Group Note 94 rev, March 6, 1996).

16 Bruce Brooks, “Sage and Kings in Mwodz” (WSW, sequence 2626, 22/4/2000).

17 See C. Fraser, “Mohism (supplement: ‘Significance and Chronology of the Triads,’” 1-3, 2. I agree with Watanabe in not respecting the chronological order of the “shang”, “zhong” and “xia” chapters in *all* core triads. See the paper of Karen Desmet in this issue.

This outline of the two current major views on the structure of the Mohist core chapters in general and of the “Jian’ai” triad more specifically, suffices as a background for the interpretation of these three chapters conducted below.<sup>18</sup> Although the hypotheses of regional diversity and chronological evolution do not necessarily exclude each other, my reading of this triad in general supports the evolutionary interpretation and more specifically rejects Graham’s two major claims concerning this triad. First, chapter 14 “Jian’ai shang”, may not be a later digest but an early step in the reasoning towards “inclusive caring”. Second, the politically more compromising stance of chapter 16 as compared to chapter 15 is not the major difference between them. For this triad at least, Graham’s labels of “Purist” and “Compromising” are not warranted.

As for the first point, others have argued that chapter 14 could very well be the first or “original” of the three chapters, rather than a later summary.<sup>19</sup> There are indications of a gradual evolution from “shang” via “zhong” to “xia”, at least in this triad. Throughout the three chapters, the argumentation becomes richer, the objections more varied and specific, and the answers better supported by narratives, quotations, theories or analysis of technical concepts such as *jian* 兼, *bie* 別, *fen ming* 分名, *shi fei* 是非 and *lei* 類. Although many of these and other characteristics are closely interconnected, one could tentatively unravel them as different aspects of a possible evolution.

First, comparing the *atmosphere* in the consecutive chapters, one notices diminishing optimism and growing impatience: 14 still expresses confidence that order can be brought about by the sage who follows the Mohist advice; 15 voices concern about the current situation, while 16 complains about more and worse disasters in the world. The growing impatience with opponents is reflected in the increasing use of *bi* 必 indicating the “necessary” or “inevitable” steps of sound reasoning that, according to the authors, one should make.<sup>20</sup> A second aspect of the evolution, analogous with this, are the *critics* who are mentioned: none in 14; the scholarly gentlemen (once *tianxia zhi shi* 天下之士, 25/19, and once *tianxia zhi shi junzi* 天下之士君子, 26/14)<sup>21</sup> in 15; and the stubborn “critics of *jian* in the world” (*tianxia zhi shi fei jianzhe* 天下之士非兼者) (27/28), those “who have all heard of *jian* but reject it” (*jie wen jian er fei zhi* 皆聞兼而非之) (29/15) and whose objections “still don’t stop” (*you wei zhi ye* 猶未止也) (28/12). Thirdly, and not surprisingly, the *objections* of these critics also augment. While there is none reported in 14, those in 15 question the applicability of *jian*. So do four out of the five objections in 16 (e.g. *qi ke yong zai* 豈可用哉, 27/28). Mozi is said to reply impatiently that “if it were not applicable, even I would object to it” (*yong er bu ke, sui wo yi jiang fei zhi* 用而不可，雖我亦將非之) (27/29). Only one objection in 16 goes so far as to question the value of “inclusive-

18 For a detailed analysis, see the scholars mentioned above and the summary of the debate in Karen Desmet, *De mohistische kernboofdstukken: Een onderzoek naar de drie versies en de band met de splitsingen in het mohisme* (Licentiate thesis, K.U.Leuven, 2001), 11-65.

19 See C. Fraser, “Mohism (supplement),” 1.

20 There is no occurrence of *bi* 必 (must, necessarily) in chapter 14, there are thirteen occurrences in chapter 15, and twenty-seven in chapter 16. It does not occur in the narratives nor in the quotes, but in the arguments, in which the point is made either that something inevitably results from a certain cause, or that a certain answer to a (didactic) question is inevitably right (*bi yue* 必曰, in chapter 16). This increasing use of *bi* in the argumentation indicates the evolution towards Later Mohism.

21 Graham must have overlooked the latter when he argues that “thinkers who oppose Mohism on the issues of universal love [...] are never called officer gentlemen.” See Graham, *Divisions*, 19.

ness”, not just its applicability, by opposing it to the duties of a “loving” or “filial” (*xiao* 孝) son. Along with this growing opposition comes a fourth and more complex evolution, namely in the increasing types of defense or *argumentation*. The plain argument of 14 is supported in 15 by well-known stories and model figures (with one quote) indicating the feasibility of the Mohist project; in 16 the views are further supported by five quotes from authoritative sources and explicitly attributed to the exemplary figures mentioned in them. For example:

雖子墨子之所謂兼者，於湯取法焉。

Even what master Mozi calls *jian* is derived from the model of Tang. (16:29/10-11)

A fifth aspect of the evolution may be called *rhetorical*: while 14 is one piece of monologue, 15 and 16 make use of didactic questions and answers, with the latter appearing like a catechism in which purely hypothetical alternatives are posed, reflections on good reasoning are presented, and technical vocabulary is stipulated.

Admittedly, none of these characteristics, even when combined, is totally conclusive in the rejection of Graham’s theory, since the absence in chapter 14 of seemingly later characteristics could be determined by the style or decision of the later author. But that hypothesis, we will see, is much further from being proven convincingly. Three further arguments in favor of the evolution theory relate to the similarities and differences between the three chapters. First, it is generally known that the three “Jian’ai” chapters share ideas, vocabulary and sentences. *Unique similarities* exist between chapters 14 and 15, on the one hand, and between chapters 15 and 16 on the other, but almost not between chapters 14 and 16.<sup>22</sup> This strongly suggests that 15 made use of some written or remembered version of 14, adding arguments and narratives to support the central idea; and that chapter 16 did the same with 15, again supplementing reflections, arguments, objections and responses as the authors found necessary in the context of their time. Thus, while further elaborating on each other, the chapters increased in length, each doubling the previous one in number of characters.<sup>23</sup> In Graham’s alternative the later writer of 14 would have made a summary of only chapter 15 without any indication of knowing the content of the best developed arguments in the last chapter. A second indication of the chronological priority of chapter 14 could be the fact that, while increasing tension may have caused objections and responses to augment, some *arguments seem to have disappeared*, perhaps because they were considered generally accepted and not disputed by opponents. For instance, the first chapter argues at length that political chaos should be handled by the sage just as a disease is treated by a doctor, namely through diagnosis and remedy.

治亂者何獨不然？

Why would turning chaos into order be any different? (14:24/2)

Like a doctor, the sage has to find the cause of chaos and suggest a solution. This argument does not occur in 15 or 16, but the political methodology is taken for granted. If chapter 14 were a later summary of chapter 15, it would be difficult to explain why it starts out by arguing

22 The only exception is the use of the verb *luan* 亂 (to disrupt) in a parallel passage in chapters 14 and 16, where chapter 15 uses *cuan* 篡 (to usurp). The latter also occurs in a parallel passage in “Tianzhi shang”, which in various other ways parallels chapter 15. See 26:43/26 and 28.

23 According to Taeko Brooks’ count, chapter 14 has 585 words/characters, chapter 15 has 1312 words/characters and chapter 16 has 2716 words/characters, which means a progression at the ratio of 1:2:4. See T. Brooks, “MZ 14-16.”

a point that the other authors apply and that nobody, as far as we can tell, ever calls into question. And a third indication of the priority of chapter 14 is that the four cases of chaos mentioned in the first half of the chapter appear in a *reversed* order, not only at the end of that chapter, but also in the whole of 15 and 16. As will be illustrated in point 3, when discussing the argument of the chapter, these differences suggest that a reversal, made for good reasons in 14, was retained throughout the two following chapters.<sup>24</sup>

The final argument in favor of the chronological priority of chapter 14 brings in the second point of disagreement with Graham, namely on the characterization of the different chapters of the triad. Connected with the changing atmosphere, the critics and their criticism, the arguments and rhetoric, there is an important evolution in the *content* of the three chapters, which is not well captured in the labels “later summary” (chapter 14), “Purist” (Y, chapter 15) and “Compromising” (H, chapter 16). Graham’s arguments in relation to this particular triad are rather thin. As for chapter 14, he believes that the “central importance of universal love in Mohism makes it incredible that ch. 14 [...] can be one of the authoritative statements of the doctrine”, because it is short, lacks quotations as well as answers to objections, has few parallels with chapters in the same triads, and lacks attributions to Mozi (except for one mention in the conclusion).<sup>25</sup> As for his characterization of the two other chapters, his only and indirect argument is that chapter 15 addresses “rival thinkers who question the doctrine of universal love”, presumably the officers (*shi* 士) or officer gentlemen (*shijunzǐ* 士君子),<sup>26</sup> while chapter 16 would be addressed to princes and men of state, and hence be more political in nature. Graham does not quote any example to support his case, but there is exactly one occurrence of “kings, dukes, great men” (*wang gong daren* 王公大人) in the conclusion of chapter 16 (30/7). As noted above, the more common opponents in chapter 16 are “those among the officers of the world who reject *jian*” (*tianxia zhi shi shi fei jian zhe* 天下之士非兼者), and their criticism only differs from chapter 15 in amplitude and philosophical subtlety, not in political demands for conformity. Graham, moreover, admits that, at least in the “*Jian’ai*” triad, there is no major difference in content:

In the next triad, *Chien ai*, there is no evidence of compromise on the central Mohist doctrine of universal love. The J chapter is missing, but Y and H, as well as the digest ch 14, all say explicitly that each should regard the family of another as though it were his own.<sup>27</sup>

Hence, the content of the “*Jian’ai*” triad does not support his labels. I have similar reservations towards Brooks’ characterization of the triad as an increasing political conformism<sup>28</sup> and a gradual acceptance of war.<sup>29</sup>

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24 Another proof of this evolution is found in Karen Desmet’s study of compounds in the core chapters of the *Mozǐ*, also contained in this issue.

25 Graham, *Divisions*, 4. Stephen Durrant concluded, on the basis of the use of grammatical particles, that both hypotheses were possible. See Stephen Durrant, *An Examination of Textual and Grammatical Problems in Mo Tzu* (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1975), 172. For arguments in favor of the chronological sequence 14-15-16, see e.g. Watanabe, “Bokushi” (1962), 4-9, Ding, “Mojia *jian’ai*,” 71-72, T. Brooks, “MZ 14-16” and C. Fraser, “Mohism (supplement),” 1-2.

26 Graham, *Divisions*, 20. As mentioned above, he must have overlooked the *shi jun zǐ* at 15:26/14 when he argues on page 19 that “thinkers who oppose Mohism on the issues of universal love [...] are never called officer gentlemen”.

27 Graham, *Divisions*, 24.

All this indicates that, at least for the “Jian’ai” triad, Graham’s labels – “later summary”, “Purist” and “Compromising” – are not warranted.

My alternative characterization of the three chapters highlights their views concerning “caring” and related concepts in the “Jian’ai” triad. Nobody denies that it is good to love or care (*ai*). But the crucial question is: for whom? For oneself, for each other, for specific others, or for everyone? The answer differs in the three “Jian’ai” chapters, which, I argue, can be seen as stages in the growing scope of caring, reaching the ideal of “inclusive care” only in the last chapter, where the expression *jian’ai* is for the first time used. In this respect, the relation of chapter 16 to chapter 15 is not a willingness to compromise but rather a further radicalization of the moral stance. The evolution that will now be traced throughout the triad starts off with reciprocal love within traditional relationships and moves toward unidirectional concern of the rich and strong towards the poor and weak. Along with this tendency towards an ever growing scope of *ai* there is an increasing specification of the moral stance: the attitude of caring in chapter 14 is later (in chapter 15) specified as a double duty, namely feelings of concern (*ai* 愛) as well as beneficial acts (*li* 利). Thus, only in chapter 15, the concept of benefit or profit joins the scene in a positive sense.<sup>30</sup>

### 3. “Caring for Each Other” (ch. 14)

Unlike the two following chapters, chapter 14 does not consist of short reflections attributed to Master Mozi in response to various critiques, but of one long reflection on political chaos and order. As suggested by the conclusion of 14, the whole chapter is an interpretation of what Master Mozi may have meant by his strong urge to care for others:

故子墨子曰不可以不勸愛人者，此也。

Thus, the fact that master Mozi says that we must encourage people to care for others, is because of this. (14:24/22)

Hence, the encouragement to *ai ren* 愛人 could be the most original echo of the master’s thought, if one considers his sayings in the two following chapters as attributions to the master for didactic purposes rather than quotes of his actual speech.<sup>31</sup> The Mohist starting point of *jian’ai* would then be “care for others” (*ai ren*), a view that was shared by Confucians, as indicated in *Lunyu*, 12.22:

28 There certainly is an increasing political interest in the triad, but I am not sure that this is an indication of Mohists occupying positions at the court. I will not further focus on this evolution. For this evolution, see also Yoshinaga, “Jian’ai shi shenme,” 31-34.

29 See Graham, *Divisions*, 19-20, and Brooks, “MT 14-16.” I am not convinced of this evolution (see part 4 of this paper). See also H. Schmidt-Glintzer, H., *Mo Ti: Gegen den Krieg* (Düsseldorf: Diederichs, 1975), 13-15, and H. Schmidt-Glintzer, *Mo Ti: Solidarität und allgemeine Menschenliebe* (Düsseldorf, Diederichs, 1975), 46.

30 In chapter 17, according to T. Brooks “MT 17-19” the earliest core chapter, just predating chapter 14, *li* is also related to egoism and harming others in terms similar to those in chapter 14 (*yi kui ren zì lì yě* 以虧人自利也, 17:30/18).

31 See e.g. Yoshinaga, “Jian’ai shi shenme,” 31.

樊遲問仁。子曰：愛人。

Fan Chi asked about goodness. The Master said: care for others.<sup>32</sup>

For what reason did Master Mozi, according to the author, urge his audience to care for others? What does the “this” (*ci* 此) of the conclusion refer to? It refers to his long interpretation arguing that someone who dedicates his life to the noble cause of ordering the world has to make a diagnosis of the political disease and subsequently suggest a remedy. Furthermore, the diagnosis, which consists of the first half of his argument (from 14:24/4 to 24/12), is the failure to care for each other (*xiang'ai* 相愛) because people only care for themselves (*zi'ai* 自愛); hence they benefit themselves to the detriment of others. The remedy, in the second half of the argument (from 14:24/14 to 24/19), is that people are made to<sup>33</sup> “care for each other inclusively” (*jian-xiang ai* 兼相愛), so that the causes of disorder are removed. According to the author, this is what the master meant when he encouraged his audience to “care for others”. The first step that chapter 14 makes towards what will eventually be known as “inclusive caring” (*jian'ai*) is to widen the scope of one’s care for oneself by including others in relations of reciprocity (*xiang* 相). *Jian* only enters in the second half of the chapter: at this point it is neither stressed nor explained, but broadens the scope from one’s familial or political in-group to include others.

This broadening of scope has implicitly started through the presentation of four analogous cases of the *diagnosis* of disorder. At the beginning the author does not seek to challenge traditional contemporaries, but rather to convince them, by showing that their rejection of certain types of selfish behavior logically ought to lead to a rejection of analogous cases of *zi'ai* 自愛. He thus first describes a situation in which there is a lack of respect on the side of the lower actors in dyadic and hierarchical relations: of a son versus his father, a younger versus an older brother, a minister versus his lord. Everyone, including the Confucians, would call these attitudes (further called “case 1”) “disorder” (*luan* 亂) and hence would reject them. In a second step, the reader is invited to reject equally three other instances of egoism, namely of the father, the older brother and the ruler in relation to, respectively, the son, younger brother and minister (further called “case 2”). Thus far, there is probably no major problem for most traditional contemporaries to share the Mohist concern. The third analogy contains the indisputably rejectable behaviour of thieves and murderers because they, respectively, only care for their own houses and their own persons (further called “case 3”). The fourth and last analogy condemns the top ministers and feudal lords, who, respectively, disorder and attack each other’s families and states out of concern with their own families and states (further called “case 4”). At this point, we have reached the problem of political disorder that the sage is eager to solve.

The reader is tempted to follow the author in his consecutive rejection of these seemingly analogous cases of *zi'ai*, up to the rejection of top ministers (*dafu* 大夫) and feudal lords (*zhuhou* 諸侯) who fight for their families and states. I strongly suspect that this last point is what the author wants to bring home: in the political remedy presented in the second part of chapter 14 as well as in the two following chapters, the order of these four types of causes is reversed and most attention is directed towards this fourth case of the diagnosis, namely the chaos generated

32 This may be a relatively late passage. I refrain from speculating about cause and effect between Mohist and Confucian ideas. See Yoshinaga, “Jian’ai shi shen,” 31, on *ren* as a non-familial duty.

33 *Shi* 使 in the sense of “order them to”, “make them” is a political initiative, which is further developed in chapters 15 and 16; in the sense of “suppose that” it is rather hypothetical thinking. It is also possible that a hypothesis was later interpreted as political initiative.

by ministers and feudal lords. Unfilial sons (case 1), unloving fathers (case 2), thieves and murderers (case 3) were mainly brought into the picture as commonly rejected egoists, just like, at least according to the Mohists, these powerful aristocrats. But this last analogy was probably a step that some contemporaries were not willing to take. Not that they favored war in itself, but they generally admired aristocratic knights as filial sons or loyal ministers for the honor and wealth that they acquired for their ancestors, parents and lords. A failure to do so was traditionally considered a threat to the cornerstone of morality, namely the family or clan. In this argument, however, the Mohist challenge forces more traditional contemporaries to show where the analogy breaks down: because they reject the selfish son, the unloving father and the thief as being *zì'ài* 自愛 and failing to *xiāng'ài* 相愛, why not the aristocratic ministers and feudal lords who engage in war? If unable to counter the last step of this reasoning, they are compelled to reject these aristocrats on the basis of their rejection of the three analogous cases.

In the second part of chapter 14, the *remedy* to the chaos caused by egoism is that we inclusively care for each other (*jiānxiāng ài*), not only in traditional hierarchic familial and political relationships (cases 1 and 2) but also more broadly in relation to strangers (case 3) and, most importantly, to other families and states (case 4). It is worth noticing that in the final summary of this remedy, the four cases are repeated in opposite order, with most attention given to the first two “egoists” of case 4: feudal lords and top ministers attacking and disordering each other’s states and families, respectively (14:24/18-19). This reversal is preserved throughout the two following chapters and reflects well the Mohist concern with political chaos. Thus, in his argument for reciprocity in these four cases, the Mohist also builds in an explicit plea for broadening one’s scope of care and concern: *jiān*. Precisely this aspect will be criticized by opponents and defended by the Mohists in the two following chapters. The opponents could have defended their aristocratic knights by tackling exactly the inherent ambiguity of this scope that the Mohists chose to overlook here: very often, namely, egoism (*zì'ài*) coincides with altruism (*ài ren*), whenever egoism is for the sake of a group of people, as the third case shows (a thief steals for the people of his own house, not just for himself). While obviously rejecting the behaviour of a thief, the traditional audience risks to also reject as egoism an attitude that he would, under other circumstances (namely those of case 4) consider altruism. Top ministers and feudal lords, who promote the benefit of their own states or families, are not only analogous with selfish sons but also with their opposites, namely respectful sons in relation to their family. The ambiguity of the scope of caring allows one to stress either one of the viewpoints.

In the *Mozì*, however, this line of defense is not to be found. The content of chapter 15 shows, in my view, that Mohism evolves away from traditional morality, by further widening its scope of concern and by insisting on beneficial acts. The double fact that, first, only chapter 14 really takes pains to incite traditional readers in its diagnosis of the political problems by initially giving priority to family virtues and, second, that the focus on top ministers and feudal lords in its second part is taken over by the two following chapters, seems to further support the chronological priority of chapter 14.

## 4. “Inclusively Caring for Each Other, Mutually Benefitting Each Other” (ch. 15)

Chapter 15 doubles chapter 14 in length: about one third consists of a summary of the argument of chapter 14, including both the diagnosis and the remedy; the remaining two thirds formulate a defence of the Mohist view in the face of two very similar expressions of criticisms. Only in that part of chapter 15 *jian* enters the debate as an independent concept for Mohists to defend in response to specific objections to the practicability of “inclusiveness”. The expression *jian'ai* is still not mentioned.

The summary not only briefly contains the views of chapter 14 but includes some differences. The two main differences are the addition of “benefit” and the growing scope of morality. First, the moral duty of “caring” in 14 is now divided into “caring and benefitting”. The author of 14 may have considered *ai* (caring) a matter of both feeling (“care for”) and consequently acting (“take care of”), the latter mainly amounting to a rather passive attitude of *not* disturbing or attacking others. This doubling of the moral duty in chapter 15 somewhat moves *ai* to the realm of emotions or attitudes and separately stresses the importance of beneficial acts. “Benefit” (*li* 利), which was exclusively related to egoism in the diagnosis of chapter 14, now positively joins the duty of “caring” in a moral tandem. Hence the insistent promotion throughout chapter 15 of the method (*fa* 法) of “Inclusively Caring for Each Other, Mutually Benefitting Each Other”.

The second major difference in the summary is the larger scope of one’s care and beneficial acts, although less in the case of benefitting than of caring. The double slogan of this chapter “inclusively care for each other and mutually benefit each other” seems to install a difference between a very broad scope of *ai* (*jianxiang ai* 兼相愛), as in the second part of chapter 14, and the mere reciprocity promoted for *li* (*jiaoxiang li* 交相利). The author’s concern is nevertheless broader and goes far beyond hierarchical relations in which reciprocity traditionally dominates.

天下之人皆不相愛，強必執弱，（眾必劫寡），富必侮貧，貴必敖賤，詐必欺愚。

If people in the world all fail to love each other, the strong will inevitably have power over the weak, (the many will inevitably force the few), the rich will inevitably insult the poor, the noble will inevitably be arrogant towards the vulgar, and the cunning will inevitably cheat the simple of mind. (15:25/6-7)<sup>34</sup>

Despite the recurring presence of *jian* in the expression *jianxiang ai*, the argument still largely runs in terms of *xiang'ai* not *jian*, but the latter is present in the wider scope including the weak, the poor, the vulgar and the simple of mind. They stand for those people with whom the aristocracy usually did not have a relationship of reciprocity.

Following the summary, the two objections of chapter 15 focus on the scope of morality, namely *jian*. For the first time, this term is discussed separately as a concept (inclusiveness), not just mentioned as an adverb within a longer expression (inclusively). The first objection is:

34 The text between square brackets is added by the CHANT editors. See also Watanabe, “Bokushi?” (1962), 8-9, on this new social dimension.

「然，乃若兼則善矣。雖然，天下之難物于故<sup>35</sup>也。」

Admitted, “inclusiveness” is good indeed. But it is, nevertheless, the most difficult thing in the world. (15:25/21)

The second objection is very similar: it also admits that inclusiveness is a worthy ideal, and equally finds it “something that cannot be put into practice” (*bu ke xing zhi wu ye* 不可行之物也) (15:26/14). Criticism of the Mohist view is remarkably mild: nobody rejects caring, nor reciprocity, not even the value of benefit. What critics object to is “inclusiveness”, more specifically because of its apparent difficulties in practice. This objection to *jian* will occur in four of the five objections in chapter 16.

According to the first response, the problem of these critics lies in a failure to understand:

天下之士君子，特不識其利、辯其故也。

The officer gentlemen of the world really don't understand their benefit, nor do they distinguish their motivation (or the causes of their actions). (15:25/22)

Such a failure can be helped by explaining, arguing and teaching, a duty which the author takes to heart. The misunderstanding of the critics consists of two major aspects: short-sightedness and self-contradiction in their motivation, at which the Mohist responses are consequently aimed.

As for the short-sightedness, the Mohists set out to show that reciprocity also exists at a broader scope than only within traditional and hierarchical relations, as there obviously is between fathers and sons, elder and younger brothers, ministers and lords.

夫愛人者，人必從而愛之；利人者，人必從而利之。惡人者，人必從而惡之；害人者，人必從而害之。此何難之有？特上弗以為政，士不以為行故也。

Well, one who cares for others will inevitably as a consequence be cared for by them; one who benefits others will inevitably as a consequence be benefited by them. One who hates others will inevitably as a consequence be hated by them; one who harms others will inevitably as a consequence be harmed by them. What is difficult about this? It is only that the superiors don't make their policy of it and that officers don't make their lifestyle of it. That's what it is. (15:25/24-25; 26/11-12)

The author thus assumes that a failure to see this broader reciprocity makes people reluctant or even incapable of doing good to those with whom they traditionally have no relation. Hence, these officer gentlemen find it very difficult to include strangers in their scope of caring. But if they recognized the benefit to be reaped from treating others well, they would certainly incorporate inclusiveness in their policies and in their behaviour.

The implicit contradiction in understanding their own motivation, secondly, lies in the fact that these gentlemen reject *jian* as too difficult or impracticable, while they are willing and able to do things that are much more difficult than that:

今若夫攻城野戰，殺身為名，此天下百姓之所皆難也。苟君說之，則士眾能為之。況於兼相愛、交相利，則與此異。

As for attacking a city and fighting in the fields, offering one's life for a reputation, these are things that people in the world consider difficult. But if the lord finds pleasure in them, then masses of

35 Following *Mozzi duben* 墨子讀本 (Taipei: San min, 1996), ed. Li Shenglong 李生龍 et al., 95, note 2 and *Mozzi jiaozhu* 墨子校注, 2 Vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1993), ed. Wu Yujiang 吳毓江 et al., I, 162, note 14.

knights/officers are able to do them. How much easier is it, compared to this, to care for each other inclusively and to benefit each other mutually! (15:25/22-24)

If capable of that, how much more should they be willing to “inclusively care for each other and mutually benefit each other”, an imperative that is both easier (at least not as life-threatening) and more beneficial (because of the inevitable reciprocity of one’s acts). The author refers to three stories that show how easy inclusiveness would be for subjects if only they understood the great benefits of this moral imperative.<sup>36</sup> The stories describe cases in which ministers starve themselves, dress shabbily or give their life for a reputation, simply because this is what their lord is pleased with. These examples of fights and attacks, also occurring in the fifth response of chapter 16, do not necessarily indicate a growing acceptance of warfare by Mohists,<sup>37</sup> but illustrate a contradiction in the aristocratic code of behaviour: in arguments, the officer gentlemen reject “inclusiveness” because of the difficulties in practising it, but in reality, they are very willing to undertake acts that are much more difficult, life-threatening and harmful. Such contradiction between words and deeds is explicitly denounced in the two first responses of the following chapter. The second Mohist response of chapter 15 mainly refers to the feats of three ancient model rulers, Yu, King Wen and King Wu, and their capability to “practice inclusiveness” (*xing jian* 行兼) (26/21, 26/24, 26/26). This response also almost verbatim occurs in the third response of chapter 16.

## 5. “Encouragement to be Inclusive” (ch. 16)

Chapter 16, “*Jian’ai xia*”, again doubles the previous chapter in length. The summary of the argument, also consisting of a diagnosis and remedy, now only occupies one fifth of the chapter, while the objections and their responses occupy almost four fifths. The two differences pointed out about the summary in chapter 15 – the positive reference to benefit and the wider scope – seem to be further developed here: the social concern has increased, and *jian* is being promoted from the beginning of chapter 16 as an independent value. The last sentence of chapter 14 suggested that the whole argument of “*Jian’ai shang*” might be an interpretation of Mozi’s encouragement (*quan* 勸) to care for others (*ai ren* 愛人). In chapter 16, the moral value of “caring” is being taken for granted, reciprocity (*jiao* 交 or *xiang* 相) is somewhat less dominant, and the focus lies on its scope, namely *jian*. Hence my tentative title for this chapter: “*Quan jian*” 勸兼, an expression that does not occur in the text. A total stranger to the debate, who reads only this chapter, might initially wonder in what respect one has to be inclusive. Certainly not in hate and harm! The argumentation seems to be based on the two previous chapters and assumes that we are talking about “caring”.

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36 While the first response highlights the behaviour of subjects, the second one refers to the lords and contains references to three sagely kings from antiquity who practiced *jian*: Yu benefitted people from all regions, barbarians included; King Wen helped the old, childless and widowed; and King Wu selected workers impartially, taking the blame upon himself whenever something went wrong. It is from their acts that we can now learn to practice *jian*. (15:26/21, 26/24, 26/25)

37 Pace T. Brooks, “MZ 14-16.”

The diagnosis is worse than in the previous chapters: chaos caused by attacking states and disordering families (case 4 in chapter 14) is on top of the harms of the world, as it was in chapter 15. They are immediately followed by situations in which the strong, many, cunning and noble, respectively, maltreat the weak, few, simple and vulgar. Only then are unloyal ministers, unloving fathers and unfilial sons (a selection of cases 1 and 2 in chapter 14) mentioned. And finally instances are added where common people harm and hurt each other in various ways. The cause of all this misery is the opposite of *jian*, namely *bie* 別: “exclusion” or “exclusiveness”,<sup>38</sup> which is said to be wrong (*bie fei ye* 別非也). The remedy is *jian*, the central topic of this chapter. In the argument below, “caring” or “benefitting” are not explicitly mentioned:

是故子墨子曰：兼以易別。然即兼之可以易別之故何也？曰：藉為人之國若為其國，夫誰獨舉其國以攻人之國者哉？為彼者由<sup>39</sup>為己也。

Thus, master Mozi says: With “inclusiveness” replace “exclusiveness”. But how can “inclusiveness” replace “exclusiveness”? Well, assume that people are for someone else’s state as they are for their own state, who would then mobilize his own state to attack someone else’s state? They would be for the others as they are for themselves. (16:27/14-16)<sup>40</sup>

If, thanks to the ideal of “inclusiveness”, people cared for others as for themselves, one would have to conclude that this would amount to benefit for the world (*ji bi yue tianxia zhi li ye* 即必曰天下之利也 16:27/18). More specifically, elderly widowers without sons would be supported in their old age and orphans would be provided for in order to grow up (16:27/24-25).<sup>41</sup> It seems that in a gradual evolution from chapter 14 to 16, the Mohists expect a moral concern for others, not just in traditional relations, not just in reciprocal connections, but with all those who need help.

The major part of this chapter (almost 4/5) consists of five objections and responses. The content of the objections and the order of their appearance strongly suggest that they do not reflect a continuous reasoning, but were later collected on the basis of existing fragments.<sup>42</sup> Four objections (1, 2, 3, and 5) largely resemble those of the previous chapter. They are remarkably positive towards the Mohist project: they find it good (*shan* 善), humane (*ren* 仁) and right (*yi* 義) – the first appearance of *yi* 義 in the triad! – but they mainly doubt its practicability. The two first Mohist responses are new: they consist of thought experiments, respectively about officers (*shi* 士) and lords (*jun* 君) who, in words and deeds, stand for *bie* or for *jian*. The author argues that everybody without exception would, in fact, prefer to deal with an “inclusive” officer or lord, even if, in theory, one rejects the value of *jian*.

38 It is used as an adverb in the expression *biexiang wu* 別相惡 in chapter 26. Schumacher, “An Outline”, 18, points out that in chapters 27 and 28, *bie* is an independent concept opposite to *jian*.

39 Read 猶 (*you*) as in the two following parallel lines.

40 This passage is followed in 27/16-17 by the same reasoning, first concerning for one’s city (*du* 都) and then concerning one’s family (*jia* 家).

41 This is also said about the second model ruler in the second response of 15:26/22.

42 The first and second responses go together, respectively arguing about the “officer” (*shi* 士) and the “lord” (*jun* 君). This separation was implicitly present in chapter 15 in the sense that its first response refers to narratives about officers and its second response to models of rulers. The third and fifth responses in ch. 16 are inspired by, respectively, the second and first responses of ch. 15. Only the fourth objection makes a further point.

我以為當其於此也，天下無愚夫愚婦：雖非兼之人，必寄託之於兼之有是也。此言而非兼，擇即取兼，即此言行費<sup>43</sup>也。不識天下之士，所以皆聞兼而非之者，其故何也？

I believe that facing this (choice), there are no stupid men or women in the world: even those who reject inclusiveness would certainly depend on the one who considers inclusiveness right. This is to reject inclusiveness in words but to select it in one's choices, which is a contradiction between words and deeds. I really don't understand why the officers of the world reject inclusiveness once they have all learned about it. (16:28/8-10)<sup>44</sup>

This is how the two first responses end, respectively, concerning the best officer (response 1) and lord (response 2). The focus is *jian*. The concept of *ai* is replaced in both hypothetical cases by acts that are supposed to be “caring”: feeding the hungry, clothing the cold, supporting the sick and burying the dead. (16:27/31-28/1, 28/3-4, 28/15-16, 28/18) The argument, moreover, illustrates well the further intellectual evolution of Mohism: while self-contradiction was implicitly criticized in the responses of chapter 15, it has now become the major argument. By indicating the contradiction between words and deeds, the author considers the objection refuted and goes to the next objection.

The slogan from chapter 15 – *jianxiang ai, jiaoxiang li* – appears in the response to the third objection. This response, together with the fifth, closely resembles the two of the previous chapter, although they are argued more profusely.<sup>45</sup> The third response (like the second in chapter 15) promotes the Mohist interpretation of *jian* through reference to ancient sages and kings, but now explicitly supported by quotes from respectable sources: the “Taishi” (Grand Oath),<sup>46</sup> “Yushi” (Oath of Yu),<sup>47</sup> “Tangshuo” (Declaration of Tang),<sup>48</sup> and “Zhoushi” (Odes of Zhou).<sup>49</sup> It is here that the sole expression *jian'ai* of the whole triad appears. The fifth response contains the three narratives (of the first response in chapter 15) in which subjects proved to be able and willing to do much more difficult feats than what the Mohists ask, as long as this pleases their lord. Like in chapter 15, the contradiction between their willingness to offer their life and their rejection of inclusiveness as something too difficult, is implicitly present but not further elaborated upon.

The most interesting objection of chapter 16 is the fourth, because it takes the argument a step further by showing the complexities of an ever increasing scope of caring: it is not mere egoism combined with a failure to recognize reciprocity on a large scale that prevents the critics from doing well to strangers, but the care that they owe to their own parents above all. Only the critics of the fourth objection explicitly worry about the practice of filiality:

43 Read in the sense of *fu* 拂 (go against). See *Mozǐ duben*, 104, note 8, and *Mozǐ jiaozhu*, I, 185, note 43.

44 See also 16:28/21-23.

45 The third response in ch. 16 further elaborates (using more quotes from classic sources) on the second response in ch. 15. The fifth response in ch. 16 largely copies the three narratives (in different order) of the first response in ch. 15.

46 This passage does not occur in the current “Taishi” in the *Shu*.

47 This title does not occur in the current *Shu*, but a similar passage occurs in “Da Yu mo”. See *The Chinese Classics*, trans. James Legge, Vol. III (*Shu*) and IV (*Shi*) (Taipei: SMC Publishing inc., 1991/1994), III, 64-65.

48 This passage does not occur in the current *Shu*, but the last lines contain similarities with “Tanggao”, see *The Chinese Classics*, III, 189-90.

49 This passage does not occur in the current *Shi*, but the two first lines occur in the *Shu*, “Hongfan”. See *The Chinese Classics*, III, 331.

「意不忠親之利而害為孝乎？」<sup>50</sup>

Should we perhaps abandon our parents' benefit and harm the practice of filiality? (16:29/17)

Their question resonates with more traditional or Confucian concerns that the larger scope may endanger the small one. Chapter 14 had started from a need for reciprocal caring within the traditional hierarchy and only then broadened the scope, mainly asking people to refrain from harmful acts; but chapter 16 clearly demands active care for widows and orphans, the hungry, the cold, the sick and even the dead. How can one take care of one's parents as a filial son when all these other – sometimes even opposite – duties are claiming moral priority? To offer one's life for a reputation is not just a failure to understand one's own benefit, but also an act of respect and care for one's parents and ancestors. Reference to the reputation to be won in the battle is one way in which the aristocrats defend the drive of their knights to engage in war.<sup>51</sup> Thus, what looks like “harm to others” (strangers) from one viewpoint can be “benefit for others” (within one's family) from another viewpoint. To fight another family is thus not unambiguously a harmful act, as the Mohists want us to believe. Or, to put it in terms of the diagnosis in chapter 14, the knight who fights another family for the reputation of his own family, is not analogous with the unfilial son in case 1 but, on the contrary, with a filial son.

The response of the Mohists to this objection is that moral acts in the largest scope will inevitably be rewarded in the smaller scope, not just to oneself (as was the case in chapter 15). Since a filial son obviously also wants other people to be good to his parents, he must be good to their parents and not harm them. Thus, serving one's own parents ultimately amounts to caring for all other parents inclusively. This is how truly filial sons reason:

若我先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親乎？意我先從事乎惡賊人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親乎？即必吾先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親也。

Will others reward me by taking care of and benefitting my parents if I first work at taking care of and benefitting their parents? Or will they reward me by taking care of and benefitting my parents if I first work at hating and hurting their parents? Certainly they will reward me by taking care of and benefitting my parents if I first work at taking care of and benefitting their parents. (16:29/19-21)

This reasoning is not only a clear instance of common sense, according to the author, but can also be founded on ancient sources that celebrate the functioning of rewards or compensation (*bao* 報).<sup>52</sup> An ode of the “Great Hymns” makes exactly this point:

『無言而不讎，無德而不報。  
投我以桃，報之以李。』  
即此言愛人者必見愛也而惡人者必見惡也。

“Every word gets its answer. Every good deed has its recompense.

You throw a peach to me, I'll reward you with a plum.”<sup>53</sup>

This is saying that the one who cares for others will inevitable be cared for, and who hates others will inevitably be hated.

50 Replacing the character 忠 by 中, meaning “fit, accord with”. See *Mozǐ jiaozhu*, I, 194, note 104.

51 See e.g. *Mozǐ*, “Fei gong” 非攻 (Against Aggression), 19:33/26-27.

52 On the concept of *bao*, see Yang Lien-sheng, “The Concept of Pao as a Basis for Social Relations in China,” in *Social Thought and Institutions*, ed. John Fairbank (Chicago: Univ of Chicago, 1957), 291-309.

53 These are two separate lines in Yi 抑, Mao 256. See *The Chinese Classics*, IV, 514-515.

As for the scope of “caring”, we see that the value of reciprocity (*xiang*) that was prominent in chapter 14 is slowly replaced by inclusiveness (*jian*) from the middle of chapter 15, and most explicitly in chapter 16. Reciprocity is still present, if not as a traditional moral value, at least as an argument: those who are not short-sighted realize that being good for others will involve compensation for themselves and for their loved ones. But this intellectual insight does not really temper the opposition between the traditional duty of reciprocity and the new demand for inclusive caring. A new foundation will be found in later triad chapters.

## 6. *Jian'ai*

What was the steering force behind the above traced evolution of *jian* in these three and other core chapters of the *Mozzi*? One could imagine that Mohist thought evolved as a consequence of various types of criticism, by gradually accommodating to the critics. As noted above, Ding Weixiang reads in the three “*Jian'ai*” chapters an evolution of accommodation and watering down of an originally quite radical doctrine. Yoshinaga Shinjirō traces an evolution from a moral vision in chapter 14 towards an increasingly political and utilitarian stance in chapter 16.<sup>54</sup> Taeko Brooks also identifies a growing court prominence of the Mohists and consequently a gradual acceptance of war.<sup>55</sup> If we focus on those objections that were quoted in the triad – admittedly perhaps only an unrepresentative portion of the actual critical voices – we can detect a minor and a major trend.

The minor and most critical trend is represented by the fourth objection in chapter 16, which concerns the duty of “filiality” or “care for one’s parents” (*xiao* 孝). Since a filial son must reciprocate the care of his parents, he cannot treat them just as others to whom he owes nothing. Even a theoretical understanding of the reciprocity that rules the larger scope of one’s relations cannot undo the priority of this filial duty. The growing scope of *jian* that I have tried to describe is certainly not an accommodation to this objection. There are other records of attempts to counter the criticism of traditionalists by nuancing the Mohist view. Such compromises between the broad scope of *jian* and the traditional priority of the familial scope, as found in *Mozzi* 44 and *Mencius* 3A5,<sup>56</sup> are more subtle and mature than the response in chapter 16, which promises certain benefit for the parents of one who first benefits the parents of others. There are no indications of accommodation to traditional views as a response to this or other objections, although the authors are indeed remarkably respectful of traditional values and hierarchical roles throughout the three chapters: not only in the beginning of chapter 14, as a possible *captatio benevolentiae* of the audience, but also at the end of chapter 16, where “inclusiveness” is ascribed to the gentleman (*junzi* 君子) who works hard at being a wise ruler, a loyal minister, a loving father, a caring son, a friendly elder brother or a brotherly younger brother, depending on his social role. (16:30/7-9) Perhaps the Mohist departure from the

54 Yoshinaga, “*Jian'ai* shi shenme,” 31-34.

55 See T. Brooks, “MZ 14-16.”

56 The compromise in the Mohist Canon and *Mencius* 3A5 amounts to a division of labour between one’s feeling of caring for everybody and the concrete implementation that starts from one’s own relatives. For the Mohist Canon, see A.C. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University, 1978), 249-50). For *Mencius*, see David S. Nivison, “Two Roots or One?,” *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association*, 53.6 (1980) 739-762, 740-47, and Kwong-loi Shun, “*Mencius*’ criticism of Mohism: an analysis of Meng T’zu 3A:5” *Philosophy East and West*, 41.2 (1991) 203-214.

tradition only began in this early triad and is mirrored in their sequence. Its thought has not yet reached the point of accommodation but instead follows its inherent logic of demanding more equality and social concern.

The major and milder trend of all other recorded objections in chapters 15 and 16 is a combination of approval and doubt concerning the practicability of something as difficult as *jian*. This criticism of Mohism is also echoed in other sources.<sup>57</sup> Again, the response is not a bit accommodating: first, the authors point out that aristocrats are capable of much more difficult feats if they are really motivated; and second, they quote authoritative sources concerning model rulers who were all examples of *jian* and inspirations for Mozi. It is in such a context that the expression *jian'ai* occurs for the first time, namely in chapter 16, the response to the third objection.

《泰誓》曰：『文王若日月乍照光于四方于西土。』

即此言文王之兼愛天下之博大也，譬之日月兼照天下之無有私也，即此文王兼也。雖子墨子之所謂兼者，於文王取法焉。

The “Grand Oath” says: “King Wen was like sun and moon, spreading and shining his light over the four quarters and the Western region.”

This says that King Wen’s inclusive caring for the world was broad and great. He is being compared to how sun and moon are impartial in their shining over the world. This is the inclusiveness of King Wen. Even what Master Mozi called “inclusive” was taken from the example of King Wen (16:29/1-3)<sup>58</sup>

The model of *jian'ai* is an exemplary ruler who cares for the world unbiasedly. He is compared to heavenly bodies, such as sun and moon. The emergence of this model marks a further growth in the scope of *jian*, which does not result from a compromise with objections but, on the contrary, follows an inherent and radicalizing urge within Mohist thought. The ideal of *jian'ai* in this passage and in some other triad chapters is one in which reciprocity is further stretched and adapted, perhaps to the point of being abandoned: like Heaven, the sage is able to care for others “inclusively”, “impartially” or even “universally” without expecting any reward. The gradual appearance of exemplary rulers over *tianxia* (all-under-Heaven) and their description in heavenly terms indicate this further growth of the concept of *jian*.

In order to trace this evolution further in the core chapters,<sup>59</sup> we have to turn to the somewhat later<sup>60</sup> triad on Heaven’s intent, “Tianzhi” 天志. Chapters 26, 27 and 28 share ideas about the scope of caring and benefitting with the “Jian'ai” triad using expressions such as *jianxiang ai jiaoxiang li* 兼相愛交相利 (the slogan of chapter 15), “inclusively care for everybody in the world” (*jian tianxia er ai zhi* 兼天下而愛之), the independent concepts *jian* 兼 and *bie* 別, and even the expression *jian'ai*, which occurs no less than four times in chapter 28.<sup>61</sup>

57 See e.g. *Zhuangzi* 33 and *Shiji* 130.

58 This does not occur in the current “Taishi” chapter of the *Shu*. The same description of King Wen occurs in chapter 15 (26/21), but without quoting any source and without any interpretation in terms of *jian'ai*. But there occurs the sole reference to Heaven’s support in the whole “Jian'ai” triad.

59 All other (and later) *Mozi* chapters than the core-chapters are beyond the limits of this paper. Chapters 4 and 35 speak of *jianxiang ai, jiaoxiang li* 兼相愛, 交相利 in similar terms.

60 According to Brooks, chapter 26 is partly temporary with ch. 15 (ca. -340); chapters 27 (-300) and 28 (-290) are slightly later. See Brooks, “WSWG Theory Summary.” According to Watanabe, “Bokushi” (1962), 27-31, the whole triad (26, 28, 27) is much later (end -3th c.). There is also disagreement on the order of the two last chapters of the triad, but agreement on the priority of chapter 26.

61 They have other passages in common with the “Jian'ai” triad.

The passages in this triad about caring and benefitting further illustrate the growing scope of *jian* in two ways, both related to the idea of reciprocity. First, they install a reciprocity between Heaven and *all* human beings, as a new way to motivate the inclusion of strangers in one's scope of caring. Second, they further radicalize their moral stance to the extent that reciprocity becomes a duty towards Heaven rather than something to be expected from others. These two complementary trends are present in the “Tianzhi” triad.

In this triad, the obligation of “inclusive caring” is for the first time identified as the will of Heaven (*tian zhi yi* 天之意), and as doing what is “right” (*yi* 義):

今天下之士君子之欲為義者，則不可不順天之意矣。

曰：順天之意何若？

曰：兼愛天下之人。

As for the officer gentlemen of the world who want to do what is right, they must follow the will of Heaven.

But what is the will of Heaven?

It is to inclusively care for everybody in the world. (28:48/4)<sup>62</sup>

We know that Heaven inclusively cares for everyone in the world because it has in all times and all regions accepted offerings from all peoples, including the barbarians. The offerings by men to Heaven seem to initiate a general relation of reciprocity and cause Heaven's positive response to everybody:

苟兼而食焉，必兼而愛之。譬之若楚越之君，今是楚王食於楚之四境之內，故愛楚之人；越王食於越之四境之內，故愛越之人。今天兼天下而食焉，我以此知其兼愛天下之人也。

If it inclusively accepts food from them, it must inclusively care for them. Compare it to the lords of Chu and Yue. Since now this king of Chu is fed by all those in the territory of Chu, he takes care of the people of Chu; since the king of Yue is fed by all those in the territory of Yue, he takes care of the people of Yue. Well, since Heaven is being fed by everybody inclusively, I know that it takes care of everyone in the world inclusively. (28:48/7-9)<sup>63</sup>

Another indication of Heaven's caring for everybody is the fact that it punishes anyone hurting others and that it rewards those who are good for others. The best proof is:

故昔也三代之聖王堯、舜、禹、湯、文、武之兼愛天下也，從而利之

the inclusive caring for and consequently benefitting of the world by the sage kings of antiquity, Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen and Wu.

62 See also 28:48/23: “to follow the will of Heaven is “inclusiveness”; to go against the will of Heaven is “exclusiveness”. If “inclusiveness” determines the Way, it is government through justice. If “exclusiveness” determines the Way, it is government by force.” (順天之意者，兼也。反天之意者，別也。兼之為道也，義正。別之為道也，力正).

63 Because *jianxiang ai*, *jiaoxiang li* is now being paired by *biexiang wu*, *jiaoxiang zhi*, with both *jian* 兼 and *bie* 別 used adjectively, Schumacher, “An Outline,” 19, 21, believes that chapter 26 preceeds chapter 16, where both characters stand for independent and central concepts, namely “inclusiveness” (which is being promoted) and “exclusiveness” (which is being rejected). It is also possible that the two opposite concepts were already established when chapter 26 was written. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why the author wrote *bie(xiang) wu* 別(相)惡 (exclusively hate each other) instead of *jian(xiang) wu* 兼(相)惡 (inclusively hate each other), which grammatically makes more sense (as in 4:5/2). It seems that the concept of *jian* was considered as something invariably good, and hence not usable as an adverb of the verb “hate”. Since *bie* was rejected as the opposite of *jian* it is here used in connection with hate.

As they cared for those that Heaven cared for and also benefited them, they were rewarded by Heaven and became known as “sagely kings”. But punishments came down on violent kings such as Jie, Zhou, You and Li, who hated the world and harmed it against the will of Heaven. (28:48/10-21)

Heaven is thus promoted as the foundation of *jian'ai*: whether by accepting offerings or by compensating human actions, *tian* meaningfully relates to humans. The promise of a broad type of reciprocity that was formulated as a response in the “Jian'ai” triad is now being strengthened or replaced by the promise of a reward to be expected from a communicative Heaven,<sup>64</sup> an idea that is almost totally absent from the “Jian'ai” triad.<sup>65</sup> The idea of a responding Heaven, inspired by ancient textual references to such a Heaven<sup>66</sup> and expanded to all human beings, may have seemed a more reliable and respected foundation for the Mohist moral principle.

The same argument is developed in chapters 26<sup>67</sup> and 27,<sup>68</sup> but in the latter with explicit reference to “repay” or “compensate” (*bao* 報) and elaborating on the second characteristic of the enlarged scope of *jian*. Heaven is portrayed as such an endless source of bounty and welfare that human beings should try to repay at least a minor fraction of it: it orders sun, moon and stars, regulates the seasons, sends frost, rain and dew, grows grain and silk, provides us with hills and rivers, gathers metal and wood, bestows us with birds and beasts, and so on. Hence, the motivating force of reciprocity does not only lie in its promise of punishment or reward, but also in its inducement of duty towards such an enormous gift.

今天夫兼天下而愛之，撒遂萬物以利之，若豪之末，末非天之所為也，而民得而利之，則可謂后矣。然獨無報夫天，而不知其為不仁不祥也。此吾所謂君子明細而不明大也。

As for Heaven, it cares for everything in the world inclusively, quickly ripens all things to benefit them. Since even the tip of an autumn hair is made by Heaven, and people get to benefit from it, it can be said to be really substantial. Why then do they not compensate Heaven, and do they not realize how bad and disastrous they are. This is why I say that the gentlemen understand things on a small scale but not on a large scale. (27:45/17-19)

The author again resorts to an analogical reasoning starting from generally accepted social virtues to make his point: If a son, a brother or a minister behaves badly towards his superior and benefactor, we do not hesitate to criticize him. Why then, do the gentlemen fail to respond appropriately towards their most obvious benefactor? If a son did not repay his loving

64 In chapter 26, there is a unique passage in which the will of Heaven is twice literally quoted (故天意曰) about those sagely kings who also cared for those people that Heaven cared for, and about those violent kings who did not.

65 The sole reference in the “Jian'ai” triad to Heaven is in chapter 15 in relation to King Wen, who is compared to sun and moon (15:26/22), as he is in the Ode in chapter 16 quoted above.

66 About the image of Heaven in the *Shi* and *Shu*, see Nicolas Standaert, *The Fascinating God: A Challenge to Modern Chinese Theology Presented by a Text on the Name of God Written by a 17th Century Chinese Student of Theology*, Inculturation. Working Papers on Living Faith and Cultures 17 (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1995).

67 The same argument is developed in 26:43/7-12, where it is said that “whoever follows the will of Heaven inclusively cares for each other and mutually benefits each other, and inevitably will be rewarded” (順天意者，兼相愛、交相利，必得賞) as opposed to those who “go against the will of Heaven, exclusively hate each other and mutually hurt each other and inevitably will be punished” (反天意者，別相惡、交相賊，必得罰).

68 See also 27:45/16-46/25.

father who spent all his energy benefitting this son, we would be utterly shocked. Why then do we accept this ungrateful behaviour towards Heaven that has been going on since antiquity? (27:45/25-29)

The expression *jian'ai* occurs more frequently in other sources than the *Mozzi*<sup>69</sup> and in other Mohist chapters<sup>70</sup> than the triad named after it. In this analysis of the idea of *jian'ai* I have tried to avoid later influences: not only the other sources that often use *jian'ai* as a, often somewhat pejorative, label for Mohist thought, but also the titles of the triad. On the basis of the expression *jian'ai* in the core chapters (one in chapter 16 and four in chapter 28), I have highlighted related arguments about “caring” (*ai* 愛) and “benefitting” (*li* 利), “hating” (*wu* 惡), “hurting” (*tsai* 賊) and “harming” (*hai* 害), “oneself” (*zi* 自) or “each other” (*xiang* 相, *jiao* 交), “inclusively” (*jian* 兼) and “exclusively” (*bie* 別). This analysis shows an evolution from “caring for oneself”, via “caring for each other” towards an unconditional type of caring for anybody else. The center of the debate is not caring but its scope and, more specifically, the changing nature and value of reciprocity. Since the traditional type of reciprocity (of chapter 14) is a burden for the new focus on *jian*, it is gradually replaced by a reciprocity among non-kin (in chapters 15 and 16) and ultimately with Heaven. The last step not only motivates a wide moral concern for others, but also further radicalizes it, since Heaven not only responds to humans but also expects response from them in the form of “inclusively caring” for others. In its relation to man, Heaven is thus a model of supreme goodness, both unrewarded since it does not want anything for itself, and also ultimately unrewardable, considering the sheer size of its bounty. Those who were sensitive to the obligations that their relation with Heaven brought about, were constantly driven by a duty to compensate Heaven for at least a fraction of its goodness, indeed a heavy and impossible task for humans to fulfill. This early Mohist ideal emerged in the first “*Jian'ai*” chapter, evolved through the triad and concluded with a foundation in Heaven, as far as the core chapters are concerned. From this viewpoint, early Mohism has to be seen as an ever radicalizing force, despite various objections, and not an evolution towards compromise or accommodation.

69 Briefly: *Mengzi*, “*Jinxia*” and “*Teng Wengong, xia*”, oppose it to the egoist, Yang Zhu. In *Huainanzi*, “*Fanlun*”, Yang Zhu is opposed to the Mohist *jian'ai*. In *Zhuangzi*, “*Tiandao*”, “*Daozhi*” and indirectly in “*Tianxia*”, which mentions the difficulty of *jian'ai*, so that one cannot *ai ren* and *ai ji*. *Xunzi* “*Chengxiang*” is positive about *jian'ai*. See also *Hanfeizi* 49 and *Guanzi* 4, 7, 65 and 66.

70 The other occurrences of the expression in the *Mozzi* (besides once in chapter 16 and 4 times in chapter 28) are once in chapter 49 (mentioned in part 1), twice in chapter 44 and twice in a dialogue chapter 46 (generally considered relatively late).

## Appendix: Scheme of the argument (with working titles)

[Mozi, ch. 14] “Xiang’ai” 相愛 “Caring for Each Other”	[Mozi, ch. 15] “Jianxiang ai, jiaoxiang li” 兼相愛，交相利 “Inclusively Caring For Each Other, Mutually Benefitting Each Other”	[Mozi, ch. 16] “Quan jian” 勸兼 “Encouragement to be Inclusive”
<p>Medical analogy 譬之如...</p> <p>I: diagnosis: 不相愛 – 1 子，弟，臣 – 2 父，兄，君 – 3 盜，賊 – 4 大夫，諸侯</p> <p>II: remedy: 兼相愛 – 1, 2, 3, 4 – summarized: 4 4, 3, 1+2</p> <p>Conclusion: Mozi: 勸愛人</p>	<p>Introduction</p> <p>I: diagnosis + remedy – Harm in the world: 4 4, 3, 1 + 2 – Its cause 不相愛: 4 4, 3 – 4 4, 3, 1 + 2 and more – Remedy 兼相愛，交相利: 4 4, 3 – 4 4, 3, 1+2, and more</p> <p>II: first objection: 兼 is 善 but 難 Response: – A: self-contradiction in understanding motivation of one’s acts (辯故) – B: failure to understand benefit in large scope (識利) – A: narratives of officers —— 惡衣 —— 少食 —— 殺身為名 – B repeated</p> <p>III: second objection: 兼 is 善 but 不可行 Response: – against Taishan analogy – model rulers were 兼 —— 禹 —— 文王 —— 武王(+ 專)</p> <p>Conclusion: 兼相愛，交相利</p>	<p>Introduction</p> <p>I: diagnosis + remedy – Harm in the world: 4 4, 3 and more, 1+2, 3 – Its cause: 別 – Remedy: 兼 4? 4 – From remedy to result: ... and much more</p> <p>II: first objection: 兼 is 善 but 可用? Response: – in 行 we all prefer 兼士 not 別士, but in 言 some reject 兼.</p> <p>III: second objection: OK, but for 君? Response: – in 行 we all prefer 兼君 not 別君, but in 言 some reject 兼.</p> <p>IV: third objection: 兼 is 仁 and 義 but 可為哉? Response: – against Taishan analogy – model rulers were 兼 —— 文王 (+ 泰誓) —— 禹 (+ 禹誓) —— 湯 (+ 湯說) —— 文武 (+ 周詩)</p> <p>V: fourth objection: 孝 Response: – benefit in large scope for small scope (+ 大雅 : 報)</p> <p>VI: fifth objection: 難 Response: self-contradiction —— 少食 —— 焚身 —— 直服</p> <p>Conclusion: 兼者聖王之道也</p>