The art of knowing others:
The Remwu zhi and its cultural background*

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The birth of the Wei 魏 dynasty (220–265 AD) along the reaches of the Yellow river saw the fight among different ways to interpret imperial institutions and the society as a whole. Torn between the dream to revive the splendour of the Han 漢 dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) and the necessity to look for new paths, Cao Pi's 曹丕 (187–226) court swarmed with scholars and intellectuals who competed for visibility. Many of them comprehended the necessity to have a confrontation with the recent historical cataclysm: in front of the arduous task to explain the reasons which had led to the definitive downfall of the Han dynasty, the Wei scholars were unable to find a unanimous diagnosis. Several intellectuals highlighted the problem of recruitment of capable and honest officials. On the other side, there were those who explained the historical debacle of the second and third century AD through the Han cosmic paradigm and, in particular, with the theory of heaven’s mandate (tianming 天命). The Remwu zhi 人物志, written by Liu Shao 劉劭 (ca. 186–245) at the beginning of the third century AD, has to be understood in this context.1

The medieval text very early attracted the attention of the sinological world. As early as 1937, when several basic texts of Chinese tradition were still awaiting for reflection and consideration, Shryock “discovered” and translated the text integrally. His useful introductory notes present the Remwu zhi as a psychological treatise on typology of human characters. This sudden concern for a work, which, in spite of the recent translation by Lara,2 has never gained again a wide resonance, can only be understood within the intellectual context of the thirties, when America faced the interrelated intellectual action of behaviourism and neopositivism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in fact, American psychology began to experience a traumatic evolution. The strong call for transforming psychology in a strict empirical science led scholars to shift the focus on those phenomena that could be objectively analysed and measured. The new exigencies caused, in turn, the gradual fading in importance of traditional concepts as “consciousness”, “mind”, and “feeling”. From a methodological perspective, thus, the psychologists substituted the analysis of the mind with the observation of human behaviour. On a more theoretical level, a new target was set, namely the

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1 According to his biography in the Sanwen zhi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), Liu Shao began his official career at the Han court of emperor Ling 灵 (r. 168–189). Apparently, his life continued quietly during the traumatic decades of the third century AD. Under the Wei, he was appointed twice for important missions. During the reign of Mingdi 明帝 (r. 227–240), he became member of a commission for the revision and the correction of the imperial legal code; later, around the middle of the third century AD, he was commanded to draw regulations for the examination of officials. In this regard, see: Sanwen zhi 21:617-622. For further details on Liu Shao’s life, see: Shryock, John K., The Study of Human Abilities: The Fan wen chih of Liu Shao. New York: Kraus, 1966 (reprint-First Edition: New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1937), pp. 20-26.

2 See: Lara, Anne-Marie, Traité des Caractères. Paris: Gallimard, 1997. Unlike Shryock’s work, Lara limits her introductory notes to a general comparative presentation of the medieval text. However, her translation is worth of note, mainly in virtue of the exhaustive footnotes.
drawing of an array of principles, which could enable the researchers to predict and to control behaviour.\(^3\)

The impressive growth of importance of behaviourism in its several tendencies and theories, together with the neopositivistic wind coming from Europe, moulded intellectually the America of the mid-1930ies: it was under these intellectual circumstances that Shryock published his pioneer-translation of the \textit{Renwu zhi}. The American sinologist, in fact, did not miss to notice the similarities between the Chinese text and the new intellectual tendencies and, as a consequence, his translation specifically highlights Liu Shao’s focus on manner and behaviour. It is undoubtedly true, for instance, that the medieval thinker attaches a great importance to objectivity and observation: as Shryock says: “He never gives a non-scientific answer to a scientific question”.\(^4\) In this way, the \textit{Renwu zhi} came to be considered primarily in terms of an enlightening description of talents and features of men. Thus, in Shryock’s opinion, Liu Shao’s work should be regarded as a remarkable treatise of applied psychology, whose scientific analysis of human characters well deserved the praise of the whole scholarly community.\(^5\)

In order to demonstrate the cultural value of the \textit{Renwu zhi}, the American sinologist preferred to defend its intellectual and scientific validity by opting for a comparative approach. Despite its success in providing the readers with an exhaustive analysis of the text, this framework is not adequate enough to explain, on one hand, how Liu Shao remoulded his cultural background and, on the other hand, for which reasons he regarded as necessary to write extensively on ways of behaving. From this point of view, it is worthwhile to dwell on the intellectual profile Shryock sketches of the author of the \textit{Renwu zhi}. First, the medieval philosopher is described as a conservative thinker, whose respect for Confucianism, and above all for the Confucius of the \textit{Lunyu}, brings him into conflict with the cultural landscape of his age.\(^6\) Moreover, in the attempt to respect the tradi-

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3 As John Watson (1878–1958) put it in the famous lecture delivered in 1913 at the Columbia University, psychology has to be regarded as a “purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behaviour. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness”. See: Watson, John B., “Psychology as the behaviorist views it”, in: \textit{Psychological Review}, 20 (1913), page 158. Watson’s lecture has been usually regarded as the very starting point of behaviourism. Recently, however, this point of view has been challenged in view of a more organic vision of the psychological theories prior to 1913. Wozniak, for instance, emphasizes the studies on human and animal behaviour carried on in the decades before Watson delivered his famous speech. In this regard, see: Wozniak, Robert H. (Ed.), \textit{Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: Functionalism, the Critique of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness}. London: Routledge/Thoemmes, 1993. For the reception of Watson’s theories, see: Samelson, Franz, “Struggle for scientific authority: the Reception of Watson’s Behaviourism, 1913–1920”, in: \textit{Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences}, 17 (1985), pp. 399-425.

4 Shryock (see footnote 1), page 38.

5 As far as the consideration of the \textit{Renwu zhi} within the western sinological community is concerned, Shryock’s work should be regarded as a turning point of basic importance. In this regard, we may compare the position of two famous sinologists. A few years before the publication of Shryock’s translation, Alfred Forke defined the text as the first attempt to delineate a \textit{Charakterologie}, whose main features were to be reclined in the centrality of physiognomy and in the lack in scientific method. See: Forke, Alfred, \textit{Geschichte der mittelalterlichen chinesischen Philosophie}. Hamburg: Friederichen, De Gruyter & Co. M. B. H., 1934, p. 197. During the fifties, Needham, strong of the new integral translation, described Liu Shao’s work as the most important book on psychology of characters in old Chinese literature. Moreover, he added: “It is significant to find that the \textit{Jen Wu Chih} (Study of human abilities) […] has nothing whatever to say about physiognomy. It is based entirely on a rationalistic observation of psychological traits and their effects in human affairs”. See: Needham, Joseph and Wang Ling, \textit{Science and Civilisation in China}. Vol. 2. \textit{History of Scientific Thought}. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1962, page 386.

6 Shryock recalls the medieval reaction against Confucianism, understood as the state ideology, which rose to a dominant position during the Han dynasty. See: Shryock, \textit{op. cit.}, page 40. For a reflection on Han theories, see: Cheng,
national classification of the text, the American sinologist speaks of him as “the Confucian wing of the logicians”, with additional tendencies towards Daoism and Legism. Shryock gives a perhaps less generic evaluation when he highlights that the materialistic thought outlined in the medieval essay has to be regarded as a mark of pessimism in a world, which had just witnessed the institutional collapse of Han China.7

The vagueness of these short remarks on Liu Shao’s cultural background clearly shows how the American sinologist preferred to avoid a careful consideration of the intellectual contiguities between the contents of Renwu zhi and earlier Chinese works, by opting, instead, for a comparative approach. There are several factors, which can help to clear up Shryock’s choices. The surrounding cultural climate of the thirties must have undoubtedly played a decisive role.8 A further factor of some importance is represented by the ambiguities of the historiographic judgement on this medieval work. In several bibliographic catalogues compiled from the Sui dynasty (589–618) onwards, for instance, the Renwu zhi is classified under the School of Names (mingjia).9 Then, at the end of the eighteenth century, the scholars working at the Siku quanshu 四庫全書 accepted, on one hand, the traditional cataloguing and, on the other hand, emphasized its contiguity to Confucian texts.10

Finally, the scarce interest shown by Shryock for an analysis of the relationship between the Renwu zhi and its cultural past is more comprehensible in view of the novelty of the theme. After all, the classification of human talents – surely the feature that had mostly attracted Shryock’s attention – constitutes a new field within the Chinese tradition.

At this point, it is reasonable to ask whether the typology of human characters has to be necessarily regarded as the only nerve centre of Liu Shao’s work. An analysis that aims to explain the intellectual relationship between the medieval thinker and his cultural forefathers should, rather, consider this argument as arrival point of a long theoretical path, which may be summed up in the expression “know others” (zhi ren 知人). As a matter of fact, if the classification of human talents may be regarded as a permutation of scholarly interests, the knowledge of men is a recurring topos in Chinese culture: from the Shujing 书经 up to the later decades of the Han dynasty, the importance of this topic had always been a matter of debate. Confucius himself, for instance, once identified wisdom (zhi 知) with the knowledge of other human beings.11 Consequently, this paper will not address the analysis of human characteristics: it will rather show up the theoretical assumptions as well as methodological considerations Liu Shao took as starting point for his analysis of human talents. Thus, the Renwu zhi will be considered as a reflection on the ways a man formulates his judgement on other human beings. Actually, such a reading of the text finds its justification in the overture of this short medieval essay, where the medieval thinker tries to wipe out any possible misunderstanding.

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7 See: Shryock, *op. cit.*, page 40. Apart from these scattered notes on Liu Shao’s cultural background, Shryock also devotes a short section of his work to discuss the position of the Renwu zhi within the whole Chinese tradition. See: Shryock, *op.cit.*, pp. 46-48.
8 In this regard, see the chapters on science and psychology in the Renwu zhi. See: Shryock, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-43.
9 For the traditional cataloguing, see: *Saihu* 34:1004 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979); *Jiu Tangshu* 47:2031 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1975); *Xin Tangshu* 59:1532 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975); *Songshi* 205:5203 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977).
Among the enchanting sides of the sages and of the worthies, nothing is more fascinating than intelligence. Among the treasures of intelligence, nothing is more valuable than to know other human beings.\footnote{Renwu zhi quanyi xu: 21 (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1998).}

The analysis of mutual knowledge among men, as it was understood and explained at the eve of the third century AD, will gain in clarity if paired with an enquiry of the intellectual frameworks, which constituted Liu Shao’s cultural background. This basic instrument of scrutiny shall work as a litmus test for novelty and originality of the text, both from an intellectual and historical perspective.

In order to portray Liu Shao’s argumentation on the art of knowing others, it is convenient to proceed gradually and dissect the topic “know others” (zhi ren) in different spheres of analysis. First of all, it is necessary to define the object of knowledge, meaning that the significance of ren人 within the Renwu zhi should be adequately explained and investigated. The crucial importance of this point is mainly related to its being the theoretical pillar of the issue under examination. As it will be shown below, discrepant interpretations of the meaning of ren led to the formulation of different strategies for knowing men.

It is well known that the definition of “human being” within the intellectual communities of both pre-imperial and imperial China passed also through the analysis of meaning of human nature (xing性): the attempt to give an ethical judgement of it had found its climax in the famous controversy between Xunzi荀子 (313–230 BC) and Mengzi孟子 (372–281 BC). Furthermore, the success of human emotions (qing情) as important part of the debate had to further complicate the main coordinates of the topic. With the foundation of the centralized empire the dispute on moral qualities of human nature not only went on fascinating scholars and intellectuals but it even radicalised into a sharp classification of xing as source of goodness in a man, and of emotions as spring of human degenerations. The success of this theory and its consequent promotion to imperial dogma did not impede, however, the arousal of competing ideas:\footnote{Baihutong 30:55 (Baihutong zhuzi suoyin. The ICS Ancient Chinese Texts Concordances Series. Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1995) defends the goodness of basic nature by identifying it in the five primary virtues: benevolence (ren仁), righteousness (yi义), etiquette (li礼), wisdom (zhi智), and trustiness (xin信). This statement should be regarded as a summary of the intellectual positions developed during the Former Han. According to Wang Chong, for instance, Dong Zhongshu董仲舒 (179–104 BC) had been the first important defender of this theory. See: Lunheng 13:38 (Lunheng zhuzi suoyin. The ICS Ancient Chinese Texts Concordances Series. Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1996.) In Chunqiu fanlu 10.1:45 (Chunqiu fanlu zhuzi suoyin. The ICS Ancient Chinese Texts Concordances Series. Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1994) there are some clear hints in this direction. Sarah Queen, however, prefers to read in the Chunqiu fanlu a dual theory, meaning that both human nature and human feelings should have yang as well as yin components. For further details, see: Queen, Sarah A., From Chronicle to Canon: the Hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn Annals, According to Tung Chung-shu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; page 52.} only fifty years before the drafting of the Renwu zhi, for instance, Xun Yue荀悦 (ca.148–209) devoted a small section of his work Shenjian申鑒 to the summary of several scholarly opinions on the features of xing and its emotional component.\footnote{Xun Yue as well as Wang Chong testify that the opinions of Han scholars on this delicate topic were far from being unanimous. See: Shenjian 5:22–23 (Congshu jicheng ed. Vol. 533); Lunheng 13:36–39. On Xun Yue’s summary, see also: Santangelo, Paolo, Il Peccato in Cina. Bari: Laterza, 1991, page 53.} If we look at the question from this point of view, it would be easy to expect a similar approach when we come up to Liu Shao’s time. Astonishingly, the medieval philosopher shuns to be trapped in the classical diatribe as the perspective he proposes completely avoids the discussion on the inborn moral qualities in a man. The target he set himself was, rather, a definition of ren in structural terms. Therefore, it is not by chance that the discussion is opened with a statement on the subtlety and mysteriousness of...
the primordial endowment of men: Liu Shao was evidently drawing on Confucius’ refusal to speak about matters concerning human nature.15

The human being who materializes from the first chapter of the Renwu zhi is a multi-levelled fabric based on mixture of cosmic mass. The more obscure part, namely basic nature, is fruit of the concoction of the yin 隱 and of the yang 阳. The deposit of original qi 氣 in the body then constitutes what Liu Shao calls (material) essence (zhi 質), whereas the concomitant action of the five agents (wu xing 五行) will manifest itself in the form (xing 形). The second and the third elements of this composite structure are the pivot on which Liu Shao orchestrates his two-fold argument.

First, the material essence is comparable to a melting pot where the several characteristics of human temperaments are blended. In particular, it encompasses virtues as well as inborn talents (cai 材). The features of the cosmic material within a human body will, in fact, determine the ethical potencies of each individual: it is thus up to the quantity and the quality of the endowed substance if a man will be more intelligent or simply more talented. Second, each of these peculiarities and inborn talents will reflect in the form, which works essentially as a mirror. In this way, the features of the material substance are deducible through an analysis of the external signs: tones of voice, facial expressions, physical constitution, ways of behaving are all weapons available to those wishing to decipher the inner structure of a man.

In order to illustrate the meaning of such arguments, we may dwell on the explanations Liu Shao gives in regard to the features and development of virtues. The schema below should work as a diagrammatic presentation:16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner structure</th>
<th>Reflects in</th>
<th>Outer structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Virtue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood (mu 木)</td>
<td>Benevolence (ren 仁)</td>
<td>Wood (bones (gu 骨))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal (jin 金)</td>
<td>Righteousness (yi 義)</td>
<td>Metal (muscles (jin 筋))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire (huo 火)</td>
<td>Etiquette (li 礼)</td>
<td>Fire (breath (qi 氣))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth (tu 土)</td>
<td>Wisdom (zhi 智)</td>
<td>Earth (flesh (tu 肌))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (shui 水)</td>
<td>Trustiness (xin 信)</td>
<td>Water (blood (shui 血))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above represents Liu Shao’s view of the double structure of men and, in particular, his opinion regarding the body as reflection of human innerness: as the author says, the inner system reveals itself in the form (xìng 形), appears in voice and looks (shēngse 聲色) and emerges from feelings. Each of the inner features, concludes Liu Shao, is exactly as its exterior manifestation (ge ru qi xiang 各如其象).17

The table above not only works as an attempt to present visually Liu Shao’s argument on human structure, but also illustrates a section of Han cosmic paradigm. In fact, the advent of a state ideology under the first successful dynasty of China set the basis for a substantial interpretation of the original endowments of men. In trying to summarize the whole cosmos in a set of models, the Han scholars treated the themes “human nature” and “human feelings” in terms of yin/yang categories. The five

15 Lunyu 5.13:10.
16 The table has been drawn according to Renwu zhi 1:5-6. See also Shryock (footnote 1), pp. 98-99.
17 Renwu zhi 1:8; Shryock (footnote 1), page 98.
agents, in turn, were seen as correspondent to the five virtues.\footnote{In Baihutong 30:55 it is stated: “What do we call emotions and basic nature? Basic nature is what yang has arranged [in our body] and feelings are what yin has altered. The human being is endowed with the qi of the yin and the qi of the yang and then he is born. Therefore, he cherishes inside [himself] the five [components of] human nature and the six emotions.” On the Baihutong, see: Tjan, Tjoe Som, Po hu t’ung: The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall. A Contribution to the History of Classical Studies in the Han Period. Leiden: Brill, 1949, 1952.} Even the apparent confusion in Liu Shao’s association of earth/water – wisdom/trustiness reproduces loyally an intellectual problem of the Han, which, as late as the third century AD, had not yet been solved.\footnote{According to Ban Gu, for instance, water had to be related to trustiness, whereas wisdom was the counterpart of earth. However, a different interpretation must have played a role as well. As some of the weft-texts (weishu 緯書) witness, a few Han scholars preferred to identify trustiness in the agent earth and wisdom in water. This point of view was later accepted by Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127–200). For the different opinions on this topic see: Wuxing dayi 14:78 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2001). On the Wuxing Dayi, see: Kalinowski, Marc, Cosmologie et Divination dans la Chine Ancienne: Le Compendium des cinq Agents. Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1991.}

The crucial question that arouses from Liu Shao’s arguments is whether the cosmic material hidden in the human body at the moment of birth is the same for everybody. Liu Shao clearly rejects this possibility by presenting the three classes of people, which, in his opinion, establish a virtual pyramid of human potential. The so-called men of all-encompassing virtues (jiande 兼德), who occupy the position at the top, distinguish themselves for the exceptionality of their inner substance. In particular, the perfect balance (zhonghe 中和) and the refinement of their yin/yang components predestine these individuals to become heroes and sages. At the other end of this imaginary pyramid are those who are called “men with one-sided talents” (piancai 偏材), or, in other words, individuals whose inner substance is highly deficient. The multi-talented people (jiancai 兼材) represent the nexus between these borderline-cases. Liu Shao is very strict in defending, on one hand, the substantial difference among these kinds of people and, on the other hand, the discrepancy among their talents.\footnote{Renwu zhi 1:15; Shryock, op.cit., pp. 100-101.}

This categorical point of view opens the way to the discussion of a further hot theme: the issue of human improvement. In other words, is it possible for a man whose inborn substance is highly deficient to correct an unlucky coincidence of nature and to improve his character? Liu Shao’s opinion emerges very clearly from the following passage:

Then, the study is the means to perfect the talents […]. The basic nature of a man of one-sided talents cannot be totally changed. Even if we educate him and the talents flourish, at the end, he will lose [what he got].\footnote{Renwu zhi 2:32; Shryock (footnote 1), page 105.}

夫學所以成材也。[…] 偏材之性不可移轉矣。雖教之以學材成而隨之以失。

Liu Shao’s attitude towards human being and role of education clashes with some basic thought of Chinese ethical tradition. The paradigm of pre-medieval China was generically based on that famous Lunyu statement, where Confucius maintained that, as far as human nature is concerned, the human beings are close to each other: it is only due to experience that they will finally drift apart.\footnote{Lunyu 17.2:47; see: Roetz, Heiner, Die chinesische Ethik der Achsenzeit: Eine Rekonstruktion des durchbruchs zu postkonventionalem Denken. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1992, pp. 205, 317; Roetz, Heiner: Konfuzius. München: C.H.Beck, 1995, pp. 13-14.} Actually, Confucius took into account some exceptional cases as well. In particular, the Master of Lu 魯 is remarkably explicit in stating that the best among men are those born with an innate knowledge.
The people who need to study to reach this level build the next step, whereas those whose inborn faculties are limited and do not even study are to be regarded as the lowest level.23

Even if the Master had conceived the possibility that men were different in some way, his followers generally preferred to highlight their similarness and, above all, to stress the possibility each individual has to grow ethically. During the Han, for instance, several scholars defended this assumption, by simply ignoring the problems deriving from a cosmic interpretation of human structure. In this way, many of them chose to explain “human nature” in terms of the life (zheng 生) each human being is provided with.24 This axiom was still valid as late as the second half of the second century AD, when Wang Fu 王符 (ca. 90–165) wrote:

Basic natures and emotional spheres of human beings cannot be distinguished in hundred sorts and yet clarity and wisdom of the men differ for thousand kinds. These, however, are not talents, which are inborn in their real nature.25

The clash between the ideas presented in Renwu zhi and the axioms of pre-medieval China stands particularly out if we recall Liu Shao’s definition of study as a method that does not penetrate the Way (bu ru dao 不入道). On the other side, the just mentioned Wang Fu preferred to insist that the dao flourishes in the study and hides itself in the books.26

If Wang Fu’s words portray the official point of view under the Han, a stronger materialistic interpretation of human nature must have played a significant role as well. This is easily provable through the reading of some sections of the Lunheng. Here, in speculating as to why some succeed in raising their ethical stature, while others remain slaves of their desires and ambitions all their lives, Wang Chong 王充 (27–97 AD) states that, when a man is born, he receives a certain quantity of qi, which encompasses the qi of the Five Phases. Since the quantity of this vital fluid varies from person to person, it is appropriate to distinguish among three classes of people: the first is represented by the masses with an average quantity of qi; then, there are those endowed with less qi, who will be inclined to follow their bad instincts, whereas those lucky people with a superior quantity of the heavenly breath will excel over others, both ethically and politically.

As we see, Wang Chong’s opinion seems to reflect quite well the arguments of the Renwu zhi. Yet, the Later Han thinker, probably afraid of the logical consequences of his theoretical assumptions, preferred to avoid a sharp distinction between bad and good human natures. In his opinion, the basic endowment of the gentlemen and of the common people is similar to the five cereals: each of them has its own function in spite of their identical substance. This makes the human beings members of the same category (bi 類); consequently, their results and accomplishments will stand out only through the process of maturity and education.27
The theoretical definition of men as an unchangeable structure worked as \textit{conditio sine qua non} for the elaboration of a theory of knowledge.

Since [a human being] is provided with a form and a substance, it is possible to delimitate his [features] and to look for them.\(28\)

苟有形質，猶可即而求之。

The significant excerpt above seals the passage from the first sphere of analysis to the successive phase: after having clarified his understanding of human being, Liu Shao now turns towards the difficulties of the process of knowledge. Actually, the arduousness of knowing others had been accepted in China at least from the drafting of the \textit{Shujing} onwards. Moreover, as in the case of the medieval thinker, the earlier intellectuals saw in the theoretical definition of \textit{ren} a springboard for the development of a theory, which could illustrate and explain the complex mechanisms triggered off by people who try to comprehend each other.\(29\) The strategy, which found a wide assent among the scholars, was undoubtedly the definition of knowledge as a process in which the knower approaches and understands the man in front of him by means of analogy with himself. In this regard, the \textit{Lüshi Chunqiu} offers a very clear account:

The ancient rulers took the human being as starting point for the formulation of the law. Yet, they were men as well! Therefore, the analysis of the self will conduct to know others and the analysis of the present will lead to understand the antiquity. At the end, past and present form a unity and the others are the same than I am.\(30\)

先王之所以為法者，人也。 而已亦人也。 故察已則可以知人， 察今則可以知古， 古今一也人與我同耳。

The confidence in the possibility of extending the knowledge of one’s self up to embrace all mankind was a direct consequence of the hypothesized similarity among human beings. This point was even strengthened under the Han, both by the sustainers of the cosmic paradigm and by more sceptical intellects. The scholars who worked at the drafting of the \textit{Huainanzi}， for instance, strongly defended the analogical character of knowledge, called in the text “know the differences from the affinities” (\textit{you jin zhi yuan} 由近知遠).\(31\) More than a century later, Wang Chong reinforced the ancient theory by stating explicitly that knowledge may be obtained exclusively among members of the same species.

Human beings share basic nature and kind. Beasts and human beings are provided with a different basic nature. How would it be possible to know them? Men cannot know beasts and beasts cannot know men as well. These two species cannot obtain a mutual knowledge."\(32\)

人同性類[...]鳥獸與人異性，何能知之？人不能知鳥獸亦不能知人，兩不能相知。

\(28\) Renwu zhi 1:2; Shryock (footnote 1), page 96.
\(29\) On the difficulty of knowing men, see: also Da Dai liji 6.2:37 (Da Dai liji zhuzi suoyin. The ICS Ancient Chinese Texts Concordances Series. Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1996).
\(32\) Lunheng 51:229. Wang Chong also maintains that it is possible to understand the past by analogy with the present. In this regard, see: \textit{Lunheng} 56:248-251.
If we try to judge the classic theory from Liu Shao’s perspective, we may first emphasize its theoretical inadequacy, as it evidently does not fit the assumptions of the Renwu zhi: if Wang Chong reputed necessary to exclude the possibility of mutual knowledge among members of different classes, the medieval thinker simply recalls that differences in category do indeed exist among human beings as well. A second problematic issue involves a methodological perspective.

Liu Shao’s strategy for an effective knowledge of human beings was conceived as an analytical process marked by a strong empirical approach. Essentially, it is possible to distinguish two main phases. First, Liu Shao highlights the importance of observation (guan 觀), through which the subject of knowledge approaches its object. This first stage is then followed by a reflective moment, as the results of the observational phase need to be elaborated and systematised. Liu Shao indicates this second phase by using the key word ming 名. As Shryock has argued, ming plays a basic role in the intellectual structure of the medieval text and should be understood in its meaning of “classify”. During this classificatory moment, thus, the knower expresses his judgement about the man in front of him. In this context, however, the word “judgement” does not exclusively involve a generic opinion since it mainly regards evaluation and estimation of the inner structure of an individual.33

For the purposes of this paper, we shall narrow the discussion on Liu Shao’s strategy by focusing the attention on the treatment of the observational moment. In discussing the role of observation, Liu Shao does not miss to emphasize the importance of the standpoint from which the observer approaches his target. From this perspective, it is useful to dwell on Liu Shao’s methodological manifesto.

The eight fields of observation: the first is to observe what a man grasps and what he leaves in order to clear up (his inner) mixture. The second is to observe a man under emotional reactions in order to analyse his firm points. The third is to observe his intentions in order to know how he (should) be classified. The fourth is to observe his starting point in order to distinguish to what he could be similar. The fifth is to observe what a man loves and respects in order to know what he can overcome and from what he can be stopped; the sixth is to observe the nucleus of his feelings in order to distinguish his devotion and his doubts; the seventh is to observe what he lacks of in order to grasp his gifts. The eighth is to observe his wisdom in order to know what he can reach.34

What Liu Shao is trying to illustrate here is the necessity to carry on an analysis based on the observation of the whole life of an individual: the examination of what a man undertakes and what a man does constitute the first step for grasping the most evident features of human characters. Yet, the scrutiny of action cannot be regarded as sufficient for the formulation of a comprehensive judgement as emotional impulses and dialectical exchange are basic factors as well. In this way, a man who wishes to understand others is very attentive in analysing their emotional reactions. These, in turn, should be carefully checked through the examination of discussion. In particular, there is a point where Liu Shao emphasizes the importance of speaking with the man whom we are trying to know.

Then, the examination of words means to distinguish between the beauty and ugliness of sounds. The analysis of replies is tantamount to look for capabilities and inabilities of the wisdom. There-

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33 For an analysis of the classificatory moment, see: Shryock (footnote 1), page 34.
fore, the examination of words and the analysis of replies are enough to allow (men) to know each other.35

夫觀其辭旨，猶聽音之善丑；察其應贊，猶視智之能否也。故觀辭察應，足以互相別識。

The importance of discussion is repeatedly stressed in the pages of the Renwu zhi. Liu Shao, in fact, nurtured the conviction that dialectic exchange may reveal a large part of human characteristics: an ideal sovereign, for instance, would be able to decipher the features of a man after three days of discussion.36

As for the feelings, they constitute an extremely effective weapon, in so far the knower uses them to comprehend the man in front of him. On the other side, they may represent an insurmountable obstacle if the observer let them get the upper hand during the operation of judgement. This point, in turn, introduces a further important issue since, by now, it still remains to clear up which factors are to be regarded as potentially misleading for a full comprehension of human beings. First, if it is carried on in a discretionary way, the observational phase risks to seriously compromise the process of knowing. In particular, the analysis of single fields as well as an examination lacking in well-established criteria are dangers that should be absolutely avoided. The partiality of collected data, in fact, could lead the observer to ignore or to put aside elements, which are of fundamental importance for his analysis. Hence, it is necessary to establish criteria (度) whose validity should be atemporal and objective. From this standpoint, the analogical model of knowledge reveals its methodological incongruities:

Now, at the beginning, human beings are extremely difficult to know […]. Each man reputes himself able to know others: in the analysis of others, one takes himself as criterion and believes that thereby the men are knowable. If we observe someone absorbed in the analysis of other men, (we see that) he does not reach the acquaintance. […] One may be able to discern the positive sides of the same kind but sometimes he will miss the (natural) gifts of different sort.37

夫人初甚難知，[…]皆自以為知人，故以己觀人則以為可知也。觀人之察人則以為不識也。[…]能識同體之善，而或失異量之美。

Thus, in Liu Shao’s opinion, the analogical understanding of knowledge completely lacks objectivity. To take oneself as first criterion of judgement means to renounce to commonly shared principles. As a result, the knower will constantly misunderstand qualities and features of the man in front of him.38

Yet, there is a point where the analytical strategy and the analogical model seem to meet. Liu Shao’s emphasis on direct experience has to be regarded as a direct inheritance of the past. In fact, the condemnation of data gathered through secondary sources echoes what Wang Chong called “the supremacy of seeing over hearing (闻不如見)” 39:

35 Renwu zhi 9:117; Shryock, op. cit., page 132. Liu Shao even lists the most important features of a discussion in order to interpret them as revealing signs of human temperaments. Shryock has arranged these characteristics in tabular form. See: Shryock, op. cit., page 83.

36 Renwu zhi 7:99; Shryock, op. cit., page 126.

37 Renwu zhi 7:95; Shryock (footnote 1), page 124.

38 In this regard, Liu Shao offers several examples to elucidate his point of view. We can consider, for instance, the case of a man with a broad talent for the formulation of laws (法制之人): he will take his own gift for differentiation and analysis (分術) as a main criterion of observation. Consequently, he will reckon all the people with an unambiguous personality, by missing, at the same time, the changes, which take place in the surrounding world. See: Renwu zhi 7:95; Shryock, op. cit., page 125.

39 Lunheng 83:359. In regard to the discussion of this topic in pre-imperial China, see: Roetz (footnote 30), pp. 21-23.
Therefore those able to know men use what they see in order to correct what they have heard. And those unable to know others let their ears win over their eyes.40
是故知人者，以目正耳，不知人者，以耳败目。

The discussion of theoretical assumptions and methodology has shown two important factors. First, in proposing a monograph on the art of knowing others, Liu Shao was surely unearthing a theme, which had formerly been treated in several occasions. Nevertheless, the philosopher has exhibited a remarkable intellectual independence from the dogmas of Chinese tradition. Thus, the second aspect emerging from the analysis above deals exactly with the originality of the text, both from a theoretical and methodological perspective. At this point it is legitimate to wonder about the reasons which led Liu Shao first to propose a renewed concept of human being and then to sketch a methodology whose different phases had been defined and justified. In formulating an answer to this question, it is possible to suppose that Liu Shao was simply systematising the inheritance of the past. This hypothesis, in turn, would lead to consider the Renwu zhi as an original elaboration of a theme that, as late as the third century AD, was still waiting for an organic treatment. In this perspective, it seems appropriate to speak about an intellectual need of Chinese cultural world at the eve of the third century AD. This argument, however, is not strong enough to explain the hidden reasons that pushed Liu Shao to investigate the process of knowing among human beings and to deviate from the clear indications he had found in earlier sources.

Liu Shao’s desire to clear up how men approach and know each other reflects a precise historical perspective. In order to elucidate what is meant by historical perspective, it is necessary to turn the attention at the question of functionality. This new sphere of analysis, both on its individual and social level, is well testified in Chinese sources from the very beginning onwards. In the Shuying, for instance, the knowledge of human beings was taken as pointer of wisdom and, at the same time, as main feature of the government of emperor Yao. In this way, a man able to know others was called sage, whereas the figure of an ideal ruler was characterized through his ability to reckon and to engage the worthies in the government.41 Apart from these few general hints, however, the classic is quite sparing with details on the relationship between the private and public sphere. The task to enlighten the several facets of this complex problem was carried on in the following centuries when the knowledge of human beings came to be explicitly conceived as one of the traits, which characterized the ethical growth of an individual. Confucius, for instance, encouraged his disciples to shelve being ignored by others and to worry, rather, about the personal incapability to know men.42 Moreover, in pairing the comprehension of others with the understanding of the self, as to form two sides of a coin, the Confucian scholars of pre-imperial China also managed to bind the individual level of human mutual knowledge to its function within the social community. In this way, the concentration on the inner realm was to be regarded as a basic step for ethical growth: self-knowledge, self-respect, and self-love were all distinctive traits of a junzi. The importance of the individual level did not necessarily involve a sharp separation from the outside: Confucius, in fact, dispelled the temptation to withdraw from the community in the famous passage on the surmounting of the self and the return to the world (keji fuli 克己復禮).43

The reverting to society marks the passage from the private sphere of human knowledge to its social dimension. If we look at the question from this perspective, it is necessary to recall that a

40 Renwu zhi 10:144; Shryock, op.cit., page 141.
42 Lunyu 1.16.2.
43 Lunyu 12.1.30. In regard to this passage, see: Roetz (footnote 22), page 258.
Confucian ruler was supposed to be able to mould his community in an ethical way, mainly in virtue of the successful cultivation of his inner realm. At this point, his capacity to know others may be fruitfully applied within the political sphere. When Xunzi was called to define the traits of an ideal sovereign, he highlighted that the dao 道 of a ruler is identifiable with the knowledge of others (zhu dao zhi ren 主道知人). It is exactly this particular ability that enables a sovereign to reckon worthies and sages and to appoint them as ministers in his government: these, in turn, will be in charge of practical political affairs (chen dao zhi shi 臣道知事).44

The advent of Han cosmic paradigm shifted the emphasis on the importance of knowing natural processes. Even if knowledge of others remained one of the features of an ideal ruler, the comprehension of tian 度 came to be the precondition for an effective perception of human qualities and characteristics. Therefore, Han scholars emphasized the importance of a multi-layered knowledge, which is based on the need to know natural processes as well as on the necessity to comprehend the importance of human action. The Hanshi waizhuan 韓詩外傳, for example, states:

Above, he knows heaven, for being able to take advantage from its rhythm; below, he knows earth, for gaining profit from its resources; in the middle, he knows men, for managing to pacify them: this man is surely a wise.45

In a more political perspective, the ideological paradigm demanded from Han scholars to go beyond the ethical viewpoint. In this regard, the ruler became a trait d’union, which could unify the whole cosmos, both in its temporal and spatial dimensions. As proof of the new understanding of the sovereign, it is interesting to dwell on the ways Ban Gu 班固 (32–92) explained the reasons, which had led to the success of the Liu 刘 clan at the end of the third century BC. First, the Han historian hinted at the historical necessity: the Han were in fact regarded as the legitimate heirs of the great emperor Yao. Then, as proof of Liu Bang’s 刘邦 unicity, Ban Gu evokes the singularity of his exterior aspect and the fact that heaven had conceded its mandate through numerous proofs. Finally, he recalled the intellectual and moral virtues of the emperor and his capacities to reckon and appoint worthies.47

Before directing the attention to how Liu Shao solved the problem of functionality, there is a further issue that needs some remarks. It is, in fact, interesting to wonder whether the scholars of pre-medieval China did specify the characteristics of those in charge of governmental matters. In other words, what did Xunzi understand under the word “minister”? In order to attempt an answer


46 Huainanzi 18:199. In Chunqiu fanlu 17.3:82 it is also said that an ideal ruler has no other possibility than knowing heaven. The emphasis put on the knowledge of tian was later violently attacked in the pages of the Lunheng, where Wang Chong accused his contemporaries to try to understand heaven simply by means of analogy with human beings (tui ren yi zhi tian 推人以知天). In this regard, see: Lunheng 23:88.

47 Hanshu 100A:4211 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1972).
to this delicate question, it may be helpful to investigate the image Liu Shao’s intellectual forefathers had of bureaucracy. In an ideal Confucian community, ministers were undoubtedly junzi or, in other words, men of remarkable ethical stature. Thus, they fitted the ideal of great ministers (dachen 大臣) and served the prince by following the Way and by withdrawing when the ruler betrayed their ethical values. In conclusion, they were not comparable to instruments (junzi bu qi 君子不器). At this point, it is reasonable to ask whether Confucius and his followers conceived the existence of an alternative sort of ministers. Once, asked whether Zilu 子路 and Ranyou 冉有 could be regarded as true ministers, Confucius resolutely denied and called them juchen 具臣: unlike the officials who deserved to be called dachen, they would have withdrawn from the court only in circumstances of extreme gravity, as, for instance, patricide. What does juchen mean? Kong Anguo 孔安國 explained the term by hinting at the practical methods of ministers (chen shu 臣數). The definition of juchen may also involve the positive form of Lunyu 2.12: Zilu and Ranyou were instruments (qi), apt to perform specific tasks but unfit for being great ministers. A confirmation of this hypothesis is traceable in the Xunzi, where it is said that there are people versed in the Way and there are those versed in specific fields (wu 物). A few centuries later, even Wang Chong regarded as necessary to highlight this aspect. In the first chapter of his work, the later Han thinker maintained that the appointment of great ministers is feasible only under a ruler of remarkable ethical stature. On the other side, mediocre rulers will employ technicians (juchen) and will exchange them for true ministers (dachen); under such sovereigns sages and worthies are rejected simply because the ideals they represent are by far out of reach.

The difference between great ministers and common officials may help the reader to understand why Liu Shao put a great emphasis on the art of knowing others. First of all, it is appropriate to highlight Liu Shao’s ambiguity in accepting the knowledge of men as occasion for an individual growth. In this regard, it is advantageous to recall that Liu Shao conceived the human being primarily in structural terms, with the consequence that virtues came to be regarded as phases in the development of a precise structural element. In this way, for instance, it will be up to the agent wood deposited within his body if a man will develop the virtue of humaneness.

The materialistic interpretation of ethics had had a two-fold argumentative advantage. First, it surely enabled Liu Shao to defend the feasibility of grasping human temperaments and, secondly, it allowed the use of this postulated achievability as a springboard to approach the social function of this kind of knowledge. Finally, the comprehension of human structure authorized the knower to classify classes and kinds of people. Consequently, Liu Shao devoted entire chapters to the punctual analysis of human features and, still more important, of their possible utiliza-

\[\text{Lunyu } 11.24:28;\text{ Lunyu } 2.12:3.\] Perhaps, the aptest examples of such kind of ministers were the officials of king Zhou 紂, the last ruler of the Shang 商. As recalled in the Lunyu, the viscount of Wei 維 withdrew from the court; the viscount of Qi 箕 became a slave; Bigan 比干 remonstrated with the sovereign and died. See: \[\text{Lunyu } 18.1:51.\]

\[\text{Lunyu } 11.24:28.\]

\[\text{Shiji } 67:2193 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1972).\]

\[\text{Xunzi } 21:105.\]


\[\text{Renwu zhi } 1:5-7.\] Even if the figure of the sage with his superior ethical stature is a recurring topos in the medieval text, yet the discussion on moral virtues appears to be characterized by a certain mannerism. Therefore, it seems appropriate to accept Shryock’s point of view and to define the text as “a highly moral book, though in no sense a book on morals”. See: Shryock (footnote 1), pp. 97-98.
tion within the governmental apparatus. In particular, there is a point where the medieval philosopher seems to reproduce Xunzi’s argument:

In general, the twelve categories of abilities correspond to the bureaucratic posts. The virtue of an ideal sovereign is not counted among them: it is luminous, well balanced and it summarizes all possible talents. Yet (this ruler) will not take the care of political affairs upon himself. Therefore, when the Way of an ideal sovereign is set up, each of the twelve talents will get its (appropriate) post.54

凡此十二材，皆人臣之任也，主德不預焉。主德者，聰明平淡，總達眾材，而不以事自任者也。是故主道立，則十二材各得其任也。

The line of reasoning expressed above coincides perfectly with Xunzi’s argument on the incompatibility between sovereign and practical affairs as well as on the need to concentrate the management of the state into the hands of a bureaucratic stratum. At this point, the question, which needs to be faced, is what Liu Shao understood under “bureaucratic stratum”. Are we in front of great ministers or are we in front of Wang Chong’s technicians? The excerpt above may help to formulate a first hypothesis. The hint at twelve classes of human talents and the short remark on the need to assign an official post to a specific person with a specific talent echoes those disciples whom Confucius once defined as juchen. The following two passages shall work as definitive proofs.

1. Then, the capabilities emerge from the talents and talents do not weigh the same. Therefore, if talents and capabilities diverge from the beginning, appointments and policies (should be) dissimilar as well.55

夫能出于材，才不 同量。材能既殊，任政亦異。

2. Generally, men of one-sided affairs (express) the beauty of a taste. Therefore, they are suitable for holding a position but inadequate for (governing) the whole country. As for the reasons (behind this fact), a man who holds a (specific) position will assist the five tastes with his own taste, whereas a man in charge of a whole country will harmonize the five tastes with his being tasteless.56

凡偏材之人，皆一味之美，故長於為一官，而短於為一國。何者，夫一官之任，以一味協五味；一國之政，以無味和五味。

Both excerpts above suggest that Liu Shao shared Xunzi’s opinion on the existence of men versed in the dao in contraposition to those individuals versed in particular fields. However, the medieval thinker regarded the ethical perspective of his intellectual forefathers, and in particular the emphasis on true ministers, as inadequate for solving the problem. The individuation and the appointment of men whose main feature was their outstanding ethical stature was, in Liu Shao’s opinion, a misdirected answer to the complexities of imperial apparatus. First, human talents should fit the dimensions of the region under control: a state needs a man with superior abilities, whereas a less capable man is sufficient to administrate a territory of hundred li.57 Moreover, the allocation of single governmental responsibilities was to be carried out on the basis of a clear distinction of human talents: a man whose most evident gift is a certain predisposition to rhetoric should be employed in the diplomatic field, whereas the one who embodies the capacity to set up laws and institutions should hold the post at the department of justice.58

54 Renwu zhi 3:43; Shryock, op.cit., page 110.
55 Renwu zhi 5:78; Shryock (footnote 1), page 118.
56 Renwu zhi 5:80-81; Shryock, op.cit., page 121.
57 Renwu zhi 5:75; Shryock, op.cit., page 119.
58 The correspondences between human talents and official posts are expounded in Renwu zhi 5:78-80. See: Shryock, op.cit., pp. 120-121.
At this point, it could be inferred that Liu Shao’s argumentation was an attempt to solve a political problem: if this is the case, his short treatise should be regarded as an answer to a precise historical need. A glance back in time shall corroborate this hypothesis. In fact, the complexity of finding an adequate definition of bureaucratic stratum had been stressed several times in the past.59 The consciousness that imperial institutions were by far more complex than in the antiquity pushed the Han scholars to reflect on characteristics and potentialities of the bureaucratic stratum. In this way, for instance, they accepted Shen Buhai’s 申不害 (d. 337 BC) assumption that a complex state can work only with a capable and powerful bureaucracy. During the Later Han, the importance of this issue remarkably grew. In the second century AD, the famous astronomer Zhang Heng 張衡 (78–139) addressed a memorial to the throne where he maintained that:

Zengzi excelled in filial piety […]. With regard to culture, he did not reach the level of (Zi)you or of (Zi)xia and, as for governmental affairs, he could not stand the comparison with Ran(you) or with Ji(lu). Today, we aim to appoint a man who gathers (all capabilities). These (capabilities) may appear outside but they must be incomplete inside.60

The art of knowing others: The Renwu zhi and its cultural background

59 As early as the first century BC, for instance, He Wu 何武, an official who served at the court of emperor 成 (r. 32–6 BC), hinted at the necessity to review the whole administrative apparatus by suggesting that a servile imitation of the antiquity was not enough to solve the complex problems of the contemporary age. In this regard, see: Hanshu 83:3404. He Wu’s position has been discussed in: van Ess, Hans: Politik und Gelehrsamkeit in der Zeit der Han – Die Alttext/Neutext-Kontroverse. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1993, page 248.

60 Hou Hanji 18.513 (Hou Hanji jiaozhu. Tianjin: Guji chubanshe, 1987). For Zhang Heng’s memorial and for the discussion on bureaucracy during the Later Han dynasty, see: van Ess, op. cit., pp. 95-101.


62 The dynastic histories let assume that the ideological strategies pursued from the end of the Later Han dynasty onwards reproduced quite loyally the climate of the civil war of two centuries earlier. Among the contenders who aspired to the Chinese throne in the third century AD, Cao Cao and his entourage constitutes undoubtedly the circle where
period that, both from a historical and intellectual perspective, was remarkably different from the decades straddled between the first century BC and the first century AD. Liu Shao’s behaviour at the court may serve as an example: questioned on the proper ritual conduct in case of an eclipse of the sun, the scholar preferred to hint at the necessities to carry on the ceremonies without much regard to the meaning of this calamitous sign. Liu Shao’s unwillingness to side with the (re-) proponents of the Han cosmic paradigm. In any case, the medieval thinker was allowed to freely express his opinion: this fact should highlight the substantial differences between the Wei court and the circles which organized Wang Mang’s propaganda machine. In this way the author of the Renwu zhi should be taken as symbol of an intellectual community, which tried to consider the historical tumults by adopting a pure political approach. His professional experiences at the Wei court may provide the reader with an additional proof. Around the middle of the third century AD, in fact, he was commanded to draw regulations for the examination of officials: with all probabilities, this involvement played a very significant role for the drafting of the Renwu zhi.

Liu Shao was evidently picking up the inheritance of the Han, when the recruitment of capable officials became a basic question. In this way, through the emphasis on the social function of knowledge among men, the Renwu zhi comes to be a reflection on human characters, where the ethical and naturalistic perspectives gave way to the strong call for specialisation of politics and for the development of administrative science: as Liu Shao once said, the discussion on human talents cannot be carried on exclusively in the light of their being great or small since the analysis must necessarily involve their proper dislocation within the bureaucratic apparatus.

63 Sanguo zhi 21:617; Shryock (footnote 1), page 21. 64 Wang’s ability in preparing his accession to the throne in 9 AD is renewed. Methods and strategies in the ideological justification of the grounding of a new dynasty are well described in Hanshu 99 and can be summarised in the following main points: theoretically, he claimed to rule by the force of the earth-yellow, which had inherited the power over China from the fire-red of the Han. His argument was provided also with a genealogy which saw him as direct descendant of Huangdi 黄帝. Factually, Wang Mang studded his path to the Chinese throne with fictitious omens and regalia, all presented as definitive proofs of the heavenly favour. For his carefully prepared advent to the throne, see: Twitcher and Loewe (footnote 61), pp. 223-240; see also: Loewe, Michael, “Water, Earth and Fire – the Symbols of the Han Dynasty”, in Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur und Völkerkunde Ostasiens 125 (1979). In regard to the development of ideological strategies under the Former Han, see: Loewe, Michael, Divination, Mythology, and Monarchy in Han China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 65 Renwu zhi 5:76; Shryock, op.cit., page119.