The Concept of Creative Personality in Traditional Chinese Literary Criticism

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A study of the history of European literary theories from the times of Plato's Dialogues (the beginning of the fourth century B.C.) up to the year 1800 (publication of Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads) reveals that all the theories may essentially be subsumed under the Aristotelian premise "hē technē mimetai tēn phusin" (art imitates nature), of course with the necessary even if somewhat trivial qualification that the exception proves the rule. Art is something akin to a mirror, specifically reflecting nature in its immense complexity and metamorphoses, capable of encompassing the entire universe, society and man, and that which is outside of them, whether really existing, or only a product of human imagination and fancy.

In the eighteenth century, a few decades before Wordsworth, a theory began to be formed in England that was essentially to alter the physiognomy of the whole literary theory and criticism existing until then, one that had a decisive impact on literary writings. It began to spread about the time of the publication of James Arbuckle's Collections of Letters and Essays (1722) and was "codified" by numerous English and German theoreticians, poets and writers. Of these, John Stuart Mill evidently characterised most succinctly and most pregnantly his conviction and that of his colleagues of the Romantic Age, when he defined art as the "expression or uttering forth of feeling". This very simple, and at first sight insignificant definition meant an enormous change in the views on the essence of art and on its meaning and aims.

M. H. Abrams in the Preface to his book The Mirror and the Lamp writes that the title of his work "identifies two common and antithetic metaphors of mind, one (mirror, M. G.) comparing mind to a reflector of external objects, the other (lamp, M. G.) to a radiant projector which makes a contribution to the objects it perceives". Abrams arrived at these "changing metaphors of mind" through his study of romantic poets, critics and philosophers of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. He saw the most important contribution of the romantic movement in a "projective and creative mind" which resulted in the setting up of an "expressive and creative theory of art" with a share of the poetic imagination and artistic genius.

A study of the history of literary theories in China from the times of Confucius (5th century B.C.) until the beginning of our century provides a different picture, and above all, the creative consequences of this picture are different. While the most important feature in European literary theories up to the end of neoclassicism is their mimetic (i.e. imitative) character, this aspect is lacking, or at least is never and nowhere stressed in Chinese literary theories. These accentuate other components of relations and affinities that lie between "reality", the author, and the work.

The premise "art imitates nature", although not explicitly expressed in Aristotle's Poetics, was correlated to this work, otherwise more or less a compilation of notes sometimes more elaborated, sometimes only outlined. Poetics, however, is a systematic treatise on the subject. In traditional China, where the philosophy, formally speaking,
was less systematic than in ancient Greece, no effort was made either in literary theory or in epistemology, logic or methodology, to go beyond series of statements as if scattered and dispersed by various authors (theoreticians and critics) in diverse places, usually in essays, rarely in larger units, for instance books, often in the so-called shih-hua poetry-talks or tz'u-hua song-talks, in impressionist notes dealing with classic poems or later songs. During the course of our century, historians of old Chinese literary criticism had often to scrutinize, with a magnifying-glass in hand, the extremely abundant collections of Chinese writings of the past twenty-five centuries to uncover the essence that moved the theoretical and critical evolution and was its bearing axle. And again certain systematic works as, for example, Liu Hsieh’s (ca. 465–522) Wen-hsin tiaolung The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons or Yeh Hsieh’s (1627–1703) Yuan shih On the Origins of Poetry, are merely the exceptions.

A point of some interest is that probably the earliest definition of poetry in China, found in Shang-shu The Book of History (eleventh century B.C.) might be translated into English as follows: “Poetry is the expression of feelings” (shih yen chih). Although this statement may date from a period some centuries closer to us, yet it elucidates something common to poetic theories at the beginning of their existence. In another Chinese definition of poetry which during the past few decades is being ascribed to Wei Hung (fl. about 25 A.D.) we find the sentence: “What lies in mind (heart) is a feeling, when expressed in words, it is poetry” (tsai hsin wei chih, fa yen wei shih).

It might perhaps be useful to dwell for a moment on the word hsin mind. This word was pronounced in a remarkable connection a whole millennium before the author of Major Preface to The Book of Poetry wrote the sentence we have just quoted. About the year 1027 B.C., the last king of the Shang dynasty had his minister Pi Kan executed. He said: “I have heard that the heart (hsin) of a Sage has seven openings. Cut up Pi Kan that I may inspect his heart.”

Heart in the sense of mind carries an enormous weight in Chinese philosophy, literature and criticism. Anatomically the heart cannot be said to have seven openings. Seven openings of the human heart in Chinese original concept were identified with seven openings in man’s head which are the seats of four sense: sight, hearing, taste and smell. In the old Chinese epistemology “mind” represented an organ of processing sense perceptions into the knowledge of the most diverse kind. But it should be observed here that hsin (mind) occupied in the body the same place as heart; thus a homonymy came to be created in the Chinese language which came subsequently to play a specific role also in Chinese philosophical, literary but also socio-economic life.

In the book The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons, in the chapter Ming shih Exegesis of Poetry, we read: “Man is endowed with seven feelings (ch’ing). When stimulated by the external reality (wu) these feelings rise in response. In responding to it one expresses these feelings. All this is spontaneous.”

From Fan Wen-lan’s commentary on this passage we know that these human feelings were as follows: joy (hsi), anger (nu), grief (ai), fear (chü), love (ai), hatred (o), and desire (yü). As these seven feelings are mentioned in the chapter Li-yün Evolutiones of Rites in the book Li-chieh Book of Rites, there is a question of an old Chinese conviction which evidently became stabilised already in the period of the Western Han (206 B.C.–8 A.D.), if not earlier. The concordance between openings of the heart (mind) and human feelings (jen ch’ing) may possibly be a matter of numerical superstition or “number-mysticism”, as it was called by
Joseph Needham, occasionally one of unjustified considerations and speculations proper also to ancient Greeks, Hebrews and Hindus, but it is possible that the "numerical harmony" in this case has been the outcome of some contemplations seeking the answer concerned with the interaction between mind and its potentialities and the external reality outside of the mind.

That same interaction noted between external reality and mind in the quotation from Liu Hsieh, may also be seen in the chapter Yüeh chi[32] Record of Music from the Book of Rites: "The production of all sounds comes forth from the human mind. The movements of the human mind are stimulated by external reality. Being stimulated by external reality, the mind moves and produces the sounds12."

The ingenious metaphor of the mind — the mirror — seems to have occurred for the first time in Chinese history in the seventh chapter of the book Chuang-tzu[34] (third century B.C.): "The Perfect Man (chih-jen[35]) uses his mind like a mirror — going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding (ying[36]) but not storing (tsang[37]). Therefore he can win out over things and not hurt himself13."

The thirteenth chapter of this book gives the following portrait of a Taoist sage: "The sage (sheng-jen[39]) is still not because he takes stillness (ching[40]) to be good and therefore is still. The ten thousand things (wan wu[41]) are insufficient to distract his mind — that is the reason he is still. Water that is still gives back a clear image of beard and eyebrows; reposing in the water level, it offers a measure to the great carpenter. And if water in stillness possesses such clarity (ming[42]), how much more must pure spirit (ching-shen[43]). The sage's mind in stillness is the metal mirror (chien[44]) of Heaven and Earth, the mirror (ching[45]) of ten thousand things14."

Taoist apprehension of human thought was firmly linked with emptiness (hsü[46]), stillness, tranquillity (t'ien-tan[47]), silence (chi-mo[48]) and inaction (wu-wei[49]). Man, the individual, was separated from ambient reality by something that the Taoists named a mirror, no matter what form it took. Since mirror was a metaphor of the mind, they owned something that reflected the surrounding world, helped them to know it, but simultaneously not to take note of it as an object of interest or of activity, regardless of whether it could do them good or harm.

An essentially different view on mind in relation to ambient reality was held by the philosopher Hsün-tzu[50] (313–238 B.C.), a younger contemporary of Chuang-tzu or of those who produced the book Chuang-tzu. Hsün-tzu's reflections on the mind are a reaction to the views of Chuang-tzu: "The mind never ceases to store away (tsang[37]), yet it has that which may be called emptiness (hsü[46]). The mind has always a multiplicity, yet there is that which may be called a unity (il[51]). The mind is always active, yet there is that which may be called quiescence (ching[40]). Man from his birth has the capacity to know things; this capacity has its memory (chih[52])..." The same also applies to the following statement from Hsün-tzu: "The mind of man is like a tub of muddy river water: place it upright and do not jar it, and the muddiness will sink to the bottom, and the clear water will be on top; then it will be clear enough to mirror the beard and eyebrows, and to show the condition of the complexion. But if a little wind crosses its surface, the mud at the bottom rises and the clear water at the top is disturbed, until a person cannot see in it whether he is standing upright. The mind is like that17."

Chuang-tzu was a quietist Taoist. He stood up for an absolute social noncommitment and personal indifference. Starting from his conviction about an equality of things and
opinions, he did not see why he should not and could not be a detached observer of the ten thousand things.

Hsün-tzu was a very active Confucian who stood up for a social concern and personal responsibility. The human mind responds sensibly to outer reality, but simultaneously it strives to react to this reality with the aid of its instruments (feelings and passions, cognition and knowledge).

The term wen-hsin[^3] literary mind is to be found also in the title of the most systematic work of old Chinese literary criticism. The "literary mind" in this case is, according to Liu Hsieh, a certain application of the philosophical and psychological concept of mind to the domain of literary art. This is evident from the last chapter summarising the results from the whole book in which by literary mind is understood the essence whose function is literature (wen chih yung[^4][^5]). The first chapter entitled Yüan tao[^5] Origin Comes from Tao has this statement: "With the emergence of mind, the words were set up and when the words were set up, the writing appeared[^6]."

Man, as a human being, is the "mind of the universe", of the cosmos, of Heaven and Earth (t'ien t'ī chih hsin[^6][^7]). This mind is able to reflect and process all different forms of wen[^8] which, in the metalanguage of Chinese aesthetics, means the material for art and literature. There are various forms of wen. The most important to Liu Hsieh, and it seems that for the entire Confucian branch of aesthetics, is tao-wen[^9], where Tao means "the unitary principle of all things and the totality of being" and is expressed in the exemplary moral and social life in harmony with li[^9] rites, decorum and other Confucian virtues. Besides tao-wen, of importance to literature are also t'ien wen[^6][^10] literary material of Heaven[^11] and jen-wen[^11] literary material of man[^12]. Man alone is endowed with the mind of universe, and the material that concerns him has to be studied (ch'ā[^12]) in order that it might be transformed (ch'êng hua[^13]) so that social regulations (i hsien[^13]) of man and the society in which he lives, might be fulfilled[^14].

Instead of the mimetic approach typical for ancient, medieval and partly also modern art and literature of the European cultural milieu, the philosophical, reflective approach was characteristic of traditional China. Although the various forms of artistic literature were clearly separated from the other forms of literature, from philosophical and historical works at the time of Liu Hsieh, literature was not explained as mimesis, hence by means of representation that imitated or artistically reproduced reality, but through philosophical and aesthetico-ethical processing of this reality. The Heaven, Earth and Man as Three Powers (san ts'ai[^14]) should be introduced to the reader or spectator in their philosophical essence and ethical validity through the intermediary of various literary and artistic codes: the language, sounds, movements, colours, etc[^25]. While with the Greeks all human activity, but especially activity in the realm of art and literature, was mimesis, an imitation of the beauty of the universe, nature, man, in China this activity was a reflection of that universe, nature, man, in agreement with the philosophical, and aesthetico-ethical value of Tao.

The terms used thus far in which mind, hence human mind, participates and is the decisive component, and simultaneously the "mind of the universe", may be supplemented with the term tao-hsin[^6][^15] the mind of Tao[^26]. In Liu Hsieh, the mind of Tao is characterised with the words wei wei[^16] unique and mysterious. A point worth mentioning is perhaps the parallel standing of human mind with that of mind of Tao in Hsün-tzu from which Liu Hsieh drew his inspiration. From their parallelism Hsün-tzu
inferred their equivalence, their mutual complementarity that may be known solely to the wise Superior man (ming chün-tzu[68]27).

One may agree with the idea that the concept of genius, of a literary and artistic genius, was unknown in traditional China28. A concept common to both ancient Chinese and Greco-Roman aesthetics was that of ts'ai[69] talent29 and ingenium. The Latin word *ars* corresponds roughly to Chuang-tzu's or Liu Hsieh's term shu[70] art31.

Liu Hsieh's concept of ts'ai or t'ung-ts'ai[71] comprehensive talent is directly related to that of shu, for that *littérateur* alone is "comprehensive" who has succeeded in understanding art (hsiao shu[72]32). It is not in vain that Liu Hsieh refers to comprehensive art when writing about Ts'ao P'ei[73] (187–226) for he is much indebted to him and his *Tien-lun lun-wen* Essay on Literature33. Ts'ao P'ei, however, does not speak of ts'ai, but of ch'i[75] breath34. Ch'i in a man of letters is always individual, innate (ingenium), cannot be passed from one to another35. But Ts'ao P'ei in turn probably followed Wang Ch'ung[76] (27–ca 100), one of the most outstanding Chinese philosophers: "It has always been said that the talent of seventy disciples of Confucius was more perfect than that of the Confucians of our days. This is false. Such people see Confucius as a teacher (and are of opinion that) the Sage in spreading his teaching must meet with people unusually gifted (t's'ai[79]) who pass for extraordinary people. The talent of people of antiquity was the same as that of modern people36." In a work referred to earlier, Yeh Hsieh also considers talent to be one of the properties that a poet should possess together with daring (tan[81]), judgment (shih[82]) and strength (li[83]37).

One can but subscribe to the idea that China knew and had processed the concept of the Sage. Suffice it to look up the history of Chinese philosophy to be convinced about it. This concept has been acknowledged by all philosophers, although they differed as regards the essence of a Sage and his role in history. According to Mencius (371–289 B. C.), the Sage is "the ultimate standard of human relations38", hence, it is a man who achieves self-realization in an absolute measure and without residue in an ordered society founded on human-heartedness (jen[85]), righteousness (li[86]) and li (rites, decorum, propriety). The Sage is also a "teacher to a hundred generations39". He is then an ethical and epistemological category. This concept of Sage has even a plebeian quality, although ultimately the resulting product in Mencius and Hsün-tzu is identical. If a man in the street "direct his capacities to learning, concentrating his mind on one object, thinking and studying and investigating thoroughly, adding to his knowledge and long retaining it", he can become a Sage. "If he accumulates goodness and does not stop, he will reach the spiritual clairvoyance, and will form a trinity (ts'an-yü[87]) with Heaven and Earth. Thus the Sage is a man who has attained to that state by cumulative effort40." Tai Chen[88] (1723–1777), an important Neo-Confucian philosopher of the Ch'ing dynasty, defined a Sage as one "who possesses benevolence (jen[85]) and wisdom (chih[89]) and follows the principles of equilibrium and harmony (chung-ho[90]41)."

The Sage is a model, a paragon of ethical virtues and a man of wisdom. He may also be a man of letters on condition that he is able "to make Tao manifest in his writings42". Insofar as we know, however, the title of Sage has generally been reserved only for Confucius and partly for the philosopher and famous *littérateur* Han Yü[92] (768–824). One
of greatest Chinese poets Tu Fu\(^{[94]}\) (712–770) was called the “poet-sage” (shih-sheng\(^{[94]}\)).

The concept of the mind as a mirror, or of a work as a reflection in a mirror, in water, in pond, etc., was in some measure antithetic to the idea of personal creativeness, of the individual creative principle. The idea of tso\(^{[95]}\) to make, to create met with in Confucius and Wang Ch’ung\(^{[44]}\), differs to some extent from that prevailing in Europe under the influence of Christian philosophy and theology. Chinese philosophy did know the concept of the demiurge (the craftsman who creates) in its embryonal stage\(^{[45]}\), but did not believe in God, the Creator of all things. The idea of the creator existed in Chinese mythology\(^{[46]}\), but the latter was not recognised in Chinese traditional society, particularly in its Confucian strata. Confucius stated of himself that he was a transmitter (shu\(^{[98]}\)), not a maker (tso\(^{[95]}\)). Wang Ch’ung, on the other hand, quoted the words from the Book of Rites according to which “the Sage is making and the worthy (hsien\(^{[99]}\)) is transmitting\(^{[88]}\). The point at issue here is not of course that Confucius states about himself something different from what the Confucian says about a Sage—for whom he was universally held. Even if the Sage was the maker, nothing more was implied here than a reflection of the inseparable trinity: Heaven, Earth and man.

After the fall of the Han dynasty, during the rule of the Wei, Chin, Northern and Southern dynasties (220–581) when literature (wen-hsüeh\(^{[100]}\)) came to be definitively separated from classical studies (ching-hsüeh\(^{[101]}\)), history (shih-hsüeh\(^{[102]}\)) and philosophy (hsüan-hsüeh\(^{[103]}\)), greater attention began to be devoted to man as maker (tso-che\(^{[104]}\)), as writer (wen-jen\(^{[105]}\)), (wen-shih\(^{[106]}\)), to his talent, to the ways and methods by which literature or art are being produced.

Liu Hsieh devoted almost half of his essays in the book Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons precisely to the last two issues: the poet and ars poetica. In several places he wrote about poetic talent: “Individual people vary with respect to their natural talents, some are slow and some are quick\(^{[49]}\).” Or: “There is a great variety of talents and natures...” One of these essays has even the title Ts’ai lüeh\(^{[107]}\) Literary Talents. In our view, it is rather impressionist, similar to the subsequent shih-hua or tz’u-hua; it could be characterised at best as a short history of Chinese literary talents, but decidedly it is not a theoretical treatise on this important aesthetic category. Such a state of things was brought about by the lack of interest in both the psychological aspect of literary creation and in the creative individual which in turn derived from the antindividual principle typical of Chinese traditional society. The individual in every field of human endeavour, hence also in the literary sphere, was to serve the “collective”, even “all-human”. In the triad Heaven, Earth and man, the latter is always to be understood in the plural, for in China an individual meant very little indeed. An individual, even a prominent writer, was a mere vignette, a label of the written work which ultimately had to be only a manifestation of the omnipresent, multi-faceted and ad infinitum definable and redefinable Tao, if it was to be regarded as a piece of literature.

Liu Hsieh wrote about tsung shu (comprehensive art) in an essay bearing that name\(^{[51]}\). Alongside certain insights to be found in Lu Chi’s\(^{[109]}\) (261–303) Wen-fu\(^{[109]}\) Fu on Literature\(^{[82]}\) and in a later work by Yen Yu\(^{[110]}\) (12th century) Ts’ang-lang shih-hua\(^{[111]}\) Ts’ang-lang’s Remarks on Poetry\(^{[52]}\), these belong among the most noteworthy ideas from artes poeticae sinicae. In this 44th essay Liu Hsieh states that the refined linguistic expressions (tz’u\(^{[112]}\)) are not decisive, that it is imperative to study one’s own art (shu) which embodies more than verbal elegance\(^{[54]}\). Liu Hsieh underlined the necessity of a
complex view of art, of its complex use. "To be comprehensive, the talented (writer) must know art. If he lacks either the comprehensive view, or does not elevate the essential and avoid many details, how can he possibly harness his feelings for a drive through the garden of literature?"

The art of writing ought to be not only comprehensive, but also self-restrained (chih[113][56]), similarly as it is in a game of chess. Thought must not be allowed to go in for combinations that would go counter to the rules of the game; it is impossible not to adhere to the rules of art, to discard them. The book devotes considerable space to questions dealing with elements and the structure of a literary work: tropes, figures of speech, style, the question of composition and of different genres. It should not be forgotten that Chinese men of letters never, not even during periods of a relatively relaxed régime were quite free of the straight-jacket of the limiting principle that was applied in every field of activity. None could get beyond the frontiers of what the Sage of antiquity permitted.

But the concept of literary and artistic genius was likewise unknown to Chinese Taoist tradition, although the latter came closer to it – at least in a certain sense – than did the Confucian tradition. A point of interest here is that the concept of mind as a mirror figures, as we have seen already, also in the Taoist tradition: however, it must be a mind trained to it. Chuang-tzu called this process a "fasting of the mind" (hsin ch'ai[114]). "Don't listen with your ears", Confucius is alleged to have said to his disciple Yen Hui[115], "listen with your mind. No, don't listen with your mind, but listen with your spirit. Listening stops with ears, the mind stops with recognition, but the spirit is empty and waits on all things. The Way gathers in emptiness alone. Emptiness is the fasting of the mind."

Alone a mind that is hungry and thirsty due to the fasting of this kind is prepared adequately to respond to impulses from the ambient world. Chuang-tzu took note of the milieu, the universe, but particularly of man precisely in this manner. He listened to voices of people around him and of those that had gone before him, analysed their thoughts and "expounded them in old and outlandish terms, in brash and bombastic language, in unbound and unbordered phrases, abandoning himself to the times without partisanship, no looking at things from one angle only. He believed that the world was drowned in turbidity and that it was impossible to address it in sober language."

One may quite agree with James J. Y. Liu, an eminent expert in the field of traditional Chinese literary criticism, when he states that it is not exaggeration "to say that the Chuang Tzu has influenced Chinese artistic sensibility more profoundly than any other single book. Although not concerned with art or literature, it has inspired poets, artists, and critics for centuries..."

One of the ideas that reached the consciousness of Chinese literary theoreticians through the intermediary of the book Chuang-tzu is that of an ineffability of the essence, of the deeper layer or higher spheres of meaning reaching beyond a simple semblance appearing in every-day phenomena or "shallow" truths. Words have their value which is codified in their meaning. However, meaning often cannot be captured, expressed in words, and thus, that which is then embodied in books need not be that which is most valuable. For according to the Chuang-tzu: "What can you look at and see are forms and colours; what you can listen to and hear are names and sounds. What a pity! – that the men of the world should suppose that form and colour, name and sound are sufficient to
convey the truth of a thing. It is because in the end they are not sufficient to convey truth that 'those who know do not speak, those who speak do not know'60.'"

This myth of "ineffability" which originally referred to Tao, though in the Chuang-tzu it also involved deeper layers of the meaning of individual words, came to be extended to what has been earlier referred to here as "ars" in the Chinese literary world. According to Chuang-tzu art cannot be learnt: "You can get it in your hand and feel it in your mind", said the wheelwright Pien[116] to the Duke Huan[117] in one of Chuang-tzu's parables, but "you can't put it into words, and yet there's a knack (shu[118]) to it somehow, I can't teach it to my son, and he can't learn it from me61.'"

Knack, as an ingenious device, a faculty of doing things adroitly, according to Chuang-tzu, is an uncommunicative affair. We are persuaded of this also by another parable about the woodworker Ch'ing[119]62. Neither was he able adequately to elucidate in what the magic attraction of his art (shu) resided, although he could point to certain conditions of this art as "fasting of the mind", concentration, experience, acting in harmony with Heavenly nature(t'ien hsing[120]), hence, with a natural makeup (ku jan[121]), as this phenomenon is termed in the episode of the cook called Ting[122], who was cutting up an ox for Lord Wen-hui[123]63. The first and the last of these episodes became particularly popular in the Chinese literary and artistic world. Both are mentioned by Liu Hsieh in his essay Shen-ssu[124] Spiritual Thought, where he characterises such clever ways of doing things as a basic art (shou-shu[125]) and a great beginning (ta tuan[126]) of every effort at writing64.

Confucian-minded Liu Hsieh understood the parables of Chuang-tzu within the framework of a systemo-structural entity of his own critical views in which ineffability and noncommunicativeness became lost. Although Chuang-tzu's message became distorted, the important thing is that writers took contact with it. From the third century A. D. onwards, the requirement of "ars" became conditio sine qua non for every work of art.

Liu Hsieh put an original interpretation on yet another Taoist idea, the so-called spiritual wanderings or travellings (yu[127]) or Heavenly wanderings (t'ien yu[128]65), which is likewise associated with mind. These wanderings do not simply imply real journeys, they are undertaken always "within ourselves", "by means of inward contemplation"66. They are, in reality, waking dreams. From among numerous references to these wanderings, Liu Hsieh chose the most sober one: it is connected with the life history of Prince Mou[129] of Wei[130] who lived in retirement and said to a certain Chan-tzu[131]: "My body is here beside these rivers and seas, but my mind still back there beside the palace towers of Wei67.'"

As a matter of fact, Liu Hsieh characterised this process of Heavenly wandering by the term shen-ssu which Vincent Yu-chung Shih translated into English as "spiritual thought" or "imagination"68 and James J. Y. Liu as "intuitive thinking"69. "Spiritual thought" or "thinking" is probably better.

According to Liu Hsieh: "When a writer reflects, his mind roams in the distance. As he concentrates on his musing in silence, his thought attains things that are on the confines of millenia. Even by the least motion of his face his look penetrates into a distance of a thousand miles. By his songs and poems he evokes the sounds of pearls and jade and before his eye-brows and eye-lashes there appear wild winds and rolling clouds. It is the
outcome of his reflections (ssu-li\[132\]). With the aid of the delicacy of this musing, the spirit roams (through space) together with natural phenomena (wu\[19\])[70]."

Liu substituted the more philosophical and reflective thought or thinking (ssu\[133\]) for the more mystical and more dreamy travelling or wandering. To translate shen-ssu by the term imagination as was done by Professor Shih, is less correct, that is to say, if shen-ssu implied imagination, then this was imagination in a very simple form as the "power responsible for visual images, simply or in association\[71\]." Chuang-tzu's wanderings, on the other hand, involved usually a capacity "transcending the reason" which had for aim to achieve "mystical vision".

But neither in the subsequent development of ancient Chinese aesthetics was imagination known to anyone as a creative device, as "that intellectual lens through the medium of which the poetical observer sees the objects of his observations, modified both in form and colour; or it is that inventive dresser of dramatic tableau by which the persons of the play are invested with new drapery, or placed in new attitudes, or it is that chemical faculty by which elements of the most different nature and distant origin are blended together into one harmonious and homogenous whole\[72\]." This is valid all the more for Coleridge's concept which would be impossible in the traditional Chinese world of literature and art. Neither the so-called secondary imagination which "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate\[73\]", nor the so-called primary imagination which should be a "repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM\[74\]", has a place in the Chinese cultural realm which never knew individualism of the kind current in romantic Europe. Such an individualism would have disrupted the long-established relations between the Three Powers and destroyed their harmony.

If genius is something more than ingenium, if it is an artistic genius and an individual that has achieved much or at least something great or unusual in the literary development, then the book Chuang-tzu may be said to have indicated the vision not of a genius, but rather of some sort of an anti-genius, a demonic genius bent on destroying values socially recognised though not justified in all their aspects. Earlier we referred to Chuang-tzu's conviction that it was not possible to address the contemporary world of his times in sober language. Language, style as the mode of its organisation, was in the book Chuang-tzu subordinated to a higher goal, to the acquisition of freedom by an individual who was thus to rid himself of the slavery of conventional values. It may well be that the ineffability of "ars" spoken of above, this typical "je-ne-sais-quoi", is a part of the strategy just mentioned. And this applies also to certain paradoxes that are without an ending: the anecdote is given but replica non sequitur\[75\]. Readers educated in the Confucian tradition must have found provocative the various anecdotes connected with Confucius himself and his disciples, their pronouncements which inevitably had a parodic or at least a satirical intent. Likewise, the choice of his heroes, too, was nonconventional: cripples, bandits, criminals were meant to shock the readers and bring them at least to start doubting about the values that were presented to them as true\[76\]. The genius of Chuang-tzu and of his pupils, however, failed to set up a positive alternative to their iconoclastic work. Any theoretical considerations on genius in the Confucian tradition would of necessity be antiprogrammatic, for genius there was not only superfluous, but also undesirable, destructive element. Everything positive, creative had been codified by ancient Sages; their descendants had to be mere commentators of what had already been said, adjusters of old teaching to new conditions, indicators of the transformation of the Way in new works.
All the above Chinese concepts of mind and their metaphors share one common property: they are only reflectors of a certain reality which is outside the writers or artists themselves, eventually is within them but they are personally never the projectors, lighthouses showing the way forward.

Not even the most provocative statements found in the book Chuang-tzu, or those written by Mencius, likewise influenced by Taoism, intended to be positive indicators of something new, a liberation of man from the mighty fetters of dogmas with a view to achieve a free development of personality. Personal freedom in Chuang-tzu was rather of a destructive-anarchist, but not of a positively creative nature. Chuang-tzu said: "Heaven and Earth were born at the same time I was, and the ten thousand things are one with me." But these words are in the context where we find this assertion: "There is nothing in the world bigger than the tip of an autumn hair, and Mount T'ai is tiny. No one has lived longer than a dead child, and P'eng-tsu[134] died young77." Can we then believe the author? Is it not a mere expression of his thesis that all things and opinions are equal or an imitation of the logical paradoxes of his friend Hui-tzu[135]? Old Mencius in turn said: "The ten thousand things are there complete, inside me (or us, M. G.79)." He thereby meant evidently that mind may constitute an enormous treasury of knowledge, impression and perceptions if it be used as a mirror. But neither this last, nor the preceding idea was developed anywhere either in the philosophical or aesthetic direction. They may well have become a nursery of heresies.

China had, of course, its literary geniuses. Ch'ü Yüan[136] (ca 343–ca 290 B.C.), T'ao Yüan-ming[137] (365–427), Li Po[138] (701–762), Tu Fu, Su Tung-p'o[139] (1036–1101), Kuan Han-ch'ing[140] (thirteenth century), P'u Sung-ling[141] (1640–1715), Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in[142] (1715–1764) and others are proof thereof. These are primarily lyric geniuses, lyricism being one of the principal traits of Chinese poetry and partly also of fiction and drama.

The convictions of Chuang-tzu and Mencius quoted above on the oneness of the individual and the cosmos, or about the cosmic presence in us, may possibly have been an expression of faith, among other things, behind which was concealed a large amount of lyricism so typical for Chinese poetry and literature in general. T. A. Hsia was of the opinion that self-expression was the main trend in Chinese traditional literature79. It might be observed here that it would be more correct to understand by self-expression the manifestations of romantic and postromantic literature, although in all probability T. A. Hsia thereby meant lyricism, for it seems that both the concepts were to him very close in meaning. Self-expression is but an extreme manifestation of an individualist and lyric vision.

Traditional Chinese literature differs from ancient Greek and the greater part of European literature precisely through this lyric vision of reality and this was due to different relations and affinities. The mimetic approach, proper to the Western literary world, was accentuared by a dramatic and epic procedure, with emphasis being laid on the active or descriptive aspect. The reflective approach to the reality, on the other hand, underlined the lyric, reflexive side; that is why the element chih, i.e. feelings or inclinations found such an application in the first definitions of Chinese poetry. Lyricism proved to be the most effective means of the traditional Chinese poetry and lyric vision was significantly employed also in fiction80 and drama81.
According to Burton Watson, the songs of the *Book of Poetry* are pure "vignettes of feeling. Sometimes they describe a scene, sometimes they tell a story, but more often the scene and the story are outside the poem or merely hinted at within it, the body of the poem given up to an expression of the emotions they arouse. For this reason it is often possible to say with assurance that such and such a poem is about love or anguish or desertion, but not exactly what kind of love or anguish, whose, or why." Lyricism of Chinese poetry played a role also where its task was to comment on social and political events and therefore to serve the didactic and aesthetic aims. Thus poetry, if it was of a truly high quality, became the appropriate vehicle for socio-political criticism.

The problem of lyricism in Chinese poetry, literature and art has not been as yet sufficiently investigated. In addition to the reasons given above, lyricism was also aided by the nature of ancient Chinese, e.g. no indication of number of nouns, or of the time of verbs. Chinese poets rarely made use of personal pronouns, thereby enhancing the power of allusion. A rare exception was Ch'ü Yuan: in his poem *Li-sao* [143] *Encountering Sorrow* he made use of every possible form of personal pronoun in ancient Chinese.

The most important fountainhead of Chinese lyricism, however, has to be looked for in the unity of the Three Powers, in the anti-individual and anti-alienating principle (in relation to the society and the universe) proper to the people of Chinese civilisation of the traditional period. The relation of man and poet towards the cosmos was always proportional despite the most diverse modes of styles. The poet embodied in it only as much as was *dignum et justum*, hence decorous, and in agreement with the principle of *li* [59]. The above convictions of Chuang-tzu and Mencius one can apply also to two lines from the first poem called *Hsiung hun* [144] *Great Chaos* from the cycle *Erh-shih-ssu shih p'in* [145] *Twenty-four Properties of Poetry* by Ssu-k'ung Tu [146] (837–908): Chi chien wei hsiung, chü pei wan wu [147] which M. A. Robertson translates as follows: "Gather strength and become bold. Hold all creation in your sway," and Academician V. M. Alekseev by words that could be rendered in English as follows: "I gather strength in me and it is my power. All nature resides in me – in all its millions". Both translations may be judged to be correct. But Alekseev has added the author's subject which originally did not belong to the text of the poem. The poem is in fact a manifestation of the unity of the Three Powers, although the poet in it is passed over under silence. Hun [148] chaos is nothing else but hun-tun [149] chaos in Lao-tzu [150] [85], something "preceding the creation of life" and this, together with "all creation" or "all nature" (wan wu [41]) corresponds to the universe, including Heaven and Earth.

Suppressing the subject does not imply its nonexistence, on the contrary, in Chinese poetry not to mention the poet is an expedient frequently employed how to express him. For why should a tiny bit of ice bearing up the ocean make claims to life? Sooner or later it must melt away in the immense masses of waters [87].

Lyrics in Chinese literature, similarly as in other literatures of the world, is a genre without a plot and therefore, the causal arrangement of the various elements that constitute it is not essential to it. It is assumed that the author speaks in it of his relation to the world, mankind, man and the universe. It is precisely the absence of the plot, of *subject*, that enhances the suggestiveness. The same can be said about the quasi-absence of the poet's subject in the poem. The weakening of the causal arrangement of the various elements is a characteristic feature of Chinese literary works in general, as was clearly shown in the study of the traditional Chinese novel. A certain lyric vision whether of Chinese fiction or drama is recognised as an attribute of these genres.
Lyricism in poetry is also emphasised by the choice of themes frequently met with in Chinese poems: nature, time, recalling of antiquity, wandering, nostalgia, parting with friends, wives or husbands, rapture with wine, and of course, friendship and love. Lyrics was and had to be a manifestation of wen jou tun hou[151], i.e. of feelings and thoughts that were “moderate, gentle, sincere and deep”. Only such works were recognised by official criticism. In Chinese society nobody could permit himself not to keep a check over his feelings. Not even one who may have been outside it, but still lived within its reach. This was valid all the more for those who were either socially or politically active. Even such a genius as Tu Fu “may revolt at the idea of war, and of men killing their fellow-men in battle, but he trumpets forth no summons to do away with the evil. Chinese poets sing of war and its glories, but no Chinese has ever written a ‘Marseilleaise’.” The role of poets in old Chinese society never was one of exercising the function of the highest judges, prophets, of a socio-political avant-garde, or its prominent component. Using his mind as a mirror, a poet or writer had only to satirise and admonish, i.e feng chien[152]. The mirrored reflection then may (but need not) have been taken note of by the Emperor and those in power. They may (but need not) have taken action to remedy things. In this way, poems supplemented to a certain extent works of history which in turn, again using their authors’ minds as mirrors, were supposed to praise and blame (pao pien[153]).

A study of the history of Western literatures reveals that the most significant changing metaphor in the romantic and postromantic period was represented by a certain projecting power which W. B. Yeats designated by the word “lamp”, though it might be characterised by other terms, equally suitable.

The process of mirroring, its metaphoric representation, was well known in old European criticism, beginning with Plato. It was familiar also to English philosophers of the seventeenth century, e.g. John Locke. The process of projecting was known to Western philosophy and aesthetics since the times of Plotinus (204 – ca 270), the founder of the Roman school of Neoplatonism, according to whom the sculptor Pheidias “wrought the Zeus upon no model among things of sense but by apprehending what form Zeus must take if he chose to become manifest to sight.” Such a statement could not be possible if Plotinus had believed only in mimesis. This concept has a very strong religious or mystical background. Contact with Plotinus in this was taken up by English Platonists who adapted similar views to Christian teachings; thus, for instance, the mind became the “Candle of the Lord.” From these, it was but a step to English romanticism. A similar process took place in Germany with like results, thanks especially to A. W. Schlegel, F. Schlegel, F. Schiller, J. G. Herder and others.

The process of projecting, however, would not be possible without an elaboration of the theory of feelings and emotions. The definitions of poetry by Wordsworth or J. S. Mill did not come out of the blue. They were likewise preceded by a long-term evolution, going back perhaps to Aristotle’s catharsis, but certainly to some insights of Horace through the philosopher Longinus who lived in Rome in the first century A.D., the author of Peri Hypousai (On the Sublime), up to their most direct predecessors of the end of the eighteenth century. According to Longinus, sublimity “is the echo of a great soul.” One of the sources of this “sublime” is “inspired and vehement passion (or emotion)."
As seen above, the process of mirroring was known in China at least from the times of Chuang-tzu. Feelings and emotions were the corner-stone of the first Chinese poetic theory generally, but because of the moderate, ethical, antihedonist and conservative character of traditional Chinese philosophy, feelings never became the decisive factor of human being, they never influenced the concept of human mind to the extent as in Europe of the Romantic Age.

Similarly as in Europe, so also in China the word "nature" boasts of a rich history and abundant metamorphoses. One of its meanings is given by the character hsing[154], but in Chinese philosophy and very often also in literary criticism, it is associated with the character ch'ing[18] feelings – very familiar to us by now. Nature, or better human nature and feelings are often like two inseparable twins and together with "mind" go to make the trio in which mind plays the role of a censor.

In the first part of this study we pointed to the views on mind as we know them from the works of Chuang-tzu and Hsün-tzu. Both these authors differed in their views on human nature and on mind. Subsequent development came to incline towards Hsün-tzu, without of course acknowledging the debt, for this author did not belong among orthodox Confucian philosophers.

According to Chuang-tzu, human nature loses its true character if various manifestations of feelings are either accepted or suppressed. The reason is that "the five notes confuse the ear and cause the hearing to be unclear", or "the five odors stimulate the nose and produce weariness and congestion in the forehead", or "the five flavours dull the mouth, causing the sense of taste to be impaired and lifeless", and lastly, "likes and dislikes unsettle the mind and cause the nature to become volatile and flighty". Chuang-tzu’s advice was to have a completely detached attitude towards feelings, an absolute control, using the mind as the instrument of it.

Hsün-tzu held a different view: "That which at birth is so, is called nature (hsing)...The love (hao[155]), hate (o[25]), joy (hsi[20]), anger (nu[21]), sorrow (ai[22]) and pleasure (yüeh[15]) are called feelings. When, the feelings being so, the mind selects from among them, this is called cogitation (lü[157])... The feelings are the elements (chih[158]) of nature and desires (yü[16]) are reactions of the feelings...Although the desires cannot be fully fulfilled, it is possible to come near to this aim. Although the desires cannot disappear, it is possible to restrain them (chieh[159])".

This restriction or regulation of human feelings or desires became typical – the guiding principle for the subsequent twenty-two centuries of Chinese history. At the beginning of Christian era, in the first centuries A. D., yet another Indian, Buddhist concept was added to the indigenous Confucian and Taoist ones, that of klesa (fan-nao[160]), i.e. passion, which had a strongly pejorative colouring and thereby the possibility of changing the metaphor of mind from a reflecting to a projecting one was totally ruled out. Feelings, desires or passions had to be held in check or toned down or blunted, in accordance with the needs and requirements of various teachings or their representatives.

The concept of feeling, however, appeared also later in the history of Chinese literary criticism. The first such period was the Golden Age of Chinese literary criticism from the third up to the sixth century A. D. According to Lu Chi, "poetry originates from feelings (shih yüan ch’ing[161]) and should be exquisite as fine patterned silk." The word yüan[162] also means cause, to cause, destiny, affinity.
Feelings are often mentioned also by the great critic Liu Hsieh and Feelings and Ornamentation (Ch'ing-ts'ai[163]) is even the title of the 31st essay of his book. Among the three patterns making up art, he refers, besides "formal pattern" (hsing-wen[164]) suitable for creating art, also to "sound pattern" (sheng-wen[165]) suitable for music, and "emotional pattern" (ch'ing-wen[166]) indispensable for the production of literary works103. It may be of interest to note that he lays particular stress on the significance if the emotional element when he writes that old poems (he thereby meant those from The Book of Poetry) "were created on the basis of feelings" (wei ch'ing erh tsao wen[167]104), while the descriptive poems fu[168] and sung[169] from the Later Han dynasty "were made for the purpose of eliciting feelings" (wei wen erh tsao ch'ing[170]105). A literary work will be true and approximate (yüeh[171]106) when it derives from feelings.

In Liu Hsieh's system, feelings are dichotomously bound to li[172] orderly principle. "When the feelings are moved, they are formed in words, and when the orderly principle comes into being, then literature arises107." Or, "When the feelings and orderly principle are established, literature and its ornamentation will be realised108."

At other times there is a dichotomic bond between feelings and human nature. In accordance with the usage of the Later Han dynasty, Liu Hsieh stated that the word shih[173] poetry is the same as ch'i[174] to hold109. Poetry then "holds the human feelings and nature (within proper boundaries110)." It should be remembered that in the Chinese philosophical world after Tung Chung-shu[175] (179?–104? B. C.), hsing-ch'ing[176] or ch'ing-hsing[177] were understood in the closest relation with mind: "That which confines the multitude of evil things within, and prevents them from appearing externally, is the mind. Therefore, the mind is known as the confiner ... Heaven has his restraints over the yin[178] and yang[179], and the individual has his confiner of the feelings and desires; in this way he is at one with the course of Heaven111." Liu Hsieh went so far as to assume that beauty in literary works has its origin in this restrained "human nature and feelings"112; that explains why he held Confucian classics as models of literary beauty.

After Liu Hsieh, this "emotional" view of literature was taken over also by the critic Chung Hung[180] (483–513): "The spirit (ch'i[?]) sets the things in motion, the things influence man, hence human nature and feelings are agitated and seek expression in dancing and singing. The Three Powers are illuminated and all existence is beautified113."

When enframed in the broader philosophical, ethical and aesthetic context of traditional China, these very concise statements tell us that here too restrained human nature and feelings are involved as the foundation stone of literary expression.

If European historians of literary criticism are startled by the discovery that fully fourteen centuries lay between Plotinus and his "close" followers on the road of "creative imagination", the Schlegel brothers or Coleridge, and perhaps even sixteen centuries between these last and Longinus, the apostle of vehement passion (enthousiastic pathos), of strong feelings and sublimity, then there is hardly any reason to wonder that an enhanced interest in feelings in China was aroused only in the sixteenth century A. D., hence approximately one millennium after Liu Hsieh.

It would be, of course, a gross error were we to assume that Chinese literary critics after the sixth century A. D. did not reflect on the category of feelings. The names of scores of those who made use of this category are known, among them such authorities
as the great poet Po Chü-i [183] (772–846), his friend Yüan Chen [184] (779–831), Chang Chieh [185] (1131–1162), author of Sui Han-t'ang shih-hua [186], and even Li Meng-yang [187] (1472–1529) who believed in "back-to-antiquity" (fu-ku [188]) in literature, although Ch'ing had a very important place in his literary criticism [144].

The "emotional Renaissance" in China had its philosophical, social and literary causes. It should, however, be emphasised here that despite this "emotional Renaissance" and critical interest in feelings as a recognised category of Chinese literary criticism, feelings or emotions failed to contribute to a change in Chinese literary and artistic orientation. Even despite the assigning of man to the highest "triat" in the Confucian universe as a parallel power comparable to Heaven and Earth, despite the assurance that the mind of man is identical with the mind of the universe and the only agent capable of reflecting this universe, of portraying it either in literary or artistic manner, no wider space has ever been given to man than that provided to him by the mutual relations and the range of competence of the individual members of the "triat". Man could not re-make the other two participating Powers to his own image according to his own imagination or fancy. There always existed minimal conditions for an outstanding and mainly, for a socially positive, creative individual and for individualism generally.

"Ego" in China was always looked upon as on a greater or smaller sum of various "egos"; man as a physical, moral and social being had always been a part of some higher unit, the family, the clan, the village, etc. The European slogan Stadluft macht frei was never valid in China, for nobody succeeded in freeing himself from the fetters that bound him to the wider or narrower social unit from which he came. Literature and art in general served to petrify the society and the traditional dogmas, and not to break them down; at the most, they helped to adapt these dogmas to new conditions. In China there were no broader platforms that would have allowed to preach the freedom in the realm of thought or scholarship (as the universities in Europe). Every such endeavour would have disrupted the monolith of Confucian teaching, and institutions that were built up on Confucian ideas.

A man of strong passions, a complex personality, deeply tragic or dramatic characters, forceful temperaments could not be of interest to traditional Chinese axiology for they could be a danger to the establishment. Passions had to be repressed or held within the proper boundaries, and tragic or dramatic situations had only very questionable place in literature of a lyric character. And ultimately here, too, ethical reasons were found and advanced; although tragedies could take place in life, they were a matter for that group of people whom they affected and did not belong to literature, nor could they become public. Chinese poetry never created characters (with the exceptions of lyric ones), individualised portraits, but rather social and ethical types: the soldier-hero, the bandit, the monk, the servant or maid, the courtesan which cannot be judged as an original expression of individualism in literature, but as an embodiment of an ethical and social typification having for aim the principle spoken of above: to praise and blame. Of course, they also had an aesthetic function, too.

As seen above, the concept of a creative personality in traditional China developed along different lines from those in European antiquity or in the neo-classic and romantic times. And this concept did not alter even in the post-romantic period, and became substantially modified only in the twentieth century as a result of the impact of European philosophy, literary criticism, creative literature and art [115].
Nor was the concept of genius known to high antiquity in Europe. Greco-Roman age and traditional China resemble on this point. In the ancient period, a great man used to be a “hero”, e.g. in mythology, or also a philosopher; to the Romans he was *vir illustris*, a great poet or writer. However, antiquity did create conditions for the subsequent birth of the concept of genius in the Italian Renaissance. At least three if them have already been spoken of above: Longinus and his teaching on the sublime, Plotinus and his idea concerned with the work of art as being something more than a pure reflection of reality, and the demiurge, the divine craftsman who creates. The origin of the concept of genius was undoubtedly influenced by Socrates teaching on *daimonion*, Plato’s teaching on enthusiasm, and others.\(^1\)

A lyric vision prevailing in traditional Chinese literature helped to create great works, as did a dramatic or epic vision in European literature. A certain lack of imagination, or of the dramatic art (as leading to the catastrophe or consummation) in China was made up for by a fine and suggestive lyricism. But things did not go so well in the domain of developmental, evolitional tendencies. The anti-individual and limiting principles spoken of earlier, held unquestionable sway in every domain of human activity and prevented any conspicuous development, literature being no exception. The latter, of course, had its own specific features. Thus, for instance, one may make out fairly clearly the characteristic traits of literary works according to the various periods, especially of the ruling dynasties.\(^2\) But conditions were never created in traditional China for a literary development in which such violent a change would have taken place as witnessed in Europe towards the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, in the transition from neo-classicism to romanticism. The prerequisites for such a great change in China were missing both in the socio-economic foundation and in the super-structure. Nothing took place there that could be compared even from afar to the English Industrial Revolution or Great French Revolution. Social consciousness (and literature being a part of it) reacts sensitively, though through mediation, to social being. In China there were no discussion on original genius or creative imagination, or on feelings vs. reason, as in Europe.\(^3\)

The concept of creative personality, creative only within the framework of Tao, the Three Powers, and chiefly in the realm of lyric vision remained nearly the same through the many centuries of the existence of the traditional Chinese literature up to the beginning of the twentieth century.

The slow development, however, and the hardly changing concept of creative personality in China did not exert unfavourable impact on the great works of Chinese literature. But it did act as a brake on the general social development which became reflected, to China’s disadvantage, in every realm over the last centuries, and in the second half of the last century also in the literary domain.

Notes

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 69.

Shih-chi hui-chu k'ao-cheng[33], ed. by Takigawa Kametaro, chapter Yin pen-chi[34], Peking 1955, p. 32.


Li-chi cheng-i[39], SPPY ed., Taipei 1966, chapter 19, p. 1A.


Watson's Chuang Tzu p. 142 and A Concordance to Chuang Tzu, p. 33.

Loc. cit.


Ibid., vol. 1, p. 1.

Loc. cit.


Wen-hsin tiao-lung chu, vol. 1, p. 3.

Loc. cit.

Loc. cit.

Ibid., p. 1.

Ibid., p. 3.

Hsün-tzu, chapter 21, p. 7A.


The traditional concept of ts'ai was never satisfactorily elucidated in sinological scholarship. For the early use of these concepts see F. A. Petrovsky, “Ingenium – ars”, Eirene, 2, 1964, pp. 57–69.


Loc. cit.


Cf. James J. Y. Liu, Chinese Theories of Literature, p. 85.


A Concordance to Meng Tzu, p. 56.

Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 287 and Hsün-tzu, chapter 23, p. 6B.


Wen-hsin tiao-lung chu, vol. 1, p. 3 and The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons, p. 12.


Wang Ch'ung devoted one whole chapter of his book to the idea of tso.


The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons, p. 156.

Ibid., p. 506 and 161.


Ibid., p. 95.


The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons, p. 154.

James J. Y. Liu, *Chinese Theories of Literature,* p. 31.


Ibid., p. 153 and 36.

Ibid., pp. 205–206 and 50.

Ibid., pp. 50–51 and 7–8.


Ibid., p. 389.

Loc. cit.


Cf. ibid., p. 4 and 18.

Ibid., p. 43 and *A Concordance to Chuang Tzu,* p. 5.


A *Concordance to Meng Tzu,* p. 51.


Ibid., p. 389.

Loc. cit.


Cf. ibid., p. 4 and 18.

Ibid., p. 43 and *A Concordance to Chuang Tzu,* p. 5.


A *Concordance to Meng Tzu,* p. 51.


Ibid., p. 389.


Cf. the motto to the book by M. H. Abrams.

Ibid., p. 57.

Quoted according to W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and C. Brooks, op. cit., p. 117.

M. H. Abrams, op. cit., pp. 5-60

See the chapter German Ideas in Wimsatt's and Brooks' book.


James J. Y. Liu, *Chinese Theories of Literature*, p. 28.


Ibid., p. 538.

Loc. cit.

Loc. cit.

Ibid., p. 505.

Ibid., p. 543.


+Wen-hsin tiao-lung chu*, vol. 1, p. 65.


Cf. my paper read at the 9th Congress of International Comparative Association (AICL), Innsbruck (1979) to be published in *The Proceedings of the 9th Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association*.