Were the Ming against the Mongols' settling in North China?

Von Henry Serruys
(Washington D. C.)

One the most interesting phenomena of the Ming period is the presence in China Proper of large numbers of foreigners. In another study I have tried to show that besides the many prisoners from the wars against the Yuan dynasty, the Ming, especially during the first hundred years, witnessed a steady flow of immigrants from northern tribal peoples, more in particular from the Mongols. As I have tried to prove with many texts from the Ming Shih-lu, between the rise of the Ming in 1368 and the end of the 14th century, Mongols in the Ming service, mostly in the army, were scattered all over China. We find them in the northern provinces and along the Sino-Mongol borders as well as around Nanking, and in the deep south. During the Hung-wu period (1368-1398), there is not the slightest evidence that for security reasons the Mongols were systematically kept away from the northern borders. After the Hung-wu period also, although Mongols are gradually mentioned less and less frequently, there is still enough evidence to convince us that Mongols in the Ming service continued to be employed both in southern and northern garrisons. Mongols (and other aliens) were particularly numerous in Kansu. They are also frequently referred to with regard to such northern provinces as Shansi, Shensi, Hopei, and Shantung.

Since all our material comes from the Shih-lu, the picture of the Mongols in China will necessarily remain very incomplete, and in certain aspects frankly schematic; the Shih-lu, indeed, were not compiled with a view to assembling information on foreigners in China. The Chinese bureaucrats entrusted with the compilation of the Shih-lu were never too much interested in those foreigners, no matter how useful they were at times. Nevertheless, the information contained in the Veritable Records gives us a fair idea of the situation of the Mongols and other foreigners in China during the Ming.

Although during the Hung-wu period, the Mongols were never kept away from the northern borders or from the neighborhood of foreign tribes as a matter of policy, yet the question of the status of foreigners

was discussed on one or two occasions, and the emperor Ming T'ai-tsu made his opinion regarding the matter absolutely clear to governmental officers. In the Ming Shih-lu, on the date of December 21, 1370², we read this interesting passage:

"Officials of the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng[1]) said: 'the caitiffs (lu[2]) of the northwest who come to allegiance should not be established on the borders, for the disposition of the I and the Ti (i.e. the barbarians) is unstable. They come to allegiance only when they find themselves in dire straits, powerless, and without other alternatives; then we settle them and nourish them in leisure. It is unavoidable that they should look forward for an opportunity, and it is to be feared that one day, should they rebel, the border districts will be unable to control them. We should move them [deeper] inland, in order to forestall trouble. To which the emperor answered: 'In governing the caitiff-barbarians we must follow their natural inclinations. Where the barbarians live they are used to bitter cold; now if we move them inland, we must necessarily drive them southward away from the cold and nearer the heat. If we act against their natural inclinations they may on the contrary easily turn to rebellion. It will be best to soothe them while going along [with their natural likes and dislikes]. If they come to allegiance, pick out in the very border regions [an area with abundant] water and grass [suitable for] animal husbandry. If they can follow³ their nature they will naturally remain at peace'."⁴

² Hung-wu shih-lu 59.1ab; Haneda Tōru, Mindai Mammō shiryō, Minjitsuroku-shō, Mōko hen 1. 59. See also W. Fuchs, Mongolen in Mittel- und Süßchina um 1388, in OE 2 (1955), 179—180.
³ The Nanking edition (1940) reads chiu[3]; Haneda, Loc. cit., has sui[4].
⁴ For an instance of how Mongols objected to the climate of Central and South China see H. Franke, Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft. Das Shan-kū sin-hua des Yang Yū (Wiesbaden 1956), p. 82, § 67, Die Querulanten. Also in the Cho-keng-ju 2.16 a. In 1466 (Ch'eng-hua shih-lu 29.3 b—4 a; Tamura Jitsuzō, Mindai Mammō shiryō, Mōko hen 4.47—49) a certain Li K'an[5], a secretary of the Censorate and Inspector of Shansi, in a memorial to the throne made some considerations on the hardships of life on the northern frontier and the inadvisability of stationing southerners there and of sending northern troops to garrison southern cities. Li K'an, of course, is speaking of Chinese, yet his ideas are comparable to Ming T'ai-tsu's statement about the difference in climate and nature between Mongolia and South China. Li K'an quotes a few sentences from a long memorial by an official of the Tang dynasty, Lu Chih[6] (he has a long biographical notice in the Chiu T'ang-shu 139, and in the Hsin T'ang-shu 157, where the text quoted in the Ch'eng-hua shih-lu will be found on pages 139.12 a and 157.11 a, respectively. In the Hsin-T'ang-shu this memorial is in a somewhat abridged form): "The extreme frontier is a stretch of a thousand li of desert land, where the cold wind (instead of feng "wind" the Chiu T'ang-shu reads lei "to fly") cracks the skin and stirs up the sand which stings the eyes. If the land is poor,
Four years later, on May 5, 1374\(^5\), the emperor made another important statement with regard to the Mongols. The relevant text of the Shih-lu reads as follows:

"Officials of the former Yüan captured by the high-commandery (tu-wei\(^6\)) of Yen-shan\(^7\) and people who had come to surrender were escorted to the capital, but on the way some escaped. By rescript the emperor sent instructions to the border generals: 'as the fortune of the Yüan has come to an end and the Mandate of Heaven has devolved upon our China, their (i. e. the Yüan) remnants are also our subjects. Now after these have come to allegiance, all of a sudden they have again fled away, because they have lived under the Yüan\(^7\) for many years while we have only recently attempted to comfort them, thereby causing them to go away. From now on if there are who come to allegiance, you will carefully soothe them and pacify them. If some

the people work hard; this is especially true in this case. Unless (in both the Chiu T'ang-shu and the Ming Shih-lu this sentence begins with the characters tzu-fei\(^1\) . . . ; the Hsin T'ang-shu does not have char. tzu) one is a native of the country and is familiar with its customs; unless one has observed it from boyhood and, grown-up, has found peace there, one will hardly become reconciled to this abode and become intimate with the enemy." Then with regard to his own time Li K'an goes on to say: "To speak of present conditions, in the territories along the northwestern border, one meets the enemy everywhere. This is what is meant by the expression 'if the land is poor, the people work hard, and this is especially true in this case': in frontier posts of Ta-t'ung, Hsüan-fu, and in border towns there are native soldiers (t'u-ping) of the northwest who are not afraid that the icy wind may crack their skin or that flying sands may sting their eyes. At the approach of the thieves (i. e. raiding Mongols) they form ranks without fear, and knowing [the quality of] the native soldiers the caitiffs are afraid and avoid them. It is to this that refer the words 'only one born in this country and familiar with its customs will be intimate with the enemy'. But now southerners who come to fill the ranks of the northwestern army fear the wind and the cold and are afraid of the caitiff-robbers, and only desire to flee, while northerners who are sent to fill the ranks of the southern army cannot bear [the idea of finding themselves in] a far-away country, and not acquainted with the climate, also flee back. Neither one of these two procedures is practical. Now we desire that the natives of Shansi scheduled to fill the ranks of the southern garrisons be ordered to fill the ranks of the Shansi frontier garrisons; and the natives of the south scheduled to fill the ranks of the troops in Shansi garrisons be sent to fill the garrisons of the south. The result will be that [the people of] both areas will profit and will feel happy. This way there will only be natives serving in the northwest and there will no longer be any reason to worry about the caitiff-robbers."

Li K'an has a biographical notice in the Ming-shih 159.12-14\(^a\), where a summary is given of his memorial. Li K'an, however, was a little too optimistic in his opinion of the capabilities of native northerners to halt Mongol invasions. The problem was not so much one of climate and geography as of poor organization of the border defenses and low morale of the troops. In Li K'an's days, however, the situation on the Mongol borders was not yet as bad as it was to become towards the end of the 16th century.

\(^5\) Hung-wu shih-lu 88.2a; Haneda, op. cit., p. 107; W. Fuchs, OE 2. 150.

\(^6\) This was the name of the garrisons of Pei-p'ing, the present Peking.

\(^7\) Or: "... in Mongolia?"
desire to go to [the border regions] and settle there, you will select suitable places to establish them there and make their cattle-raising easy. If some desire to come to the capital, select reliable persons to escort them and do not cause them to feel frustrated."

One other text showing that Ming T'ai-tsu believed that it would be possible to control the surrendered Mongols in the border areas and to make Chinese out of them is from March 15, 1378. It is an important statement concerning the Mongols in China in general and those in the Ping-liang area, Kansu, in particular:

"Human nature is always able to practice virtue, and to reform the barbarians [through adoption of Chinese ways] in the teaching of the Ancients. Now these former Yuan officials who have been captured and those who have surrendered should be moved inland and should be made to submit to the teachings of our Chinese Sages, and gradually be polished through Rites and Etiquette in order to reform their old customs."

As a result of this decree, a group of newly surrendered Mongols was established near Ping-liang and the people were granted an allowance of grain in order to meet their needs.

A few exceptions apart, the large number of Mongols and other non-Chinese who served in the Ming armies in South China, especially under the Hung-wu and Yung-lo (1403-1422) emperors, had not been sent there for reasons of security. The fact that so many foreigners could serve in the north, as we have already explained, is proof enough that it was not felt necessary to send all non-Chinese to the south in order to keep them away from the northern borders. The three imperial declarations of 1370, 1374, and 1378, abundantly show that it never occurred to the emperor that the Mongols could not be trusted with the defense of North China. The third declaration of 1378, where the emperor orders to move the newly surrendered Mongols "inland" (nei-hsi) does not contradict the first two statements. Obviously, the emperor only meant to say that the Mongols were to be admitted into China Proper. Ping-liang where the Mongols were resettled in 1378 was to become a strong center of Mongol immigration in spite of the fact that it was only a short distance from the borders.

But neither should the emperor's declaration of 1374 be taken in too literal a sense. It is very unlikely that it was Ming T'ai-tsu's intention to leave it to the Mongols themselves to choose a place to settle in, or a garrison to join. It is true, we know very little, in most cases nothing at

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8 Hung-wu shih-lu 117.4b. This important text is not in Haneda's Moko hen 1.

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all, about the reasons why immigrant Mongols were assigned to a particular place, whether in the south or in the north. Certainly a wide variety of factors may have come into play. First, for example, the Mongols themselves. When surrendering some may have had relatives already established in China and possibly may have wished to join them. Then the local officials who had negotiated or accepted their surrender had to make a report to the throne and could make their own recommendations. Probably the number of people involved in any single case of surrender on the one hand, and on the other hand the need for fresh troops in a particular place had to be considered, too. Little though we know concerning those things, at least with regard to Kansu it is clear that almost all the Mongols and the other non-Chinese who surrendered and crossed into that province were allowed to settle and remain there. Mongols crossing into other provinces upon their arrival were sent to a large number of towns and areas.

Apart from such leaders and chieftains who expressed their desire to settle in Peking or sometimes in other towns (see below), as far as we can judge from the sources, it nowhere appears that the Mongols expressed their preference for any particular place, not even such preferences as suggested above.

Apparently the only thing the Mongols wanted was to get away from the poverty, the misery, the maladministration and civil wars of the post-Yüan years in Mongolia, and as far as this desire for peace was concerned, to them any place in China must have looked as good as any other one. In this connection we may point to somewhat similar conditions obtaining on the northern borders of Mongolia in the 17th and 18th centuries when a number of Mongols crossed into Siberia and put themselves under Russian jurisdiction in order to escape the wars and the political disturbances taking place in Outer Mongolia; or when the Turyüd decided to migrate to South Russia in the 17th century.

Ming T'ai-tsu then in spite of his declaration that it was not advisable to send the Mongols from the north to the south because they would be unable to stand the many discomforts of the southern climate, had numerous Mongols serving in his armies in the southern provinces. And this is not very surprising either. Even the Mongol emperors of the Yüan dynasty had Mongol and Central Asiatic soldiers in their southern armies. It seems that what Ming T'ai-tsu wanted to convey to his governmental

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officials, was that there was no need to make it a rule to send all non-Chinese from the north and the northwest to the south as a measure of security.

Yet in spite of these imperial declarations, during the Hung-wu period, and in fact throughout the Ming dynasty, there always was a group of officials inclined to distrust all foreigners. More than once the opinion was expressed that any Mongols, prisoners from the revolutionary wars prior to 1368, as well as prisoners and immigrants from the period after 1368, were totally unreliable elements, enemies, and potential traitors. According to many officials, both in the Central Government, first in Nanking and later in Peking, and in the provinces, the only way to cope with this "subversive" element was to send them all to the deep south, as far away from the Sino-Mongol borders as possible, where they would be unable to keep in touch with their fellow countrymen in Mongolia and lend them assistance in case of an invasion, or receive help from Mongolia should they rebel against the Ming dynasty. Ming T'ai-tsu's declaration of 1370, as we have seen, was occasioned by such a statement. The emperor in this respect seems to have been much more broadminded than many of his officials. He firmly believed that if treated justly and fairly, and given an opportunity to live decent lives, the Mongol soldiers would be perfectly reliable and would remain trustworthy even in regions close to the Sino-Mongol borders. His son and successor, the Yung-lo emperor, was of the same opinion, and later emperors, if they never expressed themselves so openly, seem to have held the same opinion, for they continued the policy inaugurated by Ming T'ai-tsu and followed by his son.

If later facts have proved that the emperors were right, this persistent suspicion of so many Chinese towards the Mongols or the Central Asiatics settled in China, is understandable too. Nobody could lightly forget that for several centuries the northern half of the country had been dominated by such foreign dynasties as Liao, Chin, and Hsi-Hsia, and for almost one hundred years the whole country had been under the domination of the Mongols, the very same race the Ming emperors were now employing in their armies, sometimes on the higher levels. Garrisons of many areas and towns comprised a sizable foreign element. Kansu here deserves another special mention. At the beginning of the Ming period, that part of China was rather thinly populated with Chinese. Besides the Chinese, there were large numbers of Mongols, Tibetans, and peoples of Turkish ancestry, and in addition to these, for more than a half century an uninterrupted stream of Mongols was to pour in. In Kansu the relative strength of the non-Chinese population was much higher than in any other province.

Judging from the facts related in the Ming Shih-lu, very few difficulties occurred between Chinese and foreigners. But whatever difficulty did occur involving foreigners was invariably labeled "rebellion" by the Chinese bureaucracy and historians. Most cases, however, were rather harmless local affairs, and usually it was the Mongols who tried to protect themselves against injustice. Yet, as a rule, after such an outburst of
discontent, the "guilty" were exiled to the south, or, as a precautionary measure, a whole group of Mongols was ordered to migrate to the south. The Chinese thought that anyone who in any way had become involved in such an act of "rebellion" was bound to seek an alliance with the Mongols abroad and sooner or later would stir up new troubles.

In the following pages we shall review a number of just such exiles to the south mostly involving Mongols.\(^{10}\) We shall mention a few cases involving Central Asiatic peoples, apparently of Turkish origin, sent to the

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\(^{10}\) Occasionally northern Chinese, too, were exiled to the southern provinces. Most were people found guilty of communicating with the Mongols, or actual desertion in time of peace of war. See for example one case from 1515–1516. The Ming Shih-lu (Cheng-te shih-lu 121.3a; Tamura, Moko hen 5.396) relates how in 1515, a certain Li Yung\(^{11}\), an officer in the garrison of Ta-t'ung was exiled to Wu-ch'ang on the Yangtze. The reason, we are told, was that Li Yung's father, Li Huai\(^{12}\), defeated in an encounter with the Mongols, had surrendered to them, and, according to the Shih-lu, actually had gone into the service of the Mongols. What is more, the rumor had been spread that Li Huai was dead while in fact he was very much alive and inciting the enemy to violate the Chinese borders. He came to be known in the army as Monkey Li. The Board of War promised a reward to any one who would be able to capture him, and at the same time invited Li Huai to given himself up to the Chinese authorities. In the mean time, the son, Li Yung, served as a hostage in the hands of the government and was sent to Wu-ch'ang with his family. It was decided to wait three years and if within that period the father should fail to return, the son would be executed. Monkey Li, however, was in no hurry to surrender. In 1516, Monkey Li is mentioned again (Cheng-te shih-lu 140.1a-b; Tamura, ibid., p. 443). Li was continuing his cooperation with the Mongols and seems to have had considerable influence over them. As an attack was expected from the north, the border defenses were put on an emergency basis. Mongol spies had been captured disguised as Buddhist monks. Shortly afterwards, the Board of War asked to bring Li Yung back to the capital for trial and punishment, but the emperor refused (Cheng-te shih-lu 140.3b; Tamura, ibid., p. 444). I have been unable to discover what happened to him later.

"Malarious districts" — a term certainly indicating some regions of the south, are mentioned in 1532 as places of exile for such Chinese, both soldiers and common people, as privately carried on trade with the Mongols. Private trade was always strictly forbidden because of the danger of iron tools and weapons falling into the hands of the enemy. Crossing into Mongolia with the intention of stealing horses from the Mongols, was also punished with banishment to the deep south. The Board of Justice (hsing-pu) asked to apply to people guilty of those crimes the punishments prescribed by the law concerning "baiting leopards, catching deer, cutting trees, and digging up rats (or hamsters?)" (Chien-ching shih-lu 143.1b; Tamura, Moko hen 6.41).

Mongols traveling to and from the capital were not allowed to communicate with the people they met on the road. As weapons still kept falling into their hands, regulations became stricter all the time, and Chinese caught breaking the law were to be exiled to Hai-nan off the Kuantung coast with their families. The result, we are told, was that when Mongols came to the border markets held at appointed times and places to purchase whatever they needed in the way of clothes and food, the Chinese avoided all contact with them. See the Ching-t'ai shih-lu 64.6b (Ying-tsung 246); Tamura, Moko hen 3.513, 514 (1454).

In 1499, a number of officers were cashiered and exiled to Kiangsi to perform frontier guard duty. They had broken the regulations concerning private trade with the Mongols, sale of weapons, and iron tools in general. The same men were also charged with negligence in the defense of the borders against the Mongols. Hung-chih shih-lu 150.8a; Tamura, Moko hen 5.37–38.
south, whether for some crime or not, we do not always know, and some cases involving people from the northeast in present day Manchuria. Cases concerning Mongols settled in Peking present a somewhat different problem and must be dealt with separately.

We have few indications from the Hung-wu period regarding Mongols banished to the south for rebellious or comparable activities, although a few rebellions are recorded in the Shih-lu of that period. Probably the most prominent man to be exiled to the south was a Mongol imperial prince, known only under his title of Fourth Grand-prince (Ssu Ta-wang), who after the collapse of the Yüan dynasty had continued to resist the Ming armies in the mountains of the province of Shansi. All indications point to a considerable number of followers of the Fourth Grand-prince. Whether all were Mongols, it is difficult to say. At any rate, it was only in 1388 that he was finally compelled to surrender. The Ming emperor, taking into consideration the fact that the prince was a member of the imperial house of the Yüan, “pardoned” him, but exiled him to frontier guard duty in Yünnan.

Mongols who after their surrender for one reason or other decided to return to Mongolia, to all practical purposes became rebels. Sometimes, however, the theory was put forth that it was not necessary to try to prevent their flight. Such a form of rebellion occurred for example in 1403. On January 5, 1403, the commander-in-chief of the military district of Ning-hsia reported that some of the surrendered Mongols settled in his border area “were ready to rebel” and he asked permission to attack them. The emperor replied:

“The barbarian caitiffs are wily and full of tricks and one cannot trust them. It has been this way from ancient times. The policy of

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11 The Fourth Grand-prince is mentioned in the Hung-wu shih-lu 53.12b—13a (July, 1370); 62.5b; 96.2a; 106.5b; 121.1a; Haneda, Móko hen 1.48, 64, 119, 128, 140. His surrender is related in ch. 188.11b; Haneda, op. cit., p. 189. See also Fuchs, OE 2.187. We may also refer to a case from March, 1375 (Hung-wu shih-lu 67.6a), when twenty-four former Yüan subjects captured by Shansi soldiers were condemned to frontier guard duty on the island of Hai-nan. Although their leader had a Chinese name, there is no doubt that some of the men were Mongols. Unfortunately, we do not know how many. Numerous as the references to Mongols are in the Hung-wu shih-lu, questions of nationality and racial origin were not the primary concern of the compilers, and on many occasions no explicit mention is made of Mongols where we can reasonably expect that Mongols were involved. We may further mention the hundreds of officers from Nayacu’s people who were sent to the southern provinces in 1387. Admittedly this measure was intended to prevent those officers from exerting any more influence over Nayacu’s soldiers who were incorporated in the Ming army (Hung-wu shih-lu 245.1a—b; Haneda, Móko hen 1.181—182). The reader should bear in mind that Nayacu’s subjects brought back from the 1387 campaign numbered around 40,000 individuals, including men, women, and children.

12 Yung-jo shih-lu 15.6a—b; Haneda, op. cit., p. 268.

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the present Dynasty is to treat them with a sincere heart. During the 
Ch'\'un-ch\'iu period (722-481 B.C.) the principle for governing the bar-
barians was not to rebuke those who presented themselves and not
to pursue those who left. The reason for such a policy is that their
arrival brings us no advantage, and therefore their departure should
cause us no worry. Moreover, their congeners are numerous and they
have contracted marriages between each other. If now we attack the
rebels, those who have not rebelled will also become suspicious. For
the time being it will be better to let them go but take strict measures
of defense on the borders, build up our prestige and wait for a rift
[to develop between our enemies], and act according to the dictates
of Heaven. Should we act lightly and hurriedly, our regret would
be futile."

Six years later, in September, 1409,\(^{13}\) as some Mongol princes were
about to come over to China and then changed their minds, the emperor
substantially repeated the same ideas.

The first time the Yung-lo emperor ordered Mongols to be deported
to the south because of their rebellious attitude was on October 9, 1409.\(^{14}\)He issued orders to the commander-in-chief of Kansu not to distribute any
land to a number of Mongols only recently surrendered, but to send them
to the capital, whence they would be forwarded by stages to the south
and assigned to places suitable for the raising of livestock. Shortly after-
wards, twenty-seven chieftains reached the capital and were given Chinese
names.\(^{15}\) No mention is made of assignments to specific garrison towns but
it is certain that at least one of them was sent to Chi-yang\(^{16}\) in Shantung.
His name, indeed, re-appears in January, 1415.\(^{16}\) Probably he had died
recently for we are told there that his son was to succeed him as an officer
in the garrisons of Chi-yang. If one man from that group was sent to Shan-
tung, it becomes very probable that the other members, too, together
with their subjects, had been sent to Shantung or to one of the neighbor-
ing provinces. The reason for this measure, so exceptional for the Yung-
lo period, was that these men had hesitated too long before carrying out
their first declaration of intention to surrender. After first expressing
their desire to come over they had waited so long to take the decisive
step that the Ming thought they could never be trusted again. On the
other hand, as they had come over quite recently, their exile was not likely to
make other Mongols suspicious of the intentions of the Ming government.

\(^{13}\) Yung-lo shih-lu 65.8a; Haneda, op. cit., p. 354.
\(^{14}\) Yung-lo shih-lu 66.1b; Haneda, op. cit., p. 358.
\(^{15}\) Yung-lo shih-lu 66.12a; Haneda, op. cit., p. 363.
\(^{16}\) Yung-lo shih-lu 94.8a—b.
The emperor's statement of 1403 about the Mongols being free either to come or to go, is not to be taken too literally. The Ming were very anxious to have as many Mongols as possible come over and they did everything in their power to keep them within the empire. The Yung-lo emperor was no exception in this respect even if he, too, in state papers called the Mongols wily and unworthy of his trust. A group which for some reasons broke away from China was allowed to leave undisturbed only if their departure could not be prevented without causing grave discontent and suspicion among the other Mongol immigrants. This preoccupation to keep the confidence of the alien residents is voiced time and again, mostly with respect to the Mongols, of course, because they were more numerous and naturally they came to mind first. Later we shall notice the same preoccupation with regard to natives from Mao-lien territory in present day Manchuria.

The foreign population was particularly dense in the border region of Yung-ch'ang and Liang-chou in Kansu. They had settled there at the beginning of the Yung-lo period, but in 1410, a considerable part of these people rebelled. One particular passage of the Shih-ju tells us that the rebels numbered no less than ten-thousand individuals, women and children included. The cause of this sudden move were rumors that had been spread around that the Mongols were going to be transferred to other places, which had made them suspicious of ulterior motives of the Ming. The rebels first attacked their fellow country men who had remained loyal to the dynasty and refused to leave China; they also attacked Chinese towns, and gradually withdrew towards Mongolia. Routed by Chinese troops (assisted by loyal Mongols), the rebels surrendered in groups, but the region was not entirely pacified until 1413 when a group of some eight hundred Mongols were captured or surrendered and were exiled to Kuangtung province. — The relevant passage, under the date of February 20, 1413, reads as follows:

"The fu-ma tu-wei Sung Hu, marquis of Hsi-ning and commander-in-chief of Kansu, dispatched men to escort to the capital the rebel thieves Nu-ta-erh (? Nudar), Bayan and others, with their families. The Board of Justice (Hsing-pu) found them guilty of a crime punishable with death but the emperor took pity on their foolishness, and since they were not the ringleaders of the rebellion, he pardoned them all, but he exiled them to Lien-chou-wei in Kuangtung to perform military service. When they reached Kan-chou (Kiangsi), Bayan and others with over three-hundred of Nu [-dar]'s men revolted

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again and started to pillage the neighboring villages. As the authorities began to capture them, the rebels lost their way and entered the mountains of An-yüan \[22\] (south of Kan-chou). Suffering all the time from malaria and lack of food, they were almost to a man killed or wounded by the governmental troops. Those who without rebelling reached Lien-chou, Nudar and others, were over five-hundred men."

After the Yung-lo era, the Ming continued to send Mongols (and other non-Chinese) to the south while allowing also large numbers to settle in the northern provinces. The matter of the fact is that when Mongols in Central and South China are referred to in the records, hardly ever do we know how and why they had been sent there. We know very little beyond the fact that at a given time we find them already settled there. Exceptionally do we discover when a certain group of Mongols or other tribesmen had been sent to the south; but the reasons are very seldom indicated. For example, in 1436,18 a group of Hui-hui (Moslems) from the Kan-chou \[23\] and Liang-chou areas in Kansu was sent to the south of the Yangtze and scattered over several garrison towns. This particular order involved 436 households numbering 1749 individuals. Apparently, these people had come from Central Asia, but how long they had been in Kansu before it was decided to attach them to garrisons towns south of the Yangtze, is not indicated. However, there is no reason to suppose that this was a punitive measure against them. As has already been explained, not all foreigners crossing into China from the northern and northwestern territories could possibly have remained in the north. First there were far too many of them, and secondly to leave all foreigners concentrated in one area would have made impossible or at least very difficult and would have significantly retarded their sinicization which was the avowed purpose of the Ming. And to prevent or retard their assimilation by the Chinese population would perpetuate their condition of a foreign body within the empire and in the long run would induce them to undertake dangerous adventures.

In 1437,19 after the western borders had been repeatedly violated by Mongols under one Atai and another chieftain name Dorjibeg, the emperor entrusted the reorganization of the Kansu borders to the President of the Board of War (Ping-pu), Wang Chi \[24\].20 He was about to leave on this special assignment, when the emperor sent him a rescript containing among other things the following instructions:

"Military matters must be handled with extreme care. If ten-thousand men should draw up plans, but one should leak them out, defeat would

\[18\] Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 18.8b—9a; Not in Tamura's excerpts.
\[19\] Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 30.1a—2a; Tamura, Möko hen 2.462.
\[20\] Biographical notice in the Ming-shih 171.1a—6b.
ensue. In Shensi there are many barbarians living intermingled with the [Chinese] soldiers, and [among them] there are many traitors who maintain relations [with the enemy abroad] and leak out information [to them]. Therefore the strong and weak points of our border defenses and every movement [of our troops] are known to the thieves (i.e. the Mongols abroad), who are thus able to come and go in every direction. You will meet [with the local military authorities] and deliberate [on the situation]: such resident Tatars, Hsi-Fan\textsuperscript{[25]} (Tibetans?, or Central Asiatics?) as ought to be deported, you shall send south following the precedents (\textit{ll})\textsuperscript{[26]} in order to prevent the recurrence of calamities. Those who may be left must be strictly isolated and informed of the restrictions [imposed upon them] so that they become unable to carry out their pernicious schemes.

Here the emperor invokes precedents for sending Mongol residents to the south, but there is no explanation as to what those precedents exactly were. Later we shall see that precedents were also frequently invoked in order to have Mongols residing in the capital sent further south. It is not clear whether the emperor here is referring to the same sort of precedents. It seems more likely that he is speaking of the custom of deporting to the south all rebellious and otherwise suspicious elements among the non-Chinese section of the population.

We should repeat, however, that in spite of the charges put forth against the Mongols in Kansu of being generally unreliable, and, as the emperor puts it in his rescript, of entertaining relations with the Mongol enemy and passing on to them information concerning the state of Chinese defenses, no actual case of subversive activity is reported at this time, and furthermore, we find no evidence of any Mongols being deported from Shensi and Kansu as a result of Wang Chi's mission. Of course, individuals may always have had relations with Mongolia, but we find no evidence that much information was passed on to Mongols abroad and that invading Mongols were substantially helped by Mongols in the Ming service. Contrary to the emperor's charges against the Mongols that while serving in the Ming armies they actually were spies for the Mongols abroad, it should be noted that there exists ample proof from this and later periods that chieftains in Mongolia were very little in need of the assistance of Mongols in the Ming service. There were enough Chinese, both prisoners and escapees, in Mongolia serving the Mongol princes and often only too anxious to provide the Mongols not only with all the necessary information concerning roads and defenses, but also ready to serve as guides for their Mongol masters on their raids. At this particular time the organization of the Ming army had badly degenerated. Morale of the men was extremely low, and in many areas military discipline had become non-existent. More in particular, the defenses along the Sino-Mongol bor-
ders seem to have been in bad shape. Major clashes with Mongol raiders rarely occurred, because they were carefully avoided by Chinese officers whenever possible; small bands of Mongols crossed the borders almost at will, and in fact throughout the 15th and 16th centuries, violations of the borders occurred almost every day in one place or another. Under the circumstances, the easiest thing to do was to blame the Mongols in the Ming service. However, despite those repeated charges against the Mongols, it seems that few Chinese were fooled, for the Ming continued to rely heavily on their Mongol auxiliaries, and if the Mongols were often described as not trustworthy, they were also praised for the courage which they displayed in battle and for their loyalty to the Dynasty.

In 1448, as Esen-tayisi of the Oyirad was busily unifying Mongolia and building up his power both in Mongolia and in Central Asia in preparation of his forthcoming campaign against the Ming empire, a group of people of Mongol or Turkish (or mixed?) origin who had been living in the Sha-chou [27] (Tun-huang) area since the beginning of the Ming period, had been forced to yield to the pressure of the Oyirad and had moved into Chinese territory. However, this group was split into at least two factions, one under the rightful ruler and the other under the leadership of his younger brother. This rival brother of the titular of Sha-chou had accepted various favors and honorary titles from Esen-tayisi, and when the elder brother with the majority of the people of Sha-chou left their home country for a new territory under Ming control, the younger brother fled to the west with a number of followers. A Chinese army, sent after him, succeeded in capturing the dissenter and bringing him back. Under the circumstances the Ming could hardly disregard his past behavior. The emperor decided to send him to Tung-ch'ang [28] and Ping-shan [29] in Shantung and Hopei respectively with his entire family. But even there this Sha-chou family continued to stir up trouble. Towards the end of 1449, we read about them again: having little to do, they had resorted to robbery. Officials who reported on the matter proposed to disperse them to various places south of the Yangtze.

A rather strange case occurred in 1455. A Chinese army officer had struck out from Tu-shih-k'ou [30], northwest of Peking, and had captured twelve Mongols, who were first sent to the capital. Upon investigation it was

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21 Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 168.2ab; Tamura, Moko hen 3.188—189.
22 Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 181.22ab; Tamura, ibid., p. 226. According to the Ming-shih 156.14a, biogr. notice of Ko-lo-o ling-chan who was a member of the princely family of Sha-chou, it was being feared that this group might take advantage of Esen-tayisi's attack on China (1449—1450) to start trouble. See also the Ming-shih 170.6b and the Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo (ed. Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu chien-pien, Comm. Press) ch. 33, p. 33.
23 Ching-t'ai shih-lu 70.3a (Ying-tsung 252); Tamura, ibid., p. 527.
27 沙州, 敦煌
28 東昌
30 獨石口
found that the men in question belonged to the commandery of T'ai-ning\[81\] in the northern part of the now abolished province of Jehol. As early as 1389, the tribes known in the Ming sources as T'ai-ning, To-yen\[32\] (Dö'en), and Fu-yü\[33\], had declared themselves vassals of China, and except for some short intervals, apparently caused by external pressure, had remained loyal to the Ming. Although, as we are told, the twelve Mongol prisoners of 1455 had no weapons upon them at the time of their capture, and according to the accepted custom they were perfectly entitled to graze their herds down to the Chinese borders, they "were pardoned", but they were nevertheless exiled to Chekiang and ordered to remain there permanently. When the Mongol prince of T'ai-ning sent emissaries to the Ming capital with presents in the form of horses, and requested that his subjects be returned to him; when furthermore it became apparent that the Chinese officer who had captured the twelve men had grossly exaggerated the facts in his report, some officials requested to redress this injustice committed against the Mongols. The emperor, however, held that as the Mongols by now were settled in Chekiang, they had better stay there, and they ought not to be returned to T'ai-ning.

In 1472\[24\], two Mongols were exiled to Kuangsi not exactly for security reasons, but rather as common criminals. Indeed four Mongols had been captured while trying to violate the borders and were sentenced to death. Two of the men, however, were too young and for this reason their sentence was commuted to exile in Wu-chou\[34\] in Kuangsi where they were to serve in the army. The following year\[25\], a similar case occurred: three Mongols captured on the borders were forwarded to the capital. Two of them were sentenced to death, but one was exiled to Kuangsi because he was too young. These captured Mongols were raiders from Mongolia and their cases can hardly be compared with cases of Mongols who had surrendered to the Ming and had already spent some time in China Proper when they were ordered to move southward. Consequently the two cases from 1472 and 1473 are entirely different from the ordinary cases of exile or deportation reviewed in the foregoing pages.

In 1473\[26\], three Mongols who had recently surrendered were sent to Kuang-chou (Canton) to serve, two as chilarchs and one as centurion, in the army. No particular reason is indicated for this assignment and there is no ground to suppose that this was anything but a routine assignment.

\[24\] Ch'eng-hua shih-lu 111.2b; Tamura, Môko hen 4.307.
\[25\] Ch'eng-hua shih-lu 115.4a; Tamura, ibid., p. 321.
\[26\] Ch'eng-hua shih-lu 116.3b; 121.1b; Tamura, ibid., pp. 323, 336.
One case involving people from Sha-chou who were exiled to Shantung has already been mentioned. Here we have a case concerning a few individuals from Central Asia. In 1509\(^{27}\), the Shi-hlu makes mention of a few individuals — nine to be exact — natives of Qamil (Ha-mi) who at the beginning of the Hung-chii (1487—1505) period had been deported to Kuangsi. It seems that they were rebels who had first fled to Turfan, and later to China. At this time the Chung-shun-wang\(^{35}\) of Qamil requested the Ming government to let them return to Qamil, but we are not informed whether his request was granted and his former subjects were allowed to return to Qamil.

In 1524\(^{28}\), we come across one other case involving some persons from Qamil. In 1524, a rebellion had broken out in Qamil and one of its leaders, a certain Mahmud had been put to death. However, his cousin 'Abdullah had crossed into China in disguise but had been apprehended all the same and was sent into exile in Yünnan. As the escorting party reached Kueichou, 'Abdullah, although in chains, succeeded in escaping, bringing of course no little embarrassment to the escorting soldiers.

In 1529\(^{29}\), one Ya-mu-lan\(^{36}\) had moved into Kansu but was considered too poor a risk to be allowed to settle permanently in a sensitive border area such as Kansu. Ya-mu-lan can be none other than Ya-lan\(^{37}\) who is mentioned several times in the Ming-shih (329, especially sections of Ha-mi and T'u-lu-fan). He was a native of Ch'ü-hsien but became the son-in-law of the ruler of Turfan and continuously warred against Qamil. In the end he fell in disgrace with his employer and father-in-law and in 1529 he surrendered to China. According to the Ming-shih he came over with 2000 followers.

In view of his past the safest thing, it was thought, was to send him away with his people to Hukuang (modern Hupei and Hunan) and orders were immediately issued to the authorities of Hukuang to prepare housing and food for Ya-mu-lan and his following.

It is certain, however, that the orders to deport Ya-mu-lan were not carried out. We do not know why, but shortly afterwards we find him settled in the vicinity of Su-chou\(^{38}\), Kansu. This is the more surprising as it is the very region from which he was to be banned in the first place.

\(^{27}\) Cheng-te shih-lu 48.10b.  
\(^{28}\) Chia-ching shih-lu 38.5a.  
\(^{29}\) Ibid., 97.15a; 102.12a.

\[^{35}\] 中順王  
\[^{36}\] 牙木蘭  
\[^{37}\] 牙蘭  
\[^{38}\] 蘭州
Chang Yü [39], who lists him together with other foreign "tribes" settled in the neighborhood of Su-chou, has the following note about him: "T'u-lu-fan (Turfan): the chieftain Ya-mu-lan, leading the surrendered barbarians from Sha-chou, settled in the suburb of Su-chou. 527 soldiers were selected [from among his people]. His subjects number 1800, both men and women, and the tu-tu Jih-kao-la [40] is under order to administer them. He (Ya-mu-lan?) was killed in a disturbance." The name Sha-chou here probably comes from the fact that Ya-mu-lan had settled there for a while before moving definitively to Su-chou [31].

It is quite possible that the small number of his subjects became the reason why after all it was not considered dangerous to let Ya-mu-lan stay in Kansu. But his case at least suggests that probably not all the "deportations" mentioned in the Shih-ju were carried out.

What looks like another routine assignment to the south of soldiers originally from the northeast occurred in January, 1544 [32]. The men involved in this case were from Mao-lien [41], and were forwarded to Kuangtung and Kuangsi to fill in the vacancies among the "Tatar" troops of the various garrisons of the south. Mao-lien [33] was a territory on the left bank of the Tumen river, south of modern Yen-chi in Manchuria. This territory, or its people, had been recognized as a "protectorate" and given the status of a commandery (wei) as far back as January, 1406. Within the territories of the Jürčed and related tribes, there existed a whole series of protectorate territories similar to Mao-lien, whose chiefs had been recognized by the Ming and received economic and political support from them. People from those protectorates occasionally crossed into the Chinese territory of Liaotung, but as a rule stayed there, and only few ever moved further into China Proper.

Those protectorate territories maintained relations with the Ming and sent embassies and tribute missions on a rather regular base. For these

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30 Chang Yü, Huang-Ming pien-cheng k'ao (pref. 1546), ed. Pei-p'ing 1936, 9.5b On page 4b mention is made of a certain Ya-lan living in the same area, but he cannot be the Ya-lan (= Ya-mu-lan) of the Ming-shih since he was a petty chief with no more than 87 subjects.

31 The (Chia-ch'ing ch'ung-hsiu) Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ing-chih, vol. 99 (Su-chou, p. 9a), writes his name Ya-erh-mu-la, probably a "correction" introduced by the Ch'ien-lung commission. He is described as living in a place to the northeast of Su-chou. The Huang-Ming pien-cheng k'ao, loc. cit., lists a whole series of tiny foreign settlements in western Kansu, all called after places in the west outside of the Ming territory. The custom of naming a place after a previous settlement of the same people was very old. See for example, Wittfogel and Feng, History of Chinese Society, Liao (1949), p. 61: "The families captured during military expeditions were used to establish prefectures in important places, which were generally named after the old residences [of the captives]."

32 Chia-ch'ing shih-ju 281.4b: Tamura, Manshū hen 3.420.

33 See my Sino Jürčed relations during the Yung-lo period, Wiesbaden 1955, p. 83.
and other reasons, the people of the northeast caused much less trouble to the Ming than the Mongols in the north and the northwest. Yet that the difficulty of the relations between the Chinese and the northeastern tribes remained substantially the same as on the Sino-Mongol borders appears from a text from 1581, in which we read how in the course of a deliberation about the problem of resettlement of people who surrendered to the Chinese in Liaotung, an official made the remark that he was willing to accept in the military service only such barbarians as had surrendered and come over a long time ago, but as to the newly surrendered barbarians, it would be better to send them to Kuangsi and Kuangtung. Whereupon another official argued that such a course of action was bound to arouse the suspicion of the tribesmen and would immediately stop the flow of new arrivals. It is also significant that the emperor accepted the latter view and spoke out against sending all barbarians to the south.

If many Chinese disliked the Mongols and were strongly opposed to their being allowed to settle in China and serve in the Ming armies, especially in North China, still more frequently were protests raised against the presence of Mongols in the capital.

As I have tried to show elsewhere, Mongols must have been very conspicuous at Nanking under Ming T'ai-tsu. After the Central Government had moved to Pei-p'ing which was then renamed Pei-ching (Peking, "Northern Capital"), Mongols were just as numerous there, if not more so. At least our attention is called to them more frequently. Officials often protested against preferential treatment of the Mongols, proposed to send them all to the south, or to send them back to Mongolia.

For example, in 1424, the President of the Board of Officials (li-pu) declared that "surrendered people from the Desert living in the capital were very numerous". He further complained that besides their regular allowances they had to be granted honorary titles in order to remain satisfied. Foreign residents in the capital must have been the more conspicuous as there was also an almost uninterrupted stream of tribute missions travelling to the capital, staying there sometimes for considerable lengths of time. Not all officials were reconciled to the sight of so many foreigners at the center of the empire. In 1425, an official proposed to sever all relations and send back all foreign embassies to their own country. It is interesting that in his reasoning this official follows the same line of thought as the Yung-lo emperor in 1403 for not compelling the Mongols to remain in China against their will: "We should not consider ourselves lucky if they declare themselves vassals; we should not consider ourselves unlucky if they rebel, and we must not think that we shall derive any profit from their [tribute] wares!" After this he refers to some opinions

34 Wan-li shih-lu 101.5b; Tamura, Manshû hen 4.28.
35 Hung-hsi shih-lu 2B.14b; Tamura, Môko hen 2.5—6.
36 Hsüan-te shih-lu 10.9b; Tamura, ibid., pp. 61—62.
held under the Han Dynasty. Then he goes on to say that under former
dynasties whenever foreigners were allowed to establish themselves on
Chinese soil trouble has ensued (the same idea was developed by a high
official in 1513; see below). Although, according to the Shih-lu, his plan
to send all foreign embassies home, sever relations and fortify the borders
was given imperial approval, there is no doubt that very little, if anything
at all, was done to carry out this decision. The Mongol residents remained
in the capital, and foreign embassies continued to visit Peking. One of the
clearest evidences that nothing was changed is provided ten years later by
another Shih-lu passage.

In 1435\(^{37}\), the President of the Board of Rites (li-\(\text{\-pu}\)), Hu-Yung\(^{42}\)\(^{38}\),
reported that a supervising censor (chi-shih-chung\(^{43}\)) had expressed the
opinion that the expenses made for the support of foreigners from the
north and the northwest who under the Yung-lo emperor had been given
offices in the capital were extravagant and totally useless; he wanted
to send them all home. Hu Yung, however, personally disapproved of this
proposal and claimed that the government was doing nothing but to follow
the principle of treating everybody on a basis of equality and to show
kindness towards foreigners, and that it would not be to the best advantage
of China to adopt the supervising censor's plan. The emperor agreed
with Hu.

Early in 1437\(^{39}\), we find a new protest against the presence of large
numbers of Mongols in the capital. This extremely interesting passage
gives us an idea of the relative strength of the Mongols, and reveals what
must have been one of the major reasons of the opposition to the Mongols.
Indeed, it shows that many Chinese were jealous of important privileges
enjoyed by the Mongols. This passage quotes the words of an official of
the Board of Officials who states that there were more than ten-thousand
Mongols at the capital, making up one third of the population of the Metro-
politan area. Then he goes on to compare the salaries of Mongols and
Chinese: "The Mongols, he claims, make up one third of the total number
of officials but the total of the salaries paid out to the Mongols sometimes
equals the total, sometimes equals half the total, paid out to the Chinese, with
the result that on average a Mongol receives twice as much as a Chinese." As
we know, the Mongols in China served mostly in the army, and undoubtedly
the same applied to the Mongols of the capital. In order then to stress his
point, the same official goes on to compare the salaries of Chinese and Mon-
gol officers holding the rank of commandant (chi-hui-shih\(^{44}\)). A commandant
belonged to the principal third degree and we are told that his salary

\(^{37}\) Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 5.11b; Tamura, ibid., p. 347.
\(^{38}\) Biographical note in the Ming-shih 169.2b—5a.
\(^{39}\) Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 25.12b; Tamura ibid., pp. 445—446.

\footnotesize{\[42\] 胡縉 \[43\] 給事中 \[44\] 指揮使}
theoretically was thirty shih of grain. In fact, however, a Chinese received no more than one shih. But a Mongol commandant received seventeen and a half shih, which, as this official puts it, seemed to make a Mongol officer seventeen and a half times as valuable as a Chinese! No explanation is furnished for this strange discrepancy, but the official's words clearly imply that the Mongols were extremely influential in the capital. Indeed, he suggests that Mongols serving in the capital be scattered and dispersed all over the country so as first to break their power and secondly to eliminate those unreasonable and useless expenses. He further suggests that in this way trouble bound to break out some time in the future can be prevented. To these suggestions the emperor answered with an order to the Board to investigate the matter and act according to their findings, but whether such a situation was found to exist indeed, and whether action was taken to correct it, I have been unable to find out.

Whether the facts quoted by that official of the Board of Officials are all accurate, it is, of course, impossible to say. Let us only observe that Peking at that time must have been a city mostly of government employees and soldiers with relatively few common people. But even under such circumstances, the Mongols in the various military units of Peking must have been extremely numerous to form as high a proportion as we are told here.

One other protest, this time against Mongol envoys traveling to the capital as well as against Mongols being stationed in Peking was voiced in 1443. A chiliarch of Shou-chou in the modern province of Anhui among other things stated the following:

“When cadet envoys reach the capital it should be forbidden to them to arrange meetings with their congeners and to have intercourse with other Tatars [living in the capital] because they claim kinship with each other and they get to know internal and external secrets; along the road [people and soldiers] should not be permitted to conceal weapons, copper and iron [tools and weapons], and sell them [to the Mongol envoys]. From now on if Mongols surrender, we think that their rewards (shang, a kind of subsidies) should be raised but that these men should be scattered over the various garrison towns of the south where they could be settled and generously supported, but they must not be allowed to stay in the capital where they present a potential danger.”

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46 Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 108.9a—b; Tamura, Môko hen 3.44.

It has already been pointed out how many Mongol soldiers were in the army units of Peking. In order to emphasize even further the numerical strength of this foreign population of the capital it should be noted that the Ming Shih-lu in numerous passages relates how Mongols upon their surrender to China asked for permission to settle in the capital. Almost unvariably these petitions were granted and in almost every case we read that orders were issued to the competent authorities to provide them with clothes, housing, and all the necessary household implements. These men seem to have been exclusively chieftains and noblemen, or otherwise influential people who came with their households and a number of retainers and servants to live in the capital at the expense of the government.

In 1436, on the same day that a group of Hui-hui from Kansu was ordered to proceed to the south, another group of Mongols was sent to serve in garrisons of Hopei and Shantung, allegedly because they were not considered reliable. It is interesting to note that whereas the Hui-hui who were not under suspicion, as far as we know, were sent to the south of the Yangtze, these Mongols suspected of possible disloyalty, were exiled no farther south than southern Hopei and Shantung. The real reason why these men were sent away appears from a memorial by an official of the Board of War on the subject:

“When foreigners surrender, the Court grants them titles and rewards and such people as wish to live in the capital are allowed to do so. But by nature the caitiffs are wily and fickle in their loyalty. Chang (or Ch'ang?) T'o-t'o-mu-erh came over at the beginning of the Yung-lo period together with his tribal chief Batu-temür. Shortly afterwards, however, he rebelled and went away, and now, some thirty years later, he surrenders again, and who knows if some day he will not rebel once more. Moreover, it is not easy to transport grain to the capital. We beg the Emperor to restore to him whatever [rank?] had been granted to him when he first surrendered but to disperse [his people] over the various

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41 See note 18.
42 Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 18.9ab; Tamura, Mōko hen 2.408—409.
43 Batu-temür’s surrender with an important group of Mongols is mentioned for the first time in the entry of August 3, 1405 (Yung-lo shih-lu 36.2b—3a; Haneda, Mōko hen 1.289—290). Batu-temür and his people were settled around Liang-chou and Yung-ch'ang, Kansu. These Mongols are frequently mentioned in subsequent years, both for distinguished services rendered to the Ming dynasty and for "rebellion". One of the rebels was Nu-ta-erh mentioned earlier in this paper. He was exiled to Kuangtung, but the rest of the tribe was allowed to remain in Kansu. I am not aware, however, that T'o-t'o-mu-erh is ever mentioned together with Batu-temür. Since we are told here that T'o-t'o-mu-erh after fleeing back to Mongolia had presented his surrender a second time "thirty years" later, it is quite possible that he was with the first rebels who ran away in 1410 and did not come back when the majority of the rebels were captured or compelled to surrender.

[46] 長褐脫木兒
garrison towns south of the Yangtze, to provide them with houses and lodgings, and to support them with an allowance of grain, so as to make them all happy. With none of their congeners to influence them, for the rest of their lives they will conceive no dangerous ideas."

This official apparently took it for granted that Chang T'o-t'o-mu-erh and his people were to settle in the capital, and he wanted to prevent this. Although he calls the emperor's attention to Chang's past disloyal conduct, the real reason for protesting against Chang's coming to the capital seems to be that the arrival of Chang with his people was to increase once more the number of Mongols living in the city and complicate further the problem of supplies. Therefore he proposes to disperse the Mongols over other cities where, of course, they would continue to live at the expense of the government, but the very fact of their dispersal would largely simplify the problem of supplies. Indeed, the Shih-lu goes on to say that this plan was referred back to the Board of War for further deliberation in the course of which the President, Wang Chi, remarked:

"Ch'ai Yung-cheng[49] and other Tatar (i.e. Mongol) officials who surrendered during the Yung-lo period are residing at Chen-ting-fu[50] and other places, and we beg the Emperor to follow this precedent and dispatch officers to escort [Chang T'o-t'o-mu-erh and his people] to such places as Ho-chien[51], Te-chou[52], etc. Orders should be issued to the local officials to prepare housing and provide them with the necessary utensils, and to give them land where they will be able to practice agriculture, raise livestock and have an easy livelihood. From now on if there are more who come to surrender, we beg the Emperor to follow this precedent."

Finally the Shih-lu notes that the emperor approved.

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44 Ch'ai Yung-cheng's Mongol name was Küjü (< Kūčü)-temür. He had surrendered on January 16, 1407 (Yung-lo shih-lu 47.6b–7a; Haneda ibid., p. 319). He was given the title of of secretary-high-commandant of Shensi, which must have been purely honorary, for it was far too high for the number of his subjects, who were no more than a little over a hundred. He began immediately to serve in the Ming army, and distinguished himself (Haneda, ibid., pp. 340, 341, 342). In 1411, a number of Mongol chieftains, Küjü-temür among them, requested permission to live in Peking. The emperor issued orders to the military authorities in Kansu to have them escorted to the capital and to provide them with the necessary funds for the trip (Yung-lo shih-lu 78.7b; Haneda, ibid., p. 407). We may presume that these chieftains were accompanied by servants and retainers and a number of subjects. I have been unable to find out at what time Küjü-temür, alias Ch'ai Yung-cheng, had been transferred to Chen-ting; nor is it indicated why he had been sent away from the capital. In view, however, of the large numbers of Mongol princes in Peking, such transfers must have happened all the time. There is no reason to suspect that this was a measure directed against Ch'ai personally.
With regard to such places as Chen-ting, Ho-chien, and Te-chou, we should note that they frequently appear among names of towns in North China mentioned in connection with Mongol soldiers. The appearance of a few more Mongols would be no surprise there. But the official of the Board of War, although insisting that T'o-t'o-mu-erh was an old rebel and thus entirely unreliable, does not demand outright banishment to the southernmost provinces of Kuangtung and Kuangsi. First he demands a banishment no farther south than the Yangtze, and later the President of the Board of War suggests Hopei and Shantung provinces. It seems thus that nobody wanted a real penalty to be meted out to T'o-t'o-mu-erh and his people. The reason for their "exile" was that in the eyes of the officials, Mongols in the capital were already too numerous.

This was also the first time a precedent was being invoked in connection with the capital, and it was to be invoked on many more occasions in the future. We have already discussed a case of 1437 when a similar "precedent" was invoked with regard to the Mongols of Kansu, but later on the precedent would only be mentioned in connection with Mongols in the capital. We shall review these cases now.

It seems that in 1457 unusually large numbers of Mongol immigrants, compelled by famine, presented themselves at the borders. During the seventh month (July 21—August 19), the Shih-lu mention the arrival of 114 persons in a single group who were attached to the Guard with Embroidered Clothes (Chin-i-wei) and provided with houses and all the necessary implements. The fact that they were to join the Guard with Embroidered Clothes is a certain indication that they were established at the capital. A further confirmation of this will be given below. No reason for their surrender is indicated at this time, but we find the explanation a few days later. This second passage is a memorial by an official from northwestern Shansi who pointed out that exceptionally high numbers of Mongols had come over in order to escape famine. In his views trouble might result from these exceptional numbers, and he proposed to send them to garrison towns on the southern seaboard. As the matter was referred to the Board of War, this office reported back that since spring more than 500 Mongols had come over, and if they were all left at the capital, it would become extremely difficult to provide them with housing and food. The Board of War proposed to settle them in Teng-chou, Lai-chou, and in a few other places of

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45 Reasons compelling the Mongols to migrate to China are rarely indicated except in very general terms as in a few passages discussed in the foregoing pages. That, besides wars between the princely families and political instability, also famine, probably caused by drought, was a reason is further suggested by a case reported from Liaotung one century later (1554: Chia-ching shih-lu 410.2b; Tamura, Manshū hen 3.467).
46 T'ien-shun shih-lu 280.7a; Tamura, Mōko hen 3.568.
47 T'ien-shun shih-lu 280.15a; Tamura, ibid., p. 569.
Shantung, and provide them with lands that had no crops standing upon them. If they wanted to join the army, they could do so. Only a few exceptions were to stay in the capital. The emperor gave his approval to this plan.

It may appear that 500 new arrivals in the course of several months of famine is not such a very impressive figure. It certainly is not large when compared with the huge numbers of immigrants of the Hung-wu and Yung-lo periods. By this time the flow of immigration had already remarkably slowed down. But this report from the Board of War obviously speaks only of those Mongols who in recent months had come to live in Peking. It must indeed have been a hard job to find enough houses and food for that ever increasing number of foreigners coming to Peking. There is no doubt that the famine had driven into China Proper many more Mongols who were not forwarded to the capital and who are not being considered here.

The precedent is again invoked in an interesting case from 150848. Here we read how a barbarian by the name of Unügüći, with a small group of followers, presented a tribute of camels and horses and surrendered to the Ming. Unügüći was given thirty ounces of silver. One of the men accompanying him, by the name of Bayasqu, received twenty ounces, and the rest of the men, five ounces each. Then Unügüći was made a junior chillarch in the Guard with Embroidered Clothes, with a monthly salary of three shih. Bayasqu was made a t'ou-mu with a salary of two shih. Twelve men from the same party were made "Courageous Soldiers" (Yung-shih) of the Bureau of Imperial Horses (Yü-ma-chien)50, and the Board of Public Works (kung-pu) was ordered to provide them with horses. Then the compilers of the Shih-lu explain that formerly such barbarians as surrendered to China were sent to Kuangtung or Kuangsi for resettlement in those two provinces. The fact, however, is that Unügüći and probably some of his men, too, were not really Mongols, but Chinese who had been born in Mongolia, or who had spent a numbers of years in captivity. Unügüći himself was the son of a native of Shansi province who had been carried off to Mongolia as a prisoner of war, and had been made a subject of a Mongol chieftain named Torqan. When a quarrel broke out between the Mongols, Unügüći

48 Cheng-te shih-lu 43.5a; Tamura, Móko hen 5.260—261.
49 As far as my knowledge goes, t'ou-mu was a term used only in the Yüan army. I am not aware that it was the name of any of the officers in the Ming army. It may have been used as a general term indicating lower officers of Mongol units in the Ming service.
50 For the Yü-ma-chien and the Yung-shih see the Ming-shih 74.24a—b; 89.17b. At this particular time there were four army units in the capital largely made up Chinese soldiers who had escaped from captivity in Mongolia. Their horses came under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Imperial Horses. Aliens were occasionally attached to these units. See Tamura, Manshu hen 3.150, 151, 240, 283.

[56] 頭目 [57] 勇士 [58] 御馬監
and 21 men, described as his "tribe", took advantage of this opportunity to escape to China. With regard to these men the Board of War declared that in leaving the barbarians and returning to China they had taken great pains and were worthy of compassion, and it was for this reason that the aforementioned measures were taken on their behalf. The compilers of the Shih-lu seem to mean that because of the fact that they (or some of them) were Chinese and, in addition, had proved their loyalty to China, they were not to be sent to the south as would have been the case otherwise. Yet we nowhere find evidence that there ever existed such a rule. Quite to the contrary the Mongols who were sent to the south always remained a minority. This statement of the Shih-lu seems to reflect once more the opinion of some officials that Mongols regardless of all other consideration ought to be deported to the south. However this may be, at the end of 1510, Bayasqu and five other men were sent to Kuangtung any way, and were attached to the army of that province. They were again provided with houses and the necessary household implements.

The precedent for sending Mongols to the south was once again invoked in 1513, and this time reference was also made to ancient exponents of the traditional diffidence of the Chinese towards the northern tribesmen. The occasion was the surrender of a Mongol by the name of T'o-t'o-t'ai who had come over in the Hsüan-fu region and had been sent to the capital. When he was made a "Courageous Soldier" of the Bureau of Imperial Horses, the President of the Board of War, Ho Chien and others made the remark that

"when the Han and the Wei resettled the [Yüeh]-chih and the Ch'iang in China Proper (lit. Kuan-chung), Kuo Ch' in and Chiang T'ung persuaded [emperor] Wu of the Chin to forestall all possible revolt.

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51 Cheng-te shih-lu 69.15b.
52 Cheng-te shih-lu 96.3a; Tamura, Moko hen 5.338, 339.
53 Biographical sketch in the Ming-shih 187.1a—4b, where the same text is repeated almost word for word.
54 Tzu-chih t'ung-chien 81 (Ssu-pu pel-yao, vol. 38, p. 960a = 280 A. D.). Kuo Ch'in complained about the large numbers of barbarians settled all over China and he proposed "to use the plans of strategists and fighting generals in order to move gradually the various barbarians from the inner districts towards the borders and build up a defense against the coming and going of the Four Barbarians."
55 Biographical notice in the Chin-shu 56.1a—6a. Ho Chien is referring to Chiang T'ung's "Resettlement of the barbarians", entirely incorporated in his biography. This "Resettlement of the barbarians" is also referred to in the Hung-wu shih-lu 109.5ab; Haneda, Moko hen 1.131—132 (see also Fuchs, OE 2.181, 198, 199) in a memorial from 1376 violently protesting against the presence of Mongols in China, especially around the then capital Nanking.
When Fu Chien [66] settled the Hsien-pi inside the borders, Fu Yung [67] became worried lest [the foreigners] spy on the state of the defenses and become a calamity on the borders. These are clear evidences from earlier times. Now if we let the caitiffs go in and out the Forbidden Quarters (Chin-ta [68]), are they not going to spy? If we favor them beyond measure, [our generosity] will only breed contempt. If ever a caitiff chieftain hears of this, he will secretly send in thieves pretending to surrender with the hope that they will be made 'Courageous Soldiers', and they will take advantage of their position to spy. Can one fail to worry about calamities to come? Once again we beg [the emperor] to follow the precedents and send [the surrendered foreigners] under escort to Kuangtung where they can be resettled, and thus protect China from being betrayed by the barbarians."

The emperor, we are told, acceded to this request.

Although the authorities from antiquity quoted here had argued against foreigners in any part of China, it is clear from Ho Chien's own words that his conclusion applied only to Mongols of the capital, or to be settled there: Mongols serving in Peking, serving in the army units protecting the city and perhaps members of the guards in and around the imperial palace. The expression "Forbidden Quarters" in the strict sense of the word means the palace. It is possible, however, that Ho uses this term here in a broader meaning for the capital as a whole, or even the whole metropolitan area. His reference to the "Courageous Soldiers" and their opportunity to spy, also proves that Ho was speaking against all Mongols of the northern provinces.

Mongols formed by far the majority of the aliens in the capital, but occasionally we meet with members of other tribes. For example in 1519 [58], mention is made of a Jürčed from Mao-lien in the northeast. He had come over to China and had also been made a "Courageous Soldier" of the Bureau of Imperial Horses. As we have already seen on several occasions, such an assignment involved residence in the capital. In his case, too, the Board of War invoked the precedents and tried to have him sent to Kuangtung or Kuangsi, but the emperor refused to accede to the request of the Board.

During the Hung-wu period many prisoners used to be brought back from campaigns or short expeditions in Mongolia. These were always settled in China and incorporated in the army. After 1400, Mongol priso-
ners are rather rarely referred to. Prisoners are mentioned in 1436 in a memorial from Shensi and Kansu about border affairs. The fourth and last point of this memorial runs as follows:

"Tatar (i.e., Mongol) prisoners captured on the borders invariably are presented to the Court, but there are not a few expenses involved for carts, horses, and provisions along the road. We beg that from now on only the chief caitiffs be presented as prisoners (hsien-fu) and the rest of the men be exiled to serve with the army south of the Yangtze, and that their married women be given to [Chinese] soldiers, in order to avoid the trouble of escorting them."

The emperor gave his approval to this plan.

At the end of the same year, we come across another plea by Wang Chi, President of the Board of War, not to keep in the capital a new group of surrendered Mongols. He couched his plea in the following words:

"The northern caitiff Aruytai has been crushed by the Oyirad and his tribes have been dispersed. On the one hand they fear the Oyirad, and on the other hand they are afraid of [our] governmental troops, and they had no other alternative but to surrender. Disregarding their former crimes, the Emperor has been extremely generous in his treatment [of the Mongols]. He has granted them offices and ranks, and has given them land, houses and lodgings with the necessary furniture, also fully equipped horses, oxen, sheep and other things. Although this has been adopted by the Wise Kings of the Three Dynasties (Hsia, Shang, Chou) as a means to pacify and mollify the out-lying barbarians, why bestow all those favors upon them? In the unworthy opinion of Your subjects, this cruel-hearted offspring of wolves will violate the borders if they are strong enough, but hang their heads and beg for mercy if they are weak. Those who surrender now are but the survivors from a crushing defeat, helpless in their extreme difficulties, who will pretend to surrender but in their hearts will never intend to do so. If we give offices to all of them, not only will this prove to be an extravagance in offices and titles, but we shall find it difficult to supply them. We beg [the Emperor] that from now on such as come to surrender with their subjects and their families be sent to the various commanderies south of the Yangtze which should control them and be permitted to raise troops from them and transfer them [in case of necessity]."

Again, the emperor gave his approval. In 1440, a Mongol officer in the Posterior Yü-lin Guard (Forest of Feathers, one of the imperial body

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59 Cheng-t'ung shih-ìu 21.3a; Tamura, Moko hen 2.418.
60 Cheng-t'ung shih-ìu 23.5a—b; Tamura, ibid., pp. 430—431.
guards in Peking), who had been exiled to perform frontier duty in Kuangsi, was allowed to return to the capital. Since the nature of his crime is not disclosed, it is not to be presumed that his banishment had anything to do with security or treason. Had his been a case of relations with the enemy, or had he been under grave suspicion for some reason, certainly the Shih-lu would not have failed to tell us. Furthermore, that his crime cannot have been serious is suggested by the fact that he was soon allowed to return to the capital, interestingly enough, to teach the Mongol language in the School of Interpreters. This passage runs as fellows:

"Shih Chung, a 'Tatar officer' and commandant with a salary (tai feng) in the Posterior Yü-lin Guard was allowed a half salary. In punishment for some crime, Chung had been exiled to perform frontier duty in Kuangsi. At this time he was pardoned and allowed to come back, and he was ordered to teach Tatar writing in the Ssu-i-kuan. Referring to a similar case, Chung begged that his salary be restored to him in order to support himself. For this reason [his half salary] was restored to him."

We have already mentioned some cases concerning people from modern Manchuria. As we have seen, these people, too, were sent to the south, on the whole for the same kind of considerations as were invoked with regard to the Mongols. Many chieftains from the northeast, mostly Jürčed but apparently also a few Mongols from northeastern Mongolia had asked permission to settle in K'ai-yüan and other Chinese towns of Liaotung, and consequently there must have been quite a number of aliens living in those towns at the expense of the government. In 1452, an official of Liaotung presented a memorial to the throne in which he stated that there where over 400 households of surrendered aliens living at K'ai-yüan and other places, and in his opinion it would become increasingly difficult to keep them under control. Consequently he proposed to resettle them in the south, and he asked that if new natives came to present their surrender, they all be moved from Liaotung to China Proper. We nowhere find indi-

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61 Cheng-t'ung shih-lu 64.11b; Tamura, ibid., p. 600.
62 The Ssu-i-kuan was a dependency of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (Tai-ch'ang-ssu). See the Ming-shih 74.1b—3b. Also Norman Wild, Materials for the study of the Ssu-i-kuan, in BSOAS 11.617—640.
63 Such requests by people from the northeast are frequently mentioned in the Shih-lu. See Tamura, Manshū hen 1—6, passim. See also Sino Jürčed relations during the Yung-lo period, pp. 62—64. Occasionally the Jürčed asked for and obtained permission to settle in China Proper, in such cities as Peking, Nanking, and other places.
64 Ching-t'ai shih-lu 38.13b (Ying-tsung 220); Tamura, Manshū hen 2.290.
cations, however, that Mongols or Jürčed in the north east were more unruly than those living in cities of China Proper. Most certainly the problem was not that the foreigners in K’ai-yüan, etc. were harder to control, but that the difficulty in supplying them and housing them properly might easily lead to friction and discontent. Members of the Board of War objected against the deportation plan as they believed that such a measure would have as its immediate result to make the native tribes suspicious and to stop the flow of new arrivals. On the insistence, however, of the Liaotung officials, the emperor finally approved the plan. From this memorial we may conclude that essentially the same situation had developed in towns of the northeast as in Peking with regard to the Mongols, and it was for the same reasons of supply that officials on the local levels objected against too large numbers of aliens in Chinese towns.

In 1493, when sixteen Mongols surrendered, the Board of War again invoked the precedents and asked that the men in question be escorted to Kuei-lin in Kuangsi and serve there as officers and soldiers. Probably the Board of War again wanted to prevent these men from going to the capital and being given honorary titles and various other privileges.

Early in 1522, eight men from Mao-lien entered China, and the emperor issued orders to the Board of Rites to give them rewards (i.e. subsidies) and let them keep the military ranks they had been holding in their native Mao-lien commandery, and to designate officers who were to escort them to Kuangtung and Kuangsi. Once there, they would become available for military duty. Here no mention is made of any precedent, yet it is quite probable that this measure was designed to avoid having to assign them to the capital and provide them with food, housing, and the other customary facilities in a city already overcrowded with foreigners.

Having reviewed these cases, we may summarize the situation as follows: it always was the policy of the Ming to induce as many foreigners as possible, especially Mongols, to cross into China. The Ming as a rule drafted them in the army and attached them to garrisons all over the empire, the north as well as the south. But the Ming apparently did not transfer them too often from one place to another once they were established in a certain area. Forcing one group to move to a new place was likely to have an adverse effect upon other alien groups in surrounding areas. Especially in the north this consideration had its importance as an imprudent decision was bound not only to cause the discontent of other Mongols in the Ming service but also could adversely influence tribes in Mongolia already favorably disposed towards the Ming. There were enough people traveling back and forth to let the Mongols abroad know how their fellow countrymen were faring in China, and the Ming could not afford to ignore the impression their policy was leaving on the tribes abroad.

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Only such Mongols in the Ming service as had shown to be unreliable, possible traitors, or outright rebels and troublemakers, were removed from their habitats in the north and sent into exile, most of the time in Kuangtung and Kuangsi.

A special situation obtained in the capital because of the unusually high number of Mongols residing there mostly serving in one of the army units or exceptionally attached to one or other office. If many Chinese now and then objected to the presence of Mongols on Chinese territory, many more seem to have objected to the presence of Mongols in the capital. From time to time Mongols after spending a few years in the capital were ordered to proceed to other places, and in this way a kind of "rule" or "precedent" came into being. On more than one occasion this precedent was invoked in order either to prevent newly arrived Mongols from settling in Peking or to have them removed from the capital so as to reduce somewhat the numbers of foreigners who seem to have become all too conspicuous at the very center of the empire.