A Question of Hairdos and Fashion

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In December 1666, Kong Yuanyang 孔元章, a garrison commander (zongbing 總兵) in Jiangnan, memorialized the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). He requested imperial authority to travel to Taiwan and meet with Zheng Jing 鄭經 (1642–1681), leader of the last major anti-Qing resistance organization. Zheng officially pledged loyalty to the fallen Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) on the island, while directing a commercial empire that dominated the maritime Asian trading lanes. Kong’s memorial initiated two rounds of negotiations between the envoys of both sides, who attempted to reach a political settlement to a bitter conflict that had engulfed coastal southeastern China for almost a quarter of a century. However, the talks, which lasted from 1667 to 1669, broke down chiefly due to the issue of hairdos and dress. This seemingly innocuous dispute encapsulated an explosive divide over “Chineseness,” as defined by the Qing, the Zheng regime, and Taiwan, which both sides agreed lay outside the cultural and geographic boundaries of “China.” The Qing viewed Zheng Jing and his men as untransformed internal rebels, who had to show their loyalty as subjects to the new dynasty by wearing Manchu-style riding jackets and shaving their heads. For Zheng, the preservation of their Han Chinese long hair and topknots and flowing robes amounted to a last-ditch defense of “civilization” from “barbarians,” whose redefinition of fashion not only signified dynastic change, but also the desecration of their very identity. His exile on a “foreign” island meant that such ethnic and cultural symbols, bolstered by Confucian morality, became even more critical to his regime’s legitimacy.

The origins of this conflict can be traced to the mid-seventeenth century, when Jing’s organization began as a massive illicit enterprise engaged in smuggling and piracy under his grandfather, Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍 (c. 1604–1662), to evade Ming restrictions on overseas trade.1 The Ming managed to secure the sea baron’s surrender in 1628 and coopt him into its governing structure, but the dynasty fell in 1644 to the Manchus, who imprisoned Zhilong and later executed him.2 In 1646, his son, Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (1624–1662), inherited the business empire and, from the ports of Xiamen and Jinmen in Fujian, took command of the


2 In 1645, Zheng Zhilong, who was supporting a Ming loyalist regime based in Fujian at the time, surrendered to the Qing in exchange for a promised fiefdom in southeastern China despite the objection of his son and other relatives. Since he failed to deliver his entire network into the hands of the Manchus, they hauled him off to Beijing, where he was imprisoned until the court ordered his execution in 1662. See Wong, “Security and Warfare,” 131–134, and Wills, “Maritime China,” 227.
anti-Qing resistance movement in southeastern China. However, a series of devastating reversals at the hands of the Qing during the next decade, including his disastrous offensive on Nanjing in 1658, forced him to look for a more reliable base outside the Mainland. In 1661, he invaded and occupied the Dutch colony of Taiwan, only to pass away there just months later.3

Zheng Jing inherited the regime after a bitter succession struggle that resulted in mass defections and the loss of his last Mainland territories of Xiamen and Jinmen in 1664 at the hands of a Qing-Dutch alliance. For the next ten years, he focused on opening and developing Taiwan, until the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories brought about his return to the Mainland. His disastrous involvement in this war ruined his regime, and, shortly after being driven back to the island in 1680, Zheng Jing died. Three years later, the Qing navy smashed his son’s fleets in the Taiwan Strait, and forced him to surrender, resulting in Taiwan’s incorporation into the empire.4

Although the Zheng regime and the Qing engaged in a violent struggle for domination of the maritime region for almost four decades, the two sides never ruled out a peaceful resolution to their conflict, entering into negotiations on at least seventeen documented occasions. My paper focuses upon the talks that occurred from 1667 to 1669, during Zheng Jing’s ten years on the island. I argue that, in this period, both sides proposed and seriously considered different political settlements, and were willing to give generous concessions to institutionalize their relationship. The Qing wanted to make Zheng Jing an inner vassal, initially ordering him to leave Taiwan in exchange for land and titles on the southeastern Chinese coast, but later allowing him to keep the island as a hereditary fiefdom. However, as a subject directly under imperial rule, he had to conform to Qing institutions and shave his hair to show his loyalty and submission. Zheng, on the other hand, proposed an alliance of equal states, before modifying his stance toward a tributary relationship along the lines of Korea. In both scenarios, he hoped to keep his internal autonomy, especially over fashion, intact, the only difference involving the recognition of the Qing emperor as his suzerain.

For Zheng, negotiations formed part of a larger effort to divorce “Chineseness” as cultural construct from its traditional geographic confines. After losing his final Mainland outposts, he began to give up Ming restoration in favor of a new conception for his regime. He instead tried to naturalize Han customs, especially hair and clothing, to a “foreign” island, and justify them according to Confucian morality, while relegating physical “China” to abstract historical memory. The paramount importance placed upon ethnicity resulted from the Qing order in 1645 for all Han subjects to shave their heads and change their dress, a move that amounted to a major redefinition of “civilized” values, and many fiercely resisted as their desecration. The Qing, on the other hand, saw the refusal of Zheng and his followers to adopt the Manchu queue as a sign of rebellion from potential subjects so close to its altered form of “Chineseess” that their very presence posed a threat to its legitimacy. Negotiations became a means of persuading the Zheng regime to surrender due to the absence of a credible naval force to match its military superiority on the high seas, and the lack of motivation to build a fleet from scratch due to the “foreign” and peripheral position of Taiwan.


4 A survey of the Zheng regime’s final years can be found in Wong, “Security and Warfare,” 149–185.
Background and Conceptualization of the Negotiations

A detailed analysis of the Zheng-Qing negotiations as a whole remains scant in academic literature, even in Chinese, due to the gradually acquired reputation of Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Jing during the Qing as Confucian paragons of unwavering loyalty to a fallen dynasty. These qualities, in turn, became appropriated and modified to serve the narrative of the modern nation-state, whether Taiwan, as either the Republic of China or a country in its own right, or the People’s Republic on the Mainland.5 The inconceivable fact that such steadfast heroes could choose to seek a permanent settlement with their avowed nemesis was thus conveniently ignored. The few scholars who study the talks still mostly shape the confusing and contradictory events according to various national agendas, and tend to exclude from their coverage the period of Zheng Jing’s rule, when both sides made decisions most incompatible with the modern narratives.6

Zhuang Jinde’s article, published in 1961 on Taiwan under Nationalist one-party rule, was among the few that studied the later talks.7 He argues that Zheng Jing, like his father, remained uncompromising in his Ming loyalism, and negotiated only because the Qing always took the initiative and forced him into the talks.8 Zhuang does not adequately explain conflicting evidence, such as Zheng’s claim, made on multiple occasions, that “Taiwan … is outside … the Middle Kingdom,” and his requests to become a Qing tributary.9 Zhuang glossed over the island’s status in just one sentence, claiming that Zheng “referred to the Qing Dynasty at the time.”10 He also dismissed the tributary request by pointing to Jing’s later participation in the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories as evidence that he had planned all along to restore the Ming, and merely used the talks to buy time for preparation.11 His narrative conforms to the Nationalist government’s own agenda, from the 1950s to 1970s, of recovering the Mainland from the Communists.

Even after the end of authoritarianism, however, very few works in Taiwan offer a serious reassessment of this position. The most recent and comprehensive study by Chen Jiexian 陳建新

5 For a general overview of how the myth of the Zhengs became created and perpetuated until modern times, refer to Ralph C. Croizier, Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth, and the Hero (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1977) and Jiang Renjie 江人傑, Jiegou Zheng Chenggong: Yingxiong, shenhua yu xinxiang de lishi 解構鄭成功: 英雄、神化與形象的歷史 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 2006). For an account of how his image changed during the course of the Qing Dynasty, see Wu Zhelong 楊正龍, Zheng Chenggong yu Qing zhengfu jian de tanpan 鄭成功與清政府間的談判 (Taipei: Wenjin chuban, 2000), 227–269.

6 See, for instance, Tong Yi 童怡, “Zheng-Qing heyi zhi jingwei” 鄭清和議之經緯, Taiwan wenxian 臺灣文獻 6 (1955), 35. For a detailed account and much more insightful analysis of these earlier talks in English, see Struve: Southern Ming, 159–166, 179–181.


8 Ibid., 2–3.

9 Ibid., 25.

10 Ibid.

11 Zhuang claims, without any evidence, that Zheng Jing “was, time and again, waiting for an opportunity to command his troops in a counterattack on the Mainland.” See Zhuang Jinde, “Zheng-Qing heyi shimo,” 28.
Jiexian recognizes the crucial importance of hair as a marker of ethnic identity, and the key point of contention during the talks. He also points out that Zheng Jing's references to Taiwan as outside the Middle Kingdom do not necessarily mean modern, state-to-state relations, and is a topic worthy of further discussion. Yet, Chen then turns around to echo Zhuang's view that Zheng actually meant the Qing Dynasty. The Qing, Chen further claims, always took the initiative, but "both sides lacked the sincere desire to engage in talks," resorting to them only as a tactical ploy. Scholars who champion a native Taiwanese identity separate from China reach similar conclusions, differing from the earlier narrative primarily in its emphasis. From his analysis of Zheng's policies on Taiwan and negotiating position, Chen Jiahong argues that Jing increasingly saw the Ming cause as an instrument to bolster his own power rather than any emotional affair. Not only did he desire political independence, but his regime also satisfied many of its conditions. Yet, his nominal goal of restoration and its underlying Confucian morality, what Chen calls the "Mainland character [Dalu xing]" of his value system, constrained him from any compromise, and hindered Taiwan's path toward a normal "maritime country." The Democratic Progressive Party heavily promoted this oceanic orientation for the island during its tenure in power.

On the other side of the strait, more work has been done on the subject, especially in light of the recent shift in political currents on Taiwan. Mainland scholars hold mixed views of the negotiations, with the key contention also centered upon Zheng's comments about the island and requests for tributary status. Zhu Shuangyi represents one school that agrees with Zhuang and Chen Jixian, claiming that the Qing treated Zheng Jing as a serious threat precisely because "he would not rest in the small corner of Taiwan. Time and again, he thought of taking up arms to recover his native land." Others, such as Lin Qian and Wang Zhengyao, take the diametrically opposite position, and accuse Zheng of attempting Taiwanese independence through the talks. According to Wang, his terms amounted to a betrayal of his father, the real hero who “recovered” from the Dutch colonialists an island that belonged to China since time immemorial. Zheng's secessionist tendencies justified the later Qing conquest of Taiwan as a necessary act of national "reunification." Despite bitter disagreements, Chinese-language scholarship in general continues to circle around similar tauto-

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13 Ibid., 207.
14 Ibid., 96, 211.
16 Ibid., 17.
18 Wang Zhengyao, *Qing shi shude* 清史述得 (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2004), 36.
19 Lin Qian, "Kangxi tongyi Taiwan de zhanlue juece" 康熙統一臺灣的戰略決策, *Qing shi yanjiu* 清史研究 3 (2000), 44.

OE 47 (2008)
logical narratives to support different nationalisms, while downplaying contradictions hinting at alternative communities.20

However, innovative new studies in maritime East Asia have begun to modify and complicate the nationalist discourse. Emma Teng’s research on Taiwan’s historical geography has clearly shown that the island lay outside of “China” in both its particular and universal connotations. Although parts of the boundaries of China’s historic landmass, or guo 國, remained fuzzy and permeable, prominent natural barriers, especially the ocean, served as unambiguous markers.21 Even in John King Fairbank’s classic model of the traditional Chinese universe (tianxia 天下), which placed the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo 中國) at the center of civilization, with increasing degrees of barbarism as one moved outward along a series of concentric circles, Taiwan occupied its extreme periphery.22 Narratives written by elite travelers to the island depict it as a “ball of mud” in the ocean inhabited by savage aborigines and once occupied by Japanese and Dutch “barbarians.” Maps from the Ming and Qing reinforced visually its psychological distance from the Mainland despite physical proximity.23 Drawing upon Teng’s work, this paper argues that, based upon the correspondence between them, neither the Qing nor Zheng Jing saw Taiwan as an entity that had to be made part of “China,” or even the empire. Moreover, Zheng’s participation in the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories on the Mainland was by no means an inevitable outcome. During the 1660s, convinced of his inability to drive out the Manchus, he, in fact, precisely took advantage of the island’s “foreignness” to obtain permanent recognition from the Qing as king of his own, autonomous tributary kingdom.

Since the nature of this desired political settlement was so starkly different from a present-day nation-state framework, the negotiations and their implications must be examined on their own historical terms, outside of the false dichotomy between “unification” and “independence.” Indeed, academic publications on both sides of the strait have started to move beyond such black and white discourse in recent years to engage in more complex analyses. On the Mainland, Deng Kongzhao 鄧孔昭, Chen Kongli 陳孔立, and other scholars based primarily in Fujian convincingly show that Zheng Jing and his followers wished to preserve Taiwan as a realm where their Han Chinese customs, including hair and dress, could be protected from

20 Prasenjit Duara calls this narrative by the self-coined term “discent.” In his words, “The narrative of discent is used to define and mobilize a community, often by privileging a particular cultural practice (or a set of such practices) as the constitutive principle of community – such as language, religion, or common historical experience – thereby heightening the self-consciousness of this community in relation to those around it.” See Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 66.

21 After a careful examination of Ming-era maps, Teng concludes that some of them even portray the empire as surrounded by stylized waves. See Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), 36–38.


23 Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 37–38.
Manchu interference. Deng, moreover, rightly points out that the key disagreement on both sides lay not with the status of the island per se, but in Zheng’s refusal to shave his head and change his clothes.

Concurrent shifts toward a more nuanced perspective of the talks have occurred as well in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law. Su Junwei points out that the Qing considered the Zheng regime as an internal rebel organization that had to adopt Manchu fashion as a sign of submission. On the other hand, Zheng Jing’s desire to preserve his hair and clothes signified his wish for administrative autonomy in his domestic affairs, and relations with the Mainland on an equal basis. Although only covering the earlier negotiations in the 1650s between Zheng Chenggong and the Qing, Wu Zhenglong’s groundbreaking study approaches this subject with an unprecedented degree of analytical depth and objectivity. According to him, the type of coiffure determined the character of Chenggong’s future political relationship with the new dynasty, whether direct subject-ruler ties, tributary, or an alliance of equal states. Since this issue touched upon the core cultural values of the Han people, and thereby, the very legitimacy of his regime, he needed sufficiently attractive incentives to overcome his disinclination to shave his head, which the Qing could not, or would not, provide.

This paper synthesizes and expands upon the points made by these scholars in its analysis of the later Zheng-Qing talks. In fact, Zheng Jing’s negotiating position represented a larger effort on the part of him and his officials to seek a new legitimacy based on Taiwan and separate of Ming restoration, a cause that appeared increasingly remote due to the consolidation of Manchu rule on the Mainland. The shift in direction can be clearly seen in a series of sweeping reforms during the 1660s, carried out with the help of his chief advisor, Chen Yonghua. Zheng set the tone for his policies in 1664 with a symbolic move, renaming Taiwan’s official title from Dongdu Mingjing, or “Ming Eastern Capital,” to Dongning, “Eastern Pacification.” He also elevated its counties to the status of sub-prefectures. These changes


25 Deng Kongzhao, Zheng Chenggong yu Qing zhengfu tanpan 郑成功與清政府談判, 123–125. However, the insightful analysis of Deng and others continues to be limited overall by the rigid paradigms of nationalist historiography. Chen, for instance, recognizes that Taiwan remained a marginal concern for the Qing, but he attempted to counter this evidence of its “foreignness” by arguing that it was because most officials had no knowledge of the island, and none bothered to study it in-depth. See Chen Kongli, “Kangxi 22 nian,” 98, 106–107.


27 Wu Zhenglong, Zheng Chenggong yu Qing zhengfu tanpan, 180–181.

28 Xia Lin, Hàiji jiàn hǎi jì jù jì, Taiwan wénxiàn congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (henceforth abbreviated as TWWXCK), 22 (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 1958), 36, and Yang Ying, Congzheng shi hu 從征實錄, TWWXCK, 32 (1958), 189. Donghu, coined by Zheng Chenggong shortly after he landed
signified his desire to settle down permanently and develop the island in its own right rather than making it the focal point for some broader movement. In the meantime, Zheng continued to use the reign title of the Yongli Emperor 永曆 despite the death of this Ming pretender at the hands of the Qing in 1662, and the presence of numerous qualified successors on Taiwan. Instead, he marginalized these surviving Ming princes. Zheng reversed his father’s deep reverence for Zhu Shugui 朱術桂, Prince of Ningjing 甯靖王, and the most promising contender for the throne, cutting off all financial assistance to him and ending the practice of providing for his meals. Zhu was given a heavily taxed plot of land near present-day Tainan, which he farmed to support himself. Zheng also conducted a purge of his elites who held onto the ideal of restoration. Zhu’s friend, Shen Guangwen 沈光文, had to disguise himself as a monk and flee into the mountains after he wrote a poem satirizing the regime’s shift in direction. For years, he lived secretly among a tribe of aborigines to avoid possible recriminations from Zheng. Besides turning away from the Ming, Zheng Jing set out to sinicize Taiwan. He aimed to transform it from a savage periphery into a new “China” abroad, by replicating Han economic, cultural, and educational practices onto the island. With Chen’s help, he implemented agrarian reforms that expanded Taiwan’s arable area and promoted a diversified commercial economy based on cash crops to replace the sugar monoculture of the Dutch period. Zheng disbanded most of his army and scattered his men across the island in military colonies, where they would clear land and grow food for their own survival. Through tax remissions, his regime attracted over 30,000 immigrants from the Mainland before its demise. Zheng also laid the framework for a routine bureaucracy to preside over daily affairs by increasing the role of civil officials and reassigning military officers to supervisory positions over them.

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on the island in 1661, implied a new base in the east for the Ming, a launching pad for future efforts at restoration.

29 The Zheng seats of government were in Chengtian Prefecture 承天府 and Anping 安平 at present-day Tainan, southern Taiwan.

30 Zheng Chenggong had thrown his support behind the Yongli Emperor and adopted his reign title in 1648.

31 Gao Gongqian 高拱乾 (ed.), Taiwan fu zhi 臺灣府志, TIFWXCK, 65 (1960), 255.

32 Deng Chuan’an 鄧傳安, Lice huichao 蠲測會嘍, TIFWXCK, 9 (1958), 55 and “Shen Guangwen,” in Quan Tai shi 全臺詩 (Tainan: Guojia Taiwan wenxue guan, 2004), 62–63.

33 By 1684, one year after the Zheng surrender, the total cultivated area in Taiwan had reached 30,055 jia 甲 (30,987 hectares), two and a half times greater than the biggest Dutch-era figure of 12,252 morgen (12,632 hectares) reported in 1660. See John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier: 1600–1800 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 99–100.

34 These men still had the obligation to take up arms again in the event of an emergency. During this period, they were primarily mobilized to defend Taiwan from the Qing and Dutch, or fight off hostile aboriginal tribes. See Xia: Haaji jyan, 36 and Jiang Risheng 江日昇, Taiwan waiji 臺灣外記, TIFWXCK, 60 (1960), 233–234.

35 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy, 96.

36 Chen Yonghua, Zheng’s staff officer, is a key example of a military man taking charge of civilian affairs. Xia: Haaji jyan, 44.
attempt to promote the island’s transformation into a bastion of “civilization,” he established
an Imperial Academy, with Chen as its director, and a Confucian temple, instituted regular
civil service examinations, and set up schools. He encouraged commoners to replace their
makeshift straw huts with permanent houses of wood and baked tiles. Toward the aborigi-
nes, he dispatched teachers to their tribes to instruct them in advanced farming methods, but
always stood ready to use force if they refused to change their old ways.

The transformation of the Taiwanese landscape signified Zheng’s desire to maintain Han
customs free of interference from the Qing. After their entry into China in 1644, the Manchus
had been keen to emphasize a universal identity based upon Confucian values and ritual prac-
tices, such as filial piety and loyalty to the emperor. Anyone who accepted this hierarchical
order can become cultured, or “Chinese,” and not “barbarian,” regardless of ethnicity. Ac-
cording to Joseph Levenson, “the civilization, not the nation, has a moral claim to man’s alle-
giance” in this framework. Prasenjit Duara adds that this universalism suited the Manchus,
who wished to emphasize the fluidity, or “soft boundary,” between them and their Han sub-
jects to legitimize their role as a minority ruling class. While the Qing tried to portray itself as
a protector of Chinese values, it also redefined the functional criteria of “civilization” with its
own hairstyle and fashion. In 1645, the Qing court ordered all Han subjects, on the pain of
death, to shave their topknots, and leave a Manchu queue in the back. The command en-
countered fierce armed resistance from elites and commoners, who treasured their long hair
and viewed the move as a “barbaric” desecration of their “civilized” values. In great num-
bers, they rallied to the Ming loyalist cause, greatly hindering the consolidation of Qing rule
over the country.

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37 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 235–236.
38 Ibid., 235.
39 Ibid., 236 and Xia: Haji jiyan, 36. The reaction to acts of defiance on the part of the aborigines was often
brutal. In one campaign, the Zheng commander Liu Guoxuan 刘國軒 nearly obliterated the Shalu tribe
沙轆番 in central Taiwan for its defiance, leaving only six people alive out of an original population of
several hundred. See Huang Shujing 黃叔璥, Taihai shi chalu 塞海使槎録, TWWXCK 4 (1957), 128.
40 Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1972), 102. The Qing rulers began to assert their role as protectors of “civilization” soon after they en-
tered Beijing. The Shunzhi Emperor 顺治 (r. 1644–1661) conducted sacrifices to Heaven and Earth,
and held ceremonies at the Altars of Soil and Grain. Moreover, he venerated Confucius and showered
ranks and honors upon the heir to the family line. See Frederic Wakeman, The Great Enterprise: The Man-
chu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1985), vol. 1, 858.
41 For more on “soft” and “hard” boundaries, and their implications for a given political community, see
Duara, Resizing History, 65–66.
42 Frederic Wakeman has pointed out that, for elites, cutting hair violated Confucian injunctions against
harming their bodies, considered an inheritance from one’s parents. The enraged masses, on the other
hand, viewed the “loss of their hair as tantamount to the loss of their manhood,” a form of spiritual ca-
43 Some of the fiercest resistance came from the Jiangnan region, in cities such as Jiangyin 江陰, Jiading 嘉
定, and Songjiang 松江. The Qing responded with equal determination and incredible brutality, massa-
Duara sees this bitterly emotional reaction as a manifestation of “Chineseness” in a more particularistic form, commonly encountered when militarily superior nomadic invaders threatened a Han Chinese dynasty. Although cultural values, including Confucian ethics, remained important as markers of “civilization” within this conception, these traits have hardened along unambiguous lines of division. Morality became an exclusive privilege of the Han ethnicity inhabiting a “fatherland” (guo) with impermeable boundaries. Subhuman “barbarians,” such as the Manchus, had no place within this discourse, as they cannot enter it through assimilation or acculturation.

The Zheng regime, like other anti-Qing resistance organizations, had made the expulsion of these outsiders and Ming restoration the twin ideological pillars of its legitimacy. By 1664, however, with the Manchus firmly in control of the Mainland, its lack of resources to drive them out, and its indefinite exile on an island far from “Chineseness” in every respect, the regime was forced to rethink its raison d’être. The majority of its officers and soldiers had chosen to defect to the Qing after Zheng Chenggong’s invasion of Taiwan and Jing’s loss of Xiamen and Jinmen. They preferred to give up their Han values rather than spend the rest of their lives in exile far away from their homes, primarily in coastal southeastern China.

The inhospitable frontier of miasmic swamplands and loss of purpose in their role as fighting men lowered their morale and resulted in widespread homesickness. Far more seriously for

cring the entire population of these towns and others. Hundreds of thousands perished to protect their hair. See Wakeman, *Great Enterprise*, 651–674.

45 During the Southern Song (1127–1279), both elites and peasants rallied around the court to defend their way of life against the Jurchens, who had occupied the northern half of the country. See Duara, *Rescuing History*, 58–59.

46 The philosopher Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 sums up this point quite aptly. In his words, “it is not inhumane to annihilate [the barbarians] … because faithfulness and righteousness are the ways of human interaction and are not to be extended to alien kinds.” See Duara, *Rescuing History*, 59.

47 According to the Qing Fujian authorities, altogether 290 Zheng officials, 4,334 soldiers, and 467 common people surrendered between September 1661 and August 1662. By 1664, Manchu officials noted that 3,985 officers, 40,962 soldiers, 64,230 commoners, and 900 junks had come over from the enemy camp. See Wong, “Security and Warfare,” 149–153. Only a tiny group of military commanders, including Chen Yonghua and Hong Xu 洪旭, resisted the tide and traveled personally with Zheng Jing to ensure his safe passage to Taiwan. He rewarded them richly for their loyalty, giving them commanding positions within his hierarchy and allowing them to form the core of his advisory body. See Xia, *Haiji jiyao*, 35–36.

48 When Zheng Chenggong first decided to invade Taiwan, his revenue officer, Yang Ying, reported that “all his commanders did not dare go against him, but their faces revealed strong displeasure.” Among them, only one spoke out in favor of the plan. See Yang Ying: *Congzheng shilu*, 185. Shepherd estimates that Zheng Chenggong brought 30,000 soldiers and their families with him to the island, while, in 1664, Zheng Jing took another 6,000 to 7,000. See Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy*, 96.

49 During the regime’s initial years on Taiwan, epidemics raged within their ranks, infecting 70% to 80% of the soldiers, who were unused to the climate and soil. Those who died of illness and battle numbered about five or six thousand. See Shepherd: *Statecraft and Political Economy*, 96 and Peng Sunyi 彭孫贻, *Jinghai zhi 靖海志*, TWFWXCK, 35 (1959), 60.
the soldier-farmers on Taiwan, over half did not have wives and families. Despite the poor condition of his troops, the Ming princes and loyalist literati kept pressuring Zheng Jing to launch what seemed an impossible campaign on the Mainland. Several of the most prominent ones, disillusioned with his perceived cowardice, withdrew from society to lead secluded lives as monks or recluses.

Seen in this context, Zheng’s sinicization policies attempted to bridge the dilemma of “Chineseness” abroad, by persuading his men to accept Taiwan as their new home, and come to terms with the painful loss of the actual, physical entity. These measures appeared to achieve initial results by 1666, at least among the elites in his ranks. Chen Yonghua spoke glowingly of Taiwan as a place whose growing prosperity and culture would “rival the Central Plain [中原 Zhongyuan] in thirty years.” Even the scholar Wang Zhongxiao 王忠孝, an ardent Ming restorationist who had opposed Zheng Jing’s shift in direction, admitted that in “Dongning … the people here are people of the Middle Kingdom [Zhongguo], and the soil is the soil of the Middle Kingdom.” For them, the island no longer served as a mere launch pad for the expulsion of “barbarians” from the Mainland, but a focal point for settlement and development in its own right. Like Zheng, they started to separate the physical setting of “China” from its cultural connotations.

For the Qing, the Zheng regime presented an equally unique challenge to its own legitimacy. As Shi Lang 施琅 (1621–1696), a former general of Zheng Chenggong who defected to the Qing and became Admiral of the Fujian Navy, wrote in a memorial to the court, “How can the mighty Celestial Empire, to which myriad kingdoms have submitted, tolerate the daily spread of these remaining ashes?” By refusing to accept Manchu rule, Zheng Jing thus acted in a manner even more “barbaric” than foreign rulers, who at least wished to partake of “Chinese” culture as redefined by its new patrons. Yet, he and his followers mostly came from Fujian and Guangdong, areas considered integral to “China,” subscribed to the same customs and the Confucian value system, thereby presenting a credible alternative that needed to be neutralized in some manner. In practical terms, the Qing feared that Zheng Jing would raid...
the shipping lanes and harass the southeastern coast, or ally with foreign powers to make even more trouble.55

However, attempts to eliminate Zheng by force met with little success. Two naval invasions of Taiwan, led by Shi Lang in 1665, were called off after storms devastated his fleets.56 Similarly, a brutal measure, launched in 1662, that tried to make the Zheng regime collapse on its own by removing all coastal residents inland resulted instead in mass starvation and destitution.57 The semi-nomadic Manchus’ traditional fear of the ocean, along with the difficulty of military operations in the hilly coastal terrain, further discouraged them to use force.58 More fundamentally, the Qing lacked the motivation and determinations to overcome these disadvantages due to events in the rest of the empire and the marginal status of Taiwan. In 1661, the Shunzhi Emperor (r. 1644–1661) passed away, and was succeeded by a group of Manchu nobles under the leadership of Oboi (d. 1669), who reigned in the name of Shengzu 聖祖, the Kangxi Emperor 康熙 (r. 1662–1722), then only a child. The regents, who pursued policies aimed at strengthening Manchu identity, remained deeply suspicious of their Han subjects, including Shi Lang and his Fujian navy, consisting mostly of defected Zheng troops.59 Moreover, with the capture and execution of the Yongli Emperor, the last Ming pretender, in 1662, the Qing secured complete control of “China,” and shifted its focus toward recovery and consolidation.60

Taiwan, as an extreme peripheral and savage foreign island, held little appeal to the Qing by itself, and cost dearly to invade, both in terms of risk and resources. While it remained concerned by Zheng Jing’s defiance, his shift away from restoration and toward development of the island made negotiations an increasingly attractive option. Jing, too, welcomed talks as a way to gain some autonomy for Taiwan, and China would not have to risk war against a semi-nomadic enemy entwined in foreign alliances.61

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55 Shi: Jinghai jishi, 5. English sources show that this fear was widespread among Qing officials. According to them, the Manchus “fear … the Chinese Combining with Cocksin [Zheng Jing, here mistaken for his father] or some other Princes …” See Cao Yonghe 賽永和, Lai Yongxiang 賴永祥, and Zhou Xuepu 周學普 (eds.), Shiqi shiji Taiwan-Yingguo maoyi shiliao 十七世紀臺灣英國貿易史料, Taiwan yanjiu congkan 臺灣研究叢刊, 57 (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 1959), 149. Likewise, Kong Yuanzhang notes in his memorial to the Qing court that “if [the Zheng regime] is not removed from the roots and seed, [its threat] would, in the end, grow and spread.” See Wu Fei 無非, “Kong Yuanzhang guanyu shoufu Taiwan de zouben” 孔元章關於收復臺灣的奏本, Lishi dang'an 历史档案 3 (1983): 134.
57 Many of these desperate coastal residents resorted to banditry or fled to Taiwan, which had sufficient resources to support Zheng Jing and his followers throughout the 1660s. For a classic study of the coastal removal policy, including its causes, method of implementation, and implications, see Hsieh Kuo-chén, “Removal of Coastal Population in Early Tsing Period,” *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 4 (1932).
58 Struve, Southern Ming, 158, Wu Zhenglong, Zheng Chenggong yu Qing zhengfu tanpan 鄭成功與清政府談判, 49 n. 68–69, and Chen Kongli, “Kangxi 22 nian,” 96.
59 Many of these defectors were Zheng relatives and former commanders, who had intense personal grievances with both Zheng Chenggong and his son. See Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 221–226, for a detailed narrative of Shi Lang’s defection, and Ibid., 221–226, for the Zheng family split. Refer also to Wills, “Maritime China,” 227.
60 Wakeman, Great Enterprise, 1034–1035, 1067–1070.
further step in his creation of a new legitimacy, and even encouraged them. In January 1667, in a major goodwill gesture, the Zheng regime voluntarily withdrew its garrisons from the strategic Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait, the frontline of Taiwan’s defense. In the short-term, he also wanted the Qing to reverse its scorched-earth policy and open up normal trading relations with the southeastern Chinese coast, the source of many lucrative exports upon which his maritime empire depended.

The two rounds of negotiations that followed, from 1667 to 1669, have been widely documented in sources of the period. My study utilizes memorials written by Qing officials directly involved in the process, the Kangxi Emperor’s rescripts, eyewitness accounts from Fujianese elites, and Zheng Jing’s poetry. In addition, I refer frequently to the histories of the Zheng regime, written two to three decades after its demise by former participants in the organization, such as Xia Lin’s 夏琳 Haji jiao 海紀輯要, or local elite historians like Peng Sunyi 彭孫贻 and Zheng Yiju 鄭亦鄒. Of the latter, Jiang Risheng's 江日昇 Taiwan waiji 台灣外記 contains the richest and most detailed coverage of the negotiations, a product of meticulous research utilizing a wide variety of sources unfortunately lost to us today.

Round One: Envoys

On Kangxi 5.11/4 (November 29, 1666), Kong Yuanzhang, Jingkou 京口 Garrison Commander at Zhenjiang 鎮江, secretly memorialized the imperial court, confidently stating his expectation of “results that can be obtained” if he persuaded Zheng Jing to submit. An edict promptly dispatched him to Fujian under the new title of Fujian Summoning and Soothing

61 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 239.
62 Ibid., 238. This intention is corroborated by other works of the period, including Xia, Haji jiao, 67.
63 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 238–239.
64 These sources include a compilation by Taiwan Research Institute of Xiamen University and Editorial Department of China Number One Historical Archives (eds.), Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an shilian xuanji 康熙統一臺灣檔案史料選集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1983); Chen Hong 陳鴻 and Chen Bangxian 陳邦賢, “Qing chu Pu bian xiaosheng” 清初莆變小乘, in Qing shi ziliao 清史資料, ed. Qing History Office, Historical Research Center, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980); “Yanping er wang yiji” 延平二王遺集, in Zheng Chenggong zhuan 鄭成功傳, TWWXCK, 67 (1960); and “Zheng Jing,” in Quan-Tai shi. A detailed historiographical study of the first two can be found, respectively, in Lynn A. Struve, The Ming-Qing Conflict, 1619–1683: A Historiography and Source Guide (Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies, 1998), 267, 277. For more on Zheng Jing’s anthology of poems, see Zhu, “Zheng Jing shi Taidu fenzi shuo zhiyi.” Kong Yuanzhang's memorial, originally found in Beijing's Number One Historical Archives, has been published in its entirety in Wu Fei, “Kong Yuanzhang zouben,” 134–135.
65 See Xia, Haji jiao, Peng, Jingfai zhi; and Zheng Yiju 鄭亦鄒, “Zheng Chenggong zhuan,” in Zheng Chenggong zhuan. A study of Xia and related works can be found in Struve, Ming-Qing Conflict, 280–281.
66 For a historiography of the Taiwan waiji, see Struve, Ming-Qing Conflict, 356–357.
67 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 239, and Wu Fei, “Kong Yuanzhang zouben,” 134. When referring to Chinese reign names and lunar calendar dates, this paper uses the following format: Kangxi 5.11/4 to stand for the fourth day of the eleventh month in the fifth year of Kangxi.
Garrison Commander (Fujian zhaofu zongbing 福建招撫總兵). He was authorized to oversee negotiations with the Zheng regime in consultation with the regional feudatory, Geng Jimao (d. 1671), and Governor-General Zu Zepu 祖澤溥. Kong’s background as a former Zhejiang-based liaison for the maritime resistance of Zheng Chenggong and Zhang Huangyan 張煌言 during the 1650s made him highly useful for this task. Before his defection to the Qing in 1662, he had formed close connections with many prominent figures in these movements, including Hong Xu 洪旭 and Weng Tianyou 翁天佑, now Jing’s top officials.

Kong advocated “summoning and soothing (zhaofu 招撫)” Zheng Jing through the talks, offering him ranks and territory in exchange for his surrender, while concurrently trying to entice Hong, Weng, and other key leaders in the organization with attractive rewards. He hoped that these advisors and subordinates would provide additional pressure for Zheng to accept his terms, or capture and hand him over to the Qing. This method, Kong believed, would save the court far more money than a highly risky naval campaign, which Shi Lang had tried without success. Although the court leaned toward Kong’s plan, its conservative Manchu regents also viewed him and other defectors with suspicion, and made sure he was closely supervised. His new garrison command post at the port of Haicheng 海澄, headquarters of the Fujian navy and directly south from Xiamen across a narrow sea, paired him with Shi, allowing for a built-in check on each other’s activities.

Once he arrived, Kong wasted no time establishing contact with his old connections. On Kangxi 6.5/16 (July 6, 1667), he dispatched the Summoning and Soothing Circuit Liu Ergong 刘爾貢 and Subprefect Ma Xing 马星 as envoys to Taiwan to feel out Zheng Jing’s attitude. Nothing else is known of these enigmatic figures thus far, not even the exact nature of their official ranks, which may have been no more than empty titles appended to their names to increase their prestige as envoys. Kong entrusted them with two letters that laid out the offers and conditions for Zheng, one from himself and the other from Dong Banshe 董班舍, brother of Zheng Chenggong’s wife, Madame Dong 董氏. Kong appeared to have made

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68 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 239, and Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71.
69 For a brief but highly fascinating biography of Kong, including his early life, involvement in the Zhejiang Ming loyalist organizations, and his later defection to the Qing, refer to He Lingxiu 何齡修, Wukuzhai Qing shi conggaousi (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2004), 294–302.
70 Wu Fei, “Kong Yuanzhang zouben,” 134, and He, Wukuzhai, 296.
71 In Struve’s words, the summoning and soothing technique was intended to make its targets “feel good about surrendering.” See Struve, Southern Ming, 165.
72 Wu Fei, “Kong Yuanzhang zouben,” 134.
73 In Kong’s words, “even if the entire [Qing] navy advances to subdue [the Zheng regime], it is still easy for these defiant remnants to escape within the vast ocean, and cause the court to waste unlimited sums of cash.” See Wu Fei, “Kong Yuanzhang zouben,” 134.
74 Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71–73.
75 Ibid., 71.
76 The term the 舍 refers to “sir” or “mister” in the southern Fujian dialect, or Minnanese, and is added to the end of a person’s name. Primary sources often referred to Zheng Jing as Jinshe 錦舍 before the death of his father.
effective use of his contacts in the maritime region, opening to the Qing a valuable web of informal relationships it could tap in its attempt to win over Taiwan’s submission.

Round One: Terms, Counter-terms, and Their Significance

Both letters from Kong and Dong entreated Zheng Jing to surrender for the sake of the coastal residents, whose suffering and impoverishment they blamed on his continued stubbornness and refusal to accept the Qing civilizing influence. If he agreed to submit, the imperial court promised to bestow upon him the title of “King of Fujian” (“Bamin wang 八閩王”), and grant him control over all of the evacuated southeastern coastal islands. The court planned to treat Zheng Jing as one of its feudatories to help it assert control and preempt potential rebels in a politically troublesome frontier, in addition to Wu Sangui 吳三桂 in the southwest, Geng Jimao in Fujian, and Shang Kexi 尚可喜 in Guangdong. In exchange for the reward of land and autonomous rights in local administration, Zheng, as an internal vassal (neifan 內藩) and direct imperial subject, could not stay on a foreign island, but should signal his acceptance of the new dynasty by shaving his head and abandoning Taiwan.

Zheng flatly rejected the offers in two separate replies addressed to Dong and Kong, each dated Yongli 21.6/23 (August 12, 1667). After the personal inquiries to his uncle, he complained that “Commander Kong’s letter still contains nothing substantial, and what Liu Er-gong and Ma Xing have said all amount to empty talk.” Since the time of the “late king [先王, Chenggong] to your nephew,” he wrote, “the Qing negotiators kept insisting, but in the past, during the height of our time on all the islands [of the Chinese coast], we still refused to shave our heads.” Filial piety dictated that Zheng could not agree to what his father, during his own negotiations with the Manchus, had refused to do even within his territories considered integral to “China,” not to mention now a “foreign” land. Indeed, “we only ever fought over these two words [shaving hair].”

Moreover, Jing told the Qing negotiators that he could not abandon Taiwan for the sake of land and ranks on the Mainland. According to his letter to Dong Banshe:

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77 The conditions for Zheng Jing could be discerned from his reply to the letters of Kong Yuanzhang and Dong Banshe. See Taiwan Research Institute et al.: Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 70.
78 The Qing put the Three Feudatories in these restive frontier areas to oversee defense and reconstruction. They commanded the personal loyalty of their troops and had rights to use them to a certain degree. However, local administration and matters of taxation all lay in the hands of centrally appointed officials. While a useful comparison, it remains unclear whether these were the same initial terms offered to Zheng Jing by the Qing court. For a look at the purpose and function of the Three Feudatories, see Liu Fengyun 劉鳳雲, Qing dai Sanfan yanjiu 清代三藩研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1994), 111–112.
80 Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 69.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 70.
今日東寧，版圖之外另辟乾坤，幅員數千里，糧食數十年，四夷效順，百貨流通，生聚教训，足以自強。又何慕于藩封，何羨於中土哉？

Today, I have opened up another universe at Dongning, outside of the domain. Its area is thousands of li, and its grain can last decades. The barbarians from the four directions submit, myriad products circulate, and the living masses gather and receive education. These are enough to be strong on its own. What do I have to desire from a feudatory title? What have I to envy about the Central Land?83

Similarly, he announced to Kong his creation of an entirely new kingdom abroad:

況今東寧遠在海外，非屬版圖之中，東連日本，南蹴呂宋，人民輻輳，商賈流通。王侯之貴，固吾所自有，萬世之基已立於不拔…不佞亦何慕於爵號，何貪於疆土，而為此削髮之舉哉？

Now, Dongning is far away overseas, and is not part of the domain. It neighbors Japan to the east and Luzon to the south. Numerous people congregate here and products circulate. The honors of a king are those which I already have myself, and the foundations of ten thousand generations have been established to the point it cannot be transplanted … What have I to envy of ranks, to desire of land, and to shave my head on account of these?84

He already ruled over an island that had nothing to do with “China,” and the Qing simply could not give him a satisfying incentive to leave, especially if it meant cutting his hair.

Zheng Jing tried to convince Kong that he had withdrawn to Taiwan to steer clear of the Mainland coast and leave it in Qing hands. Since Dongning could satisfy the needs of him and his men, he had no intention to return to scramble for territory:

囊者思明之役，自以糧盡而退，非戰之失也。而況風機所指，南極高、瓊，北盡登、遼，何地不可以開屯，何地不可以聚兵。不佞所以橫絕大海，啟國東寧者，誠傷士女之仳離，干戈之日滋也…而貴朝猶未深察，高嚴遷界之禁，遂使萬姓流離，四省丘墟，坐捐數千里之租賦，歲糜億十萬之軍糧，斯非貴朝之失策哉?

After the battle for Xiamen some time ago, I withdrew [to Taiwan] because of grain shortages, not because of military miscalculation. Still, wherever the wind points, as south as Hainan Island and as north as Liaodong [the entire length of the Chinese coast], where can I not open up land? Where can I not congregate my troops? The reason why I decided to isolate myself on the ocean and establish the Kingdom of Dongning was because I felt truly grieved at the separation of young men and women, and the daily escalation of warfare … yet, your dynasty still has not investigated this in-depth, and enforced with great strictness the evacuation of the coast. As a result, the myriad surnames are wandering, and four provinces have been laid to waste. To just sit and give up the rents and taxes of several thousand li and spend hundreds of millions annually on provisions of soldiers, alas, is this not your dynasty’s strategic miscalculation?85

Although he still possessed the capability to fight anywhere along the coast, Zheng Jing voluntarily chose to leave the Mainland because of his great pain at the tremendous suffering brought to innocent commoners by years of warfare. As he emphasized, “I only want to construct for your dynasty a method for prolonged peace, to plot for the sake of the lives of the

83 Ibid., 69.
84 Ibid., 70.
85 Ibid.
myriad people.” Yet, he lamented, the Qing failed to recognize his sincere interest in pursuing peaceful coexistence, and continued to treat him as an enemy to be forced into surrender. Therefore, responsibility for the current suffering and destitution of coastal residents lay not with his refusal to submit, but rather with its deep mistrust of his intentions, as manifested in its brutal removal of the coast, a policy that only harmed the court in terms of lost revenues and skyrocketing expenditures.

Zheng then laid out his own conditions for achieving mutual peace. His only requests, he told his uncle, were for the Qing “to treat me according to the rituals of a foreign country [yi wai guo zhi li jian dai]” and for the two sides to “initiate trade and friendly interaction [hushi tonghao].” He proposed to Kong that “representatives from each country could establish friendly relations based upon mutual trade. Both your side and ours would have no [missing], and the tempests would not roar.” These measures would encourage “coastal farmers and fishermen to return to their original activities,” and benefit the Qing government with “millions in tax revenues.” They would also legalize, or make semi-legal, the Zheng regime’s already rampant smuggling operations along the southeastern coast, and provide an additional avenue of official trade.

Zheng Jing’s negotiating position contained two components, one for the Qing side and the second for domestic consumption, each closely connected to the other in dynamic interaction. As shown, his attempt to forge a new ideological foundation for his regime propelled his willingness to engage in talks. The negotiating table, in turn, became an arena where his quest for legitimacy could be further refined and articulated internally. Other than the Yongli reign title, itself frozen in time, Jing did not make any mention of the Ming or restoration in his letters. Moreover, in referring to Taiwan’s geographic position, he avoided Qing tributaries, such as the Liuqiu Kingdom or Vietnam, but rather Japan and Luzon, important trading partners of the Chinese maritime region with no political ties to the Mainland. Even his tone and use of words, while polite, seemed far from being submissive. By boasting of “barbarians” submitting to him from the four corners of the earth, he tried to prove that, like the Qing, he possessed the moral character to bring “civilization” to non-Han peoples. His terms and actions apparently aimed at achieving equal status with the Qing, such as in a friendly trading alliance. Besides legitimate access to the lucrative China market, he could keep existing institutions on Taiwan completely intact within this model, placating potential internal opposition from Ming princes and their elite supporters. Meanwhile, he could consider several

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 69.
88 Ibid., 70.
89 Ibid.
90 Most of the smuggling before late 1669 occurred in eastern Guangdong, just south of the Fujian border (Xiamen was difficult to access at the time due to the presence of Shi Lang’s naval fleets not far away in Haicheng). See Deng Kongzhao, Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan, 250–251. For a fascinating series of memorials, imperial edicts, and eyewitness testimonies that speak of piracy on the high seas and collusion with Taiwan, see Zheng shi shiliao sanbian 鄭氏史料三編, TWFXCK, 175 (1963), 62–63, 66–73 and 74–87.
91 Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 70.
different political options, which might include a kingdom with titles and ranks still from a fictive Ming court, or a new empire in its own right.

At the same time, Zheng placed strong emphasis on Confucian morality in his correspondence with the Qing. He demanded to keep the Ming hair and dress for himself and his subjects, ostensibly because his father had proposed the same conditions, but also because of a more deeply held desire to preserve in full the body handed down by one’s parents. Not only did he care for his own people, but it was also due to his pain at the misery of coastal Chinese residents that prompted him to withdraw from his Mainland bases. On the other hand, he pointed to the Qing’s brutal removal of its subjects, their suffering, and its violation of filial piety as examples of the inhumanity of Manchu rulers, who competed on these same Confucian values, and seize from them the moral high ground. In this manner, Zheng Jing could shift “Chineseness” from physical settings to more abstract qualities, allowing for an exclusivist Han identity without having to engage in a suicidal venture to expel the invaders in the name of restoration.

After receiving the replies from Zheng, Kong Yuanzhang begged the Qing court to allow him to travel to Taiwan in person, and “permit me to persuade him to submit and listen to reason.” The regents granted his request, but they closely supervised his activities prior to his departure. Out of fear that he and other defectors might use such an opportunity to engage in illicit trade with the enemy in violation of the maritime prohibitions, or, perhaps, even worse, they dispatched a Manchu nobleman to Haicheng to verify Kong’s accompanying cargo and personnel. Kong and his mission set out on Kangxi 6.8/26 (October 15, 1667), seventeen days after the original departure date.

Once on Taiwan, Zheng Jing feted him lavishly and treated him as a guest of honor. Yet, besides increasing goodwill, the two sides made little substantive progress during his month-long stay. The Qing side merely enhanced and repackaged its old offers. It promised to end the maritime ban and give Zheng the right to oversee all trade along the coast, but continued to insist upon his status as an internal vassal, who must first shave his head and leave the overseas island to join the rest of its officials and subjects on the Mainland. As an added condition, he even had to send one of his sons to Beijing as a hostage to ensure his sincerity and trustworthiness. For his part, Zheng Jing repeated his demands to preserve his hair and clothing,

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92 Ibid., 71.
93 The imperial edict to Kong read, “The vessels plying the domestic routes, if not ordered to be checked, might find an excuse to engage in trade.” The regents also forbade Ma Xing and Liu Ergong from ever being dispatched again, and turned down Kong’s appeal for Huang Yi 黃翼, nephew of turncoat Zheng general Huang Wu 黃梧, and a potentially valuable negotiator, to join him in the talks. See Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71.
94 Besides weathering official suspicion, huge winds and tempests further postponed the start of the mission. Also during this period, a man named Dong Shen 董申, who was allowed to join Kong on the mission to Taiwan, unexpectedly passed away due to illness. Judging from his surname, he was most likely a maternal relative of Zheng Jing, probably none other than Dong Banshe himself. Once on the sea, Kong’s fleet ran into more adverse weather, greatly delaying his arrival on the island. See Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71–72.
95 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 239.
96 Xia, Haiji jiyao, 37.
and stay on his island. He emphasized to Kong that “Taiwan is far away overseas, and is not the domain of the Middle Kingdom [fei Zhongguo bantu非中國版圖] … If you can use the example of Korea, then I can [accept it].”97 Since Taiwan was a foreign land just like Korea, Zheng implied, it should deserve treatment different from China, including its ruler and cultural practices.

The talks sunk into deadlock, as both sides refused to give further ground. Zheng finally told Kong explicitly to stop wasting his time: “The strategy of negotiations cannot drag out indefinitely. The will of the late King cannot be violated!”98 He then ordered Kong’s captain to ferry him back to the Mainland. Yet, in a sign that he left the door open for future talks, Zheng sent a cargo of local Taiwanese products, including sandalwood, dalbergia wood, deer meat, and salted fish, to accompany the mission, apparently as an attempted tribute to the emperor.99 His gesture, along with his reference to Korea, a Qing tributary kingdom, signaled a willingness to give up the initial vision of equality for Dongning and become an outer vassal state (waifan 外藩). In this framework, he could have complete domestic autonomy, and only recognize the Qing emperor as overlord.100

Round One: Failure and Aftermath

Kong Yuanzhang set out for sea on Kangxi 6.10/7 (November 22, 1667), and arrived back at Haicheng eighteen days later. The inconclusive nature of this round of talks was due primarily to the Qing side’s inability to offer sufficiently powerful incentives for Zheng Jing to concede. On the one hand, the Qing navy proved incapable of launching an assault on Taiwan. Despite lacking the ability to coerce, the Qing laid out terms for peace that would essentially force him to give up the natural security of Taiwan and place his fate completely into its hands. As he aptly put it, “What have I to envy of ranks, to desire of land, and to shave my head on account of these?”101 Although it is not clear whether Kong spoke with any of Zheng’s top officials, they evidently did not betray their ruler or force him to surrender, but stuck behind him to negotiate as one body.102

97 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 239.
98 Xia, Haiji jiyao, 37.
99 According to the tally of Zheng’s tribute items done by Manchu officials on Kangxi 6.10/27 (December 11, 1667), after Kong’s return to Haicheng, they consisted of 21 dan and 40 jin (1.07 tons) of sandalwood, 400 jin (200 kilograms) of dalbergia, 200 jin (100 kilograms) of deer tendons, 2,610 jin (1,305 kilograms) of deer breasts, and 1,150 jin (575 kilograms) of salted fish. In addition, Zheng handed out 360 taels (13.5 kilograms) of silver to Kong’s entire crew. See Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 75.
101 Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 70.
102 Before Kong set out for Taiwan, he tried to secure the surrender of Li Feng 李鳳, an ally of Zheng Jing based on the islands off of Zhejiang. “If the fake garrison commander Li Feng and others take their troops and ships, and come to submit,” he claimed, “then we can seriously destroy one of the rebel [Jing’s] arms in the southeast. Taiwan would become isolated, and then we can gradually plan.” See Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 73. The outcome of this mission remains unknown, but it probably had little impact on the Zheng regime. Kong likely exaggerated the role of Li,
The stinginess of the Qing offer resulted, in part, from the regents’ deep mistrust of Zheng’s intentions. As R. Bin Wong and Kenneth Pomeranz correctly point out, these rulers of a massive continental empire, who prioritized social stability and keeping taxes and defense outlays low, saw the regime as a dangerous concentration of Chinese overseas engaged in rebellion and illegal armed trade.\(^{103}\) To prevent a protracted and costly campaign, it wanted to entice Zheng back within its boundaries, where it could keep him and his activities under close watch. In return for his submission, the court granted him the right to serve as “exclusive link between the huge Chinese market and overseas luxury goods,” even though it did not have any interest in licensing armed monopolies.\(^{104}\) At times, then, an empire’s need to achieve internal stability did not necessarily mean that it had to view them in terms of a zero-sum game. Yet, this same fear resulted in its inability to show enough flexibility in response to Zheng’s demands.

Not only did the regents suspect his intentions, but they even exhibited paranoia against their own personnel in Fujian, many of whom had originally defected from enemy ranks. In the end, the peace process spelled disaster for these collaborators. After Kong’s return, Shi Lang, seeing his chance to lead another military invasion, complained to the court that even after “our envoys went there two times,” Zheng Jing still did not dispatch any officials to accompany them back for further consultations.\(^{105}\) As the memorial essentially implied that Kong achieved nothing during his mission, the Qing court suspended the talks and recalled him to Beijing to await his next assignment.\(^{106}\)

Obviously unhappy, Kong accused Shi of collusion with the enemy, “revealing” to the court that Zheng Jing had told him about their secret interactions, and Jing even had letters exchanged between the two men to prove it.\(^{107}\) Kong’s allegations touched off a chain reaction. Several subordinates of Zhou Quanbin 周全斌, second-in-command of the previous expeditions to Taiwan, came out and accused him of faking his surrender in 1664 simply to retake Haicheng for Zheng at the soonest convenient opportunity.\(^{108}\) In Kangxi 7.1/10 (February 21, 1668), the Qing regents ordered both men to Beijing on the pretext of “an imperial audience,” and gave them honorable but worthless titles in the central bureaucracy.\(^{109}\) The court then disbanded the entire naval establishment in Fujian, grounding most of the Qing who was nothing more than one of the many coastal rebels engaged in illicit trade with Taiwan, peripheral to Zheng and his core followers.

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105 Shi, Jinghai jishi, 1. Shi Lang based his memorial upon the report of Kong’s ship captain Lin Gongxun 林功勳, whom he had sent to spy on the mission.
106 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 242.
107 Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, Pu bian xianzheng, 86.
108 The accusers claimed that before Zhou’s surrender, he and Zheng Jing had sworn by the sword to seal the pact. They purportedly promised each other that if either “had a contrary heart, then may we die under ten thousand swords.” See Zheng shi shibian sanbian, 121.
109 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 242–246, and Shi: Jinghai jishi, 4–5. Zhou would die in Beijing in 1669, while Shi Lang remained inactive until 1681, when he became charged with leading another naval expedition to Taiwan.
ships in Haicheng harbor, and eventually burning them. It reconverted a small number of
defected Zheng troops into land forces, while dispatching the rest, along with their families,
deep into the interior provinces to open up military colonies. Kong Yuanzhang, the chief
instigator of this entire chain of events, met with a similarly tragic fate. Soon after the failure
of the talks, he was exiled to the frontier outpost of Ningguta 宁古塔, in Manchuria, where he
died around 1690.

Round Two: Motivations and Preparations

Besides suspicion of its collaborators, the Qing court undertook these drastic actions as a sign
of goodwill toward the Zheng regime. With these potentially unstable elements out of the way,
they could not hijack future conciliatory action through rash military action or illicit smuggling
and political collusion. In Kangxi 8.2 (March 1669), the court further authorized a limited
extension of the maritime boundaries in Fujian, allowing residents to return to the evacuated
areas for farming and fishing. This friendlier attitude continued despite a major palace coup
in Beijing on 5/16 (June 14), when the fifteen-year-old Emperor Shengzu ousted Oboi and his
allies, and assumed personal control over the empire. The new ruler had to spend the rest of
the year purging the government of officials with close ties to the former regents, and dealing
with massive flooding from the Yellow River, which had breached its dikes for two years in a
row. In contrast, Zheng Jing’s exile on an overseas island represented a much less pressing
issue that did not immediately threaten the stability of the empire, especially after his assur-
ances that he had no intention to harass the Mainland coastline again.

In 1669, the emperor restarted the negotiations, dispatching Mingzhu 明珠 (1635–1708),
Secretary of the Board of Punishments, and Cai Yurong 蔡毓榮 (d. 1699), Assistant Secretary
of the Board of War, to Fujian. They arrived at the port of Quanzhou 泉州 in Kangxi 8.6
(July 1669), and met with Geng Jimao and Zu Zepu for consultation. The four of them
agreed to send Xinghua 興化 Prefect Mu Tianyan 穆天顏 and Assistant Commander Ji Quan 季佺
as envoys to Taiwan. Unlike the defectors before them, these imperial officials were
some of Shengzu’s most trusted allies. Mingzhu, a Manchu bannerman of the Yehe 葉赫
clan, enjoyed close relations with Suoetu 索額圖, the emperor’s imperial bodyguard, who had

110 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 246; Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, Pu bian xiaosheng, 86–87.
111 He, Wurunzhai, 298.
112 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 251; Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, Pu bian xiaosheng, 86–87.
113 For more details on this political struggle, refer to Zhang Kaiyuan 章開沅 et al. (eds.), Qing tongjian 清通
鑒 (Changsha, Hunan: Yuelu shushe, 2000), vol. 1, 615–617.
114 Zhang et al., Qing tongjian, 617–624, 608–609, 622–623. The flooding caused tremendous loss of lives
and property, and severely threatened the Grand Canal, the key artery for shipment of imperial grain
from prosperous Jiangnan to Beijing.
115 Cao et al., Taiwan-Yingguo maoyi shiliao, 149.
116 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 251; Peng, Jinghai zhi, 72; and Xia, Haiji jiyan, 22.

QE 47 (2008)
helped mastermind the ousting of the Oboi faction. It was through Mingzhu’s enthusiastic patronage that Cai, a Han bannerman from Liaodong, rose to his present position. The assistant secretary, in turn, knew Zu Zepu on a personal basis, having once served under his father, Zu Dashou 祖大壽, a former Ming commander who had surrendered to the Manchus in 1641 with his men and entire family. Mu, a northerner from Shaanxi in the service of Geng and Zu, represented a new generation of bureaucrats, who had acquired his jinshi 进士 degree during the Shunzhi period, and thus owed his entire career to the new dynasty. Through this personal chain of ties from top to bottom, Shengzu could obtain timely and accurate information on the progress of the talks.

Mu and Ji arrived at Penghu on 6/12 (July 9), where a Zheng fleet escorted them to Taiwan a few weeks later. For the upcoming talks, Zheng Jing chose two of his own trusted officials. Officer of Punishments Ke Ping 柯平 was the son of Ke Chenshu 柯宸樞, a highly esteemed general under Chenggong, while Ye Heng 葉亨 headed the Rites Office and served in the Imperial Academy under Chen Yonghua. The two men put the Qing envoys in an official residence until they arranged a date for a personal audience with Zheng Jing.

Round Two: An Issue of Hair and Tribute

During their wait, the envoys apparently insinuated in their conversations with Ke and Ye that the Kangxi Emperor would permit Zheng Jing to rule Taiwan in perpetuity as a subordinate vassal. Zheng certainly heard the rumors, since he noted, in a caption to one of his poems, the coming of “an envoy from the Manchu tribal chieftain with a saying of ‘not setting foot on shore and not changing clothes.’” Wanting to find out more about these attractive terms, he initiated a series of audiences with Mu Ti anyan and Ji Quan on Kangxi 8.7/7 (August 3, 1669), attended by all his civil and military officials. Mu forwarded to him the letters from Mingzhu and the other officials, along with an imperial command that laid out specific terms.

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117 See Mingzhu’s biography in Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽 et al. (eds.), Qing shigao 清史稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998), vol. 33, 9992–9994. For more on Suoetu’s role in the overthrow of Oboi, refer to Zhang et al., Qing tongjian 清通鑑, 616–617.

118 For Cai Yurong’s biography, see Zhao et al., Qing shigao, vol. 32, 9787–9791. For a detailed account of Zu Dashou’s surrender to the Manchus, see Wakeman: Great Enterprise, 180–194, 221–224. A biography of the entire Zu family can be found in Zhao et al., Qing shigao, vol. 31, 9419–9429. Both Cai and Zu should have been familiar with Geng Jimao, another bannerman from Liaodong.

119 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 251.

120 Xia, Haiji jian, 44; Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 238; and Deng Kongzhao, Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Tainan, 49.

121 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 251–252.

122 According to Jiang Risheng, Mu hinted to Ke, “The landscape of Taiwan does not show a large contrast with the interior [China], and His Excellency has had a heart for some time to submit.” Ke enthusiastically replied, “If it can truly be as what you, old master, have said, then the myriad surnames have great fortune.” See Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 251–252.

123 “Yanping er wang yi,” 129.
Sensing trickery, Jing refused to receive the edict, as that would mean automatic approval of Shengzu’s terms based upon mere hearsay.124

In order to understand what the Qing really offered, he opened Mingzhu’s letter:

From antiquity, great men have understood that the Mandate of Heaven has a place of belonging, and believe in the fruitlessness of hurting the people … You, sir, understand the times and changes, and are a great man of this generation. Compared to the earlier sages, it would be a simple matter. Yet, your name has no contact with the superior domain, and your ranks and titles do not emanate from the Celestial Dynasty. Instead, you float and submerge overseas … Now, fortunately, the Son of Heaven felt pain one day, and grieved at the unrecovered injuries of the coastal residents. Among them are those who left their villages and wells, who fled and wandered to islands in the sea, some as recently as over ten years ago, and others as distant as over twenty years ago. Many have suffered, and it is uncertain whether they are living or dead. Since these people all belong to the middle of the universe, who of them does not desire to return home gloriously? … As for your homeland … the children and white-haired elders of Fujian, they are mostly your fellow people. How can you bear to cause their mutual separation for a long time? … You, sir, are prominent among humans, yet you still put yourself outside of the imperial benevolence. How does this harm the court? We just feel regret on your behalf! You should truly turn around and return, and let the remote corners of the ocean become a land of joy, and the wandering masses go back to their hometowns. If you, sir, can return to the Central Plain from overseas, will it not be a tremendously happy matter not seen since remote antiquity, an opportunity that cannot be had again? Our Emperor has tried his utmost to show you his sincerity, and he has provided an imperial edict. After reading it, you should look up to the most benevolent and loving heart of the Son of Heaven …125

As Mingzhu’s letter shows, despite the sweet talk of Mu and Ji, he essentially repeated Kong Yuanzhang’s basic stance: Zheng Jing should accept Qing ranks, quit Taiwan, and return to Fujian. This time, however, Mingzhu turned Zheng’s Confucian morality on its head to launch a subtle counterattack against him. Since the Manchus, he insisted, already possessed the Mandate of Heaven due to superior moral values, any decision to submit represented an understanding of the times, and, therefore, an ethical course of action. Instead, Zheng Jing’s continued disobedience to this inevitable trend would only bring endless suffering to the coastal residents and tear their families apart, a claim that conveniently excused the Qing for its own brutal evacuation policy. Mingzhu further exploited the homesickness within Zheng’s ranks, reminding him of his soldiers’ desire to return and reunite with their loved ones and fellow

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124 Jiang Risheng, *Taiwan waiji*, 252. For more on the implications of receiving an imperial command during the course of Zheng Chenggong’s negotiations with the Qing, see Wu Zhenglong, *Zheng Chenggong yu Qing zhengfu tanpan*, 69–70.


OE 47 (2008)
The secretary implored him to trust in the emperor's sincerity, while subtly threatening that if he did not, the troops on Taiwan, moved by the benevolence of the Qing court, would do so for him.

Predictably, Zheng flatly rejected this offer. Unable to modify the conditions on their own, Mu and Ji could do nothing but fruitlessly persuade him to reconsider. After two weeks of stalemate, they requested him to dispatch his envoys to Quanzhou to meet their superiors, who had greater latitude in determining his requests. Zheng agreed, and sent along with Ke and Ye a letter to Mingzhu detailing his own conditions:

I have always heard that the form of a unicorn or phoenix cannot be surrounded by fences or cages. The view of heroes cannot be muddled by persuasion. Yet, as the ruler of mortals, one should have the entire universe in mind, and let even the insects and birds share in his bounty … You, sir, have received orders to come from far away, and desire to create fortune for the people, to allow those exiled to return to their work, to establish security in the maritime region … There was also word spread about 'not setting foot on shore and not shaving hair,' and others. It was somewhat moving. Yet, I realized that I never understood [your terms] in detail, so I had no choice but to instruct the [imperial] command to be welcomed. Matters must be set in advance before I can regret them, and words must be set in advance before I can step over them. A true man trusts with his heart, expresses utmost sincerity, and does things matter-of-factly. Why should he alter what he has already said? … I respectfully uphold the precedents of my forefathers to protect their great foundation. I must not abandon their work in order to covet the profits of a moment. I only feel pity in my chest for the suffering of the mortals. If your dynasty truly cherishes the people, it is not hard for me to put down my heart and submit, to follow the ritual of 'serving the great.' After we establish friendship, I will necessarily withdraw my patrols and sentries. As the coastal areas are all under your control, [peace] is not that which I provide. …

Similar to the first round of talks, Zheng Jing attempted to seize the moral high ground by highlighting his concern for the coastal residents, his sincerity for peaceful coexistence, and his filial piety, as opposed to the shiftiness and lack of trust on the part of the Qing. This time, however, he had taken further steps in re-envisioning his polity and its relationship to “China.”

126 In a memorial to the Qing court in 1668, Shi Lang reported that the Zheng soldiers had become lax and disorderly due to the neglect of military training and gender imbalance on the island. They might manage to brave the harsh frontier environment, but, Shi wondered, “who would be willing to remain single their entire lives without thinking once about their native land?” See Shi, Jinghai jishi, 6.

127 The two sides even traded insults, with Zheng insinuating that he could still fight if necessary, while the Qing envoys threatened that “we do not lack battleships or soldiers” if he refused to accept their demands. See Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 253.

128 Ibid., 253–254, and Zheng Yiju, “Zheng Chenggong zhuan,” 26. Some very minor differences, particularly usage of characters, exist between the two texts. This passage has been translated from Jiang Risheng’s work.
He now explicitly floated the idea of an unequal tributary model, with Taiwan as an outer vassal in a universe centered upon the Qing state. He wanted his kingdom to “follow the example of Korea, not shaving the hair and becoming your ministers and paying tribute zheng-chen nagong 稱臣納貢.”129 Zheng even referred to the term “serving the great (shida / Kr. sadae 事大),” which the Koreans often used to characterize the Choson Dynasty’s (1392–1910) relationship with the Ming for over 200 years, and with the Manchus after their second invasion of the kingdom in 1636.130

Although access to the vast China market served as a significant motivation for Zheng to enter a tributary relationship, it was by no means the dominant factor, as Fairbank might claim.131 The narrow confines of official trade would only add marginally to the rapidly growing smuggling activities between Taiwan and the Mainland coast.132 For him, the more important advantage of the system lay in the official recognition of his status as King of Dongning, in exchange for his adoption of the Qing calendar and Shengzu as his suzerain. If he obtained a patent of investiture from an established empire widely recognized as the new center of the East Asian world, he could secure automatic legitimacy at a very low risk by tying his destiny to its wellbeing. As one scholar points out, close tributary relations protected the interests of both ruler and elites in Korea’s Choson Dynasty, partly explaining why it lasted over five centuries.133 Like Korea, Zheng could count upon Qing military assistance in the event of a succession crisis or rebellion.134 Moreover, he could enjoy exclusive domestic control, including the right to use Ming institutions and the Yongli reign title, and preserve Han customs free of Qing interference.135 In this manner, he could calm internal pressure to expel the “barbari-

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129 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 253.
130 Yang Lien-sheng, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in Fairbank, ed., Chinese World Order, 27. This brief war, resulting in a humiliating Korean defeat, forced the king to accept the Manchu ruler as his new sovereign, and renounce all ties with the Chongzhen Emperor 崇禎 (r. 1627–1644) of the Ming, abolishing its reign name and surrendering its ranks and titles for those of the new dynasty. Each year, the Korean king must also dispatch an embassy bearing tribute of local products as a sign of continued submission. For more on the invasion and its aftermath, see Inaba Kunzan 稻葉君山, Shinchōzenshi 清朝全史, trans. Dan Tao 但燾 (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2006 [first edition 1914]), vol. 1, 8.3–8.4, and Zhuang Jifa 莊吉發, Qing shi lunji 清史論集, vol. 7 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1997), 26–27.
132 See n. 90.
135 Wu Zhenglong, Zheng Chenggong yu Qing zhengfu tanpan, 93–94. Korea, for instance, still utilized the Chongzhen reign name within its boundaries. In private, it continued to refer to the Ming as the “Imperial Ming (Huang Ming 皇明)” and “superior domain (shangguo 上國),” while calling the Qing by the neutral term Qing ren 清人 (in this context, Qing people or country). Such pro-Ming sentiments can be seen quite explicitly in the diaries of many Korean envoys to Beijing from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. See Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, “Da Ming yiguan jin hе zai?” 大明衣冠今在? , Ming-Qing shi 明清史 1 (2006), 3, and Zheng Keeheng 鄭克晟, Ming-Qing shi tanshi 明清史探實 (Beijing: Zhongguo
ans” from the Central Plain, transforming restoration from a concrete goal into an abstract ideal, and continue to be “Chinese” by making himself foreign to “China.”

Yet, Zheng did not entirely relinquish the other model of relations between roughly equal entities. Although he would have to create his own symbols of power from scratch, and assume full risk of failure, it would give him greater freedom to expand his authority over Taiwan, perhaps even beyond his current status as king. Moreover, he would not have to accept a “barbarian” as overlord or express his inferior status through tribute missions.136 Therefore, despite his request for investiture, he simultaneously made another bid for equality expressed subtly in the wording of his reply to Mingju. Before this letter reached the hands of the Qing ministers, however, Mu spotted his “inappropriate” use of words, and sternly rebuked Zheng’s envoys:

貴藩主書內有「麟鳳之姿，非藩籠所能囿」；人生天地間，惟昊天之子可雲「不囿」。若貴藩主不囿於藩籠，是臺灣尚非其寄託也。又雲：「英雄之見，非遊說所能惑」，此乃戰國之時，朝秦暮楚，非今日大一統之論也。茲九重之上，特布恩綸，遣大臣賚勒前來。余又以三品京秩啣命渡海，而以遊說視之，所謂擬人不於其倫也。至於「通好之後」句愈謬矣！夫兩大相偶，力敵勢並，始可謂之通好…今我朝廷以四海萬國之尊，九夷八蠻，莫不來賓，而臺灣乃海外一隅，欲匹夫行抗，強弱之勢，毋論智愚咸知…

Inside the letter of His Excellency, there is ‘the form of a unicorn or phoenix cannot be surrounded by fences or cages.’ Yet, of all living beings between Heaven and Earth, only the Son of Great Heaven can be said to be ‘unfettered.’ If His Excellency cannot be surrounded by fences or cages, then this means that Taiwan is still not his sole focus. He also mentioned that ‘the view of heroes cannot be muddled by persuasion.’ This applies to the Warring States period, when Qin and Chu competed for hegemony, not today’s order of great unity.137 The Supreme Emperor specially displayed his grace and dispatched his high ministers to come with his edict, while I, an imperial official of the third rank, received orders to travel across the sea. If you view this as persuasion, then it is equivalent to comparing people who do not belong to the same category. As for ‘after we establish friendship,’ this sentence is even more misguided. When there are two huge countries whose strength is equivalent, then we can begin to call it friendship … Now, our dynasty commands the respect of the Four Seas and myriad lands. The various barbarians all come to pay their respects. Taiwan is but
a remote corner overseas. If it wants to resist us on an equal basis, then regardless of wise or foolish, they all know who is strong and who is weak …138

Through his line-by-line critique of Zheng’s letter, Mu was reminding Ke and Ye that Taiwan could not match China in terms of military strength or political clout, nor was it remotely qualified to form an alternate tianxia and enthrone a second Son of Heaven.

In the face of this rejection, the Zheng envoys had no choice but to back down and apologize for the inconsiderate wording.139 However, their attempt to assert equality with the Qing did not end there. On the scheduled day of the talks, Mu required Ke and Ye to enter through the side gate of the compound of Mingju and Cai, and sit perpendicular to them, in the manner of prospective vassals paying homage to the Son of Heaven, whose will these representatives embodied.140 The Zheng envoys refused to comply, and instead requested treatment as foreign guests, who could use the main gate and face them directly across the room. “There are lands large and small,” Ke defended his stance, “but envoys are actually one body.”141 Due to sharp differences over the preferred ceremony, the imperial ministers and Zheng envoys refused to meet for the next few days. In the end, Mu Tianyan managed to break the impasse by relocating the negotiations to the local Confucian temple. There, Ke and Ye would still enter through the side doors to greet the imperial representatives.142 Mingju and Cai could view this move as an act of subordination toward the emperor, while the Zheng envoys could claim that they were paying their respects to Confucius, something also acceptable to the Qing, since both sides espoused him as a great sage and upheld the Confucian value system.143

During this round of talks, Ke and Ye quietly let the issue of equality drop, and settled upon Zheng’s bottom line of a tributary framework of relations with the Qing:

The land of Taiwan was opened up by his father, Zheng Chenggong, so [Jing] cannot easily bear to abandon it. Once we submit, Taiwan will belong to the imperial court, and our bodies, hair, and skin will all be at its disposal. Our submission lies in the bit of sincerity within our hearts, not in shaving our heads and returning to shore. We are willing to pay tribute along the precedents of Korea.144

The Qing officials agreed to reconsider the envoys’ requests, and, after a meeting among themselves, memorialized the emperor. In Kangxi 8.9 (September 1669), Shengzu allowed Zheng to remain on Taiwan in perpetuity. The imperial edict read:

138 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 254.
139 Ibid.
140 This ritual applied not just to the Zheng envoys, but to all Qing officials, including, on that day, the Fujian civil and military authorities. The Qing seemed to view Taiwan as a prospective inner feudatory. See Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 255.
141 Ibid., 255.
142 Ibid.
143 This interpretation comes from Deng Kongzhao, with which I wholly agree. See Deng Kongzhao, Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan, 119.
144 Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 85.
I recall that Zheng Jing and others had lived for a long time on islands in the sea, and was blocked from the sound of civilization. Now, because our officials went there to summon and soothe him, he has sent his envoys to accompany them. It is highly praiseworthy that he truly desires to submit. If Zheng Jing cherishes and loves Taiwan and cannot bear to abandon it, we can allow him to do what he wants … We can allow him to live there according to his wishes.145

However, the emperor refused to give the island tributary status along the lines of Korea, meaning that Zheng Jing must shave his hair and change his clothes:

Korea has always been a foreign country, but Zheng Jing is a man of the Middle Kingdom. Since he resides on Taiwan, on what basis can we discern his sincerity in submitting if he does not shave his hair? … If he follows [Qing] institutions, shaves his hair, and submits, I will not hesitate to award him high ranks and honors … If he does not shave his hair and submit, Mingju and others should then journey back to Beijing.146

Since Shengzu considered Zheng Jing a direct subject of the emperor, he could not adopt the customs of a foreign country like Korea. As such, he would first have to become an inner feudatory, and make Taiwan an integral part of “China.”

Mingju, Geng, and Zu ordered Mu and Ji to accompany Ke and Ye back to Taiwan with the edict, along with their own letters announcing the concessions.147 Zheng Jing found the offer highly attractive, and seriously considered shaving his hair and changing his clothing. He even sought out Zhu Shugui, the most prominent of the Ming imperial relatives on the island, and hinted to him this intention:

臣祖、父三世，受國家厚恩，不能圖報萬一。何敢自專?惟殿下所命。

Your minister, along with his grandfather and father, have, for three generations, received the munificent grace of this guo [Ming], and is unable to repay it at any chance. How can I decide by myself?

It is only at Your Highness’ command.148

The prince refused with equal subtlety, and threw the ball back into his court,

國家之事，是在將軍。事濟，則卿之惠也；不濟，則孤之命也。孤念先帝殉國之操，願從於九京…

145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 In an alternative account, the Qing authorities held Ke and Ye hostage in Quanzhou, and only summoned Mu and Ji to Taiwan to pressure Zheng Jing into shaving his hair. Highly angered, Zheng abused and imprisoned the envoys, and threatened to launch raids on the Fujian coast if his representatives were not returned. Only then did Mingzhu finally agree to send back Ke and Ye. See Peng, Jinghai zhi, 72. Peng’s story, just like Jiang Risheng’s here, cannot be independently verified. However, I prefer to utilize the latter, since it appears more consistent with the verbal and written exchanges between the two parties, and the briefer narratives found in other sources.
148 Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, Pe bian xiaosheng, 87.
The affairs of the country are all in your hands. If matters succeed, then it is due to your wisdom; if they do not succeed, then it is my life. I recall the late emperor’s decision to die for this guo, and want to follow his example…  

Although Zhu Shugui had been marginalized and enjoyed very little official privilege, he still commanded great respect, and reflected and influenced a significant segment of elite opinion on Taiwan. Even if Zheng Jing overcame his own disinclination to shave his hair, he could not afford to lose his moral high ground, and, along with it, the fragile “glue” of cultural Chinese-ness that held his movement together.

In the end, Zheng firmly decided against changing his customs: “If [the Qing] can follow the example of Korea, then I dare to accept its terms. If it wants us to shave our heads, then I will not change them even to the point of death!” In the face of his resolute refusal to alter his hair and dress, Mu Tianyan and Ji Quan saw little choice but to return to Quanzhou, carrying along his reply letters to Geng Jimao and Mingju. However, the central and Fujian authorities saw no purpose in continuing the negotiations, since Zheng’s demands remained unchanged and need not be reported to the emperor, who already made clear his bottom line. Therefore, at the end of 1669, Mingju and Cai headed back to Beijing, marking an unsuccessful conclusion to the second round of talks.

Failures and Consequences

In both rounds of negotiations, the two sides sincerely sought out a mutual settlement due to their inability and unwillingness to continue their protracted conflict. Although it is true that the Qing court initiated the talks each time, once they began, Zheng Jing’s behavior contradicted the image attributed to him in traditional scholarship of a passive recipient in no mood to compromise with the enemy under any circumstance. In fact, he actively utilized the process to drive home a deal most favorable for his regime, and encouraged it to continue at key moments by withdrawing his garrisons or sending along tribute gifts. Zheng even considered shaving his head when Shengzu granted his request to stay on Taiwan. On the Qing side, the court showed greater flexibility in the second round, with a unified hierarchy of officials answerable directly to the emperor. The reasons why the talks did not succeed had as much to do with principles as with whether the benefits received were worth the sacrifices in principles needed to realize them.

The most fundamental point of digression between the Qing and the Zheng regime lay in hairdos and fashion. For a Manchu-dominated court, altering customs represented a necessary test of its majority Han Chinese subjects’ loyalty to the dynasty. As the Kangxi Emperor admitted, if Zheng did not shave his hair, “on what basis could we discern his sincerity in submitting …?” Yet, Jing feared that if he accepted these conditions, his fate would become completely subject to the whims of an untrustworthy regime. Many Ming loyalist leaders, including his grandfather, Zheng Zhilong, had similarly agreed to surrender and alter their

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149 Ibid. Zhu here appears to refer to the Chongzhen Emperor.
150 Jiang Risheng, *Taiwan waiji*, 256.
151 Taiwan Research Institute et al., *Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an*, 85.
152 Ibid.
customs, only to encounter tragedy at the hands of their new masters. He made clear his mistrust in his final reply to Geng Jimao:

貴朝寬仁無比？遠者不問，以所聞見之事，如方國安、孫可望，豈非竭誠貴朝者？今皆何在？往事可鑑，足為寒心！

None can compare to your dynasty’s tolerance and benevolence? Let me not inquire about those far away. From what I have seen and heard, for example, Fang Guoan and Sun Kewang, are these not men who showed utmost sincerity to your dynasty? Where are they all now? The examples of past affairs are sufficient for me to shiver in my heart!

Since Taiwan lay safely outside the Qing military's reach, however, and since Shengzu had promised Zheng the autonomy he sought, such suspicions could still be overcome.

A far deeper issue involved differing shades of identity as manifested in the hairstyles and fashion. Certainly, both sides agreed upon Taiwan’s “foreign” status vis-à-vis the guo, and marginal position within the tianxia, a point made clear in their exchanges. Mingju and Mu emphasized that Jing “lived alone in a remote wilderness,” or “escaped to a remote place.” In his replies to Kong, Geng, and the central officials, Zheng spoke of the island as “outside of the domain,” or “a remote corner far away overseas, with nothing at all to do with the domain.” Yet, beneath this consensus lay a wide gulf between them in defining “Chinese” identity without a physical “China.”

The Qing authorities could care less about Taiwan, a mere “ball of mud overseas,” but they could not regard Zheng Jing and his regime as equally “foreign.” Unlike the Koreans, he and his elites came mostly from Fujian and Guangdong, spoke their local dialects, and practiced the same customs. The Qing, then, saw them as untransformed internal rebels, so close to its version of “civilized” values, and yet refusing to take the crucial final step of shaving the hair and changing fashion. As Geng Jimao implored to Zheng, “since you, sir, already call yourself a minister, why make your institutions different?” If Zheng agreed to alter his customs, the officials were prepared to offer significant concessions, including opening up

153 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 257; Zheng Yiju, “Zheng Chenggong zhuans,” 26; and Xia, Haiji jiyao, 31. In Zheng Yiju and Xia, this final reply to Geng Jimao appears under the negotiations between Zheng Jing and the Qing in 1662, before his complete withdrawal to Taiwan. However, judging from the content, especially its references to the island as Dongning, I believe that these works have chronologically misplaced the letter. The official name for the island changed only after Zheng abandoned his Mainland bases, while he touched upon topics only brought up in the negotiations of 1669. Therefore, Jiang Risheng’s placement of this letter appears more credible. Fang Guoan 方國安, a key member of the Zhejiang loyalist movement, surrendered to the Qing in 1646, and helped its forces occupy the province before the Manchus executed him and his son. See Peng, Jinghai zhi, 12. Sun Kewang 孫可望 served as a leading commander under the Yongli Emperor. After a serious conflict with Li Dingguo 李定國, another general in the regime, he surrendered to the Qing but died three years later, according to some sources, killed by Manchu soldiers during a hunt. See Wu Weiye 吳偉業, Luqiao jiwen 鹿樵紀聞, TWFVXCK, 127 (1961), 112.

154 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 256, 255.

155 Taiwan Research Institute et al., Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 69–70; Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 256, 257; Zheng Yiju, “Zheng Chenggong zhuans,” 26; and Xia, Haiji jiyao, 31.

156 Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 3, and Deng Kongzhao, Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan, 122.

157 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 255.
trade and granting him Taiwan as a hereditary fiefdom. His continued refusal, on the other hand, represented a threat to the legitimacy of the Manchu ruling class. This challenge became explicitly visible when Ke and Ye landed for talks with Mingju and Cai at Quanzhou. On that day, residents of the entire city came out to gawk at the Zheng envoys’ caps and gowns, and admire again the “majestic presence of Han officials.”\(^{158}\) The prospect of “Chinese” with their hair and outfits preserved could cause discontent among Qing subjects, who might question why they did not enjoy the same privilege.\(^{159}\)

For Zheng Jing, his personal memories of “China” remained powerful, the wounds from its loss never completely healing. In some of his poems, he would lament the “mountains and rivers of my homeland,” which “have all changed colors, and the palaces of the old capital turned into ashes.”\(^{160}\) Elsewhere, he swore to “prepare his weapons daily” as long as “my grand plans [to retake China] have not been achieved.”\(^{161}\) Zhu Shuangyi points to such stanzas to argue that Zheng never wavered in his commitment to Ming restoration, and plotted to counterattack the Mainland throughout his years in Taiwan.\(^{162}\) However, a closer reading of his poetry, juxtaposed to his actual policies, reveal them more as emotional outlets for expressing longing, bitterness, and nostalgia due to the hopelessness of recovery. Moreover, he often revealed resignation to his predicament within the same poems, referring to the Ming as “a former dynasty from times past (昔日先朝)” and Beijing as the “old capital (舊京).”\(^{163}\) In the last line of one verse, after fantasizing about raising an army of brave warriors to expel the invaders, he admits, ironically, “I look up imploringly to behold the imperial carriage [of his ruler], but year after year, I still cannot see it.”\(^{164}\)

More frequent in Jing’s poems are his references to clothing, and its naturalization to Taiwan. He noted, for instance, that “the imperial spirit is finished in the Central Plain, but gowns and caps survive overseas.”\(^{165}\) He also spoke of “gowns and caps in the maritime kingdom,” where “various affairs are managed by separate departments.”\(^{166}\) He brought up fashion again in a celebration of Taiwan’s sinicized landscape:

\(^{158}\) Xia, *Haiji jiyao*, 37.

\(^{159}\) These nostalgic sentiments were widely shared among elites and commoners throughout the empire. When the Korean tribute envoy Hong Myongha 洪命夏 traveled to Beijing in 1664, many of the Han residents, upon seeing his outfit and hair, would “all wear long sighs on their faces. They acted as if wanting to speak, but did not say anything.” Such expressions of regret and envy were still potent even 20 years after the Manchus entered the capital. See Ge, “Da Ming yiguan,” 4.

\(^{160}\) “Zheng Jing,” in *Quan-Tai shi*, 130-1. Zheng Jing’s individual poems are undated, although the entire collection falls within the decade of 1664 to 1674. A clear difference can be noticed between his earlier and later works, written on the eve of his participation in the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories. Both contained references to the recovery of the Central Plain, but the latter (for example, see “Zheng Jing,” 147-1) appears more confident and celebratory in tone.

\(^{161}\) “Yameng er wang yijii,” 129.


\(^{163}\) “Zheng Jing,” 130-1, 166-2.

\(^{164}\) Ibid., 74-1. Besides the ones already cited, see, for example, Ibid., 100-2, 110-5, 122-2, and 166-6.

\(^{165}\) “Yameng er wang yijii,” 129.

\(^{166}\) “Zheng Jing,” 122-3, 130-5.
Zheng Jing’s poems reveal that Taiwan had become the primary focus of his rule, an independent space where both hair and clothing could flourish safe from Qing mutilation.

Their preservation represented a defense of Han ethnic identity and institutions, of an entire way of life that was, in turn, bolstered in terms of filial piety and loyalty. Zheng Jing must protect the body handed down from his forefathers, just as he had to carry on the family business, and defend and develop Taiwan. Moreover, being the island’s ruler, he had to show benevolence and compassion for his people, to educate them and bring them prosperity. In this manner, the Zheng regime was imagining a dynamic new legitimacy built upon a hierarchy of Confucian relationships and obligations, culminating in loyalty to an ethnicity embodied in hair and clothing. Meanwhile, as the prospect for restoration became increasingly remote, the memory of the Ming and geographic “China” in general became decentered, objectified, and historicized. The marginalization of the Ming princes and their supporters, and policies aimed at sinifying Taiwan, represented the concrete embodiments of this discourse. Negotiations clarified and facilitated this process, and brought out two means of institutionalizing this identity: private loyalty to a deceased Ming ruler within a subordinate Qing vassal state or a “new universe outside the boundaries of the domain,” an independent tianxia abroad.169

The Qing negotiators realized the connection between Confucian morality and Han ethnicity, and tried to gain Zheng’s submission by “rewiring” these networks of relationships. In his letter announcing Shengzu’s concessions, Mingju wrote:

Since you already respect the institutions of the empire, and settled upon the righteousness of ruler and minister, it is just like father and son. There has never been a father and son with different gowns and caps. How can there be rulers and ministers with different ceremonial clothes? This matter of shaving the hair is what you must follow respectfully with a single will, and must not allow for any worries. Moreover, in staying on Taiwan, now we respectfully received word of the Emperor’s intention to yield to your filial piety, and treat you according to the ceremonial status of a king. Why, sir, do you not follow the distinction between ruler and minister? In this one act, you fulfill both loyalty and filial piety …170

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167 Literally, “setting the tripods (dingding 定鼎).”
168 “Zheng Jing,” 127-4. In the last line, Zheng probably means that the ancient sages may have never expected an overseas island to become a place of refuge for Han people and their customs.
169 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 256.
170 Ibid., 255.
The Qing tried to harness Zheng’s desire to inherit his family’s legacy, and extend his filial piety and loyalty to the Kangxi Emperor, as expressed in the shaving of hair. Zheng Jing responded to Mingju by bringing up the example of past loyalists who went into self-imposed exile because they refused to serve a second lord. In his final replies to Mingju and Geng, Zheng referred to Jizi 箕子, a legendary sage and minister of the fallen Shang Dynasty, who became enfeoffed in Korea by King Wu 周武王 of the newly established Western Zhou (c. 1050–771 BCE). He pointed to Bo Yi 伯夷 and Shu Qi 叔齊, Shang ministers who hid on a mountain, preferring to eat wild grass and die of starvation rather than accept Zhou food. Zheng compared himself to Zhang Zhongjian 張仲堅, a famed knight-errant who retreated from the Central Land and seized the throne of the Fuyu Kingdom 扶餘 in Manchuria, so the Tang Dynasty (618–907) could enter its golden age. Like these men before him, Zheng Jing accepted the shift in the Mandate of Heaven, and went overseas to “be neighbors daily” with “mud dwellings and my soldiers” in order to avoid interfering with the inevitable prosperity of the Qing. In this manner, he used loyalty in the creation of a “founding legend” for Taiwan.

For Zheng Jing, staying on the island and not changing customs became his regime’s core identity. While the Qing faced a challenge from his assertion of Han values, the successful consolidation of its rule, along with Zheng’s intention to promote peaceful relations, seen in both his words and actions, put it in the better position to grant his conditions with minimal risk. Yet, even if it felt genuine concern with its own legitimacy, the court stubbornly clung to the demand for him to shave his hair without adding sufficiently attractive incentives to overcome his strong disinclination. On the other hand, the Qing did not possess the coercive power to make him concede. Even though it held an absolute military advantage over the Zhengs in terms of size, tax revenues, and manpower, it lacked the relative ability to match their might on the sea. Instead of mobilizing its superior resources to build a strong navy, the Qing disbanded its fleets out of suspicion of defectors from the Zheng side, precisely the people with the necessary expertise on naval matters and enemy conditions to help it gain the upper hand.

As a result, Zheng Jing did not have to fear any negative consequences even if negotiations failed. As he told Mingju, “Gowns and caps are what I have myself, and ranks and honors are also what I possess. How can your words of ‘lavish titles and hereditary status’ move the heart

171 Ibid., 256. For more on Jizi and his enfeoffment, see Sima Qian, Xinjiaoben Shiji sanjiazhu 新校本史記三家注 (Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1985), 1609–1611.
172 Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 256 and Sima, Shi ji, 2121–2129.
of a solitary overseas minister. Even if Zheng willingly agreed to sacrifice what he already had, he would still run into significant opposition from his influential elites, who were equally adamant about preserving their hair and fashion. The Qing, too, realized that Zheng Jing “relied upon the danger of the waves and could not be persuaded,” nor did it plan to make any further concessions.

The Return of Restorationist Discourse

From 1670 to 1674, the two sides of the strait generally ignored each other, while enjoying relative peace and flourishing covert economic ties. However, by the end of the period, tensions between the Qing court and its powerful regional feudatories erupted into a full-scale armed conflict that severely challenged Manchu dominance. In Taiwan, the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories resulted in a radical turnaround in political discourse, as the “China” relegated to historical memory suddenly became once again tangible. At the invitation of Geng Jingzhong, son of his former negotiating counterpart, Zheng Jing reclaimed his bases of Xiamen and Jinmen in 1674. Soon after, in a proclamation to the entire empire, Jing denounced the Manchus as the “remnants of dogs and pigs,” who “caused our Ming tianxia of three hundred years to become barbarian one day. How can there not be any loyal and righteous warriors [to expel them]?”

Cultural and geographic “China” became fused again as he reprioritized restoration to legitimate his regime.

At the same time, he excused his previous policies on Taiwan by comparing himself to Gou Jian, ruler of the Warring States kingdom of Yue, who kept a low profile for years as he secretly prepared to take revenge upon his enemy, the king of Wu. Despite Zheng’s rhetoric, and its later appropriation by different nationalisms, his participation in the rebellion by no means represented an inevitable outcome. In fact, he had effectively disbanded his soldiers on Taiwan and, as Shi Lang noted, neglected them through lack of training. Although Zheng boasted of possessing “a million men, thousands of ships, and mountains of grain” on the island, an envoy of Geng Jingzhong probably hit closer to the truth when he observed that the ruler’s “ships do not amount to a hundred, and his soldiers do not add up to ten thousand.” Evidently, the rebellion caught him unprepared and necessitated a hasty mobilization of his troops.

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176 Ibid.
177 Jiang Risheng, *Taiwan waiji*, 257.
179 The Qing did not put down the rebellion until 1681, when it finally defeated and killed the son and successor of Wu Sangui, the chief instigator of the uprising, who had died a year before the final outcome. For a detailed study of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, see Liu, *Qing dai Sanfan yanjiu*.
Once ready, however, Zheng launched a massive offensive from 1675 to 1680 that, at one point, saw his forces occupy most of Fujian and Guangdong. During this period, he and the Qing continued to hold talks on an almost annual basis. Ironically, the Qing representatives of this period appropriated his former negotiating position, allowing him to preserve his hair and granting him tributary status if he would only leave the Mainland completely. However, the talks failed every time due to the regime’s stubborn refusal to abandon the territories it had occupied. In the end, Shengzu decided to build a navy from scratch to exterminate Zheng Jing once and for all. In 1680, the Qing fleets smashed his navy, once considered invincible, and drove Zheng back to Taiwan, where he died shortly afterward, bitter and hopeless. Taking advantage of a fierce succession struggle in the wake of Zheng’s death, the Kangxi Emperor recalled Shi Lang from obscurity, and put him in charge of an expeditionary force to the island. In 1683, Shi’s navy routed enemy ships in an epic sea battle near the Penghu Islands. Badly shaken, Jing’s young son and heir, Keshuang 克塽 (1670–1717), and his officials decided to surrender unconditionally, and shave their heads in submission. Taiwan became incorporated as an integral part of the Qing Empire, marking the complete redefinition of geographic and cultural “Chineseness” with Manchu ethnic characteristics.

Concluding Remarks

Many scholars point to Zheng Jing’s participation in the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories as evidence that he never relinquished Ming restoration, and merely used Taiwan as a base to prepare for a future campaign. This deterministic line of argument, however, reads what happened later back into the past. During the 1660s, with the Yongli Emperor’s demise and the Qing court’s shift toward internal consolidation, it was certainly not a foregone conclusion that disorder had to break out again. In fact, just one or two years before the rebellion, the Zheng regime was still actively opening up trade with the English East Indies Company and even debated an invasion of the Philippines. The specific reasons for Zheng Jing’s turn back toward the Mainland are worthy of further discussion, although I might suggest that the actualization of his nostalgia for geographic “China,” along with pressure from his elites, may have swayed his opinion.

185 For more on Zheng’s campaigns during this period, see Wong, “Security and Warfare,” 157–164. Dissension among Zheng, who seemed more inclined to return to Taiwan, and his key commanders, who actually came up with the demand to hold onto the captured territories, may have played a role in the breakdown of these talks. For a detailed summary of this series of negotiations, a total of five rounds, see Zhuang Jinde, “Zheng-Qing heyi shimo,” 28–34; Chen Jixian, Bu tíou, 110–117; and Su, “Tanpan yanxi,” 81–83.


188 For more on the interactions between the English and Zheng Jing, see Cao et al., Taiwan-Yingguo maoyi shiliao. Discussions within the regime about a possible invasion of the Philippines can be found in Jiang Risheng, Taiwan waiji, 259.
Yet, his participation in the rebellion by no means prejudged his actions on Taiwan during the previous decade. With the loss of Zheng’s last Mainland bases in 1664, he and the Qing tried to institutionalize a relationship involving Han Chinese on an island both agreed lay outside of “China.” In fact, the two sides made significant concessions, agreeing to open up trade and enter into some form of lord-vassal relationship. Their ability to compromise challenges the notion that commercial networks like the Zheng regime, which dominated maritime Asian trade, remained fundamentally incompatible with land-based empires. Instead, the talks broke down upon the seemingly trivial matter of hairdos and fashion. The Qing saw Zheng Jing and his men as untransformed internal rebels, who had to show their loyalty to the dynasty by shaving their heads. For Zheng, however, the adoption of the Manchu queue amounted to a desecration of the traditional Chinese world order. After fleeing to Taiwan, he staked his entire legitimacy upon creating an identity emphasizing Han cultural practices outside of physical “China” and “naturalizing” them to the island. Confucian moral values, such as filial piety and loyalty, became especially important in constructing an ethnic community manifested in the form of caps and gowns. Through a tributary relationship along the lines of Korea, he could enjoy complete autonomy over these symbolic markers. Therefore, although Zheng Jing could give up Ming restoration and serve a “barbarian” emperor, he could not give up hair and clothing, which symbolized the Han character of his entire regime.