

The Idea to Rule the World: The Mohist Impact of *Jian* 兼 on the *Xunzi* *

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Introduction

This article aims to study Xunzi's 荀子 theoretical effort in synthesizing the ideas and arguments of Mohism into his theory of rituals and social norms (*li* 禮). Xunzi (i. e. Xun Qing 荀卿, also known as Sun Qing 孫卿, ca. 316–235 BCE) is a thinker who lived in the late Warring States period. He has synthesized the preceding various Warring States' thought.¹ This nature of Xunzi's philosophy seemed also to be recognized by Sima Qian 司馬遷 when he wrote Xunzi's biography. He tersely described Xunzi's philosophical task, saying:

荀卿嫉濁世之政 […], 於是推儒墨道德之行事興壞 […].²

Xun Qing, being upset with the governments of a declining age [...], developed (his own tenet) by drawing on the deed and work, the rise and fall of the teachings of Confucianism, Mohism, and that of the Way and the Virtuous Power, [...].

In this passage, Sima Qian enumerated four characters (i. e. *ru* 儒, *mo* 墨, *dao* 道, and *de* 德) which Xunzi learned and incorporated into his doctrine. Among them, it is unclear whether the terms *dao* and *de* referred to the extant text of the *Daodejing* 道德經, viz., the *Laozi* 老子, or whether Sima Qian used the compound *daode* as a shorthand for the contents of the Daoism of his day. But it is beyond our present scope to investigate into what *daode* meant in Sima Qian's usage; what draws our attention here is the fact that Sima Qian enumerated Confucianism and Mohism in his account. Why did he do this instead of just mentioning Xunzi to represent Confucianism?

Whatever his intention was in choosing these four words, it is unquestionable that Sima Qian conceived of Xunzi as the synthesizer of Confucianism and Mohism as well as of one invested in *daode*. Thanks to Liu Xiang's 劉向 careful editing, we seem to have the texts which Han intellectuals including Sima Qian consulted still at our disposal. In his compilation of what he called "New Book of Sun Qing" (*Sun Qing xinshu* 孫卿新書), Liu Xiang omitted only the overlapping part in the 322 chapters of the texts which had circulated under the name of Xunzi, and collated all of the rest.³ This means that we can find clues for why Sima Qian judged Xunzi as the synthesizer of Confucianism and Mohism based upon our analysis on the extant *Xunzi* text.

* I wish to thank Macabe Keliher, Vincent Leung, Victor Seow, Duncan Peterson, Benjamin Gallant, as well as Martin Hanke and Dorothee Schaab-Hanke, for their help in editing.

1 See Sato Masayuki, *The Confucian Quest for Order: The Origin and Formation of the Political Thought of Xun Zi* (Leiden: Brill, 2003). In that monograph, I have attempted to demonstrate that Xunzi was not only a synthesizer of the individual thoughts of his predecessors, but also of the two distinctive discourses (i. e., moral discourse and analytical discourse) dominant in the Warring States period.

2 *Shiji* 史記 (Zhonghua shuju) 74.2348 ("Mengzi Xun Qing liezhuan" 孟子荀卿列傳). See Takigawa Kametarō 瀧川龜太郎, *Shiki kaichū koshō* 史記會注考證 (Tokyo: Tokyo bunrika daigaku, 1958), 74, 946.

3 In his "Xulu" 敘錄 (Preface) to the *Xunzi*, Liu Xiang reports the following: 所校讎中孫卿書凡三百二十二篇。以相校除復重二百九十篇, 定著三十二篇。"In the Imperial Library, the *Sun Qing shu* [to be collated]

There is another clue for this inquiry. The “Wudu” 五蠹 chapter in the *Hanfeizi* 韓非子 says:

今儒、墨皆稱先王兼愛天下。⁴

Presently, both Confucians and Mohists argue that the ancient Sage Kings concurrently loved the people of All-under-Heaven.

Han Fei was a younger contemporary of Xunzi. It is uncertain whether Han Fei had Xunzi in mind or not when he wrote this passage, but if we take into consideration his use of the term *jin* 今 (present), it is no doubt that he was describing the situation of Confucianism and Mohism during his own age, which is also that of Xunzi. Indeed, a careful investigation into Xunzi’s use of the term *jian* and *jian’ai* would illustrate that Han Fei’s remark can also be applied to the case of Xunzi. Moreover, by elevating the term *jian* to a level of theorization even higher than the Mohists did, Xunzi seemed to have gone further in attempting to establish his own political doctrine for the ruler of the world.

Both Sima Qian and Han Fei, together with modern Sinological scholars, agree on the fact that Confucianism and Mohism of the Warring States period shared a considerable set of common values and ideas. As early as in 1896, Nishiwaki Gyokuhō 西脇玉峰 published an article, titled “Jun Boku no idō” 荀墨の異同 (The Similarities and Differences Between Xunzi’s Thought and Mohism).⁵ He summarized the affinity between Mohism and Xunzi’s thought in seven points.⁶ Although a number of scholars have dealt with this topic for more than a century, most of their attention was paid to rhetoric and logical matters. These articles, similar to Nishiwaki’s article, simply enumerated common elements of both texts.⁷ In contrast to this, the present article attempts to contextualize Mohist ideas incorporated in the *Xunzi* text, with a focus on the terms *jian* and *jian’ai*.

This article is divided into five sections: in the first three parts, I will deal with the textual issues concerning the formation of the so-called “Jian’ai” triad, namely, the “Jian’ai shang” 兼愛上, “Jian’ai zhong” 兼愛中, and “Jian’ai xia” 兼愛下 chapters. I will show that the “Jian’ai” triad had certain ideas in common. Yet, each text seems to have been compiled independently between the early to mid-fourth century BCE, but not necessarily in a linear order, i. e. “shang”→“zhong”→“xia” as indication of their chronological order. In the fourth part, I analyze how Mohists developed their ideas of *jian* and *jian’ai*, and I will demonstrate that the Mohists had crystallized the idea of *jian* in order to promote their image of Heaven and of the ideal ruler, who was to rule the world as Heaven’s agent. In the last part, based on the discussion of previous parts, I examine Xunzi’s use of

were 322 chapters in total. I collated these and removed 290 duplicate chapters. Thus, it finally became a text of thirty-two chapters.” Unless stated otherwise, all quotations from the *Xunzi* in this article are based on the *Sibu beiyao* 四部備要 edition (Rpt.: Taipei: Zhonghua, 1970).

4 *Hanfeizi* 49, “Wudu”. All quotations from *Hanfeizi* in this article are based on the (Wenyuange) Siku quanshu 文淵閣四庫全書 edition (Rpt.: Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 1983).

5 Nishiwaki Gyokuhō, “Jun boku no idō”, *Tōyō testugaku* 東洋哲學 3-7 (1896), 4-7, 4-8, 4-9 (1897).

6 These are: (1) positive views on human desire; (2) respect of *fa* 法 (law or regulations of government); (3) advocacy of utilitarian merit; (4) possession of anti-fatalism; (5) exaltations of the Sage Emperor Yu 禹; (6) preference for discussing the art of war; and (7) providing an analysis on debates and rhetoric.

7 Since I have already provided a detailed review on previous comparative studies on Mohism and Xunzi’s thought, I do not repeat it here. See Sato Masayuki 佐藤將之, “Ribei jindai moxue yanjiu zhi jueqi yu Zhong-Ri xuezhe zhi Mo Xun sixiang guanxi lun tanxi” 日本近代墨學研究之崛起與中日學者之墨荀思想關係論探析, *Remmen luncong* 人文論叢 2010.12 (forthcoming).

jian-related phrases and arguments, and attempt to show that concerning the image of rulers who are characterized by the term *jian*, Xunzi basically followed the Mohist image of the ideal ruler. Furthermore, by incorporating the idea of *jian* into his discourse on *li* (rituals and social norms), Xunzi has established his theory of self-cultivation for rulers, as a means for them to become the ideal ruler of the world.

1 Is the Subject of “Jian’ai” Chapters *jian’ai*?

The doctrines *jian’ai* 兼愛 (Kingly love for all⁸) and *feigong* 非攻 (against-war) have long been regarded as the two most essential parts among the so-called “Ten Doctrines” in Mohist thought. The doctrine *jian’ai* became a slogan in its very early stage (i. e. in the early Warring States period), as is seen in a criticism by Mencius,⁹ and Liang Qichao 梁啟超 proclaimed that *jian’ai* would occupy the fundamental place in Mohism.¹⁰

In addition to this early affirmation on its cardinal position in the whole of Mohist thought, contemporary scholars also see the *jian’ai* doctrine as the most original part and the starting point for its theoretical development. Watanabe Takashi 渡邊卓, based upon his very detailed cross-textual analysis on concepts, rhetoric, subjects, and their relations with recorded historical events both in the whole text and other early Chinese texts, argued that the “Jian’ai shang” chapter and the “Feigong shang” chapter are the oldest layers of the extant *Mozǐ*.¹¹ This observation has been accepted by both Yoshinaga Shinjirō 吉永慎二郎, who carefully examined the text with a close focus upon its reciprocal influence with the thought of Mencius,¹² and Karen Desmet, who utilized statistical methods to look at the number and frequency of compound words and

8 In section 4, I will explain my reasons for this translation instead of adopting “universal love”, “inclusive care”, etc.

9 See the following famous two examples in the *Mencius*, in which the term (or slogan) of *jian’ai* has been associated with the name of Mohists, or with Mozi himself: 墨氏兼愛，是無父也。（“Teng Wengong xia”）；墨子兼愛，摩頂放踵利天下為之。（“Jinxin shang”）。Another example can be seen in *Zhuangzi* 莊子 29, “Dao Zhi”: 墨者兼愛，五紀六位將有別乎。There is another example of *jian’ai* in the *Xunzi*, which I will discuss in part 5 of this article. Unless stated otherwise, in this article all quotations from the *Mencius* are based on the Sibu beiyao edition (Taipei: Zhonghua, 1965), quotations from the *Zhuangzi* are based on the (Wenyuange) Siku quanshu edition (Rpt.: Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 1983).

10 Liang Qichao, *Mozǐ xue’an* 墨子學案 (Shanghai: Zhonghua, 1923), 8. However, his early work on Mohism is owed in part to Takase Takejiro’s monograph *Yōboku tetsugaku* 楊墨哲學 (Tokyo: Kinkōdō, 1902). See Liang’s own annotated remark in his earliest work, “Zimozi xueshuo” 子墨子學說, *Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報 49 (1904), 7. Takase’s work was the first articulation of the *philosophical* system of Mohism on the basis of applying Western scholarly methods developed during the latter half of the nineteenth century. But Takase himself considered the idea of Heaven to be the foundation of its whole philosophical system. See Takase, *Yōboku tetsugaku*, 77.

11 Watanabe Takashi, *Kodai chūgoku shisō no kenkyū* 古代中國思想の研究 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1973), 514–515, 700–701. It is worth noting that, in spite of his meticulous textual analysis, Watanabe’s interpretations on contextual meanings and the historical significance in his explanations on Mohist ideas are often deduced from his own hypotheses, rather than from a literal reading of texts. His view of the development of Warring States’ history and thought was adopted from Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉.

12 Yoshinaga Shinjirō, *Sengoku shisōshi kenkyū: Juka to Bokuka no shisōshi teki kōsho* 戰國思想史研究—儒家と墨家の思想史的交渉 (Tokyo: Hōyū, 2004), 574–585.

phrases to detect the relative earliness and lateness of the period of the composition of each chapter.¹³ With this understanding of the evolutionary process of its textual formation, we see that the doctrine of *jian'ai* has been conceived of as the crucial part of the Mohist philosophical system as well as the *earliest* and thus *original* part in its whole textual formation.

However, in spite of the fact that scholars widely agree on the point that the doctrine of *jian'ai* is the earliest part or at least one of the essential parts in the Mohist doctrine, scholars have also noticed a complication: the compound term *jian'ai* does not appear either in the “Jian'ai shang” chapter nor the “Jian'ai zhong” chapter, and it only appears once in the “Jian'ai xia” chapter. In spite of this “lack” of examples, can we still reasonably assume that the early Mohists urged the doctrine of *jian'ai* without the use of the compound term *jian'ai*? Although most of the scholars have implicitly affirmed this position, Ding Weixiang 丁為祥, Yoshinaga Shinjirō, and Carine Defoort have taken this fact very seriously, and put this question as one of central issues in their inquiries.

Ding Weixiang assumed three possible reasons for why the term *jian'ai* has not appeared in the oldest part of the “*Jian'ai*” triad. These three possibilities are: (1) Mohism initially composed the idea of “world-wide promotion of mutual love and care” (*jian xiang ai* 兼相愛), from which the idea of *jian'ai* has come into being. (2) The compound term *jian'ai* is simply an abbreviation of the phrase *jian xiang ai*. And (3) Mohists initially bore in mind and practiced the idea of *jian'ai*, and the phrase *jian xiang ai* reflected the historical development of its very idea and its adaption to discourse on social matters. After its enumeration, Ding rejects the first and second reasoning and takes the third one as a reflection of historical facts. Ding presupposes that the original idea in Mozi's thought is “universal and non-selfish love to people” (*boda wusi zhi ai* 博大無私之愛), which is a substantial in the concept of *jian'ai*, even though the term itself was not used. Ding argues that this ideal meaning of *jian'ai* is evident in the early stage of the Mohist doctrine. Ding is convinced that the core idea of *jian'ai*, i. e. “universal and non-selfish love to people”, must have been established in the beginning, and only after its establishment the idea of *jian xiang ai* could be developed from the proto-*jian'ai* idea, namely, “universal and non-selfish love to people”.¹⁴

On the other hand, Yoshinaga Shinjirō has arrived at an opposite conclusion. At first, Yoshinaga rejects the possibility that Mozi himself initially had the idea of *jian'ai*. In order to demonstrate this point, Yoshinaga draws our attention to the last passage found in the “Jian'ai shang” chapter. The whole passage reads as follows:

故子墨子曰：「不可以不勸愛人」者，此也。¹⁵

That is why Master Mozi said: “I would have no choice but to advise [people] to love others.”

13 Karen Desmet, “The Growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi”, *Oriens Extremus* 45 (2006), 99–118. Her main concern is on which chapters of the triad (“shang”, “zhong”, “xia”) are earlier or later. Desmet concludes that, from the results gained by raising statistical data, in most part the “zhong” chapters group seems to be the latest of the triad, which, as Desmet also points out, has initially been pro-pounded by Watanabe Takashi's research.

14 Ding Weixiang, “Moja jian'ai guan de yanbian” 墨家兼愛觀的演變, *Journal of Shanxi Normal University (Social Science)* 28.4 (1999), 70–76.

15 *Mozi*, “Jian'ai shang”. Unless stated otherwise, all citations from the *Mozi* are based on the Kanbun taikēi 漢文大系 edition of Sun Yirang's 孫詒讓 *Mozi jiangū* 墨子間詁 (Tokyo: Fuzanbo, 1913).

Yoshinaga argues that we have to focus upon this passage to know Mozi's *own* thought, because this is the only part that can be associated with Mozi's own utterance throughout the "Jian'ai" triad. According to Yoshinaga's understanding, the idea that Mozi himself proposed was that people must love others beyond familial and communal relationships, but the author of "Jian'ai shang" transformed Mozi's own idea of "love to others" into a politically formulated doctrine in which an imaginary sage ruler would promote the mutual love on a world-wide scale. In this understanding, Yoshinaga maintains, the idea of mutual love expressed with the term *jian* (to be promoted on worldwide scale) was an invention by the author of the "Jian'ai shang" chapter, not Mozi himself. Nonetheless, whether or not the date of the "Jian'ai shang" chapter was composed earlier than the rest of the text, as far as the use of the term *jian'ai* in early Mohism is concerned, Mozi himself only proposed the concept of *ai* (love others); it was the author of the "Jian'ai shang" chapter who propounded the proto-*jian'ai* doctrine that had been created by combining the original Mo Di's concept of "love to others beyond the restriction by familial and communal relationships" and the concept of "on the worldwide scale (promotion)" proposed by the author of the "Jian'ai shang" chapter.

While the two viewpoints by Ding and Yoshinaga do not seem to be reconcilable with each other concerning their interpretation on the initial meaning of "*jian'ai*," both would agree on the following two points (1) that the *jian'ai* doctrine has been developed in the process from the "Jian'ai shang" chapter through the "Jian'ai zhong" chapter down to the "Jian'ai xia" chapter, and in this process, the originally "pure" moral concept of "*ai* = love others" (Yoshinaga) or "*jian'ai* = universal and non-selfish love to people" (Ding) has been transformed into a doctrine which would be more flexible in responding to political and secular claim usually from the ruling side.¹⁶

Since Carine Defoort initially aimed to analyze the characteristics of persuasion in early Chinese intellectual discourse, her main attention is directed not so much towards the socio-political adaptation of the concept of *jian'ai* and the various functions of the term *jian* in the "Jian'ai" triad, but a kind of intellectual dynamism of what she calls "the growing scope" in the Mohist use of the term of *jian*. In fact, as is indicated above, it is more or less inevitable for Defoort to pay attention to the concept of *jian* rather than the compound *jian'ai* because the term *jian'ai* does not appear in both "Jian'ai shang" and "Jian'ai zhong" chapters. Defoort, together with Ding and Yoshinaga, assumes that these triad chapters have been developed in the order from "shang" through "zhong" to "xia". This assumption has led her to trace the different conceptual functions of the concept of *jian* among "Jian'ai" triad chapters.

By presenting her evolutionary picture of the concept of *jian*, Defoort argues that the center of the debate in these triad chapters is not the term of "caring" (i. e. love or *ai*¹⁷) itself, but its scope, and more specifically, the changing nature and value of reciprocity. Defoort points out that, compared with the content of "Jian'ai shang" and "Jian'ai zhong", the "Jian'ai xia" chapter uses the term *jian* to focus on the issue of the relationship between men and Heaven, and in

16 Worth noting is also Watanabe Takashi's understanding of the process of the evolution of the Warring States' Mohist doctrine *as a whole* as one shaped by interactions of the Warring States' lords, e. g. of the Qin 秦, rather than one applied by small cities defending themselves against these lords. He repeats this claim many times throughout his book.

17 Defoort translates the term *jian'ai* as "inclusive care" in most of her articles so that I have left her rendering unchanged despite my own differing interpretation of that term.

particular, the way of how the practice of equal caring of people is related with its conception of Heaven. In other words, in the “Jian’ai xia” chapter, Heaven not only responds to humans but also expects response from them in the form of “inclusive caring” for others. In such a way, Defoort continues, humans have a heavy moral burden to fulfill. Defoort concludes that the early Mohist tenet of “caring for others” has *not* been directed towards compromises with political authorities of their time; its central idea has been radicalized in the course of its evolution. Defoort’s analysis aptly suggests the strong probability that the primary value in their initial arguments, such as the practice of “mutual love” and “anti-war”, was kept intact at least in its early development, whether or not the formation of the “Jian’ai” triads took a long or a short period in its evolution. In her argument that in the “Jian’ai” triad humans are required to respond to Heaven appropriately by practicing “caring for others,” Defoort also points out that that such a conception of Heaven can be found in the “Tianzhi” 天志 triad, too.¹⁸ This observation can lead us to assume that the term *jian* should play a very important role in providing Mohist doctrine with a sort of theoretical unity, or at least a consistency among different doctrines not only among the “Jian’ai” triad and the “Tianzhi” triad, but also among the so-called “core chapters”. To put it another way, was the concept of *jian* perhaps the key idea that would enable ten different doctrines to be integrated into a set of consistent, or at least closely inter-related, parts of the Mohist tenet? If so, in what way would this integration have been achieved? This is the question that I will explore in this article. Before we do that, however, let us look at one more piece of research, which is also very illuminating on this issue.

Chiba Hitoshi’s 千葉仁 research persuasively demonstrates that the doctrines of *jian’ai*, *feigong*, *tianzhi*, *shangtong* 尚同,¹⁹ and *minggui* 明鬼²⁰ should work in a complementary manner to propel Mohist ideas of *yi* 義 (morality/justice) and *li* 利 (welfare) to the world.²¹ Chiba goes further to discuss how the two main Mohist ideas of *jian’ai* and *yi* were related to the discussions in triads that dealt with Heaven and ghosts. The will of Heaven and the power of spirits and ghosts, Chiba maintains, are coherently regarded as the means for driving (and often threatening) rulers to promote the inculcation of morality/justice (*yi*), mutual love, as well as peace and order throughout the empire, so that the welfare (*li*) of the (ruled) people could be attained. Chiba’s argument that the author(s) of the “Shangtong” triad and the “Tianzhi” triad were apparently not concerned with the establishment of a highly hierarchical theocratic regime for its own sake was a serious challenge against Watanabe Takashi’s well-known evolutionary picture of Mohism. Watanabe posited that the author(s) of the “Shangtong” triad and the “Tianzhi” triad represented the last stage of the development of Mohist doctrine, which took place towards the end of the Warring States period, and that their basic value orientation became congenial with dynastic regimes such as that of the Qin at the expense of early ideals of doctrinal claims (i. e. *jian’ai* and *feigong*). Chiba’s article was published in 1967, and to the best of my knowledge, Japanese scholars

18 See Carine Defoort, “The Growing Scope of *Jian* 兼: Difference Between Chapter 14, 15 and 16 of the *Mozzi*”, *Oriens Extremus* 45 (2006), 119–140.

19 The term *shangtong* can be translated as “exaltation of [hierarchical] integration [of the world]” and relates to the moral standard set by and descended from Heaven.

20 The term *minggui* can be translated as “clarification of [the existence and the crucial role of] spirits and ghosts [in rewarding and punishing human deeds]”.

21 See Chiba Hitoshi, “Bokuka shisô ni okeru mokuteki to shudan: ken’ai ron to tenshi ron” 墨家思想における目的と手段—兼愛論と天志論, *Shukan Tôyô gaku* 集刊東洋學 18 (1967), 51–65.

of Mohist thought have not taken up Chiba's viewpoint, but largely ignored it. One main reason for such "indifference" might be that Watanabe's evolutionary picture of Mohism has long been broadly and deeply supported by Japanese scholars until the recent excavation of a bamboo manuscript titled "Guishen zhi ming" 鬼神之明.²² Indeed, Watanabe and his followers were firmly convinced that the main ideas in the "Tianzhi" triad and the "Minggui" triad should have belonged to the latest stage (i. e. at the end of the Warring State period) in its development. However, the discovery of "Guishen zhi ming" has provided negative evidence against Watanabe's hypothesis to the extent that it shares very similar concepts, motifs, and arguments with those in the "Minggui" chapter. From this fact it follows that the notion of *minggui*, namely the belief in the trans-human intelligence and power of ghosts and spirits to reward and punish human actions, has been one of the main intellectual issues as early as the early-mid Warring States period. Although Chiba himself had not expressed his own opinion regarding the date of the philological formation of these triads, Yoshinaga's research, which was proceeded in the 1990s, assumed that the fundamental part of these three chapters were formed in the mid 4th century, one hundred years earlier than Watanabe's dating.

In sum, based upon the above discussion, let us confirm the following three points: First, even though we admit the possibility that the so-called "ten triads" have been accumulated, rewritten, and recompiled over a certain course of time, the materialization of the ten doctrines, whether they were in oral or written form, should have been attained for a shorter range of time than Watanabe had conjectured. Second, the arguments in "Shangtong", "Tianzhi", and "Minggui" triads have been coherent in promoting the *jian'ai* and *feigong* doctrines. And third, the term *jian* which appears in both the "Jian'ai" triad and the "Tianzhi" triad can provide initially different subjects or doctrines with a certain kind of unity and coherence. Bearing these three points in mind, we will focus on the term *jian* in the *Mozzi*, and other Warring States' texts.

2 The Use of the term *Jian* in Early Confucian texts and the *Mencius*

According to the *Shuowen jiezi* 說文解字 lexicon, in the *li* 林 radical section the character *jian* is depicted as the motion of "grasping two bunches of straws".²³ For the most part, the character is used as a verb (and sometimes as an adverb) to mean "to possess both A and B", "to hold two offices concurrently", "to include", "to annex another territory or country to one's own", etc.

If we examine the use of this character in canonical texts such as the *Shu* 書 (Documents), the *Shi* 詩 (Odes) and the *Chunqiu* 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals), all of which have probably taken textual form by the Warring States period, we seldom find the kind of conceptualized or valorized usage that we see in the *Mozzi*. In the *Lunyu* 論語 (Analects), it appears only once, and it is used negatively.²⁴

22 Ma Chengyuan 馬承源 (ed.), *Shanghai bowuguan cang zhanguo chushu (5)* 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書 (五) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2005), 149–159, 305–321. As for the impact of studies on Mohism in Japan, see Asano Yūichi 淺野裕一, "Guishen zhi ming' yu *Mozzi* 'Minggui'" 鬼神之明與《墨子〈明鬼〉》, in Asano Yūichi (trans. by Sato Masayuki), *Shangbo chujian yu xianqin sixiang* 上博楚簡與先秦思想 (Taibei: Wanjuanlou, 2008), 83–101.

23 *Shuowen jiezi* 7A: 兼, 并也。从又持林。兼持二林; 兼一禾。

24 *Lunyu* 11: 由也兼人, 故退之。

In the bamboo manuscripts from the Guodian Chu tomb (Guodian Chu *jian* 郭店楚簡), the term *jian* appears only twice, namely in the “Yucong III” 語叢三. It appears in the two compounds *jianxing* 兼行 and *li bi jian* 禮必兼. These usages show a sort of ethical implication to the extent that it is used in combination with such terms as *xing* 行 (practice or behavior) and *li* 禮 (rituals and respect).

What attracts our attention here are three occurrences of the term in the text entitled “Caomo zhi chen” 曹沫之陳 (Cao Mo’s Explication on Military Affairs) in the Shanghai Museum Chu bamboo manuscripts.²⁵ They are: *jian ren* 兼人, *jian’ai wanmin* 兼愛萬民, and *jian wei* 兼畏. All of them appear in the context of a discussion about statecrafts of the state of Lu 魯, where Cao Mo 曹沫 presents the way for maintaining a country. Repeated use of the term in a single dialogue, and a particular mention of the idea of *jian’ai*, suggest that by the time the author wrote or recorded this argument, the term *jian* had become more or less a kind of theoretical term for designing ideal policies.

Let us take a closer look now at the phrase *jian’ai wanmin* (to love all the people of a country). Firstly, similarity in style and values as well as the inclusion of identical texts (i. e. “Ziyi” 緇衣 and “Xingqinglun” 性情論) in both the Guodian and Shanghai manuscripts show an intellectual affinity between the two, and this in turn suggests that the ideas seen in the Shanghai manuscripts represent the thought of early- to mid-Warring States period. As such, it is highly possible that by the time that this text was written the Mohist ten doctrines had already taken form. In particular, the phrase *jian’ai* appears in very positive sense in the “Caomo zhi chen”, and so this allows us to imagine a strong connection between its author and Mohism.

However, as in the case of the “Guishen zhi ming”, there is no concrete evidence to prove that it was written by Mohists. In fact, two significant differences can be found in the usage of *jian’ai* between the “Caomo zhi chen” and the *Mozǐ*. First, as I will discuss below, the object of *jian’ai* in the *Mozǐ* is usually *tianxia* 天下 (All-under-Heaven), or all the people of the *tianxia*, while in the “Caomo zhi chen”, the term *wanmin* 萬民, literally, “ten thousand people”, is limited to only the people of one country (e. g., the state of Lu 魯).²⁶ Second, the policy of *jian’ai wanmin* in “Caomo zhi chen” is proposed as a necessary condition for enabling a country to wage warfare. In the Mohist text, the idea of *jian’ai* is directly connected with its “anti-war” doctrine, and it never argued for waging warfare except for historical cases of the ancient sage kings such as King Tang and King Wu. These two points suggest that in the early- to mid-Warring States period thinkers used the term *jian’ai* without any Mohist connotation. Nevertheless, the phrase *jian’ai* in both texts basically denotes a kind of “Kingly love”, or the virtue of a ruler, rather than a love among ordinary people.

In contrast, Mencius harshly criticizes the idea of *jian’ai* as that of Mohist in two places. These passages are: “The Mohist doctrine of ‘the equal love to all’ makes nothing of the distinction

25 Ma Chengyuan (ed.), *Shanghai bowuyuan cang zhanguo chusbu (4)* 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書(四) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2004), 89–156, 239–285.

26 A. C. Graham and Yoshinaga Shinjirō observe that the compound term *wanmin* 萬民 appears only in the “zhong” chapters, or what Graham calls “H” chapters of each triad. Thus, Yoshinaga calls the authors of this sequence group of chapters *Banmin kei bokuka* 萬民系墨家 (Mohists of the “Ten-thousand-People” School). See Yoshinaga, *Sengoku shisōshi kenkyū*, 119–128. Also see Graham, *Division in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of Mo-tzu* (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985), 15.

between one father (and other people)”²⁷ and “Master Mo [promoted his doctrine of] ‘the equal love to all’ [...] to benefit the world”.²⁸ Judging from Mencius’ way of arguing, the term *jian’ai* seemed to have been used more or less as a “slogan” to appreciate or depreciate Mohism as a whole. Although it is highly probable that Mencius did not or would not understand its meaning in the way Mohists had proposed, Mencius himself uses *jian* in a more or less conceptualized way in his own discussion. In “Gaozi shang”, Mencius says:

人之於身也，兼所愛，兼所愛則兼所養也。無尺寸之膚不愛焉，則無尺寸之膚不養也。

There is no part of himself which a man does not love, and as he loves all, so he must nourish all. There is not an inch of skin which he does not love, and so there is not an inch of skin which he will not nourish.²⁹

In discussing self-cultivation, the term *jian* suggests the wholeness of *ai* (love/care) and *yang* 養 (nourishment). There is also another usage, as we see in the following passage:

古之人，得志，澤加於民；不得志，脩身見於世。窮則獨善其身，達則兼善天下。

If a person [of excellence] in the old days is promoted to a position in which he can embody his idea, what he [primarily] did was to benefit his people; if the same person was not promoted, then he cultivated his own personality so that he became a model for the people of his day. If such a person stayed in destitute or political difficulty [e. g. exile], then he would have improved his own self; if he was in a high and noble position, then he would have prompted goodness in All-under-Heaven.

In these passages, Mencius attempted to express a kind of “completeness” or “wholeness” in idealized behaviors (*jian suo ai* 兼所愛) or situations (*jianshan* 兼善). Especially from the latter example in which the passages “to benefit [his] people” (*zhejia yu min* 澤加於民) and “if he was in a high and noble position, then he would have prompted goodness in All-under-Heaven” (*da zhe jianshan tianxia* 達則兼善天下) exist in a complementary relationship to each other. This describes the situation that if a morally motivated person is to be promoted up to a ruling position, he should never fail to practice *jianshan* all over the world. As I will show below, such usage of the term *jian* in which it is closely associated with the welfare of the people of All-under-Heaven, is fairly congenial with the Mohist conceptual relationship between *jian* and *li* 利 (welfare).³⁰ The consideration of these two points, namely, the appearance of the term *jian’ai* and the conceptualization of *jian*, are in close association with the term “All-under-Heaven” in arguments made by Mencius, and this strongly suggests that by the time of Mencius, the Mohists had already conceptualized the term *jian* as constituting their doctrine in which they would advocate the idea of *ai* 愛 and promote their contra-war campaign on a worldwide scale.

27 墨氏兼愛，是無父也。（“Teng Wengong xia”）.

28 墨子兼愛 [...] 利天下。（“Jinxin shang”）

29 See James Legge (trans.): *The Work of Mencius* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 1960), 416.

30 Here, Mencius seems to carefully avoid the use of the term *li* through which the idea in the whole passage becomes a rephrase of *jiào xiāng lì* 交相利 (world-wide promotion of mutual welfare of people) in the Mohist doctrine. It is more reasonable to assume that Mencius was very conscious of the Mohist doctrine of *jiào xiāng lì* than to assume that Mencius contrived the idea of *zhe jia yu min* without being aware of it.

3 Issues on the Textual Relationship among the “Jian’ai” Triad

If we assume that the *jian’ai* doctrine had been established by the time of Mencius in the late fourth century BCE, then we must ask if this observation is not more or less consistent with the viewpoint that the “Jian’ai” triad were already in use for a length of time. If we take Yoshinaga’s point that even in the earliest, the “Jian’ai shang” chapter, only a single passage “I would have no choice but to advise [people] to love others” (*bu ke yi bu quan ai ren* 不可以不勸愛人) reflects what Mozi himself has advocated, then the other two parts represent the thought of those who belonged to generations after Mozi. If so, the possibility that the “Jian’ai shang” chapter was compiled in the time of Mozi’s own disciples is not very likely. On the other hand, Mozi himself probably died around 400 BCE, and the approximate date of the chapter’s compilation is sometime in the mid-fourth century, which means that the early Mohists could very well have recorded their master’s words.

The hypothesis that the *jian’ai* doctrine was established much later has some intractable problems if Mencius was a youth in the mid-fourth century. To conclude from his interlocutors’ names, e. g. King Hui of Liang 梁惠王, and King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王, etc., it is fairly certain that Mencius’ social activity reached its zenith during 320–310 BCE. If we presume that the “Jian’ai shang” chapter materialized *at the earliest* in the mid-fourth century, and if we also admit a certain time range for the formation of the “Jian’ai” triad, then we have to think of the possibility that the parts of discussion only found in “Jian’ai zhong” or “Jian’ai xia” took form only after the time of Mencius. If we take into consideration another fact, namely that almost all contemporary scholars working on Mohism agree to the point that the “Jian’ai shang” chapter is the earliest portion of all the Mohist texts, then we have to reckon with the possibility that only “Jian’ai shang” was compiled during the mid-fourth century, the time of Mencius, and the contents of all the other chapters in the extant *Mozi* materialized during the time of Mencius’ old age, or even after his death. But this assumption, especially the latter one, must be rejected immediately by our new understanding based on the excavation of “Guishen zhi ming”, the impact of which on building hypotheses on the development of the Mohist ten doctrines I have pointed out above. To summarize the relevant point to our concern, this archeological knowledge has shown that even the “Minggui” chapter which Watanabe considered to be the latest part of its altogether ten doctrines, must be regarded as a reflection of the intellectual discourse *as early as the mid-fourth century BCE*.³¹

To take another example to support the materialization of Mohist texts around the time of Mozi’s death, let us take a closer look at the Guodian Chu excavated manuscript, “Lu Mugong wen Zisi” 魯穆公問子思. This text records a dialogue between Duke Mu of Lu 魯穆公 and Zisi 子思 (Kong Ji 孔伋), a grandson of Confucius. Since this manuscript is from a tomb sealed around 300 BCE, it is safe to assume that the text was written not long after the time of Zisi’s death, if it was not an actual record of that dialogue. Since Zisi must have been a contemporary of Mozi,³² it is highly probable that dialogues between Mozi and his disciples have also been

31 Based on his analysis on the contents of “Guishen zhi ming”, Asano Yūichi regards “Guishen zhi ming” as a part of the *Mozi* and thus concludes that the Mohist ten doctrines were advocated by Mozi himself. See Asano, *Zhangguo chujian yu xianqin sixiang* 100.

32 It is no doubt that Zisi was born before Confucius’ death (479 BCE). We can infer this from the fact that Zisi’s father Kong Li 孔鯉 died before Confucius. Hence, Zisi must have been an earlier contemporary to Mozi.

written no later than the “Lu Mugong wen Zisi” had been written. Thus we may quite safely assume that it were the mid-fourth century BCE Mohists who recorded Mozi’s deeds and words.

For more than a century, scholars argued about the issue of why each of the “ten doctrines” have three chapters. One side assumes that these three triads represent the different thoughts of three sects, and the other side that the characteristic of thought in those three texts can be traced to the chronological evolution of the Mohist doctrine. Here, I do not intend to involve myself with such a big issue, rather in the rest of this section, I want to limit my inquiry to the point on whether there is any incongruence of ideas within the “Jian’ai” chapter, and if so, whether or not we can presume that such difference of thought among those triads belonged to a substantially different stage of thought in its chronological evolution. I believe that the main content of the ten doctrines was more or less shared by all the Mohists of the mid-fourth century, and the extant texts of the triads were derived from that common origin. In the final compilation of each doctrine, they wrote down their own ideas, rather than referring to other parts of the triad.

When comparing the “Jian’ai” chapters, the first thing that draws our attention is the difference in size. The “Jian’ai xia” chapter is four times larger than that of “Jian’ai shang”.³³ Does this fact demonstrate any fundamental difference of thought between them? Or do these parts have to be regarded as a minor increase? According to my reading, although there can be observed relatively older and newer layers of arguments in the “Jian’ai” triad, it is still difficult based upon the observable difference to argue that the triad came into being in a linear process such as “shang”→“zhong”→“xia”. Rather, major differences among them, especially between “Jian’ai zhong” and “Jian’ai xia”, is restricted to the range of elaboration or augment of evidences which can support the common points the different authors of the triad shared.

Focusing on the difference of thought among the “Jian’ai” triad, we can see different attitudes between the author of “Jian’ai shang” and authors of “Jian’ai zhong” and “Jian’ai xia” in dealing with the term *li* 利 (profit/welfare).³⁴ As Watanabe emphasized, in the “Jian’ai shang” chapter, by the term *li* the author basically means “one’s own profit,” which would inevitably cause social discordance, while in “Jian’ai zhong” and “Jian’ai xia” chapters the term *li* appears in the phrase: “to raise the welfare of the world” (*xing tianxia zhi li* 興天下之利) and “to proliferate mutual profits” (*jiao xiang li* 交相利) in which it means welfare of the world or the ruled people. Here, I question whether the author of “Jian’ai shang” treats the term *li* negatively or not. In other words, for the author of “Jian’ai shang”, does *li* only mean profit for a selfish individual? Did not the author also leave open the possibility that the term could refer to the people or the world?

In “Jian’ai shang”, the author advocates the necessity of *xiang’ai* 相愛 (mutual love). In the beginning, the author inquires into the cause of social disorder, and says: “Social disorder causes from *bu xiang ai* (people do not care for others)”, and in its conclusion, the author proclaims:

故天下兼相愛則治；交相惡則亂。

Thus, if [a ruler] makes the people of the world love each other, then social order will be brought about in All-under-Heaven; if he makes them hate each other, then the social order of All-under-Heaven disintegrates.

33 According to Karen Desmet, “Jian’ai shang” consists of 563, “Jian’ai zhong” of 1307, and “Jian’ai xia” of 2720 characters. See Desmet, “The Growth of Compounds”, 45.

34 Watanabe, *Kodai chugoku shisō no kenkyū*, 686–687.

Thus from beginning to end, the author's concern is with whether a ruler can promote the *xiang ai* or not. Dominated by this motif, the argument ends with a quotation from Mozi's words:

不可以不勸愛人。

I would have no choice but to advise [people] to love others.

From the author's motif as observable throughout this chapter, it is quite comprehensible why the author quoted the master's phrase "to recommend people to love others" (*quan ai ren* 勸愛人).

Turning to the usage of the term *li* 利 in the "Jian'ai shang" chapter, we find that a careful examination on all the examples of the term of *li* in "Jian'ai shang" chapter would lead one to doubt the possibility that the author was completely negative against the term *li*. There are ten examples of the term *li* in "Jian'ai shang" chapter. Of these ten, six examples are used as a compound *zili* 自利, denoting namely "profit for one's own" and all the rest are used as a verb, meaning "to make profit for (one's own)...".³⁵ These two usages demonstrate that the author of "Jian'ai shang" only opposed a *limitation* of the concept of *li*, where *li* only contributes to one's selfish profit that is acquired at the expense of others. Hence, the lack of the example of "to proliferate mutual profits" (*jiao xiang li* 交相利) that appear in "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia" chapters, does not mean that the author of "Jian'ai shang" chapter conceives of the term *li* as wholly negatively. Rather, the situation that the author of "Jian'ai shang" strongly reproaches is "to make [people] hate each other" (*jiao xiang e* 交相惡), and this phrase is sharply contrasted with "to make all [people] love each other" (*jian xiang ai* 兼相愛). Although it is not clear whether the author of "Jian'ai shang" chapter had any idea of "to proliferate mutual profits" (*jiao xiang li*), as the authors of "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia" chapters, at least from the above examination, the point has become clear: as far as the use of the term *li* is concerned, there is no salient contradiction on the conception of the term *li* between the author of "Jian'ai shang" chapter and the authors of "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia" chapters. Thus, I do not assume that the argument of the latter has materialized on the basis of a sort of radical transformation of the interpretation of the meaning or value of the term *li*. Instead, I would like to reserve the possibility that both lines of the discussion about *li* in "Jian'ai shang" chapter and "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia" chapters have derived from a common idea and crystallized on their own argumentative contexts.

There is another phenomenon that goes against the view that the triad underwent the linear development of thought in the order such as "shang"→"zhong"→"xia". The main subject of "Jian'ai shang" is about how to eradicate the cause of social discordance or disorder (*luan* 亂), and this motif is very consistent until the end of argument. Strangely, this motif does not appear in "Jian'ai xia" chapter. So what are the dominant motifs in "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia" chapters?

The authors of "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia" advocate two subject matters: one is "to raise the welfare of the world" (*xing tianxia zhi li* 興天下之利) as one of major purposes for Mohist tenet, and the other is idea of *jian* 兼 as the most important means for attaining this purpose. These two motifs do not appear in the "Jian'ai shang" chapter.

But between "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia", there is also a major difference in dealing with these motifs in their conclusions. "Jian'ai xia" concludes its discussion with the passage: "Jian...brings great welfare to the people" (*jian ... wanmin zhi dali ye* 兼 [...] 萬民之大利也), so that the author keep the initial motif of "to raise the welfare of the world" (*xing tianxia zhi li*) throughout the chapter. In contrast, the author of "Jian'ai zhong" has "changed" his line of discus-

35 These examples are: *li qi shi* 利其室 (to make profit for one's own house or family), *li qi shen* 利其身 (to make profit for one's own), *li qi jia* 利其家 (to make profit for one's own fiefdom) and *li qi guo* 利其國 (to make profit for one's own country).

sion by drawing the same motif with “Jian’ai shang”, namely the matter of “order (治 *zhi*) and disorder (亂 *luan*) of the world” to his own. From these facts, it follows that the arguments of both “Jian’ai shang” and “Jian’ai xia” keep their own motifs until end, while that of “Jian’ai zhong” shows a mixed nature of two motifs sharing with both “Jian’ai shang” and “Jian’ai xia”. It is in this sense that “Jian’ai zhong” bridges the contents of the rest of the two. But does this fact allow us to assume that the “Jian’ai zhong” comes last in the textual formation of the triad?

It is true that the argument of “Jian’ai xia” seems more “complete” than that of “Jian’ai zhong” in the sense that the value of *jian* is defended more in detail and the whole discussion is well organized by the use of phrases such as “Let us try to examine from the beginning” (*gu chang benyuan* 姑嘗本原) and “I cannot understand why” (*bu shi* 不識). These characteristics, such as length, “completeness” of argument, number of illustration, have enticed scholars into assuming that the date of the formation of the “Jian’ai xia” chapter came last among the triad.

A question still remains whether or not the author of “Jian’ai xia” actually read the contents of “Jian’ai shang” and “Jian’ai zhong” before he explored his own argument. The concluding paragraph of “Jian’ai xia” is only an enumeration of traditional values, all of which are amenable to Confucian doctrine, i. e. *hui* 惠 (generosity), *zhong* 忠 (sincerity and allegiance), *ci* 慈 (mercifulness), *xiao* 孝 (filial piety), *you* 友 (friendship), and *ti* 悌 (brotherhood), and the reference of whether the “order and disorder” disappeared, which is so remarkable in “Jian’ai shang”, and was also incorporated in the conclusion of “Jian’ai zhong”. If we also take into consideration the utmost importance of the issue of “order and disorder” in the entire Mohist doctrine, as Watanabe emphasized,³⁶ then it is unintelligible why the author of the “Jian’ai xia” chapter “replaced” it with another that would appeal only to a few traditions. Indeed, why use ethical values apart from *ren* 仁 or *yi* 義 if the discussion of “Jian’ai xia” is regarded as belonging to the latest part of the discourse on *jian* or *jian’ai*? Although I do not have enough evidence to conclude on the issue of which chapter belongs earlier or later, I am inclined to presume that the author of “Jian’ai xia” did not refer to those texts of “Jian’ai shang” and “Jian’ai zhong”.

The facts which I have taken up in my discussion seem to suggest the following: as early the first half of the fourth century, several main ideas about *ai*, *jian*, *li* and main arguments about “to make all [people] love each other” (*jian xiang ai* 兼相愛) and “welfare of the world” (*tianxia zhi li* 天下之利), must have been shared broadly among all Mohists, regardless of their theoretical or political divergence and geographical remoteness. Based upon these common values and ideas, each author(s) of the triad developed their *own* arguments. Concretely speaking, “Jian’ai shang” has been compiled in order to focus more exclusively on the necessity of “mutual love”, while “Jian’ai xia” has more motivation for attaining the sophistication of the argument about *jian*. On the other hand, the author of “Jian’ai zhong” combined two motifs, namely the matter of “to eradicate discordance of the world” and “to raise the welfare of the world”. In this way, the “Jian’ai zhong” chapter has taken form as a “collected whole” of related issues in Mohist doctrine of the time of its composition, and thus it seems most comprehensive among the triad. In sum, whatever the time of the final compilation of each chapter, the substantial ideas and arguments in the triad represents early Mohist effort in the theorization of their doctrine, which commenced in the early to middle 4th century.

36 Watanabe, *Kodai chugoku shiso no kenkyu*, 669–670.

4 Mohist Conception of *Jian* and *Jian'ai*: The Idea to Rule the World

In this section, I will examine the characteristic of the concepts of both *jian* and *jian'ai*, and their role in the Mohist thought, as well as, in the development of the Warring States' socio-political discourse.

First of all, once we read "Jian'ai" triad as a whole, we can easily recognize that the term *jian* is never a mere subordinate or auxiliary term; it rather underlies the whole Mohist philosophical system as a cardinal concept. *Jian* serves to create a theoretical unity. In this sense the term *jian* is even more important than *ren* and *yi*, at least in those passages where all these terms appear simultaneously. As Yoshinaga pointed out, the topic of the chapters "Jian'ai zhong" and "Jian'ai xia" is *jian*, and not *ai* or *jian'ai*.³⁷

Throughout the *Mozǐ* text, the term *jian* appears 132 times, and this number is indeed astonishing, if one compares it to other Warring States and Han texts, in all of which it appears up to twenties times at most. The unique exception is the *Xunzǐ* which has 76 occurrences. I will discuss Xunzi's concept of *jian* in detail below.

When the term *jian* appears as a noun, it usually denotes a certain condition, capability, or method for attaining "synthesis" or "inclusion", in many cases on a very large scale. If we see its usage in the "Jian'ai xia" chapter, there are as much as twelve examples of the phrase of *jian zhe* 兼者, (literally, "*jian* is" or "*jian* means") in which the term *jian* is used as a subject of these sentences. The word *jian* is also used as an object to verbs like *xing* 行 (to practice) in the "Jian'ai zhong" chapter, and *jiao* 交 (to multiply the reciprocity of), *zhi* 執 (to hold fast), *qu* 取 (to take), *wen* 聞 (to listen or inquire) and *shen* 審 (to scrutinize with deep appreciation) in the "Jian'ai xia" chapter. In the "Tianzhi zhong" chapter, there is also a phrase: *congshi jian* 從事兼 (to put the idea of *jian* into practice), which is contrasted with an antithetical phrase: *congshi bie* 從事別 (literally, "to put the idea of *bie* into practice", which means "to go against the idea of *jian*").

Then, what kind of condition, capability, or method does the term *jian* signify? The term *jian* in Mohist thought can be addressed from the following three angles: (I) the focus on other conceptual terms which are compatible with *jian*, (II) the focus on other terms, or names which are used together with *jian*; and (III) the focus on its conspicuous function for summarizing the whole Mohist doctrine.

(I) Compatible Terms: The term *jian* is compatible with a number of other value concepts of not only Mohism, but also of those which were broadly accepted by Confucians. For instance, in the "Jian'ai xia" chapter, the value of *jian* is "defined" by the term *zheng* 正 (just and proper). On this basis, the author argues that *jian* is the most appropriate method for *xing tianxia zhi li* (to raise the welfare of the world). The author of "Jian'ai zhong" insists that even the opponents of Mohism admit the point that *jian* be *shan* 善 (good). Furthermore, in the "Jian'ai xia" an opponent also admits that the idea of *jian* be *ren* (benevolence and human heartedness) and *yi* (righteousness and justice).³⁸ Yet, the same opponent goes on to doubt and reproach the validity of *jian* (*fei jian* 非兼).

(II) Terms used with *jian*: Second, what kind of concepts and ideas is the term of *jian* usually associated with? The most conspicuous phenomenon is that the term appears in close association with that of "All-under-Heaven". Significantly, the combination of *jian* and *tianxia* is found three times in "Jian'ai shang", all three of which constitute the phrase: "to make the people of the world love each other" (*tianxia jian xiang ai* 天下兼相愛).

37 Yoshinaga, *Sengoku shisoshi kenkyū*, 71.

38 *Mozǐ*, "Jian'ai xia": 兼即仁矣，義矣。

If we focus on practitioners of the idea of *jian*, it is not difficult to see that the term is associated with particular names of historical figures. All practitioners are ancient sage kings who *ruled over the world*,³⁹ not just local feudal lords or mediocre kings, even when they were the rulers of the “world”. Both the authors of “Jian’ai zhong” and “Jian’ai xia” advocate the *jian* of the ancient sage rulers, namely, the sage emperor Yu 禹, King Tang of Shang 商湯王, King Wen of Zhou 周文王 and King Wu 周武王 of Zhou.

(III) Summarizing the Mohist doctrine as a whole: Third, the authors of the “Jian’ai zhong” and “Jian’ai xia” chapters not only praise the ancient sage kings as practitioners of the idea of *jian*. They furthermore use *jian* to summarize the major accomplishments of their rules, such as Yu’s grand achievement of controlling the floods. In these cases, the term *jian* appears as a symbolic term, which enables the reader to conceptualize the *complete picture* of the ancient sage rulers’ great achievements. This aspect is most fully demonstrated by the examples in the “Tianzhi” triad.

Table 1: Constitutive Elements of the Arguments about the Will of Heaven in “Tianzhi” triad

	A天志上	B天志中	C天志中	D天志下
Subject of paragraph	順天意	天之意，不可不慎	順天之意	順天意
Foundation of policies	義政	仁義之本	從事兼；兼者	兼；兼之為道
Policy 1	處大國不攻小國	不欲大國之攻小國	處大國不攻小國	大不攻小
Policy 2	處大家不篡小家	(不欲) 大家之亂小家	處大家不亂小家	
Policy 3	強者不劫弱	(不欲) 強不劫弱	強不劫弱	強不侮弱
Policy 4		(不欲) 眾之暴寡	眾不暴寡	眾不賊寡
Policy 5	貴者不做賤	(不欲) 詐之謀愚	詐不謀愚	詐不欺愚
Policy 6	多詐者不欺愚	(不欲) 貴之傲賤	貴不做賤	貴不做賤
Policy 7				富不驕貧
Policy 8				壯不奪老
Effects	上利於天，中利於鬼，下利人		觀其事，上利乎天，中利乎鬼，下利乎人	上利天，中利鬼，下利人
Attributes			天德	天德；聖知；仁義；忠惠；慈孝
Honor to be added	天下美名；聖王		天下之美名；仁、義	天下之美名；

Table 1 indicates that the “Tianzhi” triad presents four basically identical arguments⁴⁰, which explicate the best way for observing the Will of Heaven (*tianyi* 天意 or *tian zhi yi* 天之意). Apparently, there is a common source for these arguments. A careful analysis of their commonalities

39 Strictly speaking, King Wen of Zhou did, of course, not “rule over the world”. However, the Warring States thinkers were in general convinced that it was virtuous rule that enabled his son, King Wu of Zhou, to overthrow the rule of King Zhou of the Shang dynasty.

40 The text of these four paragraphs goes as follows:

A: 「順天意者，義政也。反天意者，力政也。然義政將柰何哉？」子墨子曰：「處大國不攻小國，處大家不篡小家，強者不劫弱，貴者不做賤，多詐者不欺愚。此必上利於天，中利於鬼，下利於人，三利無所不利，故舉天下美名加之，謂之聖王。」

B: 是故子墨子曰：「今天下之君子，中實將欲遵道利民，本察仁義之本，天之意不可不慎也。」既以天之意以為不可不慎已，然則天之將何欲何憎？子墨子曰：「天之意不欲大國之攻小國也，大家之亂小家也，強之暴寡，詐之謀愚，貴之傲賤，此天之所不欲也。」

C: 順天之意，得天之賞者誰也？曰：「若昔三代聖王，堯舜禹湯文武者是也。堯舜禹湯文武禹所從事？曰從事兼，不從事別。兼者，處大國不攻小國，處大家不亂小家，強不劫弱，眾不暴寡，詐不謀愚，貴不做賤。觀其事，上利乎天，中利乎鬼，下利乎人，三利無所不利，是謂天德。聚斂天下之美名而加之焉。」曰：「此仁也，義也，愛人利人，順天之意，得天之賞者也。」

allows one to discover the following characteristics of early Mohist discourse: The original purpose of the argument appears to be a demonstration of two fundamental Mohist policies, i. e. “against-war” and “the protection of the weaker” are representations of the Will of Heaven. Upon this basic motif, the author of the argument has set a four stage process for a ruler to meet the will of Heaven:

1. He rephrases the Will of Heaven by value concepts such as *ren* 仁 or *yi* 義,
2. itemizes the concrete contents of that policy to meet those values,
3. argues that the practicing of these policies should completely match the so-called “three principles” for welfare, which supposedly validate concrete political action, and
4. proclaims that those who have embodied those policies will be admired for their most honorable virtues.

To the extent that these four elements can prevail, in spite of different normative concepts or concrete policy proposals, they remain derivatives from a common source.

Bearing this in mind, what I want to look at more closely is the first part which contains the most important value ideas. In arguments A and B, they are *yi* 義 and *renyi* 仁義, while arguments C and D concern *jian*. Here, we should note that the authors of C and D must have recognized the importance of *ren* and *yi*, therefore, argument C is concluded with the statement:

此仁也，義也。⁴¹

That which meets the ideas of benevolence and justice.

In D, the author argues that *jian* and *renyi* should be conceived conjointly.

Furthermore, both in C and D the authors seem to attribute all concrete policies to the practice of *jian*. This point can be supported by their unique usage when they refer to the term *jian*: in C, by adding a suffix *zhe* 者 (to mean) the author implies that those six policies were predicated on the subject *jian*. On the other hand, the author of D proclaims:

兼之為道也，義正。⁴²

Those that follow *jian* as a model [for ruling], attain the most adequate and proper state of morality.

The occurrence of the term *jian* in the beginning is supplemented by the term *tiande* 天德 (Heavenly virtue) in the last part of the argument, which does not appear in either A and B. In doing so, the authors of C and D try to establish a new normative concept for the ideal ruler of the world that can bridge both Heavenly and human virtues.

If the aforementioned inference is correct, the author of C and D should have attempted to augment A (or/and B)’s argument⁴³ into a new one by incorporating the term *jian* into the cen-

D: 曰：「順天之意者，兼也；反天之意者，別也。兼之為道也，義正；別之為道也，力正。」曰：「義正者何若？」曰：「大不攻小也，強不侮弱也，眾不賊寡也，詐不欺愚也，貴不傲賤也，富不驕貧也，壯不奪老也。是以天下之庶國，莫以水火毒藥兵刃以相害也。若事上利天，中利鬼，下利人，三利而無所不利，是謂天德。故凡從事此者，聖知也，仁義也，忠惠也，慈孝也，是故聚斂天下之善名而加之。是其故何也？則順天之意也。」

41 *Mozji* 6, “Tianzhi xia”.

42 *Mozji* 6, “Tianzhi xia”.

tral part of their arguments. As I mentioned above, in C and D, the term *jian* functions as a medium between the Heavenly and human virtues. This point is very important in the consideration of the role and significance of Mohist conceptions of a comprehensive theoretical term in the development of early Chinese political thought. For, as seen in A and B, in which the terms such as *ren*, *yi*, itemized policies, and “the Will of Heaven” are not so inter-related. As a result, in this argumentative framework, it remains unclear why *ren* and *yi* represent the Will of Heaven. In contrast, since the term *jian* connotes “worldwide practice” of Mohist doctrines, and thus primarily denotes the Heavenly act by the incorporation of the terms *jian* and *tiande*, the role of ruler in C and D as the agent of the Heaven’s Will to rule over the world becomes salient. In this way, Mohism came to acquire a powerful conceptual tool to magnificently proclaim their image of the most ideal ruler. Furthermore, we also should not ignore another effect, and that is by incorporating the term *jian*, the author of C has established a kind of doctrine of *jian* that integrates different dimensions of Mohist arguments (e. g. concrete policy items and the principle of welfare in the three spheres), and by doing so he successfully reconciles originally Mohist values (*ai* 愛 and *li* 利) and those of Confucians (*ren* and other traditional ethical values such as *zhong* 忠 and *hui* 惠). Indeed, it is in this comprehensive conception of the term *jian* that we can understand the more correct meaning of the term *jian’ai* and its role for proposing the Mohist ideal of a socio-political vision. It is now time to turn our attention to the Mohist conception of the term *jian’ai*.

As is mentioned before, the term *jian’ai* does not appear in the whole “Jian’ai” triad but makes a single appearance in the “Jian’ai xia” chapter. The paragraph in which the term *jian’ai* appears goes as follows:

泰誓曰：「文王若日若月，乍照，光于四方于西土。」即此言文王之兼愛天下之博大也，譬之日月兼照天下之無有私也。即此文王兼也，雖子墨子之所謂兼者，於文王取法焉。

The “Great Declaration” proclaims: “King Wen was like the sun and the moon, shedding glorious and resplendent light in the four quarters as well as over the Western land.” This is to say that the love of King Wen is so wide and universal that it is like the sun and the moon shining upon the world without partiality. Here is the “Kingly love for All-under-Heaven” on the part of King Wen; what Master Mozi has been talking about is really derived from the example of King Wen.⁴⁴

In fact, this citation in which the term *jian’ai* appears constitutes a part of the argument about the concept of *jian*. Ahead of the cited part, the author of the “Jian’ai xia”, claiming to speak for Mozi, tries to allay doubts about the practicability of the idea of *jian* by providing examples of the ancient sage kings who had successfully embodied this idea. The citation follows these examples. The term *jian’ai* appears after a passage from a eulogy from the “Taishi” 泰誓 chapter, presumably in the *Book of Documents*.⁴⁵ Here, the virtue of King Wen is metaphorically described as the light of the sun and

43 It should be noted that it is uncertain whether the authors of C or D articulated their argument based on the same “A” or “B” texts available to us. They may well have independently developed from other sources, or were based on a kind of common *Urtext*.

44 This translation relies on Mei, Y. P. (trans.): *The Work of Mo-tse: From the Chinese* (London: Probsthain, 1929), 92–93. I have altered the part on *jian’ai*, however, according to my own understanding.

45 The “Taishi” chapter can be regarded as a lost chapter in the *Documents*. Watanabe suspects that it was contained in the *Documents* which had been compiled by Warring States Mohists themselves. See Watanabe (trans.), *Mozi shang* 墨子上 (Zenshaku kanbun taiki 全釋漢文大系. Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1974), vol. 18, 274–275.

the moon with which the idea of *jian'ai* is associated, radiating the virtue of impartiality. To the extent that the paragraph that contains the usage of the term *jian'ai* belongs to the discussion about the practicability of *jian*, in the compound *jian'ai*, the author's emphasis should be on demonstrating the attribute of the world ruler who manifests himself as a non-selfish and impartial benefactor to *all* people rather than on merely promoting "reciprocal love". It is precisely in this sense that we can find *jian* rather than *jian'ai* as the topic of the "Jian'ai xia" chapter.

Then, our next question is whether or not the aforementioned feature of the term *jian'ai* can be observed in other usages of the whole text as well. Let us look through all its examples. There are fourteen examples of the term *jian'ai* in total, but three come from chapter titles and can thus be omitted. An example in the "Luwen" 魯問 chapter can be omitted, too, because it serves as a slogan or a title of the ten doctrines like a chapter title.⁴⁶ The remaining examples are as follows:

- (1) 昔之聖王禹湯文武，兼愛天下之百姓。（“Fayì” chapter）
- (2) 即此言文王之兼愛天下之博大也。（“Jian'ai xia” chapter）
- (3) 兼愛天下之人。（“Tianzhi xia” chapter, three times）
- (4) 故昔也三代之聖王堯舜禹湯文武之兼愛之天下也。（“Tianzhi xia” chapter）
- (5) 兼愛之有相若。（“Daqu” 大取 chapter, two times）
- (6) 子兼愛天下。（“Gengzhu” 耕柱 chapter）
- (7) 我與子異，我不能兼愛。我愛鄒人於越人。（“Gengzhu” chapter）

Among the above examples, if we take into consideration the fact that the two examples in (5) appear as a discussion about the skill and validity of arguments in the so-called “Mohist logic chapters,” there is only one example, i. e., (7), that does not directly follow the term *tianxia* (All-under-Heaven). In all the other examples, the term *jian'ai* is used with term *tianxia* to denote “to love All-under-Heaven” or “to love people of All-under-Heaven”.

Furthermore, this raises the question of who is expected to practice such love in these examples. Apparently, the subjects in examples (1), (2), and (4) are ancient sage kings. On the other hand, the author of (3) maintains that *jian'ai* must be the goal of contemporary aspirants to rulership (*jīn tiānxià zhī shìjūnzǐ* 今天下之士君子), which accords with the Will of Heaven (*shùn tiān zhī yì* 順天之意). As I have discussed above, to “accord with the Will of Heaven” means to become the agent to fulfill the Will of Heaven. In other words, this *jian'ai* is originally to be emanated by Heaven. In (6), The term *zǐ* 子 (your master) designates the person as Mozi. Thus, Mozi is described as the person who is capable of loving people in All-under-Heaven. In fact, the example of (7) is complementary with (6) because Wumazi 巫馬子, a Confucian interlocutor in this chapter, asserts that he cannot practice the idea of *jian'ai* as *Master Mozi would do*. In other words, Wumazi's disclaimer paradoxically indicates that no people but Mozi himself can practice such ideas as *jian'ai*. If my argument is correct, except for two (identical) examples in the chapter of Mohist logics, in all the examples, the term *jian'ai* is considered to be the virtue of (1) Heaven; (2) ancient sage kings; and (3) the only actual practitioner of this idea, namely Mozi himself. In this demarcation of its practitioners, the idea of *jian'ai* is basically not as much a virtue that is expected to be practiced by ordinary people, as it is a kingly virtue that has been once attained by an ancient sage

46 The text goes as follows: 國家務奪侵凌，即語之兼愛、非攻。

ruler (and perhaps Mozi himself) and is expected to be attained by a single person who has internalized the Will of Heaven and, by doing so, is expected to become the ruler over the world.

This exclusiveness or selectiveness of adequate practitioners to realize this idea would be one main reason why there are only few examples of the term *jian'ai*, even in those chapters that were named under this term, in the whole *Mozǐ*, despite the fact that the term *jian'ai* has been regarded as almost the most important doctrine in all of Mohist thought. On the other hand, in spite of such few instances of usage, to the extent that for Mohists, the term *jian'ai* must have been advocated as the virtue of the *world* ruler and not of local feudal lords, it would be inevitable that Mohists primarily exalted this idea among others. That may be one of the reasons why the term *jian'ai* became the most familiar Mohist slogan despite the fact that the term does not appear many times. Based on this understanding, I translate the term *jian'ai* as “*Kingly* love for all”, and will use it hereafter.⁴⁷

Table 2: The *jian er* 兼而 phrases in the *Mozǐ*

Chapter	Phrase	Subject
“Fayi”	兼而愛之 (twice) 兼而利之 (twice) 兼而有之 (twice) 兼而食之 (twice) 兼而有食之	The Heaven
“Shangxiang zhong”	兼而愛之	Yao, Shun, Yu, King Tang, King Wen of Zhou, King Wu of Zhou
“Shangxiang zhong”	兼而憎之	Jie, Zhou, King You of Zhou, King Li of Zhou
“Feigong zhong”	西者齊人兼而有之	Ruler(s) of the Qi
“Tianzhi shang”	兼而愛之 兼而利之	Agent of the Heaven
“Tianzhi shang”	其兼而明之 (twice) 兼而有之 兼而食 (twice)	The Heaven
“Tianzhi xia”	兼而食之 (3 times) 兼而食焉 兼而愛之	The Heaven

In the last part of this section, I analyze one more aspect concerning the *Mozǐ*'s concept of *jian*, viz., its idiomatic phrase *jian er* 兼而 (to practice something in world wide scale or toward everyone equally) because this pattern-phrase also denotes a similar meaning of *jian'ai* as is used in combination of with the word *ai*. There are 23 examples of the phrase *jian er* 兼而 in the whole of the *Mozǐ*.⁴⁸ Of these, the phrase *jian er shi zhi* 兼而食之 (fed by the people of the world) appears nine times⁴⁹;

47 Another issue at stake is the question of whether or not this rendering is equally valid in passages where other rival thinkers, such as Mencius, use the term in a critical manner.

48 There are altogether four examples containing the phrase: *wen jian er fei* 聞兼而非 and *shen jian er wu xing zhi* 審兼而務行之. But in these phrases, the term *jian* is used as a noun to be practiced, not a verb, as in other phrases. Thus I have omitted these occurrences from the examples listed up in the attached tables.

49 This includes one example of *jian er you shi zhi* 兼而有食之 in the “Fayi” chapter, and three examples of *jian er shi* 兼而食. My reason for including these in the count is because these passages roughly have the same meaning as *jian er shi zhi*.

jian er ai zhi 兼而愛之 (to love the people of the world indifferently) five times; *jian er li zhi* 兼而利之 (to benefit the people of world) three times⁵⁰; and *jian er you zhi* 兼而有之 (to rule over the world) three times (see Table 2).

What draws our attention to those phrases listed in Table 2 is their subject. Except for the example of *jian er you zhi* 兼而有之 in the “Feigong zhong” chapter, all other examples take Heaven or the Son of Heaven as their subjects.

Foremost, two examples: *jian er ai zhi* 兼而愛之 and *jian er li zhi* 兼而利之 in the “Fayi” chapter and the “Tianzhi” chapter, which connote Heavenly bounty, show their congeniality with the term *jian'ai*. This also occurs in the example in the “Weide” 威德 chapter of the *Shenzi* 慎子, where the function of Heaven was usually designated by the term *gong* 公 (impartiality) in the mid-late Warring States texts.

Second, the “Shangxian Zhong” 尚賢中 chapter also contains the phrase *jian er ai zhi* 兼而愛之 and it is paired with its antonym phrase: *jian er zeng zhi* 兼而憎之 (to totally hate [evil people]). In this coupling, the subjects are the six sage rulers – Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu – as the practitioners of *jian er ai zhi*, and four evil rulers – King Jie of Xia 夏桀王, King Zhou of Shang 商紂王, King You of Zhou 周幽王 and King Li of Zhou 周厲王 – as those of *jian er zeng zhi* 兼而憎之. All of them, regardless of their virtuosity or evil natures have been recognized as the Son of Heaven according to the Warring state tradition. Therefore, by adding *jian* 兼 to the actions “to love” (*ai* 愛) in the former and “to hate” (*zeng* 憎) to the latter, those originally individual actions become ones that are pointed concurrently to all the people of the world. In other words, those actions by successive Sons of Heaven have been regarded as the projection of Heaven’s actions.

In sum, I have proceeded in my argument on the precondition that I regard the whole “Jian'ai” triad as a sort of undivided depository of the complex of arguments about the *jian'ai* (Kingly love for all) doctrine, and then sought plausible layers of relatively old and newer parts of ideas and arguments. In this attempt, I have left open the question of which chapters among the triad are – relatively seen – older or newer than others.

On this presupposition, and in discussion of it, I have delineated the “evolution” of the chapters of the “Jian'ai” triad as follows:

1. As Yoshinaga argues, the so-called *jian'ai* doctrine has originated from Mozi’s advocacy for the practice of a unique style of love or care which is to be attained by overcoming the selfishness of humans.
2. As the school expanded, Mohism became especially keen to the practice of “mutual love” (this idea is expressed by the term *xiang ai* 相愛 rather than *jian'ai*) on a world scale.
3. For the establishment of world peace and order, Mohists elaborated the image of the world ruler who would act as the agent of Heaven. The term *jian* had become a comprehensive theoretical term that could connote the several dimensions of Mohist ideas without making them contradict Confucian values.

50 The “Fayi” chapter’s two examples are as follows: 以其兼而愛之、兼而利之也。奚以知天兼而愛之、兼而利之也？ The “Tianzhi shang” chapter’s example is found in the following passages: 故天意曰：「此之我所愛，兼而愛之；我所利，兼而利之。愛人者此為博焉，利人者此為厚焉。」 Interestingly, there is no compound term *jianli* 兼利 used in the whole *Mozi*, while there is one example in the *Xunzi* which I will discuss in the next section.

4. In the movement toward such a conception of the term *jian*, the term *jian'ai* has also been crystallized as the idea that denoted the unselfish and impartial love emanated by the world ruler toward all his people. In this way, Mohists had established an unprecedented idea in the early to middle Warring States period that would enable them to delineate a grand image of the perfect world ruler to fulfill Mohist ideals.

5 Xunzi's Incorporation of the Idea of *Jian* into his Socio-political Theory

In the rest of this article, I will discuss the role and function of the term *jian* in the socio-political theory of Xunzi. As table 5 shows, there are 76 examples of the term *jian* in the *Xunzi*, which comes second only to the *Mozi* (132 times). What is more important, in these examples the term *jian* is not just used as a neutral verb, as in *jianbin* 兼併 (to annex other country), or *jianzhi* 兼職 (to hold two offices concurrently), but also as a highly valued concept in the Xunzi's philosophical system. It even often appears as a more theoretical concept than that in the *Mozi*.

Before we analyze the meaning and role of Xunzi's use of the term *jian*, let us examine Xunzi's criticism of Mohism in order to contrast his harsh criticism of Mohism with his deep appreciation of the value of the concept of *jian*, as I will show below. Indeed, through this examination, we will confirm the point that Xunzi's criticism does not point to the concept of *jian*.

A well-known reproach against Mozi is seen in the "Feishi'erzi" 非十二子 (Contra-twelve masters) chapter, which says:

不知壹天下建國家之權稱，上功用，大儉約，而僂差等 [...].

They did not know how to unite the world nor how to establish the power and reputation of a state; they honor utility and exalt thrift, but do not have any rank or distinguish roles in society [...].⁵¹

In the "Fuguo" 富國 (Enriching Country) chapter, Xunzi censures what may be called "Mozi's worries".⁵² If we focus on Xunzi's criticism of Mozi's specific topics, what Xunzi seems to abhor most in Mozi's teachings are the two doctrines of "contra-music" and "moderation in funerals" respectively.⁵³ Not astonishingly, in his discourse on rituals and social norms, he despises Mohism for its "slighting the dead and overemphasizing the living" (*ke si er fu sheng* 刻死而附生).⁵⁴ In three passages of his discourse on music, "Yuelun" 樂論, Xunzi deplores the fact that Mohists deny the postive impact of music on creating and maintaining social harmony. He maintains:

樂者治人之盛者也，而墨子非之。

Music represents the manifestation of ruling people in utmost order; however, Master Mozi reproached this!⁵⁵

51 This translation is based on Homer H. Dubs, with slight alternations. See H. H. Dubs, (trans.): *The Work of Hsün-tze*, London: Probsthain (1928), 78.

52 *Xunzi* 10, "Fuguo": 墨子之言，昭昭然為天下憂不足。

53 *Ibid.*: 我以墨子之『非樂』也，則使天下亂；墨子之『節用』也，則使天下貧。

54 Translated after Dubs, 238.

55 *Xunzi* 20, "Yuelun". In this chapter, in addition to that citation, Xunzi exclaimed three times: 墨子非之奈何! "Alas! How could Master Mozi reproach music!"; twice he put it in the following way: 墨子非之! "Master Mozi reproached music!". There are two more passages in which Xunzi criticized Mozi's doctrine

Thus, Xunzi is convinced that Mozi's way of thinking contains serious defects. In the "Tianlun" 天論 (Discourse on Heaven) chapter, he argues:

墨子有見於齊，無見於畸。

Master Mozi only observes the sameness in things at the expense of disregarding differences in them.⁵⁶

In his discussion about how to dispel one's obsession, Xunzi points out what he sees as another weakness of the Mohist teachings:

墨子蔽於用而不知文。⁵⁷

Master Mo was obsessed by [the idea of] utility, but did not understand the importance of sophistication [which is attained by spending resources for cultural matters].

Therefore, from the viewpoint of socio-political theory, Xunzi tries to demonstrate that Mohism should not be implemented by the ruler. In the "Wangba" 王霸 (Discourse on Kings and Lords-protector) chapter, Xunzi proclaims:

為之者，役夫之道也，墨子之說也。⁵⁸

[If a ruler] does all things by himself, then he follows no more than the way of a laborer. That is the teaching of Master Mo!

Interestingly, however, at no point in Xunzi's argument can we find any criticism of *jian'ai*. This shows a sharp contrast with Mencius's criticism, which mainly focused on *that* doctrine, whether or not he correctly understood it.⁵⁹

Bearing this in mind, let us examine Xunzi's own use of *jian'ai*, which appears twice in the *Xunzi*. The first example of these two is not a compound term in a set phrase like *jian'er'ai zhi bi* 兼而愛之, the meaning of which has already been discussed as pertains to its use in the *Mozi*. In the "Fuguo" chapter, Xunzi says:

若夫兼而覆之；兼而愛之；兼而制之。⁶⁰

If a ruler [wants to] extend his rule to the all corners of his empire, love all his subjects, and implement his policies in every regions of his territory [...]

The other example is found in the "Chengxiang" 成相 (Working Songs) chapter, and reads:

堯讓賢，以為民，汜利兼愛德施均。辨治上下，貴賤有等明君臣。⁶¹

The Sage Ruler Yao yielded his throne to the worthy (Shun). In order to [promote the welfare of] his people. His bounty equally reached them [by means of] the ideas of "the entire benefit of the people" and "the Kingly love for all". [As the result of such virtuous rule,] the distinction between upper and

of contra-music. These two passages are: 墨子之於道也，猶替之於白黑也，猶聾之於清濁也，猶欲之楚而北求之也。and 墨子曰：樂者、聖王之所非也，而儒者為之過也。

56 *Xunzi* 17, "Tianlun".

57 *Xunzi* 21, "Jiebi" 解蔽.

58 *Xunzi* 11, "Wangba".

59 As is well known, the example of the compound term *jian'ai* in the "Teng Wengong xia" chapter is followed by Mencius's accusation against it: 是無父也。"That is making nothing of one's own father".

60 *Xunzi* 10, "Fuguo".

61 *Xunzi* 25, "Chengxiang".

lower became clear enough to establish socio-political order. The ranking of the noble and the mean was also established so that the distinction between the ruler and ministers became obvious.

No doubt, Xunzi uses both the phrase *jian er ai zhi* 兼而愛之 and the term *jian'ai* 兼愛 (Kingly love for all) very positively. In the latter usage, Xunzi even attributes this “virtue” to Yao whom Mencius also exalted as the first sage ruler of the world in the Confucian tradition.

Next, let us examine the term *jianli* 兼利 (welfare for all), a term which does not appear as a compound term in the *Mozzi* (although we know, of course, that *jian* and *li* are both very important conceptual terms in Mohism). As discussed above, there are three examples of *jian er li zhi* 兼而利之 (to benefit the people of world) in the *Mozzi*, in a context which suggests a Heavenly bounty for the people of the world. As for other pre-Han texts, I could find only two occurrences of the compound term *jianli*, one of which is in the “Tianxia” 天下 (All-under-Heaven) chapter of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子. It reads:

墨子汜愛兼利。⁶²

Master Mozi [promoted his ideas of] Kingly love and welfare for all.

But, since this passage is an explanation of Mohist slogans, it does not represent Zhuang Zhou's own way of thought. The other is found in the “Jingjie” 經解 (Explications of the Canon) chapter of the *Liji* 禮記 (Notes of Rituals and Social Norms), and reads as follows:

天子者，與天地參。故德配天地，兼利萬物，與日月並明，明照四海，而不遺微小。⁶³

The son of Heaven forms a triad with Heaven and Earth. It is by this function that his virtue [to give his people bounty] can be compared with that of Heaven and Earth. The degree that he benefits the myriad things can be compared with that of the sun and the moon which illuminate all (within) the four seas without missing even the most infinitesimal objects.

Inoue Ryō 井上了 points out the similarity of the “Jingjie” chapter to the thought of Xunzi, as in the continuity between the concepts of kingly and hegemonic rule, and his close focus on the objectiveness of the concept of ritual. Based on that, Inoue conjectures that the “Jingjie” chapter was compiled by the scholar(s) of the Xunzian School. However, he has not pointed out that the term *jianli* is used both in the *Xunzi* and the “Jingjie” chapter.⁶⁴

From this, we can confirm the following three points:

1. Ideas in the “Jingjie” chapter are very similar to those in the *Xunzi*;
2. in the “Jingjie” chapter, the term *jianli* is used in a very positive fashion, and is even used to describe the virtue of the Son of Heaven;
3. in order to demonstrate the importance of the action of *jianli*, its author adopts a metaphor of “the sun and the moon”, which bears a great deal of resemblance to the description of

62 *Zhuangzi* 33, “Tianxia”.

63 *Liji* 27, “Jingjie”. All quotations from *Liji* are based on the Sibu beiyao edition of *Liji zhengyi* 禮記正義 (Rpt.: Taipei: Zhonghua, 1965).

64 Inoue Ryō, “Raiki Keikai hen no jiki to sono shosō teki ichi” 『禮記』經解篇の時期とその思想史的位置, *Shūchūin daigaku kenkyū kōjō* 種智院大學研究紀要, 5 (2004), 51–58. However, his hypothesis is not conclusive on the point whether the “Jingjie” chapter has been written under Xunzi's theoretical influence or merely shared a common conceptual background.

jian'ai in the “Jian'ai xia” chapter, in which the *jian'ai* of King Wen is associated with the bounty of the sun and the moon.

Now, let us examine its usage in the *Xunzi*, of which there are two examples. The first is in the “Feishi'erzi” chapter:

一天下，財萬物，長養人民，兼利天下，通達之屬莫不從服，六說者立息，十二子者遷化，則聖人之得執者，舜禹是也。⁶⁵

[This] unified the world, utilized the myriad things, nourished the people, and brought welfare to All-under-Heaven. Thus, all those who could access their rule never failed to [voluntarily] observe their rule; the six doctrines have immediately ceased; the twelve masters were transformed. Thus the sages who established political authority – such are Shun and Yu!

This citation is the concluding part of Xunzi's criticism against twelve prominent thinkers, including Mozi. In the above quoted passage, Xunzi praises the virtue of Confucius and Zigong 子弓 and, at the same time, describes the pattern of the most virtuous rule of Shun and Yu. Thus, the persons who are characterized as having carried out the action of “bringing welfare to [the people of] All-under-Heaven” (*jianli tianxia* 兼利天下) are Shun and Yu. As is well known, Yu is the sage king who has received special homage from the Mohists. In this paragraph, Xunzi utilizes both Mohist concepts and the authority of the sage-kings, namely *jianli* and the sage ruler Yu, to try to attack the validity of the Mohist doctrine.

The second example is in the “Wangzhi” chapter:

故序四時，裁萬物，兼利天下。無他故焉，得之分義也。⁶⁶

Thus, [the true king] makes the four seasons, nourishes the myriad things, and [by doing so] brings welfare to [the people of] All-under Heaven. There is no other reason that he can attain this: He implements this on the basis of the [proper] distribution [of natural and social resources] according to the idea of justice and duty.

Here, the term *jianli* is referred to as the virtue of the ideal ruler of the world, and is also regarded as the ultimate goal of a kingly ruler. Yet, what we have to pay attention to is that Xunzi goes on to advocate a more concrete method for bringing welfare to all the people of All-under Heaven, namely *fenyi* 分義 (the proper distribution of natural and social resources according to the idea of justice and duty). In the “Fuguo” chapter Xunzi rephrases the same idea as follows:

兼足天下之道，在明分。⁶⁷

The method for providing the people of the world with sufficient [natural and social resources] is nothing but the clarification of the meaning and significance of the idea of “*fen*”—the appropriate distinction [of social and political status of human beings according to their morality] and the proper distribution [of natural and social resources based on that distinction].

In these two statements, Xunzi not only advocates the importance of the welfare of all the people in the world, expressed by the combination of the term *jian* and “All-under-Heaven”, but also proposes the very concrete method, i. e. *fen*, for attaining this very noble purpose in his political philosophy. Here we can observe a synthetic role in Xunzi's theoretical effort to transform an

65 *Xunzi* 6, “Feishi'erzi”.

66 *Xunzi* 9, “Wangzhi”.

67 *Xunzi* 10, “Fuguo”.

originally merely vague “prescription” of the political goal of sage rulers into a rather practicable design for contemporary rulers who want to realize this idea. Furthermore, in order to ensure the feasibility of implementation of the idea of *jian*, Xunzi advanced his argument to introduce another cardinal idea, namely, *li* (rituals and social norms) into his explication on the concept of *jian*. I will come back to this point at the end of this section.

Next, let us examine the phrase *jian er* 兼而 (to concurrently implement [...]) in the *Xunzi*. Although there is no example of *jian er li zhi* 兼而利之 in the *Xunzi*, as in the “Fayí” and “Tianzhi shang” chapters of the *Mozí*, there are five kinds of similar usages of the term: (1) *jian er fu zhi* 兼而覆之, (2) *jian er ai zhi* 兼而愛之, (3) *jian er zhi zhi* 兼而制之, (4) *jian er you zhi* 兼而有之 (3 times) and (5) *jian er yong zhi* 兼而用之, which implies Xunzi’s affirmative attitude towards the importance of the term *jian* in his grand design for ruling the world. The subject of examples (1) through (4) is the ideal (world) ruler within Xunzi’s theory of government. This usage of the term is expanded from the Mohist usage, in which the subject denotes the Son of Heaven, who thus becomes more of an idealized ruler, called *wang* 王 (the true king). To the extent that the last example appears in his explanation of the function of *li* (rituals and social norms), it displays a major characteristic of Xunzi’s thought which I will discuss in the last part of this section.

In what follows, I will explore how Xunzi transformed this Mohist idea, expressed by the term *jian*, into one of his own conception. The above discussion of Xunzi’s idiomatic use of the term *jian* shows an affinity with Mohism to the extent that it denotes the virtue of the world ruler and is associated with the ancient sage rulers who had benefitted the people of the world. If we carefully examine all 76 usages of the term, we can characterize the term *jian* as having the following four features:

First, in the *Xunzi*, the term *jian* usually implies both “comprehensiveness” and a “ruling role”. Let us see one example in the “Jiebi” chapter, which reads as follows:

農精於田，而不可以為田師；賈精於市，而不可以為賈（市）⁶⁸師；工精於器，而不可以為器師。有人也，不能此三技，而可使治三官。曰：精於道者也；精於物者也。精於物者以物物；精於道者兼物物。故君子壹於道，而以贊稽物。壹於道則正；以贊稽物則察；以正志行察論，則萬物官矣。⁶⁹

The farmer may be expert on the farm, but he cannot be considered its administrator; the merchant may be expert at the market, but he cannot be considered its director; the workman may be expert on tools, but he cannot be considered its supervisor. There are men who do not have these three kinds of ability, but who can cause these three businesses to be properly governed. We say that they are experts on the principle of the Way; not expert in particular things. The man who is expert with things judges one thing by another thing; the man who is expert in the principles of Way comprehends all things and judges them. Hence the superior man concentrates on the principles of the Way, comprehends all things and judges them. Hence the superior man concentrates on the principles of the Way and uses them to assist in investigating things. When a man concentrates on the principles of the Way, he can be correct; when he uses them to assist in investigating things, he can get at the truth; when he discerns [the right and wrong of] opinions by means of rendering his will and deed upright, he can put all things in their proper place.⁷⁰

68 Given the parallelism it is clear that the character *jiu* 賈 should be written as *shi* 市.

69 *Xunzi* 21, “Jiebi”.

70 Translation follows Dubs, 270, with slight alterings.

In the above citation, Xunzi divides the social role between the ordinary people and those in ruling positions: ordinary people are expected to be diligent in their own single occupation (*wumu* 物物), while those who rule are asked to participate in the function of the Way so that they are able to “supervise all the people who are diligent in their own works” (*jian wumu* 兼物物). There are many similar examples.

Second, by adding the term *jian* to various behaviors, Xunzi highlights the role of rulers in these described behaviours. Verbs used in the text to describe these behaviours are *fu* 覆 (to cover/to take care of), *shuai* 率 (to lead/to rule), *ting* 聽 (to listen reports from ministers), *zhi* 制 (to institutionalize/to control/to rule), *rong* 容 (to include/to subordinate people to oneself), etc. Below, some examples will be given:

- (1) 先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，使有貧富貴賤之等，足以相兼⁷¹臨者，是養天下之本也。⁷²
Since the ancient kings hated disorder, they instituted rituals, social norms, and justice so that social and political positions can be properly allocated and social and natural resources can be distributed justly. Through their implementation, the status of the people, between the rich and the poor, as well as between the noble and the mean has been rightly divided. In doing so, a ruler sufficiently supervises all aspects of mutual (i. e. social) relationships in his empire. This is the foundation for nourishing the people of the world.
- (2) 先王 [...], 潢然兼覆之，養長之如保赤子。⁷³
The ancient king [...], ruled all over the world with overwhelming generosity; he nourished his people like taking care of his own babies.
- (3) 人主者，[...] 今以一人兼聽天下。⁷⁴
The lord of the world [...]. Now he alone administers all the policies of the world. (“Wangba” chapter)
- (4) 夫貴為天子，富有天下，名為聖王，兼制人，人莫得而制也。⁷⁵
He is so noble as to be in the position of the Son of Heaven; his wealth is so affluent as to possess the whole world; he is called the sage king; he carries [an utmost authority] to control all the people. Hence, no other man can control him.
- (5) 聖人知心術之患 [...], 兼陳萬物而中縣衡焉。⁷⁶
The sage knows the afflictions which befall the mind and sees the calamities which come from being prejudiced [...]. He is equally able to dispose of all things, and keeps the balances level.⁷⁷
- (6) 若夫論一相以兼率之，使臣下百吏莫不宿道鄉方而務，是夫人主之職也。⁷⁸
To screen and select his prime minister so as to establish his leadership over the country, to lead all of his officials and subjects so that they stay on the [correct] way and perform their proper duties, this is the work undertaken by the ruler of humankind.

71 I suspect that the word order of *xiang* 相 and *jian* 兼 has been erroneously reversed. I have thus translated this passage according to the order of *jianxiang* 兼相.

72 *Xunzi* 9, “Wangzhi”.

73 *Xunzi* 10, “Fuguo”.

74 *Xunzi* 11, “Wangba”.

75 *Xunzi* 11, “Wangba”.

76 *Xunzi* 21, “Jiebi”.

77 Translated according to Dubs, 265–266.

78 *Xunzi* 11, “Wangba”.

- (7) 本政教，正法則，兼聽而時稽之〔...〕冢宰之事也。論禮樂，正身行，廣教化，美風俗，兼覆而調一之，辟公之事也。⁷⁹
 To make the admonition of the people the foundation of his policy, to correct the laws, both to hold court and at time to inspect the officials [...] – such should be the duties of the Prime Minister. To discuss rituals, social norms and music, to correct morals, to extend culture, to ennoble customs, both to inquire into and judge them and to harmonize them—such should be the duties of the Prince and Duke (the ruler of a country).⁸⁰
- (8) 夫公道通義之可以相兼容者，是勝人之道也。⁸¹
 The method for maintaining a predominant position over [all] other people is to contain (i. e. to take care of) all [the people of one’s empire] by means of promoting the impartial way [such as the sun and the moon illuminate earth] and following the universal moral principle [in a way that all people can accept as right].

Here, as is the case of in the *Mozzi*, the subjects of the above six examples are the sage rulers who are expected to rule the world. Yet, in the remaining two examples, the subjects of (7) and (8) are *piyong* 辟公 (prince and duke) and *xiangguo* 相國 (prime minister). In fact, in Xunzi’s political philosophy, these positions are second only to the ruler, and as his agents are expected to fulfill their duty of practical ruling.⁸² Thus, in Xunzi’s theory of rulership, the term *jian* becomes part of an indispensable terminology addressing various aspects of “ruling” behavior.⁸³

Third, in the “Feixiang” 非相 chapter (Against Physiognomy), Xunzi aimed to make the concept of *jian* a sort of method which can be learnt by those ruler-aspirants. He calls this *jianshu* 兼術 (literally, the method of *jian*).⁸⁴ The “Method of *jian*” is explained as follows:

君子之度己則以繩；接人則用拙。度己以繩，故足以為天下法則矣；接人用拙，故能寬容，因求（眾）⁸⁵以成天下之大事矣。故君子賢而能容罷，知而能容愚，博而能容淺，粹而能容雜，夫是之謂兼術。詩曰：「徐方既同，天子之功。」此之謂也。

When a superior man reflects upon himself, he adopts a strict standard like a measuring rope to judge his [deeds and thoughts]; when interacting with others, he is gracious in judgment as if he would mold a bow. Because he uses a strict standard to judge himself, his mind and deeds become the model for his people; because he judges other people graciously, he can take care of his people in a very generous way

79 *Xunzi* 9, “Wangzhi”.

80 This translation is slightly altered from Dubs, 142–143.

81 *Xunzi* 16, “Qiangguo” 疆國.

82 It is worth noting that there is a dominant element of *wuwei* 無為 (non-action) in Xunzi’s image of the ruler. See the following passage in the “Jiebi” chapter: 故仁者之行道也，無為也。Concerning the aspect that in Xunzi’s political philosophy *ren zhe* 仁者 (the person of benevolence) denotes the ruler of the world, see Sato, *The Confucian Quest for Order*, 280–287.

83 In the “Junchen shang” 君臣上 chapter of the *Guanzi* 管子, there is a similar example of the term *jian* that highlights the dimensional difference of roles between the ruler and his subjects. The text reads as follows: 天有常象，地有常形，人有常禮，一設而不更，此謂三常；兼而一之，人君之道也。分而職之，人臣之事也。Quotations from the *Guanzi* are based on the (Wenyuange) Siku quanshu edition (Rpt.: Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 1983).

84 Here, based upon my understanding, I translate it as “the method for mastering the way of the world ruler for reigning over and supervising all other people”.

85 Wang Niansun 王念孫 has pointed out that the character *qiu* 求 should be *zhong* 眾. See Wang Niansun, *Dushu zuzhi* 讀書雜誌 (Taipei: Shijie, 1962), vol.2, 8–2. My translation follows this emendation.

so that he can harness [the power of his people] in order to undertake his great business [such as state rituals and warfare]. Hence, a superior man is wise as to make feeble people [be willing to] look up to him; he is so intelligent as to make fools [be willing to] look up to him; his knowledge is so erudite as to make shallow people [be willing to] observe him; his mind is so pure as to make various people [be willing to] look up to him. This is why I say the method of *jian* is (the method for making all people [be willing to] look up to their ruler). The *Odes* says: “The people of Xu in the south sent their tribute, and that had been accomplished with the virtue of the Son of Heaven”. This expresses what I mean.

It is worth noting that the topic of the quotation from the *Odes* is “the feat of the Son of Heaven”, which suggests that the prospective practitioner of “the method of *jian*” should be the ruler of the world. Elsewhere, Xunzi explains this method more concretely. In the “Yibing” 議兵 (Debate on Military Affairs) chapter, Xunzi proposes *san shu* 三術 (three methods) for making other (and usually all) people subordinate to him (*jianren* 兼人).⁸⁶ His argument goes as follows:

凡兼人者有三術：有以德兼人者；有以力兼人者；有以富兼人者。〔...〕故曰：以德兼人者王；以力兼人者弱；以富兼人者貧，古今一也。⁸⁷

There are three methods for getting [all] people to observing one’s rule: By virtue, by force, and by wealth. [...] If he gets [all] people to observe his rule by virtue, (he) will not fail to become the king [of the world]; if he drives [all] people to observe his rule by force, (his state) will not fail to remain a weak state; if he drives [all] his people to observe his rule by wealth, (his state) will not fail to remain a poor state. This is the iron rule that has been constant from ancient days to the present.

The phrase “If he gets [all] his people to observe his rule by virtue, (he) will not fail to become the king [of the world]” 以德兼人者王 clearly suggests that the prospective practitioner of *jianren* is also the world ruler. This point is made clear by Xunzi’s choice of the compound term *jian ren zhe wang*, the king who is qualified to unify the world. We can find another usage of *jianren* in the “Fuguo” chapter, which says:

故仁人之用國，非特將持其有而已也，又將兼人。詩曰：「淑人君子，其儀不忒；其儀不忒，正是四國。」此之謂也。⁸⁸

Hence, if a Man of Benevolence makes use of the land, he not only maintains what he already possessed (i.e. the land), but (his rule) also comprises man (i.e. the people adhere to him). The *Odes* says: “A virtuous and noble man’s decorum never deviates. Since his decorum never deviates, he [can possess the authority to] rectify the countries of all the four corners”. This expresses what I mean.

In the above citation, the combination of *renren* 仁人 (Man of Benevolence = an ideal ruler of the world) and *jian* reminds us of the fact that in the “Jian’ai zhong” chapter and “Jian’ai xia” chapter of the *Mozǐ*, *jian* is considered to be the task of the Man of Benevolence. In both cases, the term *renren* denotes the sage kings, such as Yao, Shu and Yu, who are expected to rule the world, not just any mediocre or local rulers. Yet, there is a difference in the scope and theoretical goals of the two “Jian’ai” chapters of the *Mozǐ* text and Xunzi’s vision of the idea of *jian*. In the case of the “Jian’ai” of the *Mozǐ* (and also in other chapters), the term *jian* is paired with its opposite, *bie* 別 (discrimination), and takes on an additional abstract meaning. Here, what the authors want to persuade readers to do is “to practice”. In the case of the adduced passages from Xunzi, *jian*, in addition to this aspect, has become a more internalized virtue which

86 The subject word of *jianren* should be at least the ruler of a country, not commors.

87 *Xunzi* 15, “Yibing”.

88 *Xunzi* 10, “Fuguo”.

one has to learn (of course, this “learning” includes “practice”) and nurture in one’s mind. In this context, Xunzi’s concept of *jian ren* 兼人 in fact reminds one of the phrase *jian fu tianxia zhi xin* 兼服天下之心 (to make the mind/heart of all the people in the world be willing to obey at the same time) in the “Feishi’erzi” chapter. In the same paragraph, Xunzi proposes the method for attaining this. He says:

高上尊貴，不以驕人；聰明聖知，不以窮人；齊給速通，不爭先人；剛毅勇敢，不以傷人。⁸⁹
If one’s position is high and noble, he will still not be arrogant; if his knowledge and wisdom is as intelligent as (that of) a sage, he still will not hound people; if his talent for words and behavior is agile, he still will not compete with others; if he is tough and brave, he still will not harm others.

Here, a ruler, who is noble, intelligent and agile, is advised not to make trouble with subordinate peoples by exerting his superior talents and position. In other words, in Xunzi’s thought the concept of *jian* is something to be attained by learning about human minds and social interactions. This leads us to the final point, namely the conceptual relationship with the concept of *li* (rituals and social norms).

Fourth, in Xunzi’s conception of the method of *jian*, *li* was a concrete and perhaps the best method to attain an ideal rulership designated by the term *jian*. For Xunzi, the combination of *jian* and *li* has two levels of significance. First, Xunzi uses *jian* to highlight *li*’s comprehensive role in the governance of human emotions. This is the case in the aforementioned example (5), which contains the phrase *jian er yong zhi* 兼而用之 from the “Lilun” 禮論 chapter. The whole passage goes as follows:

故文飾、麤惡，聲樂、哭泣，恬愉、憂戚，是反也。然而禮兼而用之，時舉而代御。⁹⁰
Hence, beautiful adornment and ugliness, music and weeping, contentment and sorrow are opposites; yet the rites (*Li*) unite them and use them, at the right time they arouse them and in turn bring them forward.⁹¹

In this paragraph, Xunzi is attempting to delineate the comprehensive function of *li*, wherein *li* should rule various kinds of human emotions as well as the behaviors arising from them. Thus, it is natural to Xunzi’s logic that mastery of *li* will lead one to have the virtue of *jian*, through which the people of the world will obey one voluntarily.

Second, Xunzi claims practicing both *li* and *jian* is necessary in order to become the world ruler. Let us examine the following argument in the “Jundao” 君道 (The Way of a Ruler) chapter:

請問為人君？曰：以禮分施，均遍而不偏。〔...〕請問兼？能之奈何？曰：審之禮也。⁹²
“May I ask how to rule [my] subjects?” [Xunzi] replied: “Distribute [natural and social resources] to your subject according to the principle of rituals and social norms, and distribute (them) to all impartially. [..] “May I ask about *jian*? By what way can I master this virtue?” [Xunzi replied:] “Anyone who aims at possessing the virtue of *jian* must reflect on whether or not his words and deeds are in accordance with what rituals and social norms order one to do. Since the ancient sage kings rule over the world by carefully examining the principle of the rituals and social norms, no words and deeds were inappropriate.

Apparently, the topic of the whole discussion is how to become the ruler of the world, or more precisely, the sage ruler with the virtue of benevolence (*ren* 仁). This idea appears twice

89 *Xunzi* 6, “Feishi’erzi”.

90 *Xunzi* 19, “Lilun”.

91 Translated after Dubs, 232.

92 *Xunzi* 12, “Jundao”.

in the concluding remarks that follow the above citation.⁹³ After Xunzi's advocacy for the significant role of *li* for ruling the world, the interlocutor continues to ask about *jian*. The two questions he raised in his conversation with Xunzi: "May I ask about *jian*? By what way can I master this virtue?" 請問兼? 能之奈何?, presupposes that there is an important conception in Xunzi's thought concerning the idea of *jian* is imperative for becoming the ruler of the world. To conclude from the question, "May I ask how to rule [my] subjects?" 請問為人君?, the interlocutor is obviously a ruler of a country (be it real or fictional). Also, the realm that Xunzi idealizes in the concluding part is that of the sage ruler who is expected to rule the whole world. Unless we understand this point, it is unintelligible why the interlocutor "suddenly" asked Xunzi about *jian* between his two arguments on *li*. On the matter of mastering the virtue of *jian*, Xunzi's answer is *shen zhi li* 審之禮 – the phrase can be interpreted as "Anyone who aims at possessing the virtue of *jian* must reflect on whether or not his words and deeds are in accordance with what rituals and social norms order one to do." The contents of actions based on the reflection by the standard of rituals and social norms are supplemental with the way "to concurrently make the mind/heart of the people of the world willing to obey", as discussed in the aforementioned passage in the "Wangzhi" chapter.⁹⁴ In both arguments, Xunzi requests practitioners to keep utmost balance in their interaction with other (subordinate) people, and in the case of the paragraph in the "Jundao" chapter, Xunzi advances his idea to go on proposing *li* as the standard for judging whether their words and deeds are appropriate or not.

Let us focus more on the particular role of *li* here: In the passage of the "Wangzhi" chapter, Xunzi presupposes that a ruler originally occupied a dominant position, and had intelligence and agility. He argues that a ruler must not take advantage of such predominance; instead, a ruler must make his best effort of virtuosity through harmonious conducts. In this effort, the ruler of one country becomes the ruler of the world, and that is the ruler who "concurrently makes the mind/heart of the people of the world willing to obey". In this paragraph, however, Xunzi has not proposed any concrete method for attaining this purpose. In contrast, in the dialogue in the "Jundao" chapter, by setting the question about *jian* between two discourses about *li*, Xunzi fully presents his answer to this question. In doing so, Xunzi proposes the idea of *li* as the method for self-cultivation for a ruler to become the world ruler.

In sum, the combination of the idea of *jian* and *li* manifests Xunzi's vision of the world ruler's peculiar capacity for taking care of *all* the people in his empire, i. e. *jian*, as well as the best way to embody that virtue, namely *li*. Furthermore, by proposing this vision, Xunzi suggests that *li* is the best method not only for aristocrats and officer-aspirants (*shi* 士) to cultivate themselves in order to achieve sagehood and become eligible for ruling, but also that for a ruler himself, whether actual or ideal, to become the world sage ruler of mankind. He would be crowned with the glorious term both for Confucians and Mohism: *ren ren* 仁人 (the Man of Benevolence). Mohists established their idea of the world ruler by designating practitioners

93 *Ibid.*: 古者先王審禮以方皇周浹於天下，動無不當也。故君子恭而不難，敬而不羣，貧窮而不約，富貴而不驕，並遇變，應而不窮，審之禮也。[...] 是故窮則必有名，達則必有功，仁厚，兼覆天下而不問；明達，用天地理萬變而不疑。血氣和平，志意廣大，行義塞於天地之間，仁智之極也。夫是之謂聖人；審之禮也。

94 *Xunzi* 9, "Wangzhi": 高上尊貴，不以驕人；聰明聖知，不以窮人；齊給速通，不爭先人。

of *jian* as the *ren ren*. Xunzi's incorporation of his idea of *li* into this argument reached its culmination in his program of self-cultivation for the ruler himself.

Concluding Remarks

It is uncertain when the concept of *jian* had first taken shape as an important conceptual term, but by the mid-Warring States period at the latest, the term should have come to possess its substantial meaning – the virtue of the world ruler. In this conception, the term *jian'ai* in the Mohist doctrine, unlike the implication of the prevalent use by other thinkers, more narrowly denoted the impartial Kingly love to all, which was associated to the virtue of the ancient sage kings with the sun and the moon metaphor. According to Mohist doctrine, this virtue was in the first place an intrinsic attribute of Heaven, and could be conferred to an ideal terrestrial ruler who in turn would spread his virtuous rule to all corners of the world.

What Xunzi made of this idea enabled him to develop various aspects on rule without losing the indispensable morality of the Confucian doctrine. But Xunzi's theoretical work was not only limited to this. Compared to the Mohist lack of an articulation of self-cultivation in relation to the use of the term *jian*, Xunzi incorporated the idea into his theory of self-cultivation by rituals and social norms (*li*). In doing so, Xunzi could propose “another” theory of self-cultivation for a ruler to become the true world ruler.

In “Li Si liezhuan” 李斯列傳 (Biography of Li Si), Sima Qian wrote that Li Si learnt from Xunzi the method for ruling the world, namely, *dawang zhi shu* 帝王之術.⁹⁵ The concept of *jian* was a significant element for its establishment. For in Xunzi's theory of self-cultivation, ritual and moral practice could naturally be fulfilled not only by actual rulers, but also by all the aristocrats and officer-aspirants (*shi* 士). In theory, the highest fulfillment of self-cultivation allows one to be ranked as a sage. But to conclude from this theory, it remains unclear whether or not that sage has become ruler or not.⁹⁶ In other words, for practitioners, it is not clear what degree of moral practice would allow one to transform oneself into a ruler. By the inclusion of the idea of *jian* Xunzi clearly demarcated the scope of the ritual and moral practice for the ruler to move into a higher realm of rule. The ultimate purpose of the practice of *jian* through rituals and social norms was to become nothing more than the ruler of the world.

Indeed, when Sima Qian summarized the source of Xunzi's philosophy as *Ru Mo* 儒墨 (Confucianism and Mohism) and its characteristic as “the method for ruling the world”, he was tellingly referring to two aspects of its very essence.

95 See *Shiji* 87.2539 (“Li Si liezhuan”). There are also three examples of the term *dawang* 帝王 in the *Xunzi*, all of which are found in the discussion about an ideal ruler. The frequencies of their occurring in other important Warring States' texts are as follows: nine times in the *Zhuangzi*, five times in both the *Hanfeizi* and the *Lishi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋, three times in the *Guanzi*, two times both in the *Yanzi chunqiu* 晏子春秋 and the *Shangjun shu* 商君書.

96 At the same time, this theory paradoxically enables a sage not to involve in ruling people.

Table 3: Occurrences of the Term *Jian* in Warring States and Qin-(the Western) Han Texts

Text	N ⁹⁷	Notes
論語	1	由也兼人故退之
孔子家語	10	兼有:1;兼而有之:1;兼行:1;兼四子者:1;兼以:1;兼食於社:1;兼用:1;兼通:1;兼天下而有之:1;兼而用之:1
孝經	1	
墨子	136	兼愛:11;兼相愛:15
孟子	12	墨氏兼愛:1;人之於身也兼所愛。兼所愛則兼所養也:1;墨子兼愛:1
荀子	76	兼愛:1;兼并:3;兼知:3;兼人:14;兼聽:6;兼制:5;兼利天下:2
新語	4	
新書	15	并兼:3;兼諸侯:2;兼覆:2;兼愛:2;兼有天下:1
韓詩外傳	14	兼聽:3;兼制天下:3;兼覆天下:1;兼利天下:1;兼天下:1
春秋繁露	27	兼愛:1;兼利:2;兼人:2
鹽鐵論	23	并兼:4
新序	2	并兼:2
說苑	19	兼國:4;兼有:3
古列女傳	2	查劉向《列女傳》,「兼」有3個。堂上兼女、自吾先君武公兼翼、昭儀兼之矣
法言	4	
孔叢子	5	兼吞天下:1;兼利天下:1;兼六藝:1
鬻子	0	
管子	35	并兼:3;兼愛:6
老子	1	大國不過欲兼畜人,小國不過欲入事人。此兩者各得其所欲,大者宜為下
文子	10	兼官:2;兼利:1;兼愛:1
關尹子	3	兼天下:1
莊子	17	兼愛:3
列子	4	兼利:1;利兼:1
鶡冠子	0	
商君書	3	兼并:1;并兼:1;兼天下之眾:1
申子	0	
慎子	10	兼事:3;兼官:3
韓非子	31	兼天下:3;兼官:5
鄧析子	1	
尹文子	5	
公孫龍子	4	
晏子春秋	9	
尉繚子	1	并兼
尸子	0	
呂氏春秋	8	兼愛:3;兼國:2
淮南子	25	兼覆:5;兼愛:1
孫子	1	倍道兼行
吳子	4	
鬼谷子	0	
燕丹子	0	
六韜	1	
司馬法	4	兼愛:1
語叢三	2	兼行:1;禮必兼:1
曹沫之陳	3	兼人:1;兼愛:1;兼畏:1

97 N = Number of Occurrences.

Table 4: Occurrences of the term *Jian* in the *Mozi*

Examples	Chapter	Phrases including examples
兼王之道	親士	
兼愛	法儀 兼愛下 天志下 (4 例) 大取 (2 例) 耕柱 (2 例) 魯問	法儀：兼愛天下之百姓 兼愛下：文王之兼愛天下之博大也 天志下：兼愛天下之人 昔也三代之聖王堯舜禹湯文武之兼愛天下也 大取：兼愛之有相若 魯問：國家務奪侵凌，即語之兼愛、非攻
兼惡	法儀 天志下	法儀：兼惡天下之百姓 天志下：兼惡天下
兼相愛	兼愛上 (3 例) 兼愛中 (6 例) ⁹⁸ 兼愛下 (3 例) 天志上 非命上 (2 例)	兼愛上：若使天下兼相愛 故天下兼相愛則治 兼愛中：兼相愛交相利之法 兼相愛，交相利，此聖王之法，天下之治道也 天志上：順天意者，兼相愛，交相利，必得賞 非命上：與其百姓兼相愛，交相利
兼而食	法儀 (2 例) 天志上 (2 例) 天志下 (4 例)	兼而食之 兼而食焉
兼有/兼而有	魯問 法儀 (3 例) 非攻中 天志上 (2 例)	魯問：兼有天下 法儀、非攻、天志上：兼而有之
兼而利	法儀 (2 例) 天志上	兼而利之
兼而憎	尚賢中	兼而憎之
兼而明	天志上	兼而明之
行兼	兼愛中 (3 例)	無今行兼矣
執兼	兼愛下 (2 例)	使其一士者執兼；使其一君者執兼
取兼	兼愛下 (2 例)	擇即取兼
聞兼	兼愛下 (5 例)	皆聞兼而非之者
審兼	兼愛下	莫若審兼而務行之
兼士	兼愛下 (2 例)	兼士之言
兼者	兼愛下 (12 例) 天志中	
兼君	兼愛下 (3 例)	兼君之言
兼天下	法儀 天志中 天志下	法儀：兼天下之百姓 天志中：天兼天下而愛之 天志下：今天兼天下而食焉
兼	經上 經下 (2 例)	經上：體，分於兼也。 經下：牛馬之非牛，與可之同，說在兼。 無窮不害兼，說在盈否。
兼之體也	經說上	損，偏也者兼之體也。
不外於兼	經說上	同，二名一實，重同也。不外於兼，體同也。
兼指之	經說下	兼指之，以二也。
兼白黑	貴義	兼白黑，使替取焉，不能知也。
兼左右	迎敵祠	和心比力兼左右，各死而守

98 學生只有找到 6 個，編輯說有 7 例。

Table 5: Occurrences of the term *Jian* in the *Xunzi*

Examples	Chapter	Phrases including examples	Notes
兼權	不苟		
兼術	非相		
兼服	非十二子	兼服天下之心	
兼臨	王制	足以相兼臨者，是養天下之本也	《書》曰：「維齊非齊。」此之謂也。
兼利	非十二子 王制	兼利天下	舜禹是也 得之分義也
兼技	富國	能不能兼技	
兼官	富國	人不能兼官	
兼足	富國	兼足天下之道在明分	
兼率	王霸	若夫論一相以兼率之	
兼而有	王霸 (3例)	王者兼而有是者也 (2例) 合天下之所同願兼而有之	
兼能	君道	請問兼能之奈何?	
兼覆	王制 (2例) 富國 王霸 (2例) 君道 正名	王制：兼覆無遺 兼覆而調一之 富國、王霸：泮然兼覆之 君道：仁厚兼覆天下而不閔 正名：有兼覆之厚	
兼聽	王制 王霸 (2例) 君道 (2例) 正名	王制：兼聽而時稽之 王霸：兼聽天下 君道：兼聽齊明則天下歸之 兼聽齊明而百姓不留 正名：有兼聽之明	
兼制	儒效 (2例) 富國 王霸 君道	儒效、富國、君道：兼制天下 王霸：兼制人	
兼愛	成相 富國	成相：汜利兼愛德施均 富國：兼而愛之	
兼人	富國 議兵 (13例)	富國：又將兼人 議兵：凡兼人者有三術	
兼并	王制 議兵 (2例)	王制：無兼并之心 議兵：兼并易能也 兼并無強	
兼容	彊國	公道通義之可以相兼容者	聖人之道
兼有之	正論 (2例) 宥坐	正論：義榮欮榮，唯君子然後兼有之；義辱欮辱，唯小人然後兼有之。 宥坐：少正卯兼有之	
兼陳萬物	解蔽	兼陳萬物而中縣衡焉	
兼知	解蔽 (3例)	萬物可兼知也	
兼物物	解蔽	精於道者兼物物	
兼其情	解蔽		
喻則兼	正名	單不足以喻則兼	
兼異實之名	正名	辭也者，兼異實之名以論一意也	
兼萬物之美	正名		