Forced Resettlement Campaigns in Northern Thailand During the Early Bangkok Period*

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1. Introduction

In pre-colonial indianized Southeast Asia not the conquest of land, but the control of manpower was the crucial factor for establishing, consolidating and strengthening state power. Thai, Burmese and Cambodian chronicles provide ample evidence of how Southeast Asian rulers launched successful attacks against weaker neighbours in order to seize large parts of the population and to resettle the war captives in their own realm. At the same time, the victorious side was very often content on establishing a loose tributary relationship with the former enemy whose resources of manpower had been reduced.

The victors drew many benefits from this kind of traditional warfare in demographic, political, economical and cultural terms. The losers, on the other hand, suffered severely from massive depopulations resulting in the devastation of cities and rural areas and, in consequence, a decrease of agricultural production. Sometimes it took centuries until population losses and its concomitants, like the devastation of rural areas and the decrease of agricultural production, could be overcome. The rulers of the Burmese Konbaung dynasty, for example, used systematically large-scale deportations of war captives as an underlying

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principle of strengthening and expanding state power. In 1757, King Alaunghpaya defeated the resurgent Mon (Môn) kingdom of Pegu. Numerous Mon were resettled in Upper Burma, others fled across the Salween into Tenasserim province (Martaban) or even sought shelter in Siamese territory. Fifteen years later, Burmese maltreatment of the Mon provoked a new exodus to Siam. Lower Burma began to recover from the ravages caused by warfare, forced resettlements and voluntary emigration only in the second quarter of the 19th century.¹

The structural backwardness of Laos can at least partially be explained by the drastic measures taken by the Siamese in suppressing the rebellion of King (cao) Anu of Vientiane (Wiang Can). The ruthless victors not only destroyed the Laotian captial completely; in numerous mopping-up operations Siamese troops depopulated Vientiane and its hinterland. Furthermore, they raided Central Laos between the Kading river and Sawannakhet. The massive resettlements of Lao populations across the Mekong (Mà Khong) to the Khorat plateau and even to the Central Plain (e.g., Lopburi, Suphanburi, Chachongsao, Prachinburi) continued until the early 1850s.² Within a few decades after the suppression of the Cao Anu rebellion the demographic centre of gravity of the Lao country had moved from the trans-Mekong territories (i.e. present-day Laos) to the Khorat Plateau. “In the 30 years after the Cao Anu rebellion more than 100,000 people were deported from the left bank. The present fivefold disparity between the populations of Laos and Thailand's Isan region are a result of the deportations in the aftermath of the Cao Anu rebellion.”³

The Siamese campaigns in Laos, as well as in neighbouring Cambodia, during the 1830s and 1840s were primarily directed against Vietnamese political expansion. As Kennon Breazeale points out, “Thai notions behind the restructuring of human resettlement to suit political ends rather than local geography were based in the time of Rama III on the idea that a depopulated region would serve as a physical barrier against enemy attack.” However, the Vietnamese did not engage in the same sort of depopulation efforts that the Thai did. Hué was primarily concerned with acknowledgements of suzerainty by Lao rulers and did not envisage a depopulation campaign either practical or desirable. Generally speaking, “there was never any question of rounding up villagers and resettling them in Annam”.⁴ Conditions in the densely populated Red River basin

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¹ As to the events in Burma see Koenig 1990:14–17.
² A good general description of the Siamese policy of forced resettlements in the Lao mûang is given by Snit and Breazeale 1988:9–22; as to the deportations of Lao war captives to Central Thai provinces see Bangon 1986. Up to 50,000 Lao were resettled in Central Thailand by the mid 19th century. In Prachinburi, for instance, the Lao still outnumbered the Siamese by the turn of the century. Compare Bangon 1986:99.
³ Chalông 1986:149.
⁴ Snit and Breazeale 1988:21.
and the Central Vietnamese coastal zones did not favour an eastward flow of people from the Mekong basin. During the short-lived conquest of Cambodia by Huế (1834–47) considerable numbers of Vietnamese settlers were sent into the new province of Tran Tay Thanh as Cambodia was renamed by Emperor Minh Mang. This attitude was in sharp contrast to the Siamese strategy of raiding Cambodia to assemble manpower.

The esteem of a strong population base (“manpower”) and the relatively minor importance of land, with the notable exception of Vietnam, can certainly be explained by the chronic underpopulation of Southeast Asian river basins since ancient times. The control of land was apparently not the decisive factor for state power. The political status of a certain Thai mūang depended on the patrimonial ties of the population living in that territory. For example, the district of Phan, now a part of Chiang Rai province, was until the beginning of this century an enclave of Lamphun. Settlers from that mūang founded Mūang Phan in the 1840s but maintained their allegiance to their old overlord, the cao mūang of Lamphun. Old patrimonial bonds proved obviously to be stronger than geographic or economic considerations which would have favoured political relations to Chiang Mai rather than to Lamphun.5

The primacy of manpower can be best exemplified by the following conflict between Nan, a Northern Thai tributary state of Siam, and Chiang Khāng, a small mūang in Sipsong Panna that became a part of French Laos in 1896. In 1866, the ruler of Chiang Khāng sent some of his subjects to neighbouring (Mūang) Sing, at that time virtually unpopulated and covered with deep forests. Nan regarded Sing as a dependency, because it had once deported the inhabitants of Sing. When the ruler of Chiang Khāng claimed his exclusive rights to exploit Sing’s rich natural resources, the ruler of Nan threatened his rival to launch a punishing campaign and deported the illegal settlers to Nan.6 Chiang Khāng complied with Nan’s demand, at least temporarily. Two decades later, in 1883, Chiang Khāng made a second, this time successful, attempt. More than 1,000 settlers from Chiang Khāng in search of new land settled permanently in Sing.7

Forced resettlement campaigns as an important aspect or even the main rationale of wars in traditional Thailand and Laos have considerably shaped the linguistic and ethnographic map of these countries. Khmer villages in Ratchaburi, Phuan settlements in Lopburi and Lao enclaves in Saraburi originate from deportations of war captives during the Thonburi and early Bangkok periods. Suffice to say that the existence in the Siamese heartland of large non-Siamese

5 For details on Mūang Phan see Ḥọ cotmaihet hāngchat, Raingan mūang lamphun pi rattana-kosin sok 112 (pp. 10–12 and 21–22), R.5 M.58/187.
6 Ḥọ samut hāngchat, Cotmaihet ratchakan thī 4, C.S. 1228 [A.D. 1866], No. 31.
7 Somsak 1986:69.

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ethnic groups, though partially assimilated today, are of relevance for political scientists and social anthropologist doing fieldwork in those areas. In this paper I try to examine the impacts of forced resettlements on state and society by using Thailand's upper north, the historical region of Lan Na, as a case in point.

*Kep phak sai sa kep kha sai mìuang,* is an old Northern Thai (Yuan) saying, translated by the late Kraisri Nimmanhaeminda as “Put Vegetables into Baskets, put People into Towns.” This saying refers to one of the most extensive deportations in Thai history. Two centuries of Burmese domination had destroyed the Lan Na state and society. Large parts of the Ping-Kuang basin, the agricultural heartland of the country, laid waste. The population had either been deported to Burma or had fled into the jungles to escape the hardships of war. The liberator of Chiang Mai, Phaya (King) Kawila (r. 1782–1813) launched numerous campaigns against various petty Shan States to the North deporting large parts of their populations and resettling them in Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Lampang. Kawila's policy of *kep phak sai sa kep kha sai mìuang* contributed to the political, economic and cultural revival of these three Northern Thai principalities. Each was a tributary state (*mìuang prathetsarat*) of Siam, but Chiang Mai played the leading role. Nan and Phrä, two other Northern Thai tributary states, were ruled by own dynasties and launched resettlement campaigns likewise, partially in coordination with Chiang Mai, partially on their own account. In this study I will use following questions for the sake of conceptual clarity: *First,* can we determine the geographical and ethnic background of the war captives? *Second,* is it possible to quantify the extent of the forced resettlements? *Third,* where were the deportees resettled in their new homesteads? *Lastly,* what were the political, demographic and economic implications on Lan Na society as the whole?

2. Sources

To reconstruct the history of Lan Na, especially the period of its restoration under Kawila, the historian has to make use of a wide range of different source materials. They can be classified into four categories:

1. Local chronicles (*tamnan*) written in Dharma script (*tua tham* or *tua mìuang*) and kept in the numerous monastery libraries of the region;
2. royal chronicles (*ratchaphongsawadan*) and reports of the Siamese government (*cotmaithet*) on relations with its Northern Thai principalities;
3. contemporay reports of British officials about their visits to Northern Thailand;

8 Kraisri 1965 and 1978.
4. interviews with knowledgable informants in communities of Lü, Khôn or Tai Yai (Shan) background.

Among the different sorts of source materials, the local chronicles turned out to be most promising and useful. However, in cases of direct Siamese involvement Central Thai sources are often more precise and reliable. During recent decades when public and scholarly interest in Thai local history has grown dramatically, many of the most important tamnan have been transliterated into modern Thai script. The Chronicle of Chiang Mai [Tamnan phûnmûang chiang mai – TPCM], one of the key sources of Northern Thai history, has been available in Central Thai transliteration since 1971. Before that, non-readers of Dharma script had to consult Camille Notton's French translation published in 1932. The Yonok Chronicle [Phongsawadan yonok – PY] written in 1898/99 by Phraya Prachakitcakôracak, a high-ranking Siamese official in Monthon Phayap, makes extensive use of various Northern Thai chronicles including TPCM. Since PY was first published in 1907, long before any Northern Thai chronicle had been transliterated into modern Thai, many Thai scholars used it as an authoritative source on Northern Thai history. Although PY's account on developments in Chiang Mai during the 18th and early nineteenth centuries follows TPCM very closely, there are several errors or misunderstandings of the Chiang Mai Chronicle. PY is, however, a useful secondary source though one which should be taken with caution.

There exist altogether eight versions of TPCM, each slightly different. Linguists and historians from Chiang Mai are now reconstructing the “archetype” (codex optimus) of TPCM; the results of their work will be presented on the occasion of Chiang Mai’s 700th anniversary in 1996. The authorship of TPCM is unknown. Northern Thai experts, however, are convinced that more than one author was involved in the composition of the chronicle which might have been revised and rewritten several times over the centuries. Saraswadee Ongsakul suggests that the first part of the chronicle was composed not long after the reign of Phaya (King) Tilok (r. 1441–1487), for starting with the reign of Tilok’s predecessor, Sam Fang Kân (1402–1441), TPCM is becoming more and more detailed on political events. Unlike the religious tamnan of the early 16th century, like Jinakålâmâlipakarapaamt or Câmadevivaṃsa, the author of TPCM might not have been a monk but a member of the king's entourage. Starting with events in the mid 1550s, the chronicle changes style and scope. The two centuries of Burmese rule are dealt with only in a cursory manner. There are large gaps, especially for the first quarter of the 17th century. The condensed style of writing resembles that of an astrological calendar emphasizing exact years of

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9 See e.g. PPR1, Thiphakprawong 1988. Prince Damrong Rachanuphap's famous book "Thai rop phama" (1977) is largely based on the royal chronicles of Ayutthaya and Bangkok.
events. As for the late 18th century, when the anti-Burmese struggle gaining momentum, style changes again. The liberation of Lan Na and its restoration under Kawila and his brothers is described in remarkable detail. It seems that this final part of TPCM was written by a person standing either in the service of Kawila himself or of his younger brother Thammalangka, who got, as uparat, directly involved in the resettlement campaigns.

Another chronicle similar to, and over many pages identical with, TPCM is the Chronicle of the Fifteen Dynasties [Tamnan sipha ratchawong – TSHR]. Concerning Kawila’s policy of forced deportations, TSHR occasionally provides more details. Both chronicles glorify Kawila’s policies, there is no space for the victims’ point of view. Therefore, I wish to pay attention to the Yong Chronicle [Tamnan müang yong – TMY] which Thawi Sawangpanyangkun transliterated into modern Thai script. The version of TMY used by Thawi describes the resettlements of people from the műang of Yong and Chiang Tung during the early 19th century. The name of the chronicle is a little misleading, for TMY deals more with events in Chiang Tung than in (Müang) Yong itself; it is thus also a good supplementary to the Jengtung State Chronicle [Tamnan müang chiang tung]. Obviously written by survivors of the deportations, it describes with empathy events from the victims’ perspective. Thus, I was able to use TMY and TPCM for obtaining both corroborating and complementary evidence. As to the polity of Nan, the Nan Chronicle [Phongsawadan müang nan – PMN] was used as the pendant to TPCM.

Apart from transliterated editions of Northern Thai chronicles, there are numerous manuscripts yet unpublished and awaiting scholarly attention. So far I have made only limited use of this rich and promising material. Thus, in some instances, my tentative conclusions might be revised after a thoroughgoing analysis of all materials available. In 1826, after the first Anglo-Burmese war, Tenasserim fell under British rule. Three years later, the British colonial office in Moulmein sent Dr. David Richardson, a high-ranking official, to explore the state of politics, society and economics in Lan Na and the Shan States further to the north. The main intention of the British was to establish cattle trade with Chiang Mai and, further, to explore trade routes leading to Southern China. A couple of years later, W.C. McLeod, assistant to the governor of Tenasserim, made another tour to Chiang Mai and other parts of Lan Na. The reports of the two Englishmen provide much insight into the society of Lan Na during the early 19th century. Moreover, Richardson and McLeod make interesting ob-

10 Saraswadee Ongsakul, personal communication (Chiang Mai, 8 March 1993).
11 Richardson, “Journal of Missions” (British Library, Western Manuscript Department; “A Journal kept by Captain W.C. McLeod” (British Library, India Office & Oriental Collections), see also Blundell 1836. In the following these sources are quoted as “Richardson's Journal” and “McLeod's Journal” respectively.
servations about the size and ethnic origin of the population in various mūang, observations that are missing elsewhere.

The use of “oral history” as a further category of source materials needs some short explanations. As the events I am dealing with occurred 150–200 years ago, it was not surprising that even old villagers of Lū or Khôn origin could seldom give any clear account about the resettlements five to seven generations ago, hence, the more so since no village records have been kept from that early period. However, as an additional source to improve my general understanding of the geographic and social environment the interviews were helpful. In a few monasteries, like Wat Phrathutthhabat Tak Pha (Pa Sang District, Lamphun), abbots were able to provide valuable details on the history of communities founded by former war captives. On the whole, interviews were used to gather additional information and for conceptualizing purposes rather than for filling the gaps left by the chronicler evidence.

3. Anti-Burmese Resistance Efforts in Lan Na

In 1558, Chiang Mai capitulated to Burmese troops without offering any serious resistance. King Bayinnaung of Burma regarded Lan Na as a rear-base where manpower and provisions of food and ammunition could be assembled for the approaching attack on Ayutthaya. Although the Burmese had eventually to retreat from Ayutthaya and the Siamese heartland which they dominated for about 15 years (1569–1584), they were determined to integrate Lan Na into an outer belt of vassal states. The Burmese were pursuing a policy of “divide and rule” in Lan Na. After the death of Phranang (Queen) Witsuthathewi in 1578, Chiang Mai and other important mūang were mostly ruled by Burmese noblemen. The rulers of former dependencies of Chiang Mai, like Nan and Chiang Rai, were directly appointed by the Burmese kings. The Northern Thai (Yuan) élite were strictly controlled by Burmese or Mon civilian and military officials. By letting the high state positions in Lan Na frequently rotate, the political power of Lan Na's old nobility was further reduced. This aggravated rivalries among the Yuan elite along regional lines eventually resulting in the political fragmentation of Lan Na. Each of the Burmese dominated and mutually suspicious Yuan mūang was unable to regain independence for long. Some mūang like Chiang Rai (in 1600) succeeded in throwing off the Burmese yoke for a couple of years when Burma, facing a challenge by a resurgent Siam under King Naresuan, had fallen into chaos. But Anauk-hpet-lun (r. 1606–1628) not only restored Burmese rule over Lan Na, he and his immediate successor, Talun-min (r. 1628–1648), easily


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suppressed further revolts in Nan (1625), Chiang Mai (1631) and Fang (1632), for the rebels were inferior in arms and did not coordinate their actions.13

Burmese retaliatory measures had always been decisive and harsh. Campaigns were followed by mass deportations to Burma. In 1615, after having won a military victory against Chiang Mai the year before, Burmese king Anaukhpet-lun (Yuan: "Mangthara") deported numerous inhabitants of Chiang Mai to lower Burma. We know details of this event from the "Poem on Mangthara's War against Chiang Mai" (Khlong riąng mangthara rop chiang mai – KMCM). The poem, comprising more than 300 stanzas, is one of the oldest travel poems (nirai) of the Thai and among the most eminent pieces of Lan Na literature. Singkha Wannasai transliterated the poem into modern Thai script and also published a translation into the Central Thai language.14 KMCM describes the deportation of the Yuan war captives from Chiang Mai to Hongsawadi (Pegu). Able-bodied men, women, old people and children had to set out on a long, difficult journey. The poem's author was probably a high-ranking Yuan officer whose task was to personally accompany a princess of Chiang Mai (cao ying) to Pegu. Although not written for historical records, KMCM is important for the historian of Lan Na because of the following reasons:

1. As is typical for its genre, its author describes the stages of his journey, from the start to the place of destination, in detail. As his march was also that of numerous war captives, we learn much about the route usually taken by deportees from Lan Na to Lower Burma on other occasions.15 The war captives left Chiang Mai, and travelled in a southwesterly direction following the Ping river. They passed the present-day districts of Hang Dong, San Pa Tông, Cóm Thống. In Hōc, an important trading port, they took a longer rest before continuing their tedious journey in a westerly direction. They crossed mountain areas (Đòi Kang Ma) inhabited by Lawa and Karen until reaching the Salween, Lan Na's western border. Finally, after altogether three months, the prisoners of war arrived at Pegu, the Burmese capital.16

2. KMCM gives a vivid and impressive picture of Lan Na's society and economy of that time. As evidence from Northern Thai chronicles on the late 16th and 17th centuries is poor, Northern Thai literary sources like this travel poem are a welcome addition. However, one has to be cautious, because a travel poem has, unlike chronicles and annals, no special intention to put events in a correct

15 In particular, between 1558 (conquest of Chiang Mai by Burma) and 1635 (transfer of the Burmese capital from Pegu to Ava).
chronological order. Sometimes the unfavourable present situation of the writer intermingles with memories of a better past, thus more favourable social and economic conditions of past decades may be transferred to the later time of writing. For instance, KMCM describes Hpt as a large and busy trading centre accommodating numerous merchants from Ayutthaya, Burma and Laos. But in 1615, when the deportations took place, trade between Ayutthaya and Chiang Mai was still interrupted and reopened only three years later as we know from contemporary Dutch sources.

The large-scale deportations of Yuan to Pegu were obviously a response to heavy population losses in Lower Burma during the late 16th century. According to Victor Lieberman, “Anauk-hpet-lun may have settled Tai prisoners around Pegu between 1616 and 1624, but these deportations could hardly compensate for the losses of the late sixteenth century”.17 However, deportations were not always the lot of the entire population. It appears that some groups of people, like commoners who were already attached to monasteries for life (phrai war), were able to escape forced resettlement. This seems to be evident from two documents found at Wat Ratchawisutharam in the village of Ban Pâ (Cơm Thống District, Chiang Mai Province). The first document is engraved on two thin silver-plates bearing the seal of Phranang Wisuthathewi. The queen vested to the villagers of three hamlets, which make up present-day Ban Pâ, the rights to stay permanently in their settlements. They had to pay an annual ground-rent of 500 baht; in exchange, the villagers were exempted from corvée labour and military service.18 When some 60 years later, in 1632, the Burmese king Tha-lun ordered a campaign against recalcitrant Chiang Mai, he tried to deport the inhabitants of Ban Pâ to Ava. The villagers, already rounded up, submitted, but when the Burmese generals were shown the silver-plates, the villagers were finally allowed to stay.19

Tha-lun’s campaign against Chiang Mai is very shortly mentioned by the Chiang Mai chronicle. TPCM states that the Burmese took prisoner the cao míaung of Chiang Mai bringing him to Pegu in 1631. One year later, Fang was retaken by Burmese troops.20 The chronicle which discussed events of the 17th century only cursory fails to mention large-scale deportations of Northern Thai (Yuan) populations to Burma. But Burmese sources confirm resettlements of Tai speaking peoples, including Yuan, to Lower Burma between 1616 and 1632 and to Upper Burma after 1635.21 In 1635, the Burmese king Tha-lun transferred the

17 Lieberman 1984:59; see also Lieberman 1980.
18 Chomrom lanna khadi chiang mai 1990:15.
20 TPCM:81.
royal capital from Pegu to Ava. Preparations for this transfer had begun in 1627/29 as Victor Lieberman convincingly demonstrates. In 1628, the Burmese centre of power in Lan Na shifted from Chiang Mai to Chiang Sán. I believe that the growing importance of Chiang Sán has to be seen in connection with the transfer of the Burmese capital. Communication between Pegu and Chiang Mai was comparatively easy when the route described in KMCM was taken. Seen from Ava, situated in the heartland of Upper Burma, routes of communication to Lan Na were shortest via the eastern Shan States and Chiang Sán. Moreover, the transfer of the Burmese capital was motivated by a shift from maritime to overland trade in Burma and neighbouring regions. The new trade-routes favoured not only Ava, but also Chiang Sán which controlled the trans-Mekong trade deep into present-day Laos. During the second half of the 17th century Burmese rule in Chiang Mai and other parts appeared to have been relatively stable, although the Siamese under King Narai managed to conquer Chiang Mai for a short period (1661–1663). Occasional Siamese raids, like the assault on Tak in 1677 which resulted in the deportation of parts of its inhabitants, do not alter this assessment.

In 1701, Chiang Sán was administratively separated from Chiang Mai and put under the direct control of Ava. Twenty-six years later, a popular uprising in Chiang Mai under Thep Sing, a “man possessing magical powers” (phu wiset), occurred. The Burmese garrison was expelled, and Chiang Mai regained its independence for three decades. Because they lost Chiang Mai, the Burmese decided to turn Chiang Sán into their military, political and economic base in Lan Na. In 1733, all important mūang in the North and East of Lan Na were placed under the direct supervision of Chiang Sán: Phayao, Chiang Rai, Chiang Khong, Fang, Thōng, Phrá, Nan and Sat. Thus, by the mid-18th century Lan Na fell apart into two competing spheres of influence: a Burmese controlled zone with Chiang Sán as its centre and a “Free Lan Na” around Chiang Mai and Lamphun.

The temporary Burmese withdrawal from the Ping-Kuang basin resulted from a severe power crisis in Burma during the second quarter of the 18th century. To the north the state of Mogu was gaining independence with help from Manipur in 1734/35. Some years later, the Mon in Lower Burma revived their own state and dared to challenge even the Burmese heartland around Ava. The Burmese Kon-ba-ung-zet Chronicle explains the precarious situation of that time as follows: “Day by day and month by month, the great tributary states that made up the empire – the crowned swa-bwas and [Thai] myo-zas – broke away

22 See Lieberman 1980.
23 Sommai 1975a:37.
and deserted the king. Each withdrew and fortified himself within his own principality. "25

After his decisive victory against Pegu in 1757, Alaung-hpaya, the founder of the Kon-baung dynasty, tried to win back Chiang Mai and other former vassals. In 1762, nine Burmese armies laid siege to Chiang Mai. After one year the city fell, together with Lamphun, into Burmese hands. The victors did not only deport the urban elite, but also large parts of the rural population to Ava.26 PY puts the situation in following words: "The Burmese controlled all communes of Lan Na. The oppression of the population caused much suffering all over the country. Some people fled into the jungle. Others flocked together and formed gangs killing each other. The country had no ruler."27 But like two centuries before, Chiang Mai was once again not the ultimate target of Burmese war strategy. The seizure of Chiang Mai paved the way for encircling Ayutthaya from the North. The Siamese kingdom had secretly supported Mon rebels in Lower Burma and Tenasserim, thereby threatening Ava's expansionist quest for security.

When, after the victories of Tak Sin in 1767/68, the fortunes of war turned towards the Siamese again, troops of the Siamese king hurried up towards the North. The signal for a general uprising against the Burmese was given. But in the forthcoming struggle the surviving members of Lan Na's old élite no longer played the leading role. The initiative was taken by the ruling family of Lampang. In 1732, a forester (phran pa) called Thip Chang expelled the despotic ruler of Lampang. He did so with broad popular support, including the moral encouragement of the local saṅgha. Thip Chang who ascended the throne under the title Phraya Sulawalûchâi (r. 1732–1759) tried to maintain good relations to Ava accepting Burmese suzerainty. His policy of maintaining relations with the superior regional power was supported by his son Chai Kao (r. 1759–1774). Lampang seemed to have been spared the devastations and mass deportations Chiang Mai suffered in 1762. Chai Kao's eldest son, Kawila (*1742), helped his father in the day-to-day administration and also proved to be an able military commander.28

The conciliatory attitude towards Burma began to change when the Burmese were taking drastic measures to assimilate the Yuan culturally. PY reports that in 1770, "the Burmese issued an order that in all parts [of Lan Na] males had to

26 3,000 inhabitants of Chiang Mai were obviously deported and resettled in the San State of Mok Mai. The müang of Mok Mai was at that time depopulated. The ruler of Ava decided to reestablish it as a Burmese vassel state. See Hø samut hângchat, Cotmaiheit ratchakan thi 4, C.S. 1228 [A.D. 1866], No. 126.
tattoo their legs black and females to pierce their ears and insert a rolled palm
leaf, according to Burmese fashion”.29 It seems probable that, as Saraswadee
and Penth suggest, this change in Burmese cultural policy was due to the gruff
and uncompromising character of (Po) Moyakhamani, the new Burmese gover-
nor in Chiang Mai.30 Moyakhamani, also called “General Whitehead” (po hua
khao)31 by the Yuan, had succeeded the relatively humane (Po) Aphaikhamani a
year before.

A few years later, Kawila secretly plotted with Ca Ban, the Yuan ruler of
Chiang Mai, against the Burmese occupiers. Ca Ban was appointed by the Bur-
inese king and had as his trusted attendant organized stiff resistance against the
troops of Tak Sin (in 1770/71). But obviously in direct response to the arbitrar-
iness of the Burmese forces, which was becoming increasingly unbearable,
Kawila and Ca Ban secretly plotted against the Burmese. Realizing their own
forces were too weak to launch a successful war of liberation, they changed
their loyalty to the Siamese side. By ruse, Ca Ban escaped with his followers
from Chiang Mai and finally joined Siamese troops south of Thôn.32 Kawila, for
his part, attacked the poorly guarded Burmese garrison in Lampang causing a
carnage among the Burmese and Tai Yai troops stationed there.33

The events that led to the defeat of the Burmese troops and their withdrawal
from Chiang Mai within three years are depicted by TPCM in detail. The
Chiang Mai Chronicle emphasizes the eminent role of Kawila in the liberation
of the city. According to TPCM, Kawila commanded a small, but audacious,
army. Possessing great tactical skills, Kawila contributed decisively to the vic-
tory of the main Siamese army under the command of Phraya Chakri, the later
King Rama I.34 Siamese sources do not agree. In his pioneering work on the
wars between Siam and Burma [Thai rop phama] Prince Damrong Rachenuphap
does not even mention Kawila. The liberation of Chiang Mai is portrayed by
him as the work of Phraya Chakri with the support of Ca Ban and 5,000 vol-
unteers from the Chiang Mai region.35 Damrong's appraisal of events is corrobo-
rated by a palm-leaf manuscript from Wat Phumin in Nan which reports on
“Historical Events in [Lan Na], A.D. 1728–1854”. The text written in the form of
a cotmainhet states: “In the year 1134 [A.D. 1774] the Siamese (chaoo tai –
 walmart) conquered Chiang Mai. The Burmese under General (po) Hua Khao fled.

31 He was named so because he used to wear a white cloth around his head, not unusual for
General Tô Măng Khi raised troops and laid siege to Chiang Mai from the fifth until the eleventh or twelfth month [February – August/September]. Many people died of famine. But Phraya Ca Ban resisted the Burmese and with the support of the people of Chiang Mai he repulsed them. A major role of Kawila is not mentioned in this Northern Thai source. By contrast TPCM tends to eulogize Kawila's later achievements for the restoration of Lan Na; it does not seem to reflect adequately his subordinate role in 1774. However, Kawila's rise to become Lan Na's charismatic leader was imminent.

The marriage between Kawila's younger sister, Si Anocha, and Phraya Surasi, younger brother of Phraya Chakri, in 1774, paved the way for Kawila's career. When in 1782 Phraya Chakri ascended to the Siamese throne, Phraya Surasi became vice-king (uparat), and Kawila was appointed to the high-ranking position of cao phraya ruling Chiang Mai as a vassal of Bangkok. The decisive role of Si Anocha in suppressing the so-called Phraya San rebellion, which had led to Tak Sin's assassination, should have smoothed Kawila's rise to power. Moreover, there was no real alternative to Kawila, since after a Burmese counter-attack on Chiang Mai in 1776, Ca Ban had retreated with most of the city's inhabitants to areas in the present-day province of Lampang. There he placed himself and his followers under Kawila's protection (in Tha Wang Phrao). After Ca Ban's death none of his relatives, like Kon Kao, his nephew and uparat of Chiang Mai, was able to challenge Kawila.


Though in 1782 King Rama I had bestowed Kawila with the honorific title "Phraya Wachiraprakan Cao Müang Chiang Mai", Kawila's effective sphere of power barely reached beyond Lampang. Chiang Sän and the müang in the northern and eastern areas of Lan Na were still under Burmese rule. Chiang Mai, whose symbolic importance as Lan Na's political and cultural centre had

36 Cotmai lan na: banthik hetkan prawattisar ph.s. 2271–2397 (p. 11 in the original), in: Saraswadee 1993:20. This document is available on microfilm in the archives of the Social Research Institute (SRI), Chiang Mai University (CMU) under the code SRI 82 107 05 048–048.

37 TCCT, Sanguan 1968:35.

38 A Siamese army repelled the Burmese who besieged Chiang Mai for eight months. During that time the inhabitants of the city faced starvation. One Northern Thai chronicle even reports cases of cannibalism in the beleaguered city. The victims were captured Burmese soldiers. See TCCT, Sanguan 1968:28.

39 TSHR:20; TPCM:95–96.
survived the vicissitudes of the preceding two centuries, was in complete desolation as is described by TSHR: "At that time Chiang Mai was depopulated and had become a jungle overgrown by climbing plants, it turned into a place where rhinoceroses, elephants, tigers and bears were living. There were few people [left], only enough for building houses to live in and roads to facilitate communication with each other. Thus, there were no opportunities for clearing [the jungle]."

Under these circumstances a soon return to Chiang Mai, a virtually uninhabited city surrounded by a devastated countryside without any viable rural infrastructure, could hardly have been realized. Kawila therefore decided to establish his headquarters at Pa Sang, a community situated at the confluence of the Ping and Li rivers and roughly 40 km to the South of Chiang Mai. Together with 300 soldiers and other able-bodied men from Lampang, Kawila fortified Pa Sang into a fortified and moated settlement (wiang). 700 other able-bodied men from the vicinity of Pa Sang settled in Kawila's new headquarters. The choice for Pa Sang as provisional capital might have been motivated by the following considerations:

1. Pa Sang was situated halfway between Lampang and Chiang Mai. In the event of a Burmese attack from Chiang Sän prompt support from Lampang could be a asked for. Was Kawila menaced by a large-scale invasion, he could devise an orderly retreat to Lampang.

2. Pa Sang was situated in the centre of the Ping-Kuang river basin, a potentially fertile rice-land. The surrounding countryside could support a sufficiently large population.

3. Unlike nearby Lamphun, which had been destroyed after 1762, Pa Sang had direct access to the Ping river that linked Lan Na with Siam.

The favourable geostategic situation of Pa Sang could also have inclined Kawila to make this wiang, not just the temporary, but the permanent political centre of the Chiang Mai-Lampang region. But this theoretical option was not taken into consideration, for the complete liberation of Lan Na had not yet been achieved, and Chiang Mai was, in the long run, a better base for controlling the areas further to the north. But the decisive argument for Pa Sang as only a tem-

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40 TSHR:20.
41 TPCM:98; TSHR:25. PY, Prachakitca-kpraracak 1973:452 gives only 200 able-bodied men from the vicinity of Pa Sang. This could be the result of misreading, for the ciphers 2 and 7 have in Northern Thai script (here: lek hora) a similar shape. However, if we follow TPCM and TSHR, Pa Sang had around 1,000 able-bodied men or, including family members, roughly 5,000 inhabitants in 1782.
42 Before the Burmese conquest of Lan Na the city of Lamphun was still situated along the Ping river. At some time after 1558, the Ping river changed its course, probably as a result of a great flood. Thereafter, the new course of the Ping river was c. 5 km to the east.

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porary administrative centre was probably a question of legitimacy. Kawila and his family (trakun cao cet ton) were commoners, they could not trace their origin back to any line of the Mangrai dynasty that had ruled Chiang Mai and Lan Na until 1578. The chronicles do not tell us whether members of the old ruling house of Chiang Mai had survived. As Kawila obviously had in mind a revitalization of the pre-Burmese state tradition, he decided to rebuilt Chiang Mai, its monasteries, city walls and compartments. The official ceremony marking the reestablishment of the reconstructed capital took place on an auspicious day of the year 1796, exactly 500 years after its founding by Phaya (King) Mangrai.43

At the beginning of Kawila's reign, the weak population base was the biggest obstacle for the final expulsion of the Burmese from Lan Na and the re-construction of Chiang Mai as the country's political and cultural centre. However, little by little people were returning from their jungle hideouts to their former villages in the deserted basins of the Ping, Kuang and Wang rivers. Kawila also persuaded a group of former Chiang Mai residents who had fled to Müang Yuan (Mã Hong Són) in the early 1760s to come back.44 Furthermore, the chronicles report that in 1784 natives of Rahâng (Tak) and Thôn (Lampang), who had sought shelter in Siam twenty years before, were flocking back into their places of origin.45 One year later, Rama I made Tak a dependency (müang khùn) of Chiang Mai.46 However, the severe losses of population caused by war, famine and epidemics could by voluntary immigration and natural increases hardly be compensated for.

To accelerate Lan Na's political and economic recovery, Kawila needed a sufficiently strong demographic base. He secured this by extensive military measures. Between 1782 (founding of Pa Sang) and 1813 (Kawila's death) the ruler of Chiang Mai led a number of small and large raids and resettled war captives in Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Lampang. There were three important waves of resettlement campaigns: The first wave began shortly after the building of Pa Sang and was conceived to increase the manpower at Kawila's disposal to reestablish Chiang Mai. The second, in which more people were cap-

43 TPCM:106; TSHR:35; Notton 1932:226.
45 Kawila needed royal consent for calling back the Yuan refugees who settled in Ban Pym near Ayutthaya ("Krung Kao"). See TSHR:28; PY, Prachakitekpracak 1973:455.
46 Tak was ruled by Chiang Mai until the reign of Rama III, when it was handed back to Siam. Tak (Rahâng) was until the end of the 19th century predominantly inhabited by Yuan. Holt S. Hallett writes: "The province of Rahaeng is mainly occupied by descendents of the Zimmé Shans [Yuan], owing to its having formerly been part of the kingdom of Zimmé. Even in the the city, more than half the people are Zimmé Shans and Peguans [Mon]." Lilian Curtis 1903:58 makes a similar observation: "The city is made up of a native hauis, crowded with people. The latter form a most interesting study, for the population here is about half and half Siamese and Lao." Compare also Penth 1973.

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tured than in the first wave, started in 1798 and culminated in the conquest of Chiang Sän in 1804. The last wave, around 1808–10, finally secured Kawila's goals.

1. In 1783, Kawila sent Sam Lan, his trusted assistant, to several Red Karen villages (Yuan: Nyang Dăng) in the territory of the present-day Burmese Kayah State. The economically backward Karen were lured by the distribution of various consumer goods; they left their homes and settled in Pa Sang. In the same year, Kawila raided villages on the western bank of the Salween. The chronicles designate the attacked settlements as müang, but it seems that most of them were rather small and unimportant. Their inhabitants were forced to march to Pa Sang.

In 1784, a 40,000 men strong Burmese army approached Lampang. This was the last large-scale Burmese invasion at Lan Na. Kawila could repel the invaders only with Siamese military support. On the Burmese side auxiliary troops from several Shan States, like Mìang Cuat were involved in the fighting. Before the ruler Mìang Cuat and his defeated soldiers arrived at home, Thammarangka, the uparat of Chiang Mai, was able to strike a lightning attack against the defenceless müang of Cuat, Tha and Nän. When the ruler of Mìang Cuat saw his county depopulated, he hurried to join his family and people in Pa Sang, where he submitted himself to Kawila.

A further influx of immigrants into the areas around Pa Sang and Lampang occurred in 1786/87. Encouraged by Kawila, the rulers of Chiang Rai, Yông, Sat, Fang and Phrao raised an insurrection against the weakened Burmese garrison of Chiang Sän. After initial successes (the rebels caught the Burmese governor, Arprakarni [Aphaikhamani], and sent him to Lampang, from where he was taken to Bangkok) the insurrection crumbled, and its leaders fled with


48 Both TSHR:27 and TPCM:99 mention the village (ban) of Tha Fang as the main target of Kawila's forces. After the conquest of Ban Tha Fang, the leaders (php “father”) of the müang of Yan and Thuk (TPCM: Thu) surrendered, too. TPCM records the village of Kiti as a further target of forced relocation.

49 Following the successive Burmese defeats of 1784–86, Burmese offensive capacities dwindled. “The scale of the conflict was much reduced”, Koenig 1990:20 concludes.

50 TSHR 28; TPCM 100; PY, Prachakitsakprakac 1973:454–455.

51 The Northern Thai sources are silent on the events leading to the popular uprising in Chiang Sän and its short seizure by Yuan forces (see TPCM 101; TSHR 29). One may speculate that the Chiang Mai centred chronicles were not inclined to report the seizure, even temporarily, of Chiang Sän by forces other than Kawila's. But the Siamese royal chronicles do report the events in details. See PPR1, Thiphakprawong 1988:48; compare Damrong 1977:628–629. The Siamese sources are largely based on the testimony of the captured Burmese general who confessed: “I had spent a year with 10,000 men [?], cultivating the paddy fields at Cheingsen [Chiang Sän] when Pya (governor) Prè [Phrá] and Phya Yong marched a Siamese
numerous followers to Lampang. In the same year also the rulers of Nan and Phra who had joined the insurrection placed themselves under Siamese protection.

In 1788, Phaya Kawila launched an attack against Chiang Sän in retaliation for a Burmese attack on Lampang the year before. In both campaigns there was obviously not a large number of troops involved. Kawila, for his part, tried to raid areas to the northwest of Chiang Sän to cut Burmese supply lines to this last base in Lan Na. The ruler of Chiang Mai attacked the Shan State of Pan and its dependence Tông Kai, where many people were taken prisoners of war. Kawila's thirst for manpower, however, was not yet stilled. Two years later, troops from Chiang Mai under the uparat's command again raided areas west of the Salween. The chronicles mention “numerous war captives” from the villages (ban) of Chom Chit, Satqi, Sôi Rai, Wang Lung and Wang Kat.

After these initial successes in applying his forced resettlement policy, Kawila tried, in 1791, to rebuild Chiang Mai. The king of Siam had urged him to do so in order to strengthen defences against Burma. After only one month Kawila returned to Pa Sang, because he controlled “too small a number of people. They were not enough to build a large city”. Only in 1796, after two years of intensive preparations, did Kawila dare to move from Pa Sang to Chiang Mai.

2. After the transfer of his capital to Chiang Mai, Kawila engaged in several resettlement campaigns against various Shan States, most of them situated on the western bank of the Salween. In 1798, Kawila attacked Yòng. Over the following two years Miang Pu and some other smaller settlements were raided. Finally, in 1801, Yòng was attacked and destroyed a second time and was this time depopulated as well. The continuous influx of war captives strengthened Kawila's resources of manpower, thus by 1802 he began to organize the campaign to expel the Burmese from Chiang Sän. It should be noted, however, that

force [Yuan force] against us. I slipped out of the town and surrendered to Phya Chiengrai, who sent me to the Siamese forces [Yuan forces] at Lakon [Lampang]. The governor of Lakon sent me on to Ayuthia [Bangkok] where I have been maintained until now.” Quoted from Phraison Salarak, Phra and Thien Subindu (U Aung Thien) 1957: 53. was the main source for the Thai version of the Mon-Burmesse Chronicles [Phongsawadan mgon phama].

54 PY, Prachakitcakpracak 1973:458.
56 PY, Prachakitcakpracak 1973:459.
57 TPCM:107; TSHR:37; Notton 1932: 228. The miang of Pa, Cat, King and Kun, all dependencies of the Burmese stronghold of Sat, were also raided.
Kawila did so not solely on his own account but with the encouragement and active support of his Siamese overlord.  

Stage 1 [1802]. Thammalangka, the uparat of Chiang Mai, campaigned against the müang of Sat, Chiang Tung, Pan and Pu in the western and northwestern hinterland of Chiang Sän. Sat and Chiang Tung were of vital importance for the survival of Chiang Sän, for two main supply routes to this Burmese stronghold passed through Sat and Chiang Tung respectively. Moreover, the Burmese had fortified Sat into a military base for attacking Chiang Mai via Fang. In 1798 or 1799, shortly after the raid of Sat by troops from Chiang Mai, the Burmese king had sent Côm Hong, a former high official in Chiang Sän, to assemble manpower in order to rebuild the devastated müang. As Sat was situated in a fertile valley, the Burmese expected that two or three good harvests would suffice to stockpile enough provisions to launch a full-scale attack on Chiang Mai and Lampang. Bodaw-hpaya, the king of Ava, obviously intended to regain the lost müang of Lan Na very soon and regarded Côm Hong as a key figure in that struggle. The Northern Thai chronicles report that Bodaw-hpaya appointed Côm Hong ruler of “all 57 müangs of Lan Na”. To be more explicit on this point, Côm Hong was seen as a “rival king”, ready to replace Kawila on the throne in Chiang Mai. Siamese overlordship of Lan Na would also, of course, be replaced by Burmese overlordship with Côm Hong as Ava’s figurehead. In 1801, Côm Hong underscored his claim to full power. He raided Nan and took prisoners of war to Sat.

However, if we follow TMY, Bodaw-hpaya did not make a good decision when he chose Côm Hong as Ava’s representative for Lan Na. For when, in 1802, Kawila’s younger brother Thammalangka launched a preemptive strike and took Côm Hong prisoner, the ruler of Sat was eager to join the Chiang Mai camp, and, in expectation of a high position in Chiang Mai, to help Kawila fight the Burmese. “If Chiang Mai wants to become a great and prosperous müang, it needs a large population. But it has [still] a very small population, not enough to


60 TSHR:39, TPCM:109; according to other Northern Thai sources, Côm Hong fell already two years earlier, in 1796, into Burmese hands. See Cotmaihet lan na ... (original: p. 20), in: Saraswadee 1993:23.

61 Hq samut hänchat, Cotmaihet ratchakan thi I, C.S. 1165 [A.D. 1803], No. 1.


63 The Northern Thai chronicles call the ruler of Sat “Racha [King] Côm Hong”.

64 Tamnan mangrai chiang mai chiang tung 1993:12. Côm Hong’s attack on Nan is not mentioned by neither the Nan Chronicle nor the Chiang Mai Chronicle.
be a powerful force in the future."65 Since the lack of manpower might cause Chiang Mai much trouble in the long run, Cambodia urged Kawila to resettle yet more people in the Chiang Mai-Lampang core area. He recommended Chiang Tung as an ideal target for a raid, because the population there was suffering under Burmese oppression and would readily surrender to Chiang Mai.66

According to the Jengtung State Chronicle (JSC), "in the year Taused Sukkaraja 1164, Month Seven waxing 3rd night, citizens of Jenghmai brought up an army and attacked Jengtung and captured the person of the prince, members of the royal family, and subjects of the prince and took them all down to Jenghmai, with the exception of Prince Dongsaeng, the younger brother, that is, Prince Mahakhanan, who escaped to stay with his subjects at Sip-či Sip-ha Ban where, with his family, he took refuge at Pangkeng. Having collected together his followers and subjects who had not been taken away, he [Mahakhanan] led them to establish themselves at Mongløy and Mongyâng".67 TPY, giving a very detailed, but slightly different account, agrees on the date of the conquest and depopulation of Chiang Tung: "the seventh month in the year tau set [May 1802]". However, there are doubts whether Kawila's victory against Chiang Tung was that decisive. PPR1 emphasizes the complete success of the campaign against Sat, whereas Chiang Tung is only incidentally mentioned.68 The Chiang Mai Chronicle is even more distinct: The ruler of Chiang Tung, Sirichai, anticipating an attack by the Chiang Mai troops via Sat and fearful of Burmese reprisals, evacuated his capital in time. Thammalangka thus seized a virtually empty city.69 The split between Mahakhanan and the rest of the Chiang Tung royalty is pointed out by the Chiang Mai Chronicle, but put into the context of the second, more successful attack on Chiang Tung that was undertaken in 1804/5, after Chiang Sän had been liberated.70

It is difficult to decide which of the two different accounts one should follow. Kawila's military campaigns in 1802 were, on the whole, a success, both in regards to the number of people captured for resettlement (6,000)71 and the geo-strategic goals achieved. In recognition of these achievements Rama I gave Kawila the title of "Cao Phraya", the highest rank for a ruler of a Siamese vassal state. Nevertheless, I am inclined to follow the Chiang Mai Chronicle because of contextual considerations. Why should a chronicle of Chiang Mai, written in

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65 TMY, Thawi 1984:57 (p. 69 in the original).
66 TMY, Thawi 1984:57 (p. 70 in the original).
68 PPR1, Thiphakhornawong 1988:87.
70 TPCM:114; TSHR:45; Notton 1932:238–239.
71 Ḥọ samut hângchat, Cot mai het ratchakan thî 1, C.S. 1164 [A.D. 1802], No. 1.
praise for its ruling house, conceal the victory against Chiang Tung? Or why should it mention the failure to capture the ruler and the people of Chiang Tung, an inglorious end of an otherwise successful campaign, if this was not the truth? Furthermore, JSC and TMY indicate that at the time of Kawila's campaigning against Sat and Chiang Tung the Burmese had already been forced out of Chiang Sän. That is not possible, for all sources agree on the fall of Chiang Sän two years later, in 1804.

Stage 2 [1804]. After one year of preparations, the united armies of Chiang Mai/Lampang, Vientiane, Nan, and Bangkok marched on Chiang Sän and laid siege to the city. Chiang Sän fell following a four-pronged attack. Its fortifications were torn down and its population deported.

Thiphakrorrowong’s PPR1 describes the “fall” of Chiang Sän, the beleaguered city’s will to resist being broken after seven months of siege:

The Lao [Yuan] in Chiang Sän suffered from hunger. They killed buffaloes, elephants and horses until they were consumed, too. The Lao inhabitants [of Chiang Sän] left the city and surrendered to the troops from Müang Lao [i.e. Chiang Mai, Nan, Vientiane]. When the army of Krommaluang Thep Harikak had already withdrawn, the Burmese commander-in-chief, Po Mayu-nguan, saw the citizens hurrying in the direction of the Lao troops. They were too large in numbers than to stop them. Thereupon, Po Mayu-nguan fled with his army. The Lao troops pursued the flying Burmese army, and Po Mayu-nguan was fatally hit in the battlefield. The Na Khwa, whom the Burmese had installed as ruler (cao müiang) of Chiang Sän, fled with his family across the Mekong into Burmese territory.

The armies [of Bangkok and its “Lao” allies] captured 23,000 people, destroyed the city wall and burnt down the whole city of Chiang Sän. Then they divided the war captives [here: khropkhrua, “families”] into five groups. One group was deported to Chiang Mai, another one to Lampang, others to Nan and Vientiane. The last group was handed over to Bangkok and resettled in Saraburi and Ratchaburi.

The conquest of Chiang Sän was followed by military campaigns against Burmese vassals in the regions to the north and northwest of Chiang Sän, the so-called müiang fai nüa, which, like Chiang Khâng, Chiang Không and Yông had supported the Burmese in the battle of Chiang Sän. However, the war of 1804 was very different from the resettlement campaigns of 1782 to 1802. It is revealing that the Chiang Mai Chronicle fails to mention any participation of troops from Nan, Vientiane and Bangkok, but instead portrays the seizure of Chiang

73 PPR1, Thiphakrorrowong: 94. As for other descriptions of the conquest of Chiang Sän see TPCM:112; Damrong 1977:686–688; PY, Prachatitcakpracaká 1973:467–469.
74 See TPCM:112; TSHR:43.

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Sän and the military operations in its aftermath as the work of Kawila. However, the Nan Chronicle (PMN) corroborates the description of the royal chronicle. According to the chronicle, 20,000 troops from Siam, Vientiane and Chiang Mai, including also 1,000 soldiers from Nan, were besieging Chiang Sän, but failed to take the city. The Burmese stronghold could only be taken when Nan, Chiang Mai and Lampang sent additional troops of 1,000 men each.\(^75\) It seems that the surrender of the Yuan inhabitants of Chiang Sän to these (Yuan) troops from Lan Na was at least as decisive as the pure military operations. On the whole, we can draw the conclusion that Bangkok was the mastermind of the war, mobilizing own troops and those of various “Lao” vassals. Therefore, Rama I was able to put restraints on Kawila’s population policy of kep phak sai sa kep kha sai miäng.

The largest influx of manpower to Lan Na resulted from the conquest of Yong which had surrendered, in 1805, to Thammalangka’s troops without notable resistance. Kawila persuaded the ruler of Yong to resettle in Lamphun with “more than 10,000 people”.\(^76\) Chiang Tung was also raided, and the bulk of its population was deported to Chiang Mai as well.\(^77\) But the other pacifying campaigns, directed against numerous smaller miäng in Sipsông Panna and areas east of the Mekong (in present-day Laos), were obviously not a success for Kawila as far as assembling a large number of war captives was concerned. PPR1 reports that the campaign against “eleven or twelve small and large miäng” in Sipsông Panna was carried out by troops from Nan and Chiang Mai: “40,000–50,000 men and women, old and young people” were captured. Attacks on the “40 small and large miäng” east of the Mă Khong resulted in 60,000–70,000 captured people.\(^78\) One should not be puzzled by these large numbers of war captives. The figures probably represented the total population living in the subjugated territories, and thus indicated the potential, rather than the actual number, of prisoners of war. King Rama I, the royal chronicle goes on, demonstrated his mercy and broad-mindedness when the rulers of these miäng came personally to Bangkok taking with them the golden and silver trees as tokens of their submission. Rama I recognized that it was not possible to defend the subjugated territories with military support from Siam, because of their closeness to China and Burma and their relative distance from the Siamese heartland. He suggested a strategy of self-defence and concluded that it would be neither reasonable nor just to depopulate these areas and resettle the population in Siamese territory, for “they have not committed any crime, but surren-

\(^{75}\) PMN:36–37.

\(^{76}\) PPR1, Thiphakrāwong 1988:97; TPCM:114–115; PY, Prachakitcakrācak 1973:472. Thammalangka, the uparat, used Miąng Yong as his main base for further military operations.

\(^{77}\) TPCM:114; TSHR:45; Notton 1932:238–239.

\(^{78}\) PPR1, Thiphakrāwong 1988:98.
dered without resistance. Therefore, [to resettle them] would be a serious crime and not justifiable.” 79 One may speculate, had the choice been left to Kawila, as to whether he would have rendered a similar decision. But, Siamese archival evidence suggests that Rama I ordered Kawila to send 300 soldiers to persuade “displaced persons” (pha khon rasam rasai) in Sipsong Panna “to return to their original homes”. 80 However, in 1807, troops from Lampang led by the Cao Wang Na attacked Sipsong Panna again and deported many Lü from that region to Lampang and Chiang Mai (au khrua lü long thawai). 81

3. After the fall of Chiang Sän there were no longer any problems regarding security. The Burmese had lost their ability to even partially regain their lost positions in Lan Na. Burma at that time was in a state of social disruption and, moreover, was affected by a great famine which began in 1802, reached its peak by 1809/10 and gradually subsided after 1812. 82 The eastern and southern Shan States had lost large parts of their population due to Kawila’s ruthless resettlement campaigns. Yet, they were not completely depopulated. But the people who took shelter in forest areas were too unorganized to maintain important irrigation networks in the valleys. Although the local chronicles do not explicitly mention widespread famine for the early years of the 19th century, there are some clear hints indicating disruption of agricultural production. TMY reports that the reservoir in Chiang Tung (nung tung) had fallen into disrepair by 1804/5. Its water could not be used any longer. 83 The desolation of the town, similar to that of Chiang Mai before 1796, is mystically portrayed by TMY: “In all monasteries tears were running down from Buddha statues, and the Phrabat Mai Si Mahapho relic was emitting smoke. Wild animals – pigs, bears, rhinoceroses, elephants and deer – were entering the miao. Barking deers (fan) came barking in the outskirts of the town. Forest-chickens were living in the ruler’s palace (hokham).” 84

Social chaos and political anarchy prevailed in many miao of the Lü, Khôn and Tai Yai. It was in Kawila’s self-interest to prevent the political destabilization of the northern border regions of Chiang Mai, which were depopulated like Chiang Sän (in 1804) or from which the local population had partially fled, like Chiang Rai and Phayao (in 1787). But by the end of Kawila’s long and eventful reign memories of the “Burmese menace” were still fresh and the ruling circles

79 PPR1, Thiphakrawnong 1988:98.
80 Hô samut hängchat, Cotmaihef ratchakan thi 1, C.S. 1170 [A.D. 1808], No. 1.
82 For details concerning the great famine in Burma and the Burmese Shan States see Koenig 1990:33–35.
83 TMY, Thawi 1984:61 (p. 78 in the original).
84 TMY, Thawi 1984:60/61 (p. 77 in the original).

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of Chiang Mai and Lampang still deemed it necessary to strengthen the population in the Ping-Kuang and Wang river basins. In 1808, Kawila used the discontent in the Shan States, caused by intolerably high Burmese tax collections, to launch another expedition. The forces from Chiang Mai came to “rescue” a large number of inhabitants of Yōng and Chiang Tung who decided to leave their deserted homesteads. In 1809/10, having the consent of King Rama II, they were resettled in Chiang Mai and Lamphun where many of their fellow countrymen, including the rulers of both müang, were already living (since 1805).85

After 1810, there is no chroniclar evidence of any further resettlement campaign initiated by Phaya Kawila. By the time of the ruler's death in 1813, the policy of kep phak sai sa kep kha sai müang had come to an end. This does not mean that Kawila's immediate successors completely abstained from raiding neighbouring territories in search of manpower. Small-scale raids against Karen territories west of Mā Họng Sơn occurred occasionally during the 1820s and 1830s. More important with regard to captured manpower was an assault on Sat in 1837. Nearly 2,000 persons went to Chiang Mai as captives.86 The last deportation to Chiang Mai I have been able to trace so far occurred in 1869 under Kawilorot (r. 1856–1870). Mök Mai was attacked after its ruler, Fa Kolan, refused to voluntarily resettle his müang in Phrao on Chiang Mai territory.87 These “post-Kawila” raids were motivated by considerations of security along the country's western border, not by a search for manpower. However, one speaks easily of Chiang Mai as pars pro toto for the whole of Lan Na, overlooking the principalities of Phrā and Nan which were not ruled by members of the Kawila clan. Of these two müang, Nan was the larger and was able to conceive its own population policy.

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86 For a Thai chroniclar account see PCMLL:102–103.

The deportations from Sat are analyzed by D. Richardson who had visited Chiang Mai shortly afterwards (in 1839). He writes in his report to E.A. Blundell, British Commissioner of Tenasserim, that he was told by “the son of a man who is himself prisoner here, who took the account of captured property” that “there were 1,815 miserable captives of all ages, from a few days up to 70 or 80 years old, and about 500 cattle. He also stated that some 30 years ago, about the time his father was made prisoner, the Zimmay people had destroyed these towns in the same way they had done now”. Quoted after “Extract from the Journal relative to the invasion of the Birman frontier towns by the Laos people”, The Burney Papers 1971:46.

87 PCMLL:118.
5. Forced Resettlements: The View from Nan

During the period of Burmese domination Nan probably experienced as many political disturbances as Chiang Mai. Nan had common borders with the Lao principalities of Luang Prabang and Vientiane and a major invasion route from there to the northern part of the Cao Phraya river basin passed through Nan. Therefore, this principality could hardly manage to escape the ravages of the anti-Burmese wars in the late 18th century. Even the 17th century had not been peaceful, for two popular uprisings against the Burmese, the first in 1600 and another one in 1625, had been resolutely suppressed by the occupying forces.88 Chonthira's statement that "from 1558 until 1788, a period of 230 years, the people of Nan hardly experienced anything different from war and ... were deported to Burma, Chiang Rai and Thong" may be an overexaggeration.89 But when Nan's ruler Atthawonpanyo returned to his principality as a Siamese vassal (1788),90 the Nan Chronicle (PMN) laments: "The polity (banmuang) of Nan was devastated and depopulated."91 Large segments of its population had either been deported to Burmese Chiang Sän or had fled into the jungle.

The repopulation of Nan apparently started in the early 1790s. In 1790, a group of 585 families from Yong escaped deportation to Burma and fled to Nan.92 A year later, the ruler of Chiang Khong (situatated 20 km south of Chiang Sän) escaped Burmese rule and settled with 505 families in Nan.93 There are no further movements of population into the muang explicitly recorded by the Nan Chronicle, at least for the period 1792–1811. However, circumstantial evidence indicates that the influx of manpower continued, though it is not clear whether as a result of (war captive) raids or, as I tend to believe, of voluntary immigration. In 1799, more than 5,000 people were recruited to construct a dam (fai) that had been destroyed when the Burmese attacked Nan in 1580.94 The involvement of thousands of able-bodied men in the large irrigation project indi-

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90 PMN:21–22; see also Wyatt 1989:67–68.
91 PMN:22.
92 PMN:26–27.
93 PMN:27.
94 PMN:34. The chronicle states: "In 1151 (1799 A.D.) Chao Atthawon Pannya conscripted 4,963 people and 434 of the princes and elders, altogether 5,397 people. He made them repair the irrigation dam Fai Samun. This dam had been neglected for 219 years, ever since the time when the Lao Kon Kom took away the population of Nan as prisoners of war. The repair work took fifteen days. The paddy fields in the region have been productive ever since." Quoted after Prasert/Wyatt 1966:56.
cates that there must have been a considerable increase in available manpower during the preceding decade.

As we have seen in a previous chapter, the ruler of Nan joined the forces of Chiang Mai/Lampang, Vientiane and Bangkok in attacking and liberating Chiang Sän. Directly following the conquest of Chiang Sän, forces of Nan campaigned against Chiang Khâng and Chiang Rung (1805/6). The Nan Chronicle does not report any resettlement of war captives, which would indicate that Rama I's decree forbidding to do so was strictly implemented by the ruler of Nan. However, a few years later, in 1812, thousands of people from La, Phong and Luang Phu Kha were deported to Nan in a large military campaign. Altogether 6,000 persons were resettled in Nan at that time.\(^{95}\) A connection of these forced resettlements with the construction of additional irrigation canals, only two years later, seems most plausible.\(^{96}\) The building of a new capital two km to the north of the old one, in 1817/18, might have benefited from the influx of war captives as well.

Apart from the participation of Nan in the Siamese war against Vientiane (1827/28), which yielded more than 600 prisoners of war as "royal awards" to Nan,\(^{97}\) no hints of other resettlement campaigns are given by PMN.\(^{98}\) The Nan Chronicle seems to be virtually silent about a general policy of kep pha sai sa kep kha sai mûang in the principality of Nan. Instead, the chronicle emphasizes public and religious works initiated by its rulers. There is indeed a striking contrast to the Chiang Mai Chronicle, which portrays this kind of population policy, as we have seen, as the most important aspect or even the essence of Kawila's restoration of the Chiang Mai-Lamphun-Lampang polity. I will tentatively suggest that the reason was a general reluctance on the part of the Nan rulers after 1788 to resort to harsh military measures in order to assemble and control manpower. Nan's policy was obviously to encourage voluntary immigration. After the late 1830s, numerous refugees came from Sipsông Panna to Nan, because their country was plunged into anarchy and civil war.\(^{99}\) The immigrants were enticed not only by fertile land to settle in, but also by strict enforcement of just

\(^{95}\) PMN:48.

\(^{96}\) 10,000 able-bodied man were conscripted for these extensive public works. See PMN:49.


\(^{98}\) PMN reports events in and surrounding Nan until the year 1856.

\(^{99}\) For example, in 1836 or in 1837, a feud broke out among the ruling families of Sipsông Panna about the acquisition of precious elephants from Laos. One group of people from La (in the southern part of Sipsông Panna), led by a local nobleman, fled the fighting and sought refuge in Nan where they founded three villages in the present-day district of Tha Wang Pha. For details see Phachôn 1984:9–12.
rule according to the old laws and customs of Lan Na. As a late 19th century western visitor noted, “the rulers seem more liberal, more desirous of the welfare of their people, than in any other Laos [Yuan] province.”

6. The View of the Victim

The hardships concomitant to forced resettlement campaigns remain unmentioned in the Northern Thai chronicles. TPCM eulogizes Kawila’s political and military skills, but fails to record the pain and suffering of the war captives. Written by those who escaped deportation, TMY does not report details on how the deportations were planned and executed. One can imagine that the displacement of people over large distances caused physical hardships and psychological traumata, especially if no proper preparations were made to provide the deportees with sufficient food and decent shelter on the way. There is a unique report of a British witness of deportations of Phuan from Chiang Khwang (Plain of Jars) to Central Thailand. The report is cited in the private correspondence of a British official in Chiang Mai in 1876: “The captives were hurried mercilessly along, many weighted by burdens strapped to their backs, the men, who had no wives or children with them and were therefore capable of attempting escape, were tied together by a rope pursed through a sort of wooden collar. Those men who had their families with them were allowed the free use of their limbs. Great numbers died from sickness, starvation and exhaustion on the road. The sick, when they became too weak to struggle on, were left behind. If a house happened to be near, the sick man or woman was left with the people in the house. If no house was at hand which must have been oftener the case in the wild country they were traversing, the sufferer was flung down to die miserably in the jungle. Any of his or her companions attempting to stop to assist the poor creatures were driven on with blows ... Fever and dysentery were still at work among them and many more will probably die. Already, I was told, more than half of the original 5,700 so treacherously seized are dead.”

Perhaps conditions of those captured by Kawila were relatively more “tolerable”. However, the choice of “resistance or submission” was not an easy

100 At the end of the 19th century the old laws were still strictly implemented. The British Vice-Consular in Chiang Mai, W. J. Archer, observed: “The town of Nan is situated in the centre of the broad valley of the eastern branch of the Menam. Having less intercourse with Siam, it retains many laws and customs which have fallen into disuse among the western Laos [i.e. Chiang Mai, Lampang etc.]. Its criminal code is very severe ... Muang Nan also enjoys complete exemption from all the tax farms that are burdensome in other provinces; but there is a customary rice tax, which is here still paid in kind.” Quoted from Archer 1889:15–16.

101 Siam and Laos as seen by our American Missionaries 1884:541.

one for those being raided. TMY describes discussions among members of the ruling house of Chiang Tung and other high-ranking noblemen about how to negotiate with Thammalangka, who had laid siege to the city in 1805. Should they surrender to the uparat of Chiang Mai or fight the enemy until the end? The arguments ran as follows [in paraphrase):

The Yuan (chao tai, “people of the south”) have come. If we continue to side with the Burmese (man), a devastating war will inevitably be the result. In case of defeat we face deportation to Chiang Mai. But should we be able to resist and repulse the enemy, Chiang Tung will have to remain a vassal state of Burma, thus being subject to high tributes. At the same time, the Burmese are not able to protect Chiang Tung against renewed attacks by Kawila. Thus it would be wisest to capitulate and accept the fate of forced resettlement.103

In reality, the noblemen of Chiang Tung could have exchanged arguments just in the way the chronicle describes. They appear plausible and would further explain why a relatively small force of 300 soldiers from Chiang Mai could “conquer” Chiang Tung which is quite well protected by high mountains surrounding the city. Consider, some forty years later, that much superior forces from Bangkok and the various Northern Thai prinicipalities failed several times to take Chiang Tung.104

Cao Mahakhanan, a younger brother of Sirichai, at that time only 24 years old, did not join the exodus to Chiang Mai. He fled to Yang, situated north of the old, now deserted capital of Chiang Tung, and led protracted wars against the Burmese. Finally, he and his followers withdrew to Chiang Sän without surrendering to Chiang Mai.105 However, some “pro-Burmese” noblemen thought it would be better to accept Burmese overlordship, since it was the lesser evil. They argued [in paraphrase]:

Kawila has contributed to the deportation and destruction of numerous people. The mâuang of the Khôn are uninhabited and destroyed. The Burmese, at least, will not carry the population away. Siding with the Burmese will mean that we can stay in our country. We will not loose our country, monasteries or our religion. If we will not accept the status of Burmese vassals, the Burmese will come and start trouble again.106 At last, Burmese suzerainty was accepted, “because water [peace] is distant, fire [danger] is near.” (het wa nam yu klaw fai yu klaw ฉันมีน้ำใจไม่ไกลไฟอยู่ใกล้กัน).107

103 TMY, Thawi 1984:61 (p. 79 in the original).
104 The second invasion of Chiang Tung, for instance, involved a total of 30,000 men, 449 elephants, 152 horses, 400 guns, and nine pieces of heavy and medium-weight artillery. See Ratanaporn 1988:313.
106 TMY, Thawi 1984:63 (p. 83 in the original).
107 TMY, Thawi 1984:63 (p. 83 in the original).
Burmese emissaries were sent out to persuade Mahakhanan to return home and accept vassalage to Burma. As TMY tells it, Mahakhanan realized that without a legitimate ruler the remaining population would become subject to a vicious cycle of further raids and yet more destruction.\textsuperscript{108} In 1813, Mahakhanan was invested with the full insignia of a vassal by the King of Ava.\textsuperscript{109} Six years later, in 1819, Mahakhanan refounded the devastated town of Chiang Tung. “The work was finished three years later, and its completion was celebrated by a great festival, at which offerings were made to the monasteries and sacrifices offered to the guardian spirits.”\textsuperscript{110} Mahakhanan ruled Chiang Tung for more than forty years until he died in 1857. During his long reign the Khôn principality gradually recovered both politically and economically. However, this recovery could hardly be foreseen in 1813 when Mahakhanan had made his bold decision to resist the Chiang Mai forces. In the final consequence, the unpleasant dependence on Burma appeared less forbidding than the destructive raids by Kawila.

Yet even the best organized campaigns of forced relocation hardly depopulated the raided territories completely. By fleeing into the jungles and mountainous areas or retreating to save enclaves, larger parts of the population could escape. For this reason, the armies sent out to raid a mūang had to apply a politico-military strategy that concentrated on capturing its ruling families. If the ruler (cao mūang) and his relatives consented to resettlement, sooner or later this subjects would follow them. Many inhabitants of Chiang Sän who escaped captivity in 1804 returned thereafter to their destroyed mūang. But they failed to revive agriculture. Several consecutive bad harvests persuaded them that by the deportation of its ruler Chiang Sän had become an ominous place to live. Thus

\textsuperscript{108} TMY, Thawi 1984:63–64 (p. 84–85 in the original).

\textsuperscript{109} See JSC, Sāimōng Mangrāi 1981:259. The Khôn local tradition says: “Sao Kawng Tai was the 33rd chief [of Chiang Tung] in 1802, when the Siamese invaded that State. The invaders stormed through the 15th wall constructed by Alaungpaya, and sacked the city. The country was laid waste. Families including that of the chiefs were carried away and forced to settle at Cheinshen [Chiang Sän] in Northern Siam. Of the chief's family thus carried away, Maha Khanan, younger brother of the chief, was the only one to escape. One version says that he made good his escape by wearing a monk's robe. The chief Sao Kawng Tai had died in 1804 and the commander of the town garrison sent by Bodawpaya refused to accommodate Maha Khanan: The country was in utter chaos, Maha Khanan went north to Mongyang area and made a plan to regain his state. He wiped out a force sent to capture him and maintained himself gallantly amid(s)t vicissitudes for some years. In 1813, he was called to the capital [Ava]. He went boldly and presented his justification in fighting his right. King Bodawpaya heard him and in consideration of his courage, ability and the correctness in the line of succession, recognized him as chief of Keng Tung.” Quoted from The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), 7 February 1974.

\textsuperscript{110} Scott 1901:408.
the returnees decided to give up Chiang Sän and to follow their ruler to Chiang Mai.\textsuperscript{111}

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In conclusion, the influx of immigrants from the Shan States and Sipsông Panna to Lan Na during the late 18th and early 19th centuries resulted from forced deportations as well as from more or less voluntary migrations of those who had managed to escape. Even some of the forced resettlements could only be carried out with the consent of the captives who sometimes accepted deportation as the minor evil. The willingness of the Lü and Khôn to cooperate constructively with the invading forces from Chiang Mai and Lampang may be explained in at least two ways:

1. \textit{Escape from continuous warfare}. Throughout the second half of the 18th century political turmoil caused by Burmese attacks, Yuan raids and civil war were exorbitant in all major eastern Shan States including Chiang Tung and Yöng. In 1748–50, when Ava's influence over the Shan States had been reduced, Chiang Tung experienced a murderous civil war. Several years later, a Chinese invasion shocked the Khôn state. In 1765/66 Chiang Tung “could not cultivate rice. The following year ... there was a great famine”,\textsuperscript{112}

Around 1769/70 Chinese (Hỏi) troops raided first the principalities of Nan, then Chiang Tung and Upper Burma. Political uncertainty remained even after the Burmese restored their rule over Chiang Tung, Yöng and Chiang Rung, the capital of Sipsông Panna. In 1775 the Burmese raised an army of roughly 40,000 soldiers from Burma proper and various Shan míaug (such as Chiang Khäng, Sat, Len and Yöng) to attack Phitsanulok. 1,500 soldiers from Yöng participated in this attack that failed, they retreated under severe losses via Chiang Sän. The people of Chiang Tung and Yöng more and more felt Burmese rule oppressive,\textsuperscript{113} But unlike their brethren further south, in Chiang Mai, Lampang and Nan, they did not succeed in expelling the Burmese troops of occupation. In 1805, when shortly after the fall of Chiang Sän the army of Thamma-langka approached Chiang Tung and Yöng, the population and ruling classes of these towns hoped probably now to break the vicious circle of uprisings, conquest and suppression. Therefore, the alternative to resettle in Lan Na appeared to them not to be a bad one.

2. \textit{Search of land}. The Ping-Kuang river basin was very fertile and comprised – compared to the narrow valleys of the Khôn and Yöng rivers – large tracts of

\textsuperscript{111} Nithi 1991:270.
\textsuperscript{112} JSC, Sâmông Mangrai 1981:254–256.
\textsuperscript{113} Phama rop thai 1989:7–9.

\textit{OE} 37.1 (1994)
arable rice-land. Whereas the areas under rice cultivation expanded in Chiang Mai after 1796, the Shan States and the Burmese heartland around Ava faced with a severe drought from 1802/3. The year 1805 marked the beginning of a great famine in those areas. "The problem was further aggravated by starving tigers who made it unsafe to work in the fields. The general lack of food caused growing outbreaks of banditry and disorder, as villages fought each other for what little was still available. Tens of thousands starved to death, others fell prey to the tigers or bandits, and the remainder sought refuge in the larger towns and cities." 114 Thus one can understand that the prospect of resettlement in the comparatively fertile and politically stable region of Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Lampang looked promising. It helped break the fighting spirit of the Lü and Khôn people to resist Thammalangka's troops.

7. The War Captives and Their New Homelands

The chronicles give hardly any information concerning the ethnic and social background of the war captives. Based on present-day ethnographic data, we can guess that most of the deportees were Lü (Yông, Sipsông Panna), Khôn (Chiang Tung) and Tai Yai (müang of Sat, Pan, Pu). However, those who were deported from Chiang Sän and surrounding areas or who fled from Müang Yuan (Mä Sariang), should have mostly been of Yuan origin. The massive exodus of Yuan from Mä Sariang is indirectly confirmed by palm-leaf manuscripts discovered some twenty years ago in the famous Red Cliff Cave (Tham Pha Đâng) near Mä Sariang. The most recent of the Red Cliff manuscripts written in the Yuan language are dated 1792/93. After that year there is no trace in the area of any Yuan settlement. In the second half of the 19th century Tai Yai and Karen began settling in the depopulated valley of the Yuan river, where to this day they constitute the dominant population. 115

The Khôn and Lü resettled by Kawila in territories within the present borders of Thailand were seen by the Yuan not at all as "foreigners" (khön tang chat), but were viewed as people belonging to a greater Lan Na cultural zone. Yuan, Khôn and Lü speak mutually understandable dialects, and they use, with minor regional variations, the same "Dharma script" (tua tham). Moreover, the major-

114 Koenig 1990:34.
115 Keyes 1970:232 concludes: "... it is reasonable to assume that the Burmese-Yuan wars were responsible for the end of the production of the manuscripts in the area. It would seem probable that some of the Yuan subjects living along the Salween would have evacuated their villages when they realized they were on the route of the Burmese armies. Once could well conjecture, further, that villagers in the area, having decided to escape from the threat posed by the Burmese attacks, had collected all of their religious texts and stored them in the cave pending their return."
ity of the cis-Salween müang raided by Kawila, like Chiang Tung, Yong and Sat, were vassals of Lan Na (Chiang Mai) during most of the pre-Burmesian period. As Kawila placed himself in the tradition of the great kings of independent Lan Na, he likely saw the relocation of people from those müang as a legitimate internal affair within the Yuan-Khôn-Lû cultural zone.\footnote{Concerning the relations between Chiang Mai and its Lûi and Khôn vassal states (until 1558) see Saraswadee 1986:24–39; Usani 1988.}

There were also no small numbers of Karen, especially Kayah (Nyang Dăng), and Lawa among the war captives. The chronicles mention Kha ("slaves") captured in the campain of 1804/5.\footnote{TPCM:115; TSHR:48; see also PY, Prachakitcakôracak 1973:472.} These Kha living in the uplands of the Shan States, Sipsông Panna and Laos were obviously various hill-tribes speaking Mon-Khmer related languages. They were called Kha in Laos, Wa in Burma and Lawa or Lua in Thailand. Perhaps, some Karen were also among these Kha, for it is reported that, around 1804, Kawila established several villages settled by (Pwo) Karen war captives from the "Two Kabin Mountains".\footnote{Renard 1980:132.}

As to the areas of resettlement, the chronicles rarely mention any place-names. Specifications like "Müang Lamphun", "Müang Chiang Mai" or "Müang Nan" are very vague, for the complex term müang, in the Western literature often wrongly translated as "city", not only referred to the walled administrative centre – the wïang – but the outlying dependencies as well. Sometimes a large müang could comprise dozens of satellite müang (müang khûn or müang bôriwan) and hundreds of villages. Müang Chiang Mai, seen in this wider sense, comprised in the early 19th century a larger area than the present-day province of Chiang Mai.\footnote{The province (cangwat) of Chiang Mai comprises an area of 22,800 km².} More important than the geographic extension of a müang was, however, its population.\footnote{Wyatt 1984:7 describes the ambiguous meaning of müang as follows: "Müang is a term that defies translation, for it denotes as much personal as spatial relationship. ... We can imagine that such müang originally arose out of a set of political, economic, and social interrelationships. Under dangerous circumstances ... Tai villages banded together for mutual defence under the leadership of the most powerful village or family, whose resources might enable it to arm and supply troops. In return for such protection, participating villages rendered labor service to their chao or paid them quantities of local produce or handicrafts."} 7.1. Areas of Resettlement

In which areas of Northern Thailand had the captive populations settled down immediately after their arrival, and how did their settlements spread in the course of the 19th century? To give convincing answers to these challenging
questions is not easy and face serious obstacles. First, unlike neighbouring
Burma, the Siamese and Yuan have not kept reliable censuses which differenti-
ate social and ethnic background of a counted population. Second, source ma-
terials which might provide important clues have not been subjected to close ex-
amination by Thai scholars. As far as I know, local (Tai) dialects of Northern
Thailand have not yet been systematically mapped, nor have village names been
analyzed in depth with regard to any geographical or ethnic connotation to the
Shan States or Sipsong Panna. The research needed would involve cooperation
among specialists of various disciplines: linguists, historians, geographers and
anthropologists.

As a non-linguist, I will refrain from “creating” my own empirical data; but
at this juncture I want to make an observation from a historian’s point of view.
Persons dislocated in large groups very often give their new dwelling-places
names that remind them of their native country. This is a well-known phenome-
non in the European world. It can be seen, for instance, in numerous village and
street names in West Germany which are of Silesian or Pommeranian origin. If
geography allows, immigrants/refugees tend to build their new settlements in a
geographic and ecological environment similar to that of their original home.
Sometimes even the spatial relationship of one locality to another is pre-
served.\footnote{121}

We can hunt up these phenomena in Northern Thailand, too. In the districts
of San Sai and Đop Saket (Chiang Mai) there are Khôn villages \textit{(ban)}, such as
Mâuang Wa, Mâuang Luang, Phayak and Mâuang Khôn, all named after communi-
ties in the Chiang Tung region.\footnote{122} The Lôi of (Mâuang) Yong settled mostly in
present-day Lamphun Province where they founded villages like Wiang Yong,
Thi, Yu, and Luai, likewise bearing the names of larger settlements in the Yong
region.\footnote{123} According to oral tradition, in 1805 the ruler \textit{(cao mâuang)} of Yong
was promised fertile land around Chiang Mai in which to resettle when he sur-
rendered – without fighting – to Kawila’s forces. Since areas in the vicinity of
Chiang Mai had already been occupied by other groups of war captives, the
people of Yong were asked to clear the paddy fields around Lamphun which
laid still waste at that time. After a first survey the ruler of Yong and his advi-
sors expressed their delight about the prospective areas of resettlement. Soil in
Lamphun was of good quality, but more importantly, the geographical environ-

\footnote{121} In the former autonomous German Wolga Republic, dissolved by Stalin in 1941, one will find
the small towns of Basel and Schaffhausen situated in a short distance from each other on the
right bank of the Wolga. If we substitute the Wolga with the Rhine, we get a duplicate of
Northern Switzerland, the native home of these German settlers. See map in \textit{Süddeutsche

\footnote{122} For details see Sanguan 1972:166; see also Kraisri 1978:55.

\footnote{123} Kraisri 1983/84:31.
ment resembled that of Yong in many aspects. The course of rivers and the location of nearby mountain slopes was very much the same in Yong as in Lamphun. Thus the ruler of Yong decided to settle with his subjects on the eastern banks of the Kuang river, just opposite the still deserted city (wiang) of Lamphun. He named his chief village “Wiang Yong”, whereas smaller settlements nearby were named after former satellite müang of Yong. The villages of Yu and Luai were built on opposite sides of the Kuang river, corresponding exactly to the original locations of Müang Yu and Müang Luai.124

When the people from Yong (ethnic Lü) founded their first communités in present-day Lamphun, the areas occupied were not completely unpopulated as the chronicles suggest. However, the Yuan hamlets around Wiang Yong were small and isolated. The Lü settlers formed the large majority of the population and very soon assimilated the old inhabitants of Wiang Yong. As very few Lü from areas other than Yong settled in Lamphun, the people still called themselves chao yong, “people of (Müang) Yong”. Starting from Wiang Yong, Lü settlements spread to Pa Sang,125 only 12 km further to the southwest of Lamphun city, and later, to the districts of Ban Hong and Mä Tha.126 New waves of Lü settlers from Yong arrived in Lamphun in 1810, after Kawila’s last expedition against Mahakhanan of Chiang Tung, and contributed to the rapid extension of Lü settlements in Lamphun. The largest Lü speaking area of Lamphun not settled by Yong people was Ban Thi. It seems that the Lü villages in the semi-district of Ban Thi are of the same origin as the Lü settlements in neighbouring San Kamphang (Chiang Mai).127 Local informants estimate that more than 80% of the population in present-day Lamphun Province are of Lü-Yong origin. Most of them still speak the language of their ancestors, are in fact tri-lingual (Lü, Yuan, Central Thai), although in the last twenty years assimilation has accelerated. My own observations confirm these rough estimates. Apart from the city of Lamphun, which had been resettled by people from Lampang and Chiang Mai (in 1805 or 1814),128 some villages along the main road linking

125 The population of Pa Sang had been transferred to Chiang Mai in 1776. The spread of Yong settlements in Pa Sang markedly increased after 1820. The wooden inscription of Wat Chang Khao Nöi Núa (ขวัญผูกบัว), dated 1828, is a hint to that process. See Sawang 1991.
126 See Sangwơrayanprayut 1990.
127 Interview with Phrakrhu Wicitpanyakön (Wat Ban Tông, Lamphun), 8 March 1992.
128 In 1814, Rama II ordered the restoration of Lamphun as a principality formally independent from Chiang Mai and Lampang. Kawila’s younger brother, Luang Kham Fan, was appointed ruler of Lamphun. See Darmrong Rachenuphap 1990:99. TPCM:118 reports that the re-establishment of Lamphun took place in 1805. According to TPCM, “five-hundred” (i.e., in the language of the chronicle, a sufficiently large number of) people from Lampang and Chiang Mai each were settled inside the city walls. Perhaps the formal appointment of Lamphun...
Lamphun with Saraphi (Chiang Mai) and the district of Li in the south, which was regarded a relative “safe area” during the 18th century, the whole province seems to be inhabited by people of Lụ-Yông descent.

Lampang was another area which had been spared from the worst destructions by war, pillage and mass deportations. Burmese influence was obviously much weaker than in the Chiang Mai-Lamphun area. During the last quarter of the 18th century numerous Yuan from other mūang of Lan Na fled the Burmese troops to unoccupied Lampang. When the anti-Burmese uprising of 1787 ended in failure, the rulers and inhabitants of Chiang Rai, Ngao and Phayao feared retaliation and sought refuge in Lampang. The refugees from Phayao settled, according to oral tradition, on the right (western) bank of the Wang river, while Wat Chiang Rai (in Lampang city) was built by former residents of Chiang Rai. Although these resettlements were related to Kawila’s policy of kep phak sai sa khep kha sai mūang, the ethnic Yuan from Chiang Rai or Phayao did not come to Lampang as war captives, but as people seeking temporary refuge. In fact, they stayed until 1843, when King Rama III ordered them to rebuild their deserted home towns. Most refugees followed the royal decree and returned, others stayed.

With regards to the resettlement of war captives in the present-day provinces of Chiang Mai and Lampang, I have collected only a small amount of data from oral history, barely sufficient to draw any definite conclusion as to where the war captives were resettled. A recent anthropological field-report, however, indicates a large concentration of Lụ from Yong in the southern section of the mūang district of Lampang. These communities (Ban Phā, Ban Klúai Klāng etc.) were founded by a group of Lụ-Yông war captives who did not go to Lamphun in 1805/6, but separated from the main group in Chiang Rai. From there they marched to Lampang where Duang Thip, the ruler of the mūang, settled them on wasteland near the capital after ascertaining their loyalty. One should expect some more resettlement areas in Lampang, for at least a part of the some 6,000 (ethnic Tai Yai) war captives from the mūang of Sat, Pu and Pan were resettled in Lampang. But unlike the Lụ-Yông in Lamphun, there seems

as a self-governing polity by Bangkok occurred several years later. That may explain the gap of 11 years that exists between the Siamese and the Northern Thai accounts.

129 Li means “save” (from perils). The location of Li on the periphery of Lamphun, some distance to the main invasion routes, would explain why the Yuan population of Li had probably not left their villages like people in other areas.


132 Hợ samut hângchat, Cotmaiheit ratchakan thi 1, C.S. 1164 [A.D. 1802], No. 1. Many people from Pu and Sat founded villages not far from Lampang city, like Ban Wat Mūang Sat. See Srisakara 1984:128.
to have been no single non-Yuan ethnic group in Lampang and Chiang Mai which settled in a large coherent territory. Their closeness to Yuan villages, both spatially and culturally, helps explain why they were assimilated more rapidly than the Lü-Yöng in Lamphun. This makes it difficult to reconstruct resettlement areas in these provinces mainly by using methods of oral history.

At this juncture I would like to point to a rather unique phapsa manuscript written in Yuan script and language with the title “List of Monasteries and Religious Groups in Chiang Mai” (Rai chû wat lâ nikai song nai mûang chiang mai). In his study on “Ethnic Pluralism in the Northern Thai City of Chiangmai”, Michael Vatikiotis used this document to locate settlements of non-Yuan origin within the city walls. One has to appreciate his efforts of bringing to scholarly attention the importance of an apparent “religious” document as an historical source with regard to ethnicity and population in traditional Lan Na society. However, Vatikiotis did not make full use of the document, as he overlooked its important statistical aspects. Furthermore, he did not investigate areas outside the city of Chiang Mai.

The original manuscript found in Wat Cedi Luang was first transliterated by Arnonrut Wichienkeeo and edited by Sommai Premchit in 1975. Recently Arnonrut presented a revised and more readable transliteration which will be published by M.R. Rujaya Abhakorn and Sanan Thammathi. The phapsa manuscript is dated the “tenth day of the waxing moon in the fourth month, year cunlasakkarat 1259 [1 March 1897]”. According to the final sentence, it is a detailed report on the organization of the Chiang Mai saingha written by Cao Nan Unmûang, a high clerical official in Chiang Mai. “Cao Nan Unmûang ... invited the five members of the saingha council and all monks were praying for three days ... because His Royal Highness, the King of Bangkok, will visit Mûang [Chiang Mai]”. It seems that the reason for writing this “List of Monasteries” was the official visit of King Chulalongkorn to Chiang Mai in spring 1897. Perhaps, on that occasion the highest saingha authorities in Bangkok asked their counterparts in Chiang Mai for data on the size and organizational structure of the Buddhist order in the Upper North, a region which had only recently been integrated into the Kingdom of Siam. The copy of the report by Cao Nan Unmûang was presumably sent to the Supreme Partiarch (sangkhara) in Bangkok. Name, location, and number of monks and novices of each monastery are listed.

The analysis of the document – that follows now – is a joint effort of Arnonrut and myself, details of which will be published separately.

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133 Rujaya and Sanan 1995 (forthcoming).
135 Sommai 1975b.
lists the names of 340 monasteries (*hua wat*) belonging to 23 clerical districts (*muat ubosot*). Of these, 4 clerical districts (nos. 1–4; 55 monasteries) were situated inside the inner, rectangular, city wall, two other ones (nos. 5+6; 23 monasteries) covered the space between the inner and the outer (circular) city walls. The clerical district of Wat Kao Tū (no. 7: region of Wiang Suan Đợk; 13 monasteries) extended from the Wat Suan Đợk Gate until Đợt Suthep to the west of Chiang Mai. There are 15 clerical districts (nos. 8–22; 235 monasteries) covering fertile rice-growing areas outside the present-day municipality of Chiang Mai. The last clerical district mentioned in the document (no. 23; 14 monasteries) comprised monasteries of both rural and municipal communities. On the whole, 97 monasteries were situated in urban areas, i.e. inside or very close to the city walls, whereas 243 monasteries covered areas outside the town (*npk wiang*).

As in Thailand each monastery marks either one compartment (in urban areas) or one village/large hamlet (in rural areas), the number of monasteries should represent roughly the number of major settlements in the city of Chiang Mai and the surrounding countryside by the end of the nineteenth century. Due to various reasons it is difficult to determine the exact location of each monastery, especially in rural areas. Firstly, in Lan Na, like in other parts of Thailand, names of monasteries and villages have frequently been changed over the last 100 years. Sometimes the old and the new names are completely different. Secondly, in times of famine villages were occasionally abandoned by their inhabitants, moving from rice-deficient to more fertile regions. However, we were able to locate with certainty the centres of all clerical districts, most urban monasteries and at least 77 rural monasteries or almost one third of the total. As the monasteries under the supervision of a certain clerical district cover, contiguous areas, we were, nevertheless, able to map major settlements in Chiang Mai based on the “List of Monasteries” under discussion (see maps 2 and 3).

The monasteries covered the present-day districts (*amphö*) of Müang, Saraphi, Hang Dong, San Pa Tòng, San Kamphang, San Sai and Đợt Saket. These districts are fertile, densely populated rice-growing zones situated within a radius of 40 km from the city of Chiang Mai. As to the more distant districts of Cộm Thọng, Mạ Rim and Mạ Tăng, only very few monasteries are included. The outlying districts, like Hợp (Southwest), Samông (West) as well as Chiang Dao, Phrao and Fang (North), it seems, were completely left out.

I believe that this default was due to demographic as well as administrative reasons. It is true that by the end of the nineteenth century the “new frontier zones” to the the north and west were still sparsely populated. Phrao and Fang, for example, were resettled in 1870 and 1880 respectively. In the late 1880s both districts contained only a few hundred houses each, according to Western accounts of that time. Chiang Dao, situated 60 km to the north of Chiang Mai,
suffered from several destructive raids by Shan bandits who burned down nine villages between 1868 and 1872. Some ten years later, Chiang Dao contained only 250 houses, 75 of which were in the district seat itself.\textsuperscript{138} The majority of people in the frontier zones apparently lived in small dispersed hamlets comprising, perhaps, not more than a few houses each. Communities of that size lacked the economic resources necessary to sustain monasteries and to support monks or novices.

Apart from geographic remoteness and low population density, the outlying districts of Chiang Mai were also of marginal importance with regards to political integration. It seems that about the turn of the twentieth century the secular and religious authorities in the capital exercised only limited effective control over the frontier zones. The Chiang Mai saṅgha was well established in the city and the surrounding countryside. As to the intermediate districts like C الرجال, Mạ Rim and Mạ Tăng, which belonged neither to the core area nor to the frontier zone, only the largest and most important monasteries, like Wat Mường Win (no. 338; western, mountainous part of San Pa Tông) and Wat Mường Không (no. 340; southwest corner of C蜢 Thống), were part of the saṅgha organization. The “List of Monasteries” mentions them as monasteries under the supervision of Wat Si Phummin (muat ubosot no. 23) which is situated in the fertile rice-growing region of Mạ Tăng (Mường Kăn) where large tracts of rice-land had been reclaimed during the Fifth Reign.

The manuscript does not only mention the names of monasteries, but also the affiliation of their abbots (cao athikan) and vice-abbots (rọng athikan) to a certain nikai. However, the common translation of nikai (Skt./Pāli: nikāya) as “religious sect” is misleading in the context of this particular document; for “Nikai Chiang Mai”, “Nikai Khôn”, “Nikai Lua”, “Nikai Yông” or “Nikai Chiang Săn” hardly reflects any sectarian disputes on religious issues. The names of the various nikai rather indicate different ethnic and descent groups. As the monks and novices had always to be supported by the local population, one should expect that they performed Buddhist ceremonies in accordance with local traditions that might have varied slightly in the different regions of Lan Na. Therefore, the religious affiliation (nikai) of the abbot of a monastery can be transferred to the geographic/ethnic origin (chüa sai, “descent”) of the respective village. “Nikai Khôn”, for example, would mean: The village or compartment to which the monastery belonged was founded by people from Chiang Tung. Yet, unclear is the meaning of the label “Nikai Chiang Mai”. I propose that it probably indicates either settlements of ethnic Yuan or of a mixed ethnic population.

I tried to map the monasteries and their respective communities with regard to ethnicity, too (see maps 1 and 2). The geographic distribution of settlements

\textsuperscript{138} For details concerning the (late 19th century) population of Chiang Dao, Fang and Phrao see Hallett 1988:334–352.
of the different ethnic groups reflects the situation in the late 19th century. As for the early decades of that century, one can presume that – due to assimilation into the Yuan (Khon Müang) society – the relative size of captive communities was somewhat larger than in the 1890s. However, their geographical distribution was probably not much different. The mapping shows in detail:

1. Of the 56 monasteries situated inside the square (brick) city wall (1,400 m wide and 1,810 long), 54 monasteries were affiliated with Nikai Chiang Mai. Therefore, the large majority of people in the inner city were Yuan, descendants of the original population of Lan Na. As for the southern and southeastern suburbs, i.e. those compartments which were protected by an outer earthen wall (kamphâng din), the Yuan constituted only a small minority. 18 of 23 monasteries (almost 80%) in these “suburbs” belonged to nikai other than Nikai Chiang Mai. War captives from Chiang Sän were resettled in areas to the east and southeast (close to the Tha Phâ Gate), in this area we also find two Mon settlements. The southern and southwestern suburbs were mostly inhabited by ethnic Khôn and Tai Yai. Michael Vatikiotis observes that the orientation of these suburbs “does, in fact, coincide with the two least auspicious corners [southeast, southwest] of the city. The land in this area was, and still is, subject to flooding, and was said to be inhabited by bad spirits. ... The apparent location of these captive settlements both outside and at the least auspicious corner of the city walls [southeast], indicates the likelihood that they were settled by the Prince-ruler [Kawila].” 139 Vatikiotis’ conclusion that the “the earthen wall ... was built to protect these new settlements – vital because of the manpower they provided” is partly wrong, because it confuses cause and effect. The earthen wall had already been built long before the Burmese conquest in 1558. In 1837, McLeod observed: “The outer fort is not in some parts inhabited, being swampy; it is the residence principally of the Kiang Túng, Kiang Then [Chiang Sän], and other Tsóbuas [cao müang], with their followers.” 140

2. Concerning the rice-growing regions outside the city walls, the spatial pattern seems far more complex. The general picture appears to be that the rural areas in the immediate neighbourhood of the city (present Müang District) were inhabited by native Yuan population. There are no captive settlements recorded for that zone. The rice-growing areas to the south and southwest (Saraphi, Hang Dong and San Pa Tông) were predominantly settled by Yuan as well. With the exception of two Mon monasteries/communities in Saraphi, we have not found any reference to major captive settlements there. However, we know from oral tradition that today there are still a few Khôn and Lü (Yông) villages in the dis-

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139 Vatikiotis 1984:54–55 [Explanations are added in brackets].
140 McLeod’s Journal:36.
tricts of San Pa Tông and Hang Dong. The “List of Monasteries” does not mention them, at least not under the label of their respective nikai. Furthermore, the concentration of Lua (Lawa) in Hang Dong District, a (wet-)rice-cultivating zone just to the west and southwest of Chiang Mai city, is surprising, because at present, one century later, the Lua are regarded as “upland people” who have survived only in two small mountainous areas of Hợp District (Chiang Mai) and Mạ Hồng Sơn Province. Since pre-Mangrai times the region around Đồi Suthep (including Hang Dong) was an old Lua stronghold. Until present the Yuan consider the Lua to be the original people of Chiang Mai. Until the early Bangkok period the Lua played an important role in the state ritual of Chiang Mai. However, it is not clear whether all of the Hang Dong-Lua were natives or whether some groups came from other areas, too. Numerous Lua villages are dispersed in the hilly areas surrounding the valley of Chiang Tung; it is possible that from there and other areas in the Shan States, some Lua villages were uprooted and deported to Chiang Mai by Kawila’s forces.

3. The fertile, irrigated rice-growing zones to the east and northeast of Chiang Mai (San Kamphans, Đồi Saket, San Sai) were obviously the most densely populated areas in Chiang Mai. More than two thirds of all rural monasteries/communities were situated in that region. Of that number roughly 20% had a non-Yuan background. Khôn settlements were scattered over all three districts. One finds Tai Yai villages in Đồi Saket and Lụ communities in Đồi Saket and San Kamphans. The largest concentration of war captives was in the southern part of San Kamphans where six monasteries of Nikai Yöng are reported. But nowhere did captives inhabit large coherent areas. Their villages were always interspersed between Yuan settlements.

7.2. The Numerical Strength of the Captive Population

How many war captives were deported to Lan Na during the era of kep phak sai sa kep khá sai miu璋g? How large was this population in absolute and relative numbers by the mid 19th century? The Northern Thai chronicles report in detail the numerical strength of various armies, but generally do not provide any figures on the people deported and resettled by these armies. Siamese sources are more precise here. The overall figures I collected for the various campaigns of forced resettlement (1782–1837) indicate that 50,000–70,000 war captives were deported during the late 18th and early 19th centuries to present-day Northern

141 Sanguan Chotsukharat 1972:167 reports that the inhabitants from Ban Wuai and Ban Tông Kai in Hang Dong District are descendants of war captives from Mùang Ngualai and Mùang Tông Kai in the Shan States (dependencies of Chiang Tung). They were most probably ethnic Khôn.

142 As to the role of the Lua in the Northern Thai society see Chonthira 1987.
Thailand (table 5). Furthermore, at least some 3,000 ethnic Mon fled after the last great Mon uprising in Burma (1814/15) to Chiang Mai, where they were settled in the eastern outskirts of the city and in Saraphi. Since the deportation of war captives was often followed by the more or less voluntary immigration of those who were left behind, and if a natural annual increase of 0.5% for the “Pre-Bowring Period” should be reasonable, the captive population should have doubled by 1840, eventually reaching the size of 100,000 to 150,000 persons. Taking the census results of 1919/20 and assuming an annual increase of 1.5% between 1840 and 1919/20 (including migration), I calculated the total population in Northern Thailand at roughly 0.4 million people. That means that by 1840, 25–40% of the population in the five Northern Thai principalities of Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang, Phrā and Nan were war captives or their descendants.

Contemporary British sources, however, indicate a far higher percentage of war captives than that derived from my own calculations. After his journey in 1829/30 to Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Lampang, David Richardson estimates that “of the original inhabitants of this country but a very small portion now obtains, perhaps not above one third of the whole”. In his diary about a journey five years later he wrote about the “captives of whom 3/4 of the people are composed”. Richardson explained the low numbers of native Yuan with the frequent deportations of the local population to Burma during the 16th to 18th centuries. W.C. McLeod, who visited Chiang Mai and Lamphun on his journey to Chiang Tung in 1836/37, agrees with Richardson that the large majority of the population were war captives from the “different states tributary to Ava”. McLeod estimates: “More than two-thirds of Zimmè [Chiang Mai], Labong [Lamphun] and Lagon [Lampang] are Talien [Mon] refugees, or persons from the Burman provinces to the northward, who had either voluntarily settled under the Siamese Shans [Yuan], having been inveigled to do so by specious promises, which were never kept, or seized and brought away during their former constant

143 “Cotmaihet lan na: banthük hetkan prawattisat phs. 2271–2397”, in: Sarasawadee 1993:26. Other sources give the numbers of Mon refugees as high as 5,000 (e.g., TPCM:125). Concerning the mass exodus of Mon from Burma see Damrong 1990:106–107. More than 40,000 Mon fled to Siam where most of them were resettled in areas around Bangkok. The Mon village Nong Du in Pa sang District (Lamphun) was also founded in c. 1815 or later, and not, as the present villagers – 80% still speaking Mon – pretend to believe, descendants of the Hariphunchai (pre-13th century) Mon. Interview with Phrakhru Wichansatsanakhun, Wat Nong Du, 14 March 1992.

144 Natural increase = birth-rate minus death-rate.

145 According to the census of 1919/20, more than 1,342,000 persons lived in Montthon Phayap. For details see LeMay 1986:85.

146 Blundell 1836:602.

147 Richardson’s Journal:143 [17.2.1835].
incursions into these provinces, chiefly Kiang Tung [Chiang Tung] and Muang Niong [Yong].”

Should these figures, obtained by foreigners, be taken at face value? One has to be careful because of following reasons:

Firstly, judging from the routes Richardson and McLeod were travelling in the 1830s, it seems that they really did pass through areas with a high proportion of war captives: Lamphun (nearly completely populated by Lü-Yong) as well as the eastern and southwestern parts of Chiang Mai (large concentrations of Khön). It is from observations in these regions, their conclusions were drawn. As for Lampang, visited by Richardson but not by McLeod, the two do not explicitly mention any captive group. Lampang apparently suffered from the wars with Burma (especially during 1762–1774) less than Chiang Mai and Lamphun, and was, therefore, not that depopulated. Compared to Chiang Mai, the capital, Lampang was of minor strategic importance vis-à-vis the Burmese. Lastly, the Wang river basin was a traditional rice-deficit zone. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that Lampang received a considerable smaller number of war captives than the Chiang Mai-Lamphun region.

Secondly, Richardson and McLeod do not give any information about Phra and Nan, regions they obviously never visited. There were large numbers of people resettled in Nan province during the first decades of the 19th century, either as war captives or voluntary immigrants. But neighbouring Phra is virtually left out by the chronicles and other contemporary sources. Perhaps this principality was too small, not worth mentioning. Or, perhaps Phra had been far less destroyed during the 18th century than Nan, Chiang Mai and, therefore, was not so eager to be engaged in the resettlement campaigns of the latter.

Finally, The British diplomats probably noticed the non-Yuan population more than they deserved, because they did not expect so many alien elements in Chiang Mai. The increase of population in Lan Na during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, there is no doubt, was only partly due to the influx of war captives. The return of former residents from jungle and mountainous areas was important, too. An inscription of Wat Phragrommathat Cöm Thong (Chiang Mai) mentions 21 families who had served the monastery as phrai wat, then fled the Burmese armies into the jungle and finally returned in 1779 to the monastery. Various smaller valleys situated far off the major invasion routes were not abandoned by their inhabitants, but, on the contrary, provided shelter for refugees from areas ravaged by war. The district of Li in the far south of Lamphun, for instance, remained relatively untouched by the events of the 1760s.

148 McLeod 1837:991.
and 1770s. Many Yuan people from Mái Hồng Sơn sought refuge in Li during that time.\textsuperscript{150}

There is, however, little doubt that the war captives and their descendants formed a major part of the mid 19th century population of Lan Na. The results of a detailed analysis of the “List of Monasteries” (appendix, tables 1–4) show: At the end of the 19th century the descendants of war captives comprised roughly 20\% of the total population of Chiang Mai, 30–35\% in the city and 15–20\% in the countryside.\textsuperscript{151} But these figures represent only the minimum margin, when the figures for half a century earlier are taken into consideration. There had certainly been more interaction among various ethnic groups during the 19th century than most Western observers tended to believe,\textsuperscript{152} for the “List of Monasteries” mentions at least a dozen villages with “Nikai Chiang Mai” affiliation whose names indicate, however, a non-Yuan background. Some captive groups, like the Karen, were animists, not Buddhists; their villages are not represented by the “List of Monasteries”. Moreover, one important group of war captives, some 8,000 residents of Sat (ethnic Tai Yai),\textsuperscript{153} were not conceded their own nikai. Their settlements, like Ban Müang Sat Nôi and Ban Müang Sat

\textsuperscript{150} See Ngan khong kao chao ban puang 1993.

\textsuperscript{151} To calculate the share of non-Yuan ethnic groups in Chiang Mai, I took the number of monasteries affiliated to different ethnic nikai as an indicator. In table 1, I assumed that the size of each community was about the same. That is, of course, a simplification as the number of monks and novices supported by each monastery varied in size. Therefore, I used the number of all ordained persons in religious service (banphachit), i.e. monks and novices, as a better indicator by assuming that the population of a community and the number of religious people supported by that community would be proportional (table 4). However, it can be argued that monks were not necessarily local people, but novices were. Perhaps, the size of the local population should be determined only by the number of novices (table 3).

The “List of Monasteries” provides the number of monks for two successive years, i.e. 1895/96 and 1896/97. Concerning the number of novices, figures are given only for 1896/97 but not for the previous year. The figures indicate an overall increase of monks of roughly 10\% within a period of twelve months. On the village level the fluctuations were even greater because local (economic) conditions could vary considerably from one year to another. Moreover, one may also assume differences in the monastic discipline of various nikai influencing the ratio of banphachit to laypersons. However, I don’t believe that these differences were significant.

\textsuperscript{152} Holt S. Hallett writes in 1890: “In Bangkok the inhabitants of the different quarters have gradually become amalgamated; but not far from the capital the colonies of former captives of war still retain their language and customs, and keep little intercourse with their conquerors. In the northern country [Lan Na] the separation is as complete, and the town of Chiangmai (Zimmé), for instance, is divided into numerous quarters, inhabited exclusively by people of a different race, and many of the villages in the provinces are also colonies of refugees or captives.” Hallett 1988:352.

\textsuperscript{153} From the campaign in 1798, 1802 and 1837.
Luang (near Chiang Mai city),\textsuperscript{154} were obviously included in the category of "Nikai Chiang Mai". On the other hand, Yuan villages in the sparsely populated northern section of Chiang Mai (Fang, Phrao, Chiang Dao), are not included in the "List of Monasteries".\textsuperscript{155} As for a very rough estimate, I would guess that by 1840 perhaps up to one third of the population in Chiang Mai (whole province) was of captive origin, and probably between one third and two fifths in the whole of Lan Na.

7.3. Social and Political Status of War Captives in Lan Na

Nearly everywhere in the Northern Thai principalities, war captives and their descendants constituted so large a group, in some areas even the bulk of the populace, that their general enslavement as "second-class citizens" was not feasible. Moreover, the Khôn, Lụ, and Tai Yai (in this order) shared language, beliefs, customs, and basic way of life with the Yuan and with each other. From a historical point of view, Chiang Tung, Sat and Yöng were at least as strongly connected to Chiang Mai as Phrä or Nan used to be. All these müang belonged to the Yuan-Khôn-Lụ cultural zone, i.e. Lan Na.\textsuperscript{156} To sum up, there were no attitudes of any racial or cultural superiority by the Yuan (Chiang Mai) élite towards most of the war captives. In this respect the situation in Central Thailand, where many tens of thousands Lao and Khmer war captives were often badly treated, was fundamentally different. The captive villages in Siam were organized in special labour units (kông) under the supervision of Siamese lords (nai kông). Although in most cases not being slaves (that) but commoners (phrai), these non-Siamese populations were considered culturally inferior.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{154} Personal communication with Aroonrut Wichienkeeo (22 April 1993). Furthermore, war captives from Sat were resettled in Ban Nam Ton and Ban Sán Kantha (San Pa Tông District) where Anan (1984:44–45) made extensive field-studies.

\textsuperscript{155} Although the müang in the northern part of Lan Na, like Fang, Phrao, Chiang Rai and Phayao were considered as "depopulated" and waste (rang), at least until the early 1840s, the area was by no means totally uninhabited. On his journey from Chiang Mai to Chiang Tung in early 1837, McLeod passed regularly through villages in the Lao river basin (until reaching Pak Pong, south of Chiang Rai, called "a border village of Siam"). However, the areas north of Chiang Rai seemed to have been deserted. See McLeod's Journal:44–49.

\textsuperscript{156} Northern Thai as well as Burmese sources (from the 18th and early 19th centuries) often speak about the "57 müang of Lan Na", including Chiang Tung, Yöng, Sat and even Chiang Rung in Sipsong Panna.

\textsuperscript{157} The discrimination of Lao war captives ended after the French established a Lao protectorate on the east bank of the Mekong in 1893. The Siamese authories feared the French might claim control over Lao "subjects" resettled in Central and Northeastern Thailand as well. "The very existence of captive labour villages became an acute embarrassment. It was imperative that their identity be officially suppressed and their existence denied. An obvious first step was the abandonment of the 'captive labour' caste designation within the Thai legal
In the Northern Thai principalities the captive population lived in settlements under the control of their traditional village leaders. Sometimes the ruler of a captured míaung agreed to follow his subjects to the south and was allowed to maintain his high status. Thus nearly all members of the ruling family of Chiang Tung settled in Chiang Mai city (1805), and Kawila regarded them as his “younger brothers”. Intermarriage between the Kawila dynasty and the Chiang Tung dynasty (both its Sirichai and Mahakhanan lines) occurred frequently during the 19th century.158

Likewise, cordial relations developed between the ruling families of Yong and Lamphun after the principality of Lamphun was restored in 1805/14. The ruler of Yong settled in Wiang Yong, opposite the city of Lamphun, on the eastern bank of the Kuang river. As was discussed earlier, Wiang Yong and the surrounding villages were replica of the old Míaung Yong in a geographic-ecological dimension. No less fascinating, however, is how the new settlements reflected and reinforced ritual power and social stratification. The main monastery in Wiang Yong, Wat Hua Khua, shelters the four guardian spirits of Yong which the cao míaung “resettled” along with the population. The four guardian spirits are each symbolised by a stone-cut white elephant.159 Their installation in Wiang Yong ensured the well-being of the people and reinforced the political authority of Yong’s former ruler who had now become a “younger brother” of the ruler of Lamphun. While the noble families from Yong obviously lived in the main village of Wiang Yong, architects and construction workers settled the adjacent village of (Ban) Tông. The people of Ban Tông are famous for their skills in constructing religious buildings like vihāra in the traditional Yuan-Lǔ style.160 The villages of (Ban) Luai und (Ban) Yu were widely known for their

158 For a useful and readable discussion of political relations between Chiang Mai and Chiang Tung in the 19th century see Ratanaporn 1988.

159 The Pali-derived names of the four guardian spirits are surana, pitthiya, lakkhana, thewed. The monastery founded by the Lū-Yōng in 1805/6 was Wat Hua Nguang. Later in the 19th century the people left the old monastery and built 200 m distant Wat Hua Khua. The small hall containing the guardian spirits had not been moved. It is situated just outside the compounds of the new monastery. The elephant stone figures are still in good physical condition. The local population, however, no longer seems to take notice of the spirit hall.

160 Even today the Yuan enclave of Sao Hai (Saraburi) in Central Thailand, descendants of war captives from Chiang Sän (1804), orders craftsmen from Ban Tông to construct religious buildings in the style of their ancestors. See my own interview with Phrakhru Wichitpanyakorn (Wat Ban Tông, Lamphun), 8 March 1992.
specialization in cloth-weaving and poetry, respectively. Outside this cluster of four occupationally specialized villages, lived the bulk of the rice-growing peasants.¹⁶¹ Both rulers in Lamphun, the cao miuang in the city and his junior counterpart in Wiang Yong, profited from this “cellular” organization of society.

This pattern of settlement, based on strict status and occupational divisions, was yet more distinct in Chiang Mai where the various ethnic groups living at the outskirts of the city were highly specialized craftsmen. The Khon, settling south of the “Pratu Chiang Mai”, were well-known bell-founders and producers of lacquerware (still called in Chiang Mai khruang khon). Compartments occupied by ethnic Lua and Tai Yai were famous for silversmith works and tanning, respectively.¹⁶² The community of Ban Chang Khong, situated inside the outer city wall along the banks of the Mae Kha waterway, not far away from present Ma Ping Hotel, was inhabited by descendants of Yuan war captives from Chiang San. They were highly specialized drum and gong makers (chang khong). Outside Chiang Mai City lived the peasant population, made up of various ethnic background, both native and captive.

Although the war captives were in general given a fair treatment by the Yuan rulers, one should expect resentment about the loss of heimat. As paddy fields to cultivate were abundant, the new settlers did not fear for their material well-being; the psychological effects of deportation were much more difficult to overcome, at least for the first and second generations. Richardson reports on an encounter with the last ruler of Yong whom he met in 1834: “The rightfull Tsobwa of Mein Neaung stayed with me a great part of the day. He is a prisoner who was carried off by the present Chow Tshee Weet [cao chiwit] about 30 years ago, the year after he re-established this town [Lamphun]. He complained with little reserve of this situation here. He said he ate and drank and slept like other people. His natural part was here, but his spirit cit was in his own country.”¹⁶³ Richardson's report is corroborated by McLeod who had, a few years later, a similar encounter with the former ruler of Yong. The British official, having been instructed by his superiors to avoid sensitive political issues during his fact-finding mission,¹⁶⁴ describes an even stronger dissatisfaction with an unpleasant situation. “The Mein Neaung chief ... said, he hoped the British

¹⁶¹ Sangworayanprayut 1990:2.
¹⁶² For details see Sanguan 1972:166–167.
¹⁶³ Richardson's Journal:58 [1.4.1834].
¹⁶⁴ E.A. Blundell, Commissioner in the Tenasserim Province, admonished his assistant “to make inquiries on the present state of cattle trade, and ascertain as far as practicable the probable continuance of supplies”, but to “cautiously avoid all political subjects in your conversation with the chiefs, and if introduced by them, you will state at once that your object is solely that of extending trade, and that you are not authorized in any way whatever to discuss other subjects with them”. Quoted from McLeod's Journal:8.
would interfere and have him and his countrymen released, either to return to their own country or to settle under us in the Tenasserim Provinces; that they, with the people of Kiang Tung and other places to the northward were sorely oppressed; that to the known benevolence and humanity of the English all their hearts were turned.” It seems, however, that this alleged statement by the “Müang Yông chief” reflected rather McLeod’s own wishful thinking (of British intervention in the future) than real expectations by the Yông chief. As if to dissipate such surmise, McLeod emphasized a sentence later: “I, however, gave him [the former ruler of Yông] no hopes of our interfering as they were not our subjects, and had voluntarily placed themselves under the Siamese Shans.”

The sentiments expressed in encounters with foreigners certainly did not reflect any intolerable severe grief or feelings of hatred against the Yuan rulers. McLeod’s conclusion that the war captives were “disgusted with the treatment they receive” and “ripe for revolt”, is, to say the least, an overexaggeration. Richardson’s diary includes a brief but moving account of a discussion with a Lü-Yông woman in Pa Sang, a sister of “the rightfull Tsobwa of Mein Neuang” in whose house the British diplomat had stayed one night. Richardson was told that the war captives were allowed “to live as much together as possible”. As they amounted to 3,000 people in Pa Sang, the Yuan authorities of Lamphun did not “trust them together”. Therefore, “they were distributed in small numbers about the different villages in this principality which the Birmans had then only recently left and which was thinly populated, they never made an attempt to escape”. It seems that the fear of the Yuan rulers that their captive subjects might try to escape to their native country put restraints on exploitation and misuse of power.

8. Concluding Remarks

However, communication between the war captives and their original homelands was never completely cut. On the contrary, the war captives seemed to have played a vital role not only in the revival of agriculture and of handicrafts in Lan Na, but certainly in the trade network, both intra- and inter-regional, as well. By the time of McLeod’s visit to Chiang Mai (1837) this trade was already flourishing. The British diplomat observed that dried fish and meat were brought from Chiang Tung. “Quantities of betel nut, with which these territories [Chiang Mai/Lamphun] abound, are smuggled for sale to Keng Tung, where

165 McLeod’s Journal:22.
166 McLeod’s Journal:33.
167 Richardson’s Journal:59 [1.4.1834].
168 Richardson’s Journal:142 [17.2.1835].
there is none, and the consumption great.\textsuperscript{169} The re-establishment of Chiang Rai and Phayao as dependencies of Chiang Mai and Lampang respectively (1843),\textsuperscript{170} accelerated the contacts between Lan Na and the regions further northward. These contacts were only briefly interrupted by the Chiang Tung Wars (1849–1854).\textsuperscript{171} The war captives and their descendants contributed to the forging of close relations, based on ethnic and cultural bonds, between Chiang Mai and the Chiang Tung-Yong-Chiang Rung region. This development was only interrupted after Word War II as a result of developments in China and Burma.

* * *

**Abbreviations**

C.S.  
Culasakaraja ("Little Era" = Christian Era minus 638)

CH  
Cotmaihet

CHLN  
Cotmaihet lan na

JSC  
Jengtung State Chronicle

KMCM  
Khlong ruan mangthara rop chiang mai

NL  
National Library

PMN  
Phongsawadan muang nan

PPR1  
Phraratchaphongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thi 1

PCMLL  
Phongsawadan muang nakhon chiang mai nakhon muang lampang muang lamphunchai

PY  
Phongsawadan yonok

TMY  
Tammam muang yong

TCCT  
Tammam cao cet ton

TPCM  
Tammam phummuang chiang mai

TSHR  
Tammam sipha ratchawong

\textsuperscript{169} McLeod's Journal:36.

\textsuperscript{170} Pritsana 1973:169–176.

\textsuperscript{171} Good summaries of the Chiang Tung wars are provided by Saraswadee 1986:71–81; Ratana-porn 1988: 311–319.
Map 1: Lan Na and neighbouring regions
Map 2: Ethnic groups in Chiang Mai City

Drawn by Günther Moosbauer
(rough distribution)
Map 3: Ethnic groups in Müang Chiang Mai (outside the city walls)

Natives
- **Yuan**: Nikai Chiang Mai (206)
- **Lua**: Nikai Lua (7)

Foreign groups
- **Yuan**: Nikai Chiang Sän (1) CS
  - Nikai Nan (1) N
  - Nikai Phrä (1) P
- **Luu**: Nikai Yong (6)
  - Nikai Luang (2)
  - Nikai Luai (2)
- **Khon**: Nikai Khon (9)
- **Tai Yai**: Nikai Ma Pa (2)
- **Mon**: Nikai Mon (2)

Drawn by Günther Moosbauer (rough distribution)
Appendix

List of “Nikai” in Chiang Mai

Nikai Chiang Mai
Nikai Chiang Sän
Nikai Nan
Nikai Phrä
Nikai Len
Nikai Yong
Nikai Luang
Nikai Luai
Nikai Ngualai
Nikai Khôn
Nikai Ngiao
Nikai Khong
Nikai Mā Pa
Nikai Tai
Nikai Man
Nikai Mon
Nikai Lua

Ethnic Groups

Yuan (in Chiang Mai)
Yuan (from Chiang Sän)
Yuan (from Nan)
Yuan (from Phrä)
Lü (from Len)
Lü (from Yong)
Lü (from Luang)
Lü (from Luai)
Khôn (from Ngualai/Wualai)
Khôn (from Chiang Tung)
Tai Yai
Tai Yai (from the Salween)
Tai Yai (from Pa river)
Tai Yai
Burmese
Mon
Lua
Table 1: Monasteries in Müang Chiang Mai (1896/97)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of nikai</th>
<th>Inside the city</th>
<th>Outside the city</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absolute in %</td>
<td>absolute in %</td>
<td>absolute in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Sän</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrä</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Len</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yong</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luai</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngualai</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khôn</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngiao</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mā Pa</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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Total 97 100.0 243 100.0 340 100.0

(Note: Table adapted from Rujaya and Sanan 1995.)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of nikai</th>
<th>Inside the city</th>
<th>Outside the city</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>absolute</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Len</td>
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<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yong</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khong</td>
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<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mā Pa</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Tai</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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(Note: Table adapted from Rujaya and Sanan 1995.)

+) Numbers incomplete
Table 3: Number of Novices in Mùang Chiang Mai (1896/97)

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<th>Name of nikai</th>
<th>Inside the city</th>
<th>Outside the city</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td>absolute</td>
<td>absolute</td>
<td>absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in %</td>
<td>in %</td>
<td>in %</td>
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<td>2399</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>540</td>
<td>2557</td>
<td>3097</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

(Note: Table adapted from Rujaya and Sanan 1995.)

+) Numbers incomplete
Table 4: Number of Monks and Novices in Müang Chiang Mai (1896/97)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of nikai</th>
<th>Inside the city absolute</th>
<th>in %</th>
<th>Outside the city absolute</th>
<th>in %</th>
<th>Total absolute</th>
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<td>42</td>
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</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>—</td>
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</table>

Total 890 100.0 3259 100.0 4149 100.0

(Note: Table adapted from Rujaya and Sanan 1995.)

+) Numbers incomplete
Table 5: Resettlement of War Captives from the Shan States, Sipsong Panna and other Areas to Lan Na

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of campaign</th>
<th>Area of target</th>
<th>Area of resettlement</th>
<th>Number of war captives</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>&lt; 1,000*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>Mūang (M.) Cuat</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Lamphung</td>
<td>1,000–2,000*</td>
<td>TPCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1788–1791</td>
<td>Salween region (Lampang)</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>2,000–4,000*</td>
<td>TPCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790</td>
<td>M. Yöng</td>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>2,500–3,500 (505 families)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791</td>
<td>Chiang Khong</td>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>3,000–4,000 (585 families)</td>
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<td>1798</td>
<td>M. Sat</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>1,000–2,000*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1802</td>
<td>M. Sat, Pu, Pan, Chiang Tung</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Lamphung</td>
<td>&gt; 6,000</td>
<td>NL-CHR1 1/1164</td>
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<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>Chiang Sän, Lampang</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Nan</td>
<td>c. 15,000</td>
<td>PPR1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>M. Yöng, Chiang Tung, Sipsong Panna</td>
<td>Lamphun, Lampang, Chiang Mai</td>
<td>10,000–20,000</td>
<td>PPR1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>Sipsong Panna</td>
<td>Lamphung, Chiang Mai</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>CHLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809/10</td>
<td>M. Yöng, Chiang Tung</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Lamphun</td>
<td>2,000–4,000*</td>
<td>TPCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>Chiang Khāng, M. La, Phong</td>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>PMN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827/8</td>
<td>Wiang Can</td>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>PMN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>M. Sat</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>1,800–1,900</td>
<td>PCM-LL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) rough estimate
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1.6 Social Research Institute, Chiang Mai University

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