Again on Qing
With a Translation of the Guodian Xing zi ming chu

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I Introduction

The application of contemporary psychological concepts to Chinese historical psychology is flawed by terminological obfuscation. At the roots of this problem there are many reasons, particularly an imprecise understanding of the history and content of these contemporary concepts and their transfer into the realm of philology and cultural sciences where they may be used as interpretive-analytical framework for reading and interpretation.

A prominent case in this regard is the much debated term qing 情. Following up an essential debate on definitional issues and their consequences for discriminating emotion from related but fundamentally different affective processes, states, and traits among researches of the social and behavioral sciences,1 the present paper is intended to meet four goals: (1) introducing current definitions of emotion and related affective phenomena which are useful for a better understanding of the often opaque accounts in early Chinese texts constrained by formal and stylistic features; (2) reviewing the most important opinions concerning the concept of qing since the classical study of Angus C. Graham;2 (3) defining the meaning, scope, and foundations of the concept of qing within the early Chinese tradition of moral psychology vis-à-vis a web of questions surrounding motivation and human agency, philosophy of mind, action theory, and ethics; and (4) sketching out the general content and purpose of the Guodian Xing zi ming chu 性自命出 (XZMC) (Nature from Decree Issues), in which qing plays an important role in motivation and affect regulation and is crucial to control of social behavior. Again, contemporary advances in the affective sciences will help to understand what

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1 See, e.g., Paul R. Kleinginna and Anna M. Kleinginna, “A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition,” Motivation and Emotion 5 (1981), 345–379; Beverley Fehr and James A. Russell, “Concept of Emotion Viewed from a Prototype Perspective,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 113 (1984), 464–486; and Klaus R. Scherer, “What Are Emotions? And How Can They Be Measured?” Social Science Information 44.4 (2005), 695–729, who underlines that “[w]ithout consensual conceptualizations and operationalization of exactly what phenomenon is to be studied, progress in theory and research is difficult to achieve and fruitless debates are likely to proliferate” (695). This is generally true also for historical and cross-cultural investigations into the different affective phenomena and their place in the human condition.

2 “The Meaning of Ch’ing,” appended to Graham’s “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” Qinghua xuebao 清華學報 (Ts’ing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies), n.s., 5.1–2 (1967), 215–274. To facilitate comparison with Graham’s critics, reference here is to the reprint version in Angus C. Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), 7–66, esp. 59–65. Note that in this version the important concluding sentence of the original is absent. Graham in this sentence says: “Here it is plain that ch’ing is not simply Hsün-tzu’s word for ‘passion’, since the passions are as much responses as the desires” (Ts’ing Hua version, 265). Cf. also n. 94 below.
the ancient Chinese authors of Xing zi ming chu might have had in mind but expressed in a format less analytical and less exhaustive than modern researchers do.

Overall, this study suggests that qing when applied to animate entities (humans and animals) belongs to a group of words which are grounded on some observations about projective conditions and states of affectivity, and hence comes close to the modern concept of emotion in cognitive-motivational-relational and multi-component emotion theories. And yet, although qing refers to emotion in particular contexts, it covers a much broader range of affective phenomena with different profiles and design features. Qing still has this broad meaning range in late imperial Chinese discourses on human nature. The specific meaning of “love” or “erotic (passionate) love,” commonly associated with what came to be known as the “cult of qing,” is only one sense of the word already present in pre-Qin texts.

II The Problem of Terminology

Affective phenomena include preferences, attitudes, moods, affect dispositions (emotion traits), interpersonal stances, and the emotions. For these types of affect, which are discussed below according to decreasing strength of event focus, I shall provide minimal definitions based on previous scientific proposals, in particular by emotion psychologist Klaus R. Scherer, and give illustrations from the early Chinese sources. We will see that generic descriptions related to the respective design features of these affect types are rooted in the complex notion of qing or are linked to it by indirection and/or implication.

1 Emotions

“Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition,” Beverly Fehr and James A. Russell aptly remarked in a key article on the concept of “emotion” that presents a particularly thorny problem, even today, more than a century after William James posed the classical question “What Is an Emotion?” (1884). Although it seems difficult to answer James’s question satisfactorily and define emotions in a way everybody – scientists and laymen – would agree upon, there is a general acceptance that emotions are episodes of a set of interrelated, synchronized subevents elicited by a specific stimulus event. Very similar to this definition, early Chinese writers observed that emotions need such a stimulus event – in ancient Chinese terms wu 物, “thing(s),” “object(s)” – to occur. That is, something must happen to the organism which stimulates or triggers a response after having been evaluated by that organism for its significance.

This stimulus-response mechanism is described in the famous opening section of the Liji 礼记 “Yueji” 謡記 (Records of Music) chapter. Only after “being aroused” (gan 感) by external “things” the psychic process is set in “motion” (dong 動). Likewise, XZMC says, “When it
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comes to the [emotions'] external manifestation, then it is because things evoked them,8 and further that “what moves [human] nature (and the emotions as inherent part of it), are things.”9 Often such events consist of natural phenomena, inanimate objects, the behavior of other people or animals, or the vicissitudes of life that may have some relevance for human wellbeing. Consider the following examples:

1.1 Natural phenomena:

大風至, 大雨隨之。裂帷幕, 破俎豆, 險廊瓦。坐者散走, 平公恐懼, 伏於廊室之間。8

[Then] great wind arrived, and great rain followed it. These tore tents and curtains, broke the stands for meal and cups, and swept down the tiles of the gallery. The audience dispersed, while Duke Ping [of Jin 晉平公 (r. 557–532 BCE)] was frightened and terrified, and hid himself in the gallery room.

1.2 Inanimate objects:

墟墓之間, 未施哀於民而民哀。社稷宗廟之中, 未施敬於民而民敬。9

Between ruins and tombs nothing [actively] imparts grief on the people, and yet the people are grieving there. At the altars of soil and grain and the ancestral temples nothing [actively] imparts reverence on the people, and yet the people are reverent there.

1.3 Behavior of other people or animals:

二年, 春, 宋督攻孔氏, 殺孔父而取其妻。公怒, 督懼, 遂弒殤公。10

In the second year, in spring, [Huafu] Du of Song attacked Kong Fu’s mansion, killed him, and took his wife. Duke [Shang of Song 宋殤公 (r. 719–711 BCE), a relative of Huafu Du], was angry about him, and Du therefore terrified. [Afraid of punishment, he] then murdered Duke Shang, too.

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6 及其見於外, 則物取之也。Xing zi ming chu shuwen zhushi 性自命出釋文注釋, S2, in Guodian Chumu zhujian 郭店楚墓竹簡, ed. Jingmen shi bowuguan 荊門市博物館 (Beijing: Wenwu, 1998), 179 (hereafter XZMC). Also see Appendix, 1.1. If not otherwise indicated, here and in the following, all translations are mine. Round brackets in the translation are used to add explanations and examples.

7 凡動性者，物也。XZMC, S10–11, 179; Appendix, 2.2.


9 Liji, 4/10.1313b (“Tan Gong, xia” 檀弓下); cf. Legge, Li chi, 1:191.

10 Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhushu 春秋左傳注疏, commentary by Du Yu 杜預 (222–284), sub-commentary by Kong Yingda (孔穎達) (SSJZS), Huan 2 (710 BCE), 5.1740c (hereafter Zuozhuan); cf. James Legge (trans.), The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, The Ch’i’en Ts’ien with The Ts’o Chi’en (1872; rpt., Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 39.
1.4 Vicissitudes of life:

When Confucius passed by the side of Mount Tai, there was a woman wailing by a grave in deep grief. The Master bowed forward to the cross-bar, and listened to her. Then he sent Zi Lu to inquire. "Your wailing," [Zi Lu] said, "is altogether like that of one who heaped on distress." She replied, "It is so. Formerly, my husband’s father was killed here by a tiger. My husband was also killed here by a tiger, and now my son again was killed here [in the same way]."

In other instances, a person’s own behavior can be the event that elicits the emotion, which is the case with the so-called secondary, social or self-conscious emotions, such as pride, guilt, or shame. Commenting on the decadent, smart youths of his time who richly adorned with showy behavior attract womenfolk in great numbers, Xunzi 荀子, for example, says that even “the average lord would be ashamed to have them as ministers, the average father would be ashamed to have them as sons, the average elder brother would be ashamed to have them as younger brothers, and the average man would be ashamed to have them as friends.”

In addition to such more or less external events that induce a reaction of the organism, internal events are also considered as emotion elicitors. Among the six kinds of dreams, the Zhouli 周禮 lists “delightful dreams” (ximeng 喜夢) and “terrifying dreams” (jumeng 懼夢), which by implication refer to mental imagery that elicits happy or unhappy feelings in a person. One example of a “terrifying dream” is recorded in Zuozhuan 左傳. Marquis Jing of Jin 晉景侯 (r. 599–581 BCE) dreamt of a great demon with enormously long, disheveled hair. Beating its breast and leaping as in mourning, the demon said: “You have slaughtered my grandsons unrighteously. I presented my request to Di.” [The demon then] broke the great gate [of the palace] and entered the inner apartment. The Duke was terrified and went into a [side-]chamber, the door of which the demon also broke. Then the Duke awoke.

In humans, interrelated subevents of the emotion process elicited by a specific stimulus event include responses in three reactive systems: (1) expressive and evaluative language, (2) physiol-
logic changes mediated by the somatic and autonomic systems, and (3) behavioral sequelae.\textsuperscript{15} Regarding the first reactive system, emotions are often experienced as feelings, and sometimes people are willing and able to communicate emotions as well as their feelings to others. The word “feeling” has many meanings. Here it refers to the awareness of situational meaning structure and anticipation that a given mode of action readiness may develop if the situation becomes somehow urgent.\textsuperscript{16} Feeling, then, refers to an experience similar to emotion but belongs to the realm of the virtual, imagery or mere knowledge. The issue is complex and cannot be discussed here at length.\textsuperscript{17} In the linguistic space, the expression “feeling” occurs either together with emotion words (e.g., “I feel angry”) or with words that describe states of affairs (e.g., “I feel insecure”), imposing psychological and affective properties that do not necessarily belong to the state in question so that words are more likely to seem to refer to emotions. When comparing the sentences “I am angry” and “I feel angry,” there is a difference in emphasis. While a feeling like that of anger has the same structure as the corresponding emotion experience, it differs from it in that action tendency does not really press for action. In some natural languages like Old Chinese the linguistic distinction between the “feeling” and the “being” state is missing on the grammatical surface. The distinction between them is only artificially introduced through translation. So it depends on the translator’s reading and analytical skills whether or not the passage in question brings out the emotion aspect or the feeling aspect of the affective situation depicted. Over the past fifty years emotion psychologists, anthropologists, and linguists collected a fairly rich amount of emotion terms and emotion-related expressions,\textsuperscript{18} including metaphors and


\textsuperscript{16} Nico H. Frijda, \textit{The Emotions} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 251–252. The other kind of “feeling,” which Frijda puts in quotation marks, refers to subjective self-contained experiences of an evaluative nature. Feelings in this sense are concomitant with stimulus reception and imply mere acceptance or nonacceptance of the stimulus (an object or situation). Feelings are self-contained and differ from emotion in that they do not necessarily involve action tendency or another mode of action readiness change: a musical note is agreeable or disagreeable, someone pleases the eyes or not. But this does not necessarily alter our behavior. Ibid., 243–245, 253, 362.

\textsuperscript{17} In some recent studies on the nature of emotion, the “James-Lange view” that emotions are perceptions of body states and therefore a sort of “feeling” gained new acclaim. See, e.g., Jesse J. Prinz, \textit{Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion} (Oxford University Press, 2004), “Gut feelings” also play a role in Antonio R. Damasio’s not generally accepted somatic-marker hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, “gut feelings” about the body (somatic state) normally accompany our representations of the anticipated outcomes of options. These feelings, either pleasant or unpleasant, are called markers because they mark particular images. In other words, feelings mark response options to real or simulated decisions. Somatic markers serve as an automatic device to speed one to select biologically advantageous options. Those options that are left unmarked are omitted in the decision-making process. “In short, somatic markers are a special instance of feeling generated from secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, by learning, to predict future outcomes of certain somatic” (Descartes’ Erreur Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain [New York: Gossett/Putnam, 1994], 174, emphases in original). On this issue, see also Damasio’s \textit{The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness} (San Diego: Harcourt, 1995), 40, 41–42, and \textit{Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Human Brain} (New York: Harcourt, 2003), 144–150.

metonymies and other linguistic representations. Most of the examples discussed in this study would add to these lists historical data in cross-cultural perspective. A more difficult case is arts. Visual arts or music have been defined as “languages” and seen as vehicles for rendering people’s conscious states of emotional experience. Yet the expression of emotion in the arts presents a special problem insofar as different aspects must be distinguished: artist and viewer/listener as human agencies of creation and appreciation on the one hand, and content of the work that may, but not necessarily must express emotional meaning, either visually or aurally, on the other.

Coming to the second kind of reaction in emotion, namely, bodily responses that comprise changes in the somatic and autonomic nervous system as well as in the endocrine and immune system, these changes modify specific psychophysiological responses, among them reflex, cardiovascular, electrodermal, gastrointestinal, and pupillary activity. They, too, influence hormone levels and the number of immune and antibody cells. As I have argued elsewhere, early Chinese authors observed these modifications of peripheral components of emotion, but expressed them differently from modern natural sciences in a more direct, “non-scientific” way due to the cultural specificity of the body concept and linguistic coding based upon it with reference, however, to one and the same human biophysical system. The early Chinese data on somatic responses, i.e.,

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changes in the bodily substrates “blood and qi” (xueqi 血氣), and pupillary opening, is large in amount. Consider the following cases, where in each case behavioral sequelae are also present:

1.5 Involvement of cardiovascular symptoms:

憂心如惔 / 不敢戲談22
The anxious hearts are as aflame, / [the people] neither dare to jest or talk.

1.6 Involvement of the lacrimal glands as part of the protective, highly developed and adaptive immune system of the mucosa-associated lymphoid tissues:

長太息以掩涕兮 / 哀民生之多艱23
With a long deep sigh I brush off my tears, / grieving for our people’s life full of hardship.

1.7 Involvement of qi regulation:

父母有過, 下氣, 怡色, 柔聲以諫。24
If a parent has a fault, [the son] should with bated breath, bland aspect, and gentle voice admonish him.

1.8 Involvement of pupillary reaction:

免喪之外，行於道路，見似目瞿，聞名心瞿。25
After a man has put off the mourning [for his father], if, when walking along the road, he sees one looking like [his father], his eyes look startled. If he hears one with the same name, his mind is terrified.

It is important to notice that these peripheral components prepare the body for action. This motivationally tuned readiness for action is often considered to be the core function of emotion which is crucial to the development and survival of animals, human and non-human.26 Therefore, Nico H. Frijda, defined emotions “as modes of relational action readiness, either in the form of tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environment or in the form of mode of relational readiness as such.”27 The preparatory function of emotion is concomitant with general arousal that sensitizes the organism as a whole for action and specific arousal that prepares the body for a


23 “Lisao” 遠離 (“Encountering Sorrow”), attr. to Qu Yuan 屈原 (4th century BCE), Chuci buzhu 楚辭補注, commentary by Wang Yi 王逸 (ca. 89–158), sub-commentary by Hong Xingzu 洪興祖 (1090–1155) (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 1.14; cf. David Hawkes (trans.), Ch’u T’zu: The Songs of the South (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 24. Note that weeping is commonly seen as a mode of facial expression and in many cultures indicates sadness. However, the production of lacrimal fluid is independent from facial muscle movement and connected with the metabolic system of human beings.

24 Liji, 12/27.1463a (“Neize” 內則); cf. Legge, Li chi, 1:456.

25 Liji, 21/42.1561c (“Zaji, xia” 綜記 下); cf. Legge, Li chi, 2:154.


27 Frijda, The Emotions, 71, emphasis in original.

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particular behavior. This process constitutes the energetic component of emotion which in early Chinese thought and language is covered by the concept of qi 氣.

The third kind of reaction found with emotion are behavioral sequelae or expressive display, such as facial and vocal expression,28 postures, and gestures that serve as a means for communicating feeling to others. Example 1.7 above, in which we saw the involvement of qi regulation, provides also information about “face” (se 色) and “voice” (sheng 聲). In early China, the concept of qi as shared substrate that suffuses and moves all cosmic entities includes the notion that whatever is hidden in the body must manifest itself on the surface. And, indeed, most of the early thinkers believed that this would be the case, some notable exceptions notwithstanding.29 This assumed correlation between “inside” and “outside” implied the possibility to assess man’s mental and emotional make-up by vocal and facial expression. In a previous study, I draw attention to passages from the Yi Zhoushu 逸周書 “Guanren jie” 官人解 (“Explanation of Officer [Personality]”), Da Dai Liji 大戴禮記 “Wenwang guanren” 文王官人 (“The Officers of King Wen”), and Liji “Yueji” in which particular mental qi configurations or emotional states are correlated with sound (voice).30 According to the conceptual blueprint,

誠在其中，此見於外。以其見占其隱，以其細占其大，以其聲處其氣。初氣主物，物生有聲。聲有剛柔，濁清，好惡，咸發於聲也。31

[what is sincere inside [us], this becomes manifest outside [us].] By means of the manifestation predict the hidden; by means of the small predict the large; by means of the voice locate (judge) the qi. The pri-


30 See my “Emotion Management,” 196–197. The relevant passages are found in Yi Zhoushu 逸周書 “Guanren jie” 官人解 (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1992), 58.32 (“Guanren jie” 官人解); Da Dai Liji 大戴禮記 “Wenwang guanren” 文王官人 (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1992), 72/10.60 (“Wenwang guanren” 文王官人); and Liji, 19/37.1527b (“Yueji”).

mordial qi is the main thing in all things, when things are born they have sounds. Among the sounds there are strong and weak, turbid and clear, good (loving) and bad (hateful) — all these are expressed by the voice.

Apart from this method of “inspecting the inner (middle)” (shi zhong 视中), affective states could be “observed from facial [expression]” (guan se 觀色). It was believed that emotions, when “accumulated in the inner” (nei chu 内畜), would “naturally” manifest themselves outside, even if one willfully and intentionally conceals them. After the seminal work of Charles Darwin on *The Expression of Emotion in Men and Animals* (1872), some contemporary emotion researchers claimed that facial expression of emotion uses an innate, species-typical repertoire of facial muscle movement that shows the same pattern in different cultures. However, it is clear as well that emotional expressions are influenced by acquired display rules, self-protective ones and prosocial ones, based on particular cultural practices. Moreover, as Paul Ekman and Carroll E. Izard observed, emotions may not always be accompanied by facial display.

Besides vocalization and facial expression, which are the most prominent indices of human emotion observable for conspecifics, other overt behavior includes running away, fighting, jumping, freezing (become immobilized through startle, fear, or shock), grooming, and so forth. To give two examples from the early Chinese record:

1.9 Running away because of being frightened:

鄭人相驚以伯有，曰伯有至矣。則皆走，不知所往。

The people of Zheng frightened one another about [the ghost of] Boyou, saying: ‘Boyou has arrived!’ on which they all run off, not knowing where they were going to.


33 According to modern developmental studies, beginning at about age four, children learn to alter emotional expression, a skill of high value in cultures which prefer frequent disingenuous social displays. The ability to use these so-called emotion display rules is complex. It requires that humans understand the need to alter emotional displays, take the perspective of another, know that external states need not match internal states, be sensitive to social contextual cues that alert them to alter their expressivity, and have the motivation to enact such discrepant displays in a convincing manner. For further discussion, see Carolyn Saarni, *The Development of Emotional Competence* (New York: Guilford Press, 1999), 188–192, 198–199, 214–215.


35 Zuozhuan, Zhao 7 (626 BCE), 44.2049c; cf. Legge, *Tso Chuen*, 618.
1.10 Bodily agitation because of frustrated love:

求之不得 / 寤寐思服 / 悠哉悠哉 / 輾轉反側

I seek after her but do not attain, / waking and sleeping I yearn for her. / Longing, oh, longing, / I toss and turn, fall onto my side.

Finally, in recent studies on the emotions, utilitarian emotions and aesthetic emotions have been distinguished.37 Utilitarian emotions correspond to the “common garden-variety” of emotions, including basic emotions (e.g., joy, anger, sadness, fear, disgust) and complex emotions (e.g., guilt and shame).38 Scherer pointed out that all these emotions can be considered utilitarian in the sense of facilitating human adaptation to events that have important consequences for survival and wellbeing. Such adaptive functions comprise “the preparation of action tendencies (fight, flight), recovery and reorientation (grief), motivational enhancement (pleasure, joy, pride), or the creation of social obligations (repayment).”39 Because of their importance for human survival and wellbeing, many utilitarian emotions are high-intensity emergency reactions, involving the synchronization of changes in many organismic subsystems. In the case of aesthetic emotions, however, the functionality for an immediate adaptation to a stimulus event which requires the appraisal of goal relevance and coping potential is often absent or not very pronounced. In Scherer’s view, the aesthetic experience of a piece of music or of a work of visual art is not colored by the appraisal of the work’s ability to satisfy our bodily needs, help the progress of our plans or goals, or fit with our social values. Rather, aesthetic emotions, according to Scherer, “are produced by the appreciation of the intrinsic qualities of the beauty of nature, or the qualities of a work of art or an artistic performance.”40 But it would seem that this kind of Kantian “disinterested pleasure” (interesseloses Wohlgefallen), a phrase which highlights the complete absence of utilitarian considerations, cannot be accepted without qualification.

Looking at the early Chinese situation, aesthetic emotions, such as admiration, harmony, and solemnity, are linked to social values, and, in fact, are thought to promote individual and collective welfare. Musical “harmony” (和) implies social harmony and stately order. So, then, according to Xunzi, the ancient kings “instituted the sounds of the Elegantiae (雅) and the Hymns (頌) to offer guidance to [the people].”41 And in doing so, they materialized the aesthetically pleasing standards of the “mean” (中) and of “sufficiency” (足).42 This balanced, holistic model of music was supposed to produce mild physiological and behavioral changes in the service of civic virtue and aretaic ethics that take “virtue as both self-regarding and other-
regarding, … and as involving motives, intentions, and character-traits, as well as acts in which these may be manifest."\(^43\) Although, arguably these mild bodily changes do not necessarily meet the needs of behavioral readiness or the preparation of specific, adaptive action tendencies as many utilitarian emotions do, their moderate arousal and action-oriented responses are well in tune with the tenets of ancient Chinese moral psychology and self-cultivation.\(^44\)

2 Interpersonal Stances

Interpersonal stances with high event focus, yet less strong than in utilitarian emotions, are characteristic of an affective style which spontaneously develops or is strategically used in the interaction with a person or a group of persons, coloring the interpersonal exchange in that particular situation. Consider the following example of *you li* 有禮, “having ritual propriety,” “conducting [according to the rules of] politeness,” “being polite,” in interpersonal communication.

2.1 九年,春,王使來徵聘。夏,孟獻子聘於周。王以爲有禮,厚賄之。\(^45\)

In the ninth year, in spring, the king had sent [to Lu] demanding [from the Duke of Lu] a mission of [friendly] inquiry. In summer, [therefore,] Meng Xian went on such a mission to Zhou. The king, considering that [Meng Xian] conducted [according to the rules of] ritual propriety, gave him rich gifts.

The example suggests that this sort of affective style is less shaped by spontaneous appraisal than by affect dispositions, interpersonal attitudes, and, most importantly, strategic intentions. In our case strategic intentions seem to be emphasized. In order to maintain good relationships with the superordinate power of Zhou the feudal state Lu nominated Meng Xian as its representative to the Zhou court. On behalf of his superior, Meng Xian acted in such a polite way that the Zhou king was pleased and rewarded him generously in accordance with the social obligation of “re-quital” (*bao* 報). The example indicates, too, that the king as the host adopted a warm and friendly stance towards the visitor from Lu, either intentionally and/or reflecting an unconscious interpersonal attitude that usually continues to exist throughout an interaction episode or characterizes the relationship between the two individuals involved. For this affect type, which generally may last for hours or even days, intensity is slow, bodily responses are not particularly pronounced, and the impact on behavior varies from weak to average. It is important to distinguish this type from other affective types, because of its specific instantiation in an interpersonal encounter and the intentional, strategic character of the interaction.

3 Affect Dispositions (Emotion Traits)

Many stable personality traits and behavior tendencies have a strong affective core. These emotion traits refer to characteristics of a person and are not really emotion states. Rather, they are dispositions or tendencies of how to react with emotions. So traits and states are related in that the latter are being provoked in a specific context, while the former may influence their provocation. When our concern is with dispositions or traits, we expect a certain degree of stability in the reaction across contexts (consistency), while when dealing with states we assume a certain degree of instability in the reaction (variability). In analyzing affective states in literary texts, this discrimination must be observed with special care. Saying that someone is an anxious, proud, reck-

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\(^{45}\) *Zuozhuan*, Xuan 9 (600 BCE), 22.1874b; cf. Legge, *Tso Chuen*, 304.

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less, hostile, envious, jealous, or affectionate person does not describe an emotion episode or, as in the case of interpersonal stances, the specific instantiation of an interpersonal exchange. A person with these traits is not always anxious, proud, reckless, etc. but is anxious, proud, reckless, etc. more often than most, especially under particular conditions. These dispositions entail the tendency of a person to experience certain emotions more frequently or to be inclined to react with certain types of emotions more easily. The first example below, selected from the writings of Xunzi, sheds some light on the different affect dispositions of the “noble man” (junzi 君子) and the “petty man” (xiaoren 小人). Their character and affective make-up is in polar opposition to each other, according to the ancient philosopher. In the second example, the term qing occurs in connection with “love” (“affection”) (ai 愛), and “humaneness” (ren 仁), being the affect dispositions of an ideal human who would serve as a model for others. 47

3.1 君子能亦好,不能亦好。小人能亦醜,不能亦醜。君子能則寬容易直以開道人,不能則恭敬繜絀以畏事人。小人能則倨傲僻違以驕溢人,不能則妒嫉怨誹以傾覆人。……是君子小人之分也。

Whether the noble man is capable or not, he is loved all the same. [Conversely] whether the petty man is capable or not, he is loathed all the same. If the noble man has ability, he is magnanimous and generous, easy and straight, through which he opens the way to give guidance to others. If he is incapable, he is respectful and reverent, restraint and self-deprecating, through which he inspired with awe works in the service of others. If the petty man is capable, he is rude and imperious, dissolute and obstinate, so that he is filled with a pride that overwhelms others. If he has no ability, he is envious and jealous, resentful and given to backbiting, so that he subverts and undermines others. … Such is the divide between noble and petty man.

3.2 體恭敬而心忠信,術禮義而情愛 (人 > 仁, 横行天下, 虽困四夷, 人莫不貴。 49

Whose deportment is respectful and reverent, whose heart is steadfast and faithful, who in his way of life [respects the rules of] ritual propriety and morality, and whose disposition qing is affectionate and humane, he may travel throughout Under-Heaven, and even if he finds himself surrounded by the Four Yi Barbarians, everyone would think highly of him.

Certain terms like “pride” (3.1) or “affectionate” (3.2) may describe affect dispositions as well as momentary moods or emotions. Because of this indeterminacy it is important to specify whether the respective term is used to qualify a personality disposition or an episodic emotion state.

4 Moods

Emotion researchers have often discussed the difference between mood and emotion. 50 The distinction between them is not always easy, but analytically they differ significantly in terms of

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46 Note that the term emotion trait can be aligned with sentiment or attitude in Euro-American writings up to the twentieth century. In language, emotion trait and emotion state are commonly distinguished by saying someone is an “affectionate person,” when referring to a trait, and saying “someone is feeling affection for/towards someone (something)” or “reacting with affection” at a particular time and depending on particular circumstances, when referring to a state.

47 This translation has been suggested for qing by Michael Nylan. See her “On the Politics of Pleasure,” Asia Major, 3rd ser., 14.1 (2001), 90, 93–94n. 47.


49 Xunzi, 2/1.16 (“Xiushen 修身”); cf. Knoblock, Xunzi, 1:154; and also Hermann Köster (trans.) Hsün-tzu (Kaldenkirchen: Steyler, 1967), 15.
adaptational encounters, focus, and boundaries. Thus moods are usually distinguished from emotions by one of three criteria: longer duration, lower intensity, and diffuseness or globality.

The diffuseness criterion, in fact, has been adopted by a number of emotion psychologists as the main criterion for moods vis-à-vis acute emotions “on the basis of the vagueness and lack of a contextual provocation in the mood.” In other words, emotions are “intentional” phenomena, which involve a subject-object relationship applying to subjective experience as well as to behavior. Emotional behavior is always “directed toward or away from, or at least oriented upon, a particular thing.” Moods, on the other hand, lack such object-related “aboutness.” Thus different from acute emotions, like anger or fear, moods often emerge without apparent cause that could be clearly linked to an event (object) or specific appraisals. Rather, they are considered to be diffuse affect states, characterized by a relative enduring predominance of certain types of subjective feelings that have an influence on the experience and behavior of a person. Moods are generally of low intensity and show little response synchronization, but may last over hours or days. Examples of mood terms would be being cheerful, gloomy, listless, or depressed.

With the Shijing poem “Shu li” (“Glutinous Millet Hanging Down”) (Mao 65) we find a case in which the speaker’s sense of his own disintegration is diffuse, although his anxious thoughts seem partly caused by the behavior or interpersonal stance of the person mentioned at the very end of the strophe.

4.1 彼黍離離 / 彼稷之苗 / 行邁靡靡 / 中心搖搖 / 知我者 / 謂我心憂 / 不知我者 / 謂我何求 / 悠悠蒼天 / 此何人哉

That glutinous millet is hanging down, / alas, the sprouts of that paniced millet! / I’m walking my way slowly, / in the core of my heart I’m shaken. / Those who know me / say that my heart is anxious. / Those how do not know me / ask what I’m seeking. / Oh, distant, distant azure Heaven, / what kind of man is he [who tortures my heart]?

Interestingly, the Late Han commentator Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127–200) paraphrases the line “Those who know me” (zhī wǒ zhī qīng 知我之qing) with “[Those] who know my qing (true colors)” (zhī wǒ qīng 知我qing).

5 Attitudes

Predispositions towards specific objects or persons and relatively enduring beliefs about them are commonly called attitudes. Central to many recent treatments is the classical tripartite model of attitude structure, which discriminates an affective component (consisting mainly of differential valence), a cognitive-evaluative component (thoughts, beliefs, and propositions about the attitude object), and a motivational or behavioral component, that is, a stable action tendency with
respect to the object (e.g., approach or avoidance). Attitude objects can be things, events, persons, and groups or categories of individuals. Importantly, attitudes do not need to be triggered by event appraisals, though they may become more salient when encountering or thinking of the attitude object. Affective states induced by a salient attitude can be labeled with linguistic terms such as hating, valuing, or desiring. Response synchronization among bodily subsystems and intensity are generally weak and behavioral tendencies often overridden by situational constraints.

Some emotion psychologists treat “love” as an interpersonal attitude with a very strong positive affect component rather than an emotion (i.e., a brief episodic state). This is because the notion of loving someone often implies a long-term affective disposition – think of marital love between spouses or parental love for the children. Typically, this particular affective style can produce strong and complex emotions based on intrinsic and transactional appraisals and characterized by strong response synchronization. The central concept of “filial piety” (孝) in Confucian ethics also belongs to the group of interpersonal attitudes. It describes a lifelong attitude of respect and of caring obedience toward one’s parents, especially towards one’s father:

5.1 孝有三。小孝用力，中孝用勞，大孝不匱。思慈愛忘勞，可謂用力矣。尊仁安義，可謂用勞矣。博施備物，可謂不匱矣。

Of filial piety there are three [degrees]: the least is to employ one’s strength [in the service of the parents]; the second is to take the toil [for them]; and the greatest consists in never being deficient [in the execution of one’s duties]. Thinking of parental love and affection and forgetting one’s toils [for them] may be called “employing one’s strength.” Honoring humaneness and being comfortable with morality may be called “taking toil” [for them]; widely giving [them benefits] and providing for all things [necessary for them] may be called [filial piety that is] “not deficient.”

A stable affect attitude, such as filial piety that repays “parental love” (慈), can make the occurrence of an emotion episode more likely, introducing specific response patterns and feeling states, commonly combined with positive behavioral consequences.

6 Preferences

Preferences are commonly referred to as relatively stable evaluative judgments in the sense of liking or disliking a stimulus, or preferring it or not over other stimuli or objects. In early Chinese texts, liking and disliking as well as preferring and dispreferring are represented by the words 好好 xawH and 恶恶ʔʔak-s. Dependent on context these words can also have the meaning of “to love,” “love,” and “to hate,” “hate,” respectively. Importantly, through derivation by tone change the words are expressive of positive and negative ethical values: “to be good,” “the good,” 好好 xawX < *xxu-q, and “to be evil,” “the evil,” 恶恶ʔʔak < ?ak. Per definition, relatively stable preferences should generate intrinsic appraisal (i.e., an intrinsic pleasantness check), independently of current needs or goals, even though the latter might modulate the appraisal.57

55 See, e.g., Steven J. Breckler, “Emotion and Attitude Change,” in Handbook of Emotions, 461. Most attitude theorists use the term “cognitive” without further qualification which in this context may be misleading, because cognition in the broadest sense includes emotion-related functioning. Following the proposal of Breckler (461n. 1), who argues that the term “evaluative” is preferable to emphasize that this component of attitude refers to judgments about an attitude object, I include “evaluative” in brackets.


57 Scherer, “What Are Emotions?,” 703.
Looking at early Chinese texts, it would seem that liking and disliking are directly linked to human presocial, preconventional, natural “desires” (yu 欲), with which the functional state of preference arises, that is, when one reflectively decides to choose one thing over another, although it may arise without reflection. However, in absence of higher-order cognitive evaluation processes the conflict between competing desires, which emerges especially in the case of the many socially determined desires, cannot be readily resolved. The “Yueji” presents the unsettling scenario where these socially determined, culturally-conjured desires have a negative feedback effect on human presocial, preconventional, hard-wired endowment: they “entice” man – lure him away from duty and proper conduct – and by this destroy his “natural, Heaven-given principles” (tianli 天理):

6.1 人生而靜，天之性也。感於物而動，性之欲也。物至知知，然後好惡形焉。好惡無節於內，知誘於外，不能反躬，天理滅矣。58

Man is born and still – this is his natural, Heaven-given nature. Aroused by things he moves – this is his nature’s desire. Things arrive and [due to the faculty of] sensation he perceives and recognizes them, only then liking and disliking take shape therein. When liking and disliking have no regulation within and sensation is enticed from without so that [man] cannot return to [reflect upon] himself, the natural, Heaven-given principles are destroyed.

While in current emotion research preferences are thought to generate unspecific positive or negative feelings of relatively low intensity and with low behavioral impact, except tendencies towards approach or avoidance, early Chinese thinkers warned against their strong drive-like force. The problem was not so much with preferences as a type of affect but with the inability of the average person to select among the many stimuli and to deal with them and the complicated procedures of conflict resolution, in which “metamental ascent will result in the rejection of some first-order desires and in consideration of some alternative beyond what is desired to resolve the conflict.”59 The keyword “regulation” (jie 節) or, alternatively, “moderation,” implies a self-reflective stance in which the object of choice is not preferred at random but on the basis of right motives which is at the heart of moral action theory, as defended, for example, by Mencius. Failing to perform proper stimulus selection and conflict resolution in decision-making based on preferences would lead to loss of all fundamental forms of cognitive-emotional behavior that is intended by “Heaven” (tian 天) and therefore of all moral, prelinguistic distinctions coming from Heaven. This is because it is Heaven which instills the traditional Confucian “Way” (dao 道) in human beings. Men’s “[i]ninstinctively natural behavior and the correct practical interpretation of the traditional Confucian dao should coincide,”60 Chad Hansen said. However, “if man’s arousal by things is without limit, and his liking and disliking without regulation, then things arrive, and man is transformed by things. For man to be transformed by things, is to destroy his natural,

59 Keith Lehrer, Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 91. With “metamental,” Lehrer refers to the ability of human agents to reflect “about the mental,” that is, to adopt a self-reflective stance regarding their own desires in terms both what they want to want, and what they want not to want.
Heaven-given principles and to extend human desires to the limitless."61 That means, human beings' culturally universal, unchanging, preconventional dispositions to interpretive distinctions and actions as part of the autonomy of the moral agent are artificially “transformed” by external objects, a matter which clearly goes against “Heaven’s decree” (tianming 天命).

7 Desires, Drives, Instincts

In the preceding paragraph, the problem of “desire” (yu 欲) emerged which – besides “drives” and “instincts” – is one of three remaining terminological issues that deserve clarification and comment. The discussion partly anticipates points of Section III below. Nonetheless, I find it useful to include it here because of the interconnectedness with the items, particularly the emotions, just reviewed above.

Yu in early Chinese texts takes on three different but interrelated meanings.62 First, it refers to the physiological drives (colloquially, “appetites”), the context-sensitive responses of human beings to psychophysiological tensions which lead to adaptational relevant behavior.63 Specifically, yu means the hunger, thirst, and sex drives which make possible to meet cyclical homeostatic needs, such as nutrition, self-preservation, and sexual activity, that are important for an organism’s survival and for procreation. Being linked to the sense organs, yu also includes the curiosity drive that satisfies “epistemic hunger.”64 It is the inborn, adaptive character, then, which yu in the sense of “drives” shares with the emotions, for, as pointed out earlier, emotions facilitate humans’ adaptation to events significant for their life and living. Emotions, however, although they can be relatively simple and automatic, such as the fight or flight reaction to impending danger, are in fact often very complex and achieve much greater flexibility and adaptational power than is possible in the relatively rigid stimulus elicited response systems of the drives. The term “instinct,” used in Christoph Harbsmeier’s translation of qing as “general basic instincts,”65 dates from psychological and anthropological works of the late nineteenth century, most prominently, Charles Darwin’s Descent of Man (1871), Georg Heinrich Schneider’s Der thierische Wille: Systematische Darstellung und Erklärung der thierischen Triebe (1880), and William James’s Principles of
In contemporary emotion research, however, the term “instinct” is replaced by “drive” and treated distinctively different from “emotion.”

Second, 爰 in early Chinese texts refers also to a primary motivational state that initializes and guides goal-oriented actions, namely, “seeking” (求) for “getting” (得) satisfaction (gratification). Xunzi explains:

7.1 性者，天之就也。情者，性之質也。欲者，情之應也。以所欲為可得而求之，情之所必不免也。以爲可而遂之，知所必出也。……欲雖不可盡，可以近盡也。欲雖不可去，求可節也。……道者，進則近盡，退則節求，天下莫之若也。

Nature is the flow of Heaven. Qing (what is genuine in us) is the [raw] material (substance) of our nature. Desire is the response of qing (what is genuine in us). When what is desired is believed to be obtainable, it will be pursued. That is something human qing cannot escape. Believing it possible and leading the way to it is where intelligence must come into play. … Although one’s desires cannot be completely satisfied, one can come close to complete satisfaction. And although one cannot get rid of one’s desires, the pursuit [of their satisfaction] can be moderated. … The Way is such that if advance [is possible], one can come close to complete satisfaction; if retreat is necessary, one should moderate one’s pursuit — nothing Under-Heaven can be compared to it (i. e., the Way).

In this second sense, 爰 attains the status of desire, typically assumed in conativism that accounts for moral motivation in terms of desire or emotion. Conativist emotion theories emphasize the role of desire as intentional, motivational, and value-creating part of emotion, despite contingent, relative, and unstable, with affective and expressive dimensions.

From this second sense of 爰, which may be termed “volitive desires,” a third sense is drawn: “appetitive desires.” In appetitive desires, 爰 comes close to and, indeed, overlaps with such...

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67 Remarkably, although William James claimed that “instinctive reactions and emotional expressions … shade imperceptibly into each other,” and that “every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well” (Principles of Psychology, 2:442, emphasis in original), he also underlined that there is a distinction between instinct and emotion. While the former is always elicited by objects with which we have “practical dealings,” the latter not necessarily (ibid., 442–443). James’s “practical dealings” refer to responses to homeostatic needs, i. e., the drives. For a comprehensive study of the notion of “instinct,” see Luther L. Bernard, Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, 1924), who in the mid-1920s critically remarked: “There is scarcely any concept employed in the social sciences about which there is so much diversity of usage and uncertainty of meaning as there is concerning the term instinct” (ibid. 122).


70 In discriminating “volitive desires” and “appetitive desires,” I follow the suggestion of Wayne A. Davis, “The Two Senses of Desire,” in The Ways of Desire, ed. Joel Marks (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1986), 63–82. Davis points out that, although both kinds of desire tend to generate action, spread from ends to means, and produce pleasure when satisfied, there remain important differences. Appetive desire influences volitive desire, yet not vice versa. Volitive desire is a better index of action, appetive desire of pleasu...
early concepts as *ài* 爱, “(to love:) have a strong desire for;” *hào* 好, “(to like:) to find something desirable;” and *yue* 悦, “(to take pleasure in:) to desire something,” which in fact regularly co-occur with *yu*’s antonym *wu* 恶, “dislike,” “to not desire.”

Desire, then, is a fundamental, inborn mental state with a positive motivational force that plays a functional role in determining and issuing action which seeks to satisfy a need of the organism. Action in this process is always oriented towards future (personal) benefit (welfare and utility) and the pleasure that satisfaction (gratification) gives. Satisfaction, the ultimate goal of a desire, needs not necessarily be a psychological state, though desire itself always is.

III Graham and Post-Graham Critics on *Qing*

So far, we determined the critical terminology of affect types which serves as the background for the discussion of *qing* in the following sections. In previous studies, only little or no effort was invested to even attempt to define any of the occidental psychological and pseudo-psychological terms used for the translation of *qing*. Words such as “passions,” “emotions,” “feelings,” “instincts,” “impulses,” and so on were applied without any specification of their meaning or implication and without asking what in “the anatomy of *qing*” would favor the choice of the one over the other.

Apart from the general problem of lack of terminological rigor and conceptual clarity, there is another problem which pertains to Graham’s initial claim that “in the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung dynasty *ch'ing* ‘passions’ is contrasted with *hsing* ‘nature,’” and that the term *qing*, very common in pre-Han literature, “never means ‘passions’ even in *Hsün-tzu* where we find the usage from which the later meaning developed.” As for Graham’s view of the treatment of *qing* in Song Neo-Confucianism, a quick look at Zhu Xi’s *朱熹* (1100–1170) interpretation of *qing* vis-à-vis *xing* (referring to *Mencius* 6A.6) makes clear that Graham’s claim about the notion of *qing* in Neo-Confucian texts is unwarranted, at least for this philosopher. Zhu Xi, actually, saw *qing* as an activated, “expressive” (fa 革) form of *xing* and hence as an inherent part of it. Even though we are not able to talk about *xing*, we are still able to talk about *qing*, Zhu Xi says. Implicit in Zhu Xi’s statement is the idea that the subtle workings of human nature are invisible, whereas its expressiveness manifested in particular signs (being responses of human nature’s reactive systems) can be observed. Moreover, for Zhu Xi (in the vein of Mencius), *qing* does not only refer to emotions or subjective feelings but also to distinctions of *shi* 是, “this,” “right,” and *fei* 非, “not this,” “wrong,” that is, to beliefs, preferences, evaluations (appraisals), and judgments that motivate action.

71 For examples of such instances, see, e.g., *Xunzi*, 22/16.277 (“Zhengming”), with the pair *ài* 爱 – *wu* 恶; *Zhuangzi*, 5/2C.221 (“De chong fu” 德充符), with *hào* 好 – *wu* 恶, and ibid., 4/2B.155 (“Renjian shi” 人間世), with *yue* 悦 – *wu* 恶.


74 *Zhongyi*, 59.1380 (“Mengzi, jiù”).

75 Ibid., 59.1381 (“Mengzi, jiù”).
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As for the remark on Xunzi’s usage of qing, it seems problematic — pace Graham — to infer a development of meaning from the translation of qing as “passions,” a term which is in itself questionable and much contended. The use of the word, which originally means “suffering,” “affection,” and by extension “strong barely controllable emotion,” “strong sexual feeling,” or “strong enthusiasm for a (specified) thing” (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary), as an overarching term for sets of basic emotions in early Chinese texts is inappropriate, as is any application to the affective states in Buddhist ethics, an association made by Chad Hansen in his reply to Graham — “Qing (Emotions) 情 in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought?” — which launched a broad discussion.

I doubt that it would make much sense to start an investigation of an early Chinese conceptual term by relying on translations which are difficult per se and often used in a loose and inconsiderate fashion to circumvent the more complex issue of specifying the semantic nuances a word has and other words with which it co-occurs or contrasts. Furthermore, as Christoph Harbsmeier has pointed out, in determining the meaning of qing, both pragmatic and syntactic contexts in which the word enters early Chinese linguistic practice should be observed.

1 Graham on Qing

In his seminal study on the notion of qing, Angus C. Graham proposed that the word, which contrasts with xing and is “very common in pre-Han literature, … never means ‘passions’ even in Hsün-tzu.” Based on a review of nearly thirty passages from the early texts, Graham concluded that qing as a noun means “the facts,” often contrasted with ming, wen, and sheng (all translated as “reputation” by Graham). As an adjective, qing would mean “genuine” (contrasted with wei, “false”) and, as an adverb, “genuinely.” In a second step, Graham distinguished these uses of qing from other uses in philosophical prose in which qing is generally said “not of situations (‘the facts’) but of things.” Things, according to Graham, include inanimate, abstract concepts such as the “Way” (dao), and animate things such as “human beings” (ren). In philosophical literature, qing is often juxtaposed with xing, “shape” or “form,” and mao, “guise” or “demeanor,” and means “[t]he ch’ing of X is ‘what is genuinely X in it’ or ‘what X essentially is.” In other words, “the ch’ing of X is what X cannot lack if it genuinely is X.” In a third step, Graham recalled his discussion of qing in Mengzi 6A.6, where he found that “in this usage ch’ing is surprisingly close to the Aristotelian ‘essence,’” and actually employed the word

76 Note that Frijda allows the term in a very special sense, transcending the common dictionary explanations: passions are goals springing from action tendency known to be of long standing. In these, either the actual situation or the desired situation has strong relevance for the individual. Passions are felt as such under appropriate conditions of urgency. See The Emotions, 253.
77 See n. 60 above.
78 Harbsmeier, “Semantics of Qing,” 137.
80 Ibid., 60.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 63.
84 Ibid., 33, 63. Note that “essence” is the English standard translation of the Aristotelian term to ti einai which literally means “the what it was to be” for a thing. Dissatisfied with the cumbersome phrase, the
“essential” in translating the collocation qing yu 情欲, “essential desires,” but warning the reader of “bringing in too many misleading Western associations.” Finally, Graham notices a “slightly different use” of qing in the Confucian ritualistic writings of Xunzi and the Liji. Here qing is the “genuine and unassumed,” which is contrasted with mao 貌, “guise” or “demeanor,” and wen 文, “pattern” or “refinement,” in ritual performance. Graham insists that “in these texts, but nowhere else in pre-Han literature, the word [ch’ing] refers only to the genuine in man which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to his feelings.” In concluding, Graham comes to the relationship of xing and qing and draws attention to subtle differences in Xunzi’s usage of both terms. While xing and qing are in fact overlapping concepts, according to Graham, Xunzi “distinguishes two senses of xing previously confused.” These are “the course or direction of spontaneous activity” (i.e., an action tendency) and the “spontaneous activity itself” (i.e., the instantiation or actualization of an action). Xunzi thus – Graham says – “identifies ch’ing with the passions, which belong to nature in the second sense; that is, he identifies it as those natural responses which … it is relevant to describe as genuine and not assumed.”

On the whole, then, while Graham’s analysis of qing as “facts” is problematic, and should be changed to something like “the genuine (basic, inherent) facts (of a thing, affair or situation) with dynamic qualities,” where “fact” must be understood as “a truth that can be proved from experience or observation,” an “actuality” as opposed to “potentiality,” he is unquestionably right in contending that there is a distinction and semantic differentiation between xing and qing in Xunzi and the Liji, but fails to acknowledge that such a differentiation standardly occurs in other early Chinese texts as well. Finally, Graham only in his Later Mohist Logic (1978) and Disputers of the Tao (1989) speaks of qing as the “essential” and the “authentic” in man, but never of “essence” or “essential nature,” expressions attributed to him that became subject of a confused meta-discourse on the issue, in which Graham’s translation “essential desires” for qing yu 情欲 and “desires of man’s ch’ing (that part of him without which he would not be a genuine man)” for ren zhi qing yu 人之情欲 received less attention. In his final remark on the famous Xunzi passage “Nature is the flow of Heaven. Qing is the [raw] material of our nature. Desire is the response of

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86 Ibid., emphasis added.
87 Ibid., 65. Cf. ibid., 15.
88 Ibid., 65.
89 Ibid., emphasis added.
90 Compare Christoph Harbsmeier’s definition pp. 124–125 below.
Again on Qing: With a Translation of the Guodian Xìng qí míng chu

2 Post-Graham Critics on Qing

Chad Hansen places qing rightly in the context of action theory and motivation, and recognizes its crucial role in moral psychology. In Hansen's view, Graham postulates "a radical meaning change," which requires that "the term [qing, UM] shifted from referring to something metaphysical and objective (reality, essence, or the facts) to referring to something subjective and psychological (passions)." Agreeing with Graham that qing is somehow connected with reality and has to do with naming, Hansen calls for producing a modified theory that links qing's reality core with the affective states. He argues that qing must refer to "inputs from reality on the basis of which humans do this." Accepting Graham's "passions," and having established "the qing of a thing" as "the reality-related, accessible criteria that practically guide use of its name," Hansen asserts that qing is something we receive, and that this "passive connection" allows association with the passions.

Sometimes, however, Hansen says, qing approximates sensory input, for example, in Mozi, where the qing of the eyes and ears is considered as an authentic standard for the naming of reality. In that qing is contrasted with mao 貌, "appearance," "guise," "description," and xìng 形, "form," "shape," and both mao and xìng belong to the sphere of convention and naming, qing is prior to the shape-recognition training that occurs with language. In other words, according to Hansen, qing are "the apprehensible, reality-based criteria for shared, objective naming," a kind of reliable standard in relation to the polarity between the natural and the social, and refer to "all reality-induced discrimination or distinction-marking reactions in dao executors," which guide the application of terms in a discourse in real time and in real, inevitable unique situations. So, with Hansen, qing is "reality input" and also "reality feedback" ("reality response") from executing a particular discourse in the form of pleasure, anger, sadness, fear, and so on.

In this connection, I would like to draw attention to the already above mentioned opening passage of the "Yueji." As this text clearly states, qing is always something induced which "moves" within the "mind" (xin) and which is prior to "form." "Form" is the most general term to refer to an external appearance or configuration that is audible or visible. But it also

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93 性者，天之就也。情者，性之質也。欲者，情之應也。For references, see n. 68 above.
94 Graham, "Theory of Human Nature," Ts'ing Hua Journal version, 265. Note that exactly his part (quoted in n. 2 above) is missing from the reprint article, commonly cited by most post-Graham critics.
95 Hansen, "Qing in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought," 195.
96 Ibid., 196, emphasis in original.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., emphasis in original.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 197.
101 Ibid., 196.
102 Ibid., 196–197.
103 Liji, 19/37.1527a ("Yueji"); Legge, Li chi, 292.
refers to a linguistic-phonetic form (i.e., a mental representation of language) in which a speaker encodes ideas and which acts as input to the articulatory mechanism.104 A passage of the Guanzi 管子 “Neiye” 内業 (“Inner Workings”) suggests that there was a notion of the mind that “stored” (cang 藏) another mind.105 At this center of the mind, the “Neiye” says, “perception precedes words” (yin yi xian yan 音以先言).106 The “Neiye” continues then to describe the serial process in which perception is the driving force behind linguistic conceptualization as the basis of well-ordered words that (coming from the mouth) govern the world. With regard to this evidence, one can safely assume that early Chinese thinkers saw sensation and perception at the heart of language and speech production, whereby sensation in the case of sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste was linked to the activity of the sensory organs. Qing 慶 was the pivotal element in that process, not so much as a “sensory input,” as Hansen has it, but rather as the specific way of response to sense data.

Turning to Graham’s Zhuangzi 莊子 example, in which the sophist Hui Shi 惠施 (4th century BCE) raises the question if a man who has a human “shape” (xing 形) can really be without human qing i.e., “what is genuinely man,”107 Hansen argues that for Zhuangzi the form that “reality input” (qing) takes is always a pro-con, right-wrong “response” (qing). Therefore, what Zhuangzi means, when he contends that it is possible for a man to have no qing, is not letting likes and dislikes – that is, pro-con, right-wrong responses – to harm his body. Since any reality response is “infected” with an interpretive, attitudinal bias, Zhuangzi can allow that issuing such judgments as a presocial reaction is “natural” in that humans are naturally social and judgmental.

106 Guanzi, 49/16.270 (“Neiye”); Rickett, Guanzi, 247n. 114. Also see Roth, Original Tao, 223en. 72, 73. For “Neiye,” Roth prefers the “Xinshu, xia” 心術下 (“Mental Techniques, Part 2”) reading yi yi xian yan 意以先言, (Guanzi, 37/13.224), and renders yi 意 as “awareness.” Cf. Rickett, Guanzi, 263, with n. 40. However, there is no need for such a forced reading. With regard to the process of language production, the translation “ideas precede words” would be fine as well. Further, in the context of “Neiye,” the word yin 音, “note,” “tone,” “sound,” acquires the meaning of “sensation” and “perception.” Although closely related, sensation and perception play two complimentary but different roles in how one interprets the world. Sensation refers to the process of sensing the environment through sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste. Perception is the way one interprets these sensations and therefore makes sense of everything around oneself. Concerning the particular passage under consideration, the meaning seems to center on “perception,” since the focus is only on thinking and the language producing capacity of the mind.

107 For this passage, see Zhuangzi, 5/2B.220–222 (“De chong fù”); Graham, “Theory of Human Nature,” 61–63.
animals. On the other hand, because all such human responses are necessarily infected with learned, linguistic content, Hansen (with Zhuangzi) concludes, “the most we can hope for is not letting those interpretive, attitudinal judgments harm us.”

Besides, Hansen focuses on two Xunzi passages where the ancient philosopher explains the relationship between xìng, “human nature,” and qìng. In the first case, Xunzi speaks of xìng as something inborn, in the second as something which naturally eventuates from what is inborn in its interaction with things, Hansen says. Thus, for Xunzi qìng are “natural” in the second sense: “liking and disliking, delight and anger, grief and joy of the xìng” these all are “reality responses.” Later, however, where Xunzi specifies: “Nature is what flows from Heaven. Qìng is the basic stuff of xìng. Desires are the reactions to qìng.” Hansen here translates qìng as “reality inputs,” which is inconsistent with his previous definition of qìng as “reality responses.”

From another passage in which Xunzi attacks the teachings of Song Xìng 宋鉏 (late 4th century BCE), who claimed that human “qìng-based yù are few” (qìng yù guà 情欲寡), it would seem that Xunzi challenges Song Xìng’s Daoist-flavored theory that our natural desires (as responses to reality input) are few, whereas “the disruptive and competitive plethora of human desires … induced by conventional distinctions” and learning are many. Xunzi, in contrast, asserts that both the natural, uncultivated, and the civilized desires are many. Against the Daoist position that conventions multiply desires, he argues that conventions merely define what the proper objects of desires are (or should be). Inherited “rituals” (li), according to Xunzi, are able to tame and control the myriad of natural, presocial desires and competitive urges that the philosopher treats as paradigmatically bad things. The Daoist, on the other hand, believe that such desires are induced by social practices, embedded in specific cultural contexts whose ethos is constituted by particular ethical principles and moral values. If humans were not socialized to have such desires, their original, true “natural desires” would enable them to live a comfortable life in small, simple environments. But reality shows that humans do have such desires and that they start competing with each other in order to attain the goal of their desires. Xunzi wishes to reduce this sort of competition by more conventions, more rigid, more regular, and more controlling towards the longterm goal – the establishment of an orderly society, in which self-cultivation and moral self-development encourages people to ever greater efforts to respect the difference, claims, and sufferings of others. Xunzi’s emphasis on this most urgent issue is motivated by the thinker’s pessimistic view that human nature is prone to evil (badness) and therefore needs sagelike (or sage-like) guidance in order to do or to will any good. It is the moral stance that justifies Xunzi’s “authoritarian and slavish devotion” (Hansen) to the teachings of the sages.

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108 Hansen, “Qìng in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” 199.
109 Hansen, “Qìng in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” 199.
111 For the Chinese text, see Sec. I, example 7.1, with n. 68 above.
112 Xunzi, 18/12.229 (“Zhenglun” 正論); Knoblock, Xunzi, 3:47.
114 Ibid., 200.
115 Ibid.
In their view that most desires “are a product of conceptualization, convention, society, and language,” Xunzi and other classical thinkers come close to a position that resonates with the modern Western analysis of desires. In this regard, according to Hansen, qing yu-kinds of desire would specify only those few desires which are “a matter of pure bodily or natural reaction.”

And Hansen may be right to conceive of qing in the collocation qing yu as a qualifier that highlights the preconventional or prelearned, pristine sort of desire that is there before cultivation begins. Seen from this point of view, the texts on qing from the Daoist and from the Confucian tradition, discussed by Graham and his critics, reflect the natural versus the conventional dispute between the thinkers of the two camps. Conventions are added to and intended to control the preconventional, attitudinal reactions to the world. And when the “Liyun” 礼运 (“Cycle of Rites”) speaks of renqing it does so in defining qing’s property as being preconventional or pre-learned: “these seven we are capable of without having learned them” (qizhe, 无 须 为 而 能 七者). In concluding, Hansen notices that qing, “reality responses,” are theoretically distinguished from yu, “desires,” by being the presocial bases for the application of terms, while yu may be natural or socially induced attitudes towards the things named. “The key to the gradual narrowing of the two is the receptive character of qing along with Zhuangzi’s argument that qing reality inputs …are both linguistically shaped and attitudinal – they involve pro and con attitudes.”

Importantly, Hansen’s discussion of qing illuminates that the meaning range of qing is indeed broader than that covered by the names of the various affect states listed in the paradigmatic sets of basic emotion terms in Warring States texts. The early Chinese skepticism that informs the theoretical development of talk about qing does not arise from any claim about its subjective, mental, or inner character. Rather it arises from the premise that any reality input is characterized by conventional, linguistic distortion. In Hansen’s view, it would seem that Xunzi’s authoritarian Confucianism promoted the Buddhist appropriation in sharing with Indo-European systems the negative attitude toward qing which is often looked at as a disruptive, energy-consuming episode in people’s course of action or way of life.

Although Hansen presents a conclusive analysis of qing and yu (also in relation to xing), his claim that qing threatened the order of ritual as passion or emotion disturbed reason for Buddhists and Greeks needs further elaboration. It is also doubtful that with the introduction of Indo-European psychology into China the “original” broader spectrum of meaning as regards qing was superseded by applying the term to the Buddhist set of emotional states. Chinese language is marked by a high adaptability and flexibility concerning meaning. Even if particular characters are used as tokens of translation, they inevitably carry the original meaning with them. Disambiguation is happening through some contextual constraining terms which emerge in the course of reading a particular text. So Hansen’s claim of meaning loss in the lexical thesaurus seems too general and needs to be examined in more detail based on a representative sample of linguistic data. In this respect, the studies by Christoph Anderl on the usages of qing in Chan Buddhist Chinese and Robert E. Buswell on the transformation of “doubt” (yiqing 疑 情) into a

117 Hansen, “Qing in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” 200–201.
118 Ibid., 200.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 203.
positive emotion in Chinese Buddhist meditation show the way ahead. Both are included in Halvor Eifring’s Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature (2004), a volume that provides some other important contributions to the lexical and conceptual history of qing. In his introduction, Eifring sheds light on the notion of qing in diachronic perspective, to which I shall return in the next section. In what follows, I will first consider Michael Puett’s and then Christoph Harbsmeier’s study.

Michael Puett, different from Graham and Hansen, does not intend to seek “a single, unified meaning of the term in all early Chinese texts.” Instead, he looks at the function and meaning of qing in debates from the fourth century to Han times, taking the pragmatic rhetoric approach. Based on the XZMC, Xunzi, and some early Han sources, Puett wishes to explain how the authors of these works in each of the three periods utilized the term qing “reacting against earlier usages,” and how the particular uses of the term fit into their larger goals. In a descriptive analysis of the XZMC, Puett observes that the text seems to posit qing “as the way that humans relate to the world.” In contrast to xing 性, man’s nature which is issued by Heaven’s decree and includes emotional qi, qing is the “consequent way” that xing is developed and exposed “in response to different aspects of the world.” Thus, according to Puett, the usage of qing in XZMC, in fact, comes very close to Chad Hansen’s “reality responses,” namely, the responses a human being has in particular circumstances, and one should add, to particular things. Puett suggests the “very ungainly” translation “dispositional responsiveness,” i.e., “one’s disposition to respond in certain ways.” And he finds that “there is clearly a strong emotional connotation to the term.” Accordingly, Puett paraphrases qing as “one’s emotional disposition, … the ways that one’s emotions will be pulled out in particular circumstances.” However, he does not explain how he understands the term “emotional disposition” and its significance in the moral psychology of XZMC. In contemporary emotion research, “emotional disposition” is defined as a person’s action regulating tendency which does not constitute an emotion itself.

Although not directly speaking of an early Chinese theory of action in which qing, with Hansen, would be the crucial term, Puett underlines the fact that it is qing with which activity and the human Way (ways) of self-cultivation begins. Consequently, the Way (ways) in which xing interacts with the external world is characterized by movement of qing. So then, when the XZMC

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122 Christoph Anderl, “The Semantics of Qing in Chan Buddhist Chinese,” in Love and Emotions, 149–224, and Robert E. Buswell, Jr., “The Transformation of Doubt (yiqing 疑情) into a Positive Emotion in Chinese Buddhist Meditation,” ibid., 225–236, are not further considered here, because this would go beyond the scope of the present paper.


124 Ibid., 43.

125 Ibid., 43, with reference to XZMC, S3, 179; Appendix, 1.2.

126 XZMC, SS2–3, 179; Appendix, 1.2.


128 Ibid., 46.

129 Ibid.

author says, “At the beginning one is close to qing; at the end one is close to yi (morality).”\textsuperscript{131} Puett interprets qing as the way of “how one would spontaneously respond to a situation,” and yi of “how one ought to respond.”\textsuperscript{132} The word spontaneously is a bit difficult, since it refers to something happening or arising without apparent external cause, something self-generated or to something arising from a natural inclination or impulse and not from external incitement or constraint. Qings, in contrast, comes only into being through some stimulus event. It is always generated or provoked by something.

Equally problematic is Puett’s conclusion that value judgments of “good and bad” (\textit{shan bu shan})\textsuperscript{133} are emerging from qing. This view is based on a conjectured reading of a corrupt passage, for which Li Ling, and following him, Liu Xinlan and Ding Yuanzhi suggest the reading xing,\textsuperscript{134} confirmed by the Shanghai Xingqing lun \textit{性情論} (Discourse on Nature and the Affective Phenomena).\textsuperscript{135} The idea that qing “is bad and needs to be overcome”\textsuperscript{136} – an idea which Puett takes from Xunzi, while arguing that the XZMC does not make this claim – implies, for Puett, that the process of self-cultivation proposed in this text “simply involves refining that which comes through qing.”\textsuperscript{137} In this regard, the author of the XZMC utilizes the term qing as a means of defending his support for following the classical curriculum of ethical knowledge and practice – the Shi 詩 (Poems), Shu 書 (Documents), Li 礼 (Ritual) and Yue 樂 (Music) – fixed by the sages (or Confucius).\textsuperscript{138} Hence qing, according to Puett, would become the basis of the ethical system in the text, being “the inherent emotional disposition of humans.”\textsuperscript{139} However, the latter is a claim that is not explicitly made anywhere in the text.

As for Xunzi, Puett holds that, although Xunzi did not necessarily read the XZMC, the latter helps to better understand some of the background context of Xunzi’s argument, especially where the early philosopher expands on the benefit of the “classics” to regulate qing.\textsuperscript{140} But that’s not all about Xunzi’s qing. Puett asserts that qing occupies an ambivalent place in Xunzi’s thought. Whereas in some instances it appears in fully negative terms, in others it is presented in a very

\textsuperscript{131} 始者近情，終者近義。XZMC, S3, 179; Appendix, 1.2.
\textsuperscript{132} Puett, “Ethics of Responding Properly,” 46, emphases added.
\textsuperscript{133} XZMC, S3, 179; Appendix, 1.2.
\textsuperscript{135} Xingqing lun \textit{性情論}, S3, in vol. 2 of \textit{Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhushu} 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書, ed. Ma Chengyuan 馬承源 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2002), 224.
\textsuperscript{136} Puett, “Ethics of Responding Properly,” 47.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} XZMC, S17, 179; Appendix, 2.4. Ding Yuanzhi believes that qing here refers to music. See his \textit{Guanqian Chujian shibei}, 51.
\textsuperscript{139} Puett, “Ethics of Responding Properly,” 51.
\textsuperscript{140} Xunzi, 4/2.43 (“Rongru” 誠肅); Knoblock, \textit{Xunzi}, 1:194; cf. Puett, “Ethics of Responding Properly,” 52.
favorable way. This is because, for Xunzi, “overcoming” the crude reactions to environmental stimuli by “artifice” (wei偽) is ultimately of vital interest to statecraft. So Xunzi does not only mark out “the radical difference between the artifice of the ancient sages and the natural guidelines supported by so many other texts, but also claims that the artifice of the ancient sages is … fitting and proper for humans.” Therefore, rhetorically, sometimes it seems profitable for Xunzi to emphasize the difference between artifice and qing, claiming that the teachings of the ancient sages involve control of the human “basic dispositions,” and sometimes it is useful for him to argue that such teachings allow for a proper fulfillment of those “basic dispositions.”

In contrast, the intended goal of the sage in Huainanzi淮南子, according to Puett, is to be fully resonant, fully responsive, and fully able to act out of non-action, which is possible only because the sage attained a state “according with qing” (shi qing適情). Due to this fact, there is actually no need for model rulers, textual precedent, and the moral authority of the Confucian teachings. When Puett concludes that “[q]íng is what is within oneself and, if it is accorded with properly, can provide a natural basis for always, spontaneously, undertaking correct action,” he seems to avoid the issue that the Daoist sage is only able “to accord with qing” after having thoroughly understood “mental techniques” (xinshu心術) to control his qing. So we have the

141 Puett, “Ethics of Responding Properly,” 52.
142 Ibid., 58.
143 Ibid.
146 A passage from “Yuandao xun”原道訓 (“Searching out the Way” or “Original Way, with Explanations”) emphasizes that thorough understanding of “mental techniques” or the “ways of the mind” (xinshu心術) is a necessary precondition for coping with all kinds of desires and emotions. Only when fully comprehending the ways of the mind, one will find that desires and emotions are something “external” (wei外) to it. See Huainanzi, 1.36; for translations, see Evan Morgan, Tao, the Great Luminant: Essays from Huai Nan Tzu (1933; rpt., Taipei: Ch'eng Wen, 1974), 24; and Eva Kraft, “Zum Huai-nan-tzu: Einführung, Übersetzung (Kapitel I und II) und Interpretation,” Monumenta Serica16 (1957), 244. Desires and emotions are “external” in that they are not a primary feature of the mind, but a secondary one which needs some (real or imagined) object (stimulus event) to occur. They also might be called “external” because they belong, according to Huainanzi, to the “outer mind” (waixin外心). See n. 105 above. The “Yaolüe”要略 (“Outline of the Essentials”) chapter of the Huainanzi says that one “then [should] search out the ways of the mind and regulate one’s nature and qing in order to lodge a clear and even ‘reactive spiritual force’ (ling) (乃原心術，理性情，以館清平之靈); Huainanzi, 21.706. The translation “reactive spiritual force” for ling (important in Daoist philosophy, but also, though less pronounced, in Chinese medicine) is based on Manfred Porkert’s analysis of the term, who has “structive force,” “structive capacity,” and explains that ling is the structive complement of the configurative force shen神, “the capacity of a substratum to make concrete the active influences to which it is exposed” (The Theoretical Foundations of Chinese Medicine: Systems of Correspondence [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974], 193). See, too, ibid., 177, 181; and Porkert’s “Untersuchungen einiger philosophisch-wissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe und Beziehungen im Chinesischen,”Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft110.2 (1961), 429, 432–433, with a more comprehensive explanation of the term.
puzzling situation that what Puett calls “spontaneity” is in fact manipulated – by moderation and control of qing though the workings of the mind.

Finally, Puett argues that qing in Huainanzi acquires the meaning of “affective dispositions of humans in contingent circumstances.”¹⁴⁷ This then would enable the authors of Huainanzi to define sagely authority as being independent from the past and allow them to make a political statement as recommendation for Han government. This line of thought has much in common with that of Griet Vankeerberghen who pointed out that the sage of Huainanzi only after having freed himself of emotions possesses a qing – “sensitivity” in her translation – that goes “beyond ordinary perception and ordinary communication”¹⁴⁸ and is always moved in the appropriate way to appropriate action.¹⁴⁹

Although Christoph Harbsmeier’s “Semantics of Qíng in Pre-Buddhist Chinese” covers a wide spectrum of pre-Qin, Qin, and Han texts and presents nearly one-hundred and fifty selected passages important to our understanding of the meaning of qing, his analyses include some inconsistencies and redundancies the author is aware of and explicitly states in the course of the study.¹⁵⁰ Again, as with other sinological works on the issue, the paper provides no clear definition of Western psychological terminology, which sometimes is applied imaginatively, mixing up, for example, “emotion,” “passion,” “sentiments,” “sensibilities,” and “basic instincts.” Similarly problematic is the attempt at some definitions which appear in an accumulative, associative manner intermingled with the comments accompanying the examples he adduces. He says, for example, “[a]titudes may be construed as dispositions to act, sensibilities as dispositions to feel, whereas emotions are not dispositions but certain heightened states of psychological excitement, often transitory, sometimes lasting.”¹⁵¹ Nonetheless, I would like to point out that Harbsmeier has made a couple of very important observations about qing whose basic meanings he lists up under seven categories:

(1) Factual: The basic facts of a matter
(2) Metaphysical: Underlying and basic dynamic factors
(3) Political: Basic popular sentiments/responses
(4) Anthropological: General basic instincts/propensities
(5) Positive: Essential sensibilities and sentiments, viewed as commendable
(6) Personal: Basic motivation/attitude
(7) Emotional: Personal deep convictions, responses, feelings

Harbsmeier recognizes that in many contexts these meanings shade into each other and overlap.¹⁵² This is a methodological problem, and one wonders why these fuzzy categories with difficult labels are used at all when borders between them are neither sharp nor fixed.

Following Graham, Harbsmeier starts with qing as referring to internal, real, basic relevant determinant features, the truth, the reality of a thing (matter, fact, situation, circumstance).¹⁵³ As he

¹⁴⁷ Puett, “Ethics of Responding Properly,” 64.
¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 540.
¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., Harbsmeier, “Qíng in Pre-Buddhist Chinese,” 72.
¹⁵¹ Ibid., 101.
¹⁵² Ibid., 72.
¹⁵³ Ibid., 73–76 (1)–(6), 81 (17). The bracketed numbers, here and below, refer to Harbsmeier’s.
rightly observes, qing also refers to fundamental (essential) dynamic features — the causes or “facts that constitute the underlying driving force” in some development. In contrast, denotes the state in which one is born into this world and “primarily ... static properties rather than dynamic tendencies.”

With qing it shares the “feature of innateness and of basic disposition,” says Harbsmeier. But in contrast, xing “is primarily not a response to outside things but an autogenous disposition to behave in a certain way.” Thus one might say that xing shan 性善, “nature is good,” but not that qing shan 情善, “the basic instinctive reactions/responses to things are good.”

As for the developmental aspect, xing is “[something] one cannot learn; and [something] one cannot work on (manipulate).” Qing, on the other hand, is malleable; it can be ordered and controlled. So in Confucian ritual theory it is on the same level as “artifice” (wei 偽), an acquired ability, “which one through learning is able to do, and which one through working on can perfect.” It is particularly in Xunzi that the legitimization of ritual is based upon the notion of qing. Qing here needs “adornment” (shì 饰) through what — in modern terms — would be called “culture.” The process by which Harbsmeier’s qing—“instinct” is beautified through wen 文, “(dignified) pattern,” is at the very core of the Confucian educational project. When Han Fei does not speak of wen, but instead of mao 貌, “to give expression to,” this is, because to him, Harbsmeier argues, “ritual is not the solution but part of the problem [i.e., to regulate man’s affective nature, UM], which can be only overcome through political/social Machiavellian manipulation.” According to Harbsmeier, the use of the word zhi 治, “to regulate,” implies that

154 Ibid., 76–78, (9)–(10), 81 (16). Somewhat perplexingly, Harbsmeier maintains that qing in his example from the Zhuangzi (10), where he has the translation “essential dynamic features in things,” is “something deep-seated and constant, something constitutive, if not defining, something that does indeed make one to think of the Latin word essentia” (ibid., 78).

155 Ibid., 76.

156 Ibid., 117, and also 89.

157 Ibid., 120.

158 Ibid.

159 Ibid.


162 Ibid., 85. I only reluctantly keep Harbsmeier’s “instincts” here, because the word is utterly out of place in this discussion, unless no clear definition is given. (See also n. 67 above.) Based on a considerable analysis of the literature dealing with social themes, Luther Bernard found several fairly well-defined usages of the term “instinct” which he grouped under four general headings: (1) a general and indefinite employment of the term, not necessarily descriptive of a concrete act at all; (2) all cases covering automatic and habitual actions of any sort; (3) those more or less automatic stimulus-response activity processes which are supposedly inherited; and (4) acts which are definitely inherited and which may be properly termed instinct. Besides he pointed to the least scientific employment of the term instinct by literate untrained in the terminology of psychology, and “the most chaotic and least scientific of these usages” which “is the custom of employing the term to cover almost any sort of vague or undefined psychological process or method, whether instinctive or mere habitual” (Bernard, Instinct, 128). For a full account of misuses of the term, see ibid., 122–147.

163 Harbsmeier, “Qíng in Pre-Buddhist Chinese,” 85.
qing is not by nature orderly or in good order. It needs to be “reduced” to order. In Zhaungzi, the “assertive and aggressive zhì” (Harbsmeier) is replaced by the “much milder” word lǐ 理, “to regulate,” “to get into a proper pattern,” “to sort out in a principled way.”

Harbsmeier notices the “appetitive” nature of qing which he associates with human “instincts.” He rightly points out that Warring States statecraft assumes it to be the ruler’s task to use (and to control) “these natural instincts as his steering mechanisms in such a way that the people, steered by their instincts, come to do exactly what the ruler wants them to do.” With regard to the “gratification of the sex drive” (yue qing 欲情), Harbsmeier proposes the translation “basic sensibilities” – a term which is again difficult because of the vague and indefinite usage of the word “sensibility.” The erotic use of qing is intended in the Shijing 詩經 poem “Wan qiu” (Sunken Hill).

Qing for its part constitutes the “dynamic aspect of one’s very identity,” and is seen as individualized – at least by some authors – differing from one person to another. In this form it has not only sensual but also moral overtones. Its “emotional charge,” according to Harbsmeier, is signalized by the word fa 發, “let out.” The expressiveness of qing (as emotional experience) is also indicated by words like shu 摟 (杼), “to dredge out,” “to explain oneself,” and other closely related synonyms, such as chen 陳, “to set forth,” and shu 舒, “to (expand, express:) pour out.”

Finally, Harbsmeier holds that there is no physiological basis of qing. Different from qi 氣, “vital energy,” typically part of the physical aetiology of symptoms or appearances or of a purely physical development, qing is “nowhere” conceived as distinctively predicated on some physical base. Nonetheless, if qing, following Harbsmeier, shares with xìng the feature of innateness,
there should be biological endowments determining the functioning of *qing*, a point to which I shall return below.

Overall, almost the whole semantic range found in Harbsmeier's examples is reflected in bilingual standard dictionaries since the early nineteenth century: Morrison's *A Dictionary of the Chinese Language* (1815–1823), Williams's *A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language* (1874), Giles's *A Chinese-English Dictionary* (1892), Couvreur's *Dictionnaire classique de la langue chinoise* (1904), and Mathews’ *Chinese-English Dictionary* (American ed. 1931). So Morrison, to cite only one item of the above list, gives the following scope of meaning for *qing*:

The passions, which the Chinese divide into seven, – being pleased, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire; these taken collectively, – temper, disposition, natural feelings, natural affection, animal passion, sexual desire. The reality of a thing; the circumstances; the facts.178

This brings us back to the starting point of this section: the initial claim posited by Angus Graham, namely, that in Song Neo-Confucianism *qing* (Graham’s “passions”) is contrasted with *xing*, and that the term *qing* in pre-Han literature, “never means ‘passions’ even in Hsün-tzu.”179 Though legitimate, Graham’s claim initiated a debate that, due to its limited focus on the aspects of “facts (reality)” and “passions” as translational terms and concepts, apparently neglected sinological standard knowledge. It is actually Christoph Harbsmeier’s merit to have reminded us that the study of Chinese terms and concepts is a fruitless endeavor without thorough investigation of the available material on different stages of their diachronic development. This material, then, is best arranged into a motif index organized by categories, according to usage of the respective terms and concepts as these occur in particular narrative or thematic contexts.

IV The Anatomy of *Qing* in the Light of Contemporary Affective Sciences

In his attempt to deal with the difficulty of semantic development and multiple meaning in *qing*, Halvor Eifring aptly observed that apart from the very complex historical changes, “[i]n actual language use, the borderlines between the various senses of a word are seldom as neat as in our theoretical discussion. Several layers of meaning are often allowed to vibrate together.”180 Although Eifring is certainly right that *qing* is a case of multi-tiered semantic specialization, with Harbsmeier’s “basic instincts” as the main category followed by the sub-category “emotions,” the subsub-category “positive feelings of intimacy,” and the subsubsub-category of “love,” meanings which according to Eifring evolved diachronically,181 I would argue instead, with Angus Graham and, more recently, Ulrich Unger, that the core meaning of *qing* is “what is genuine (authentic) in something,” its “inner, intrinsic nature” (*innere/eigentliches Wesen*).182 Applied to things, facts, situations or circumstances it is “truth,” “faithfulness,” and applied to

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181 Ibid., 11, 19–20. Note that Eifring is aware that all general glosses in the semantic specialization of *qing* “are at best crude labels that disregard the enormous complexity of semantic nuance that appears in the interplay between the word *qing* and the contexts in which it occurs” (ibid., 20–21).
human beings (and animals) it refers to all types of affective responses as motivational-adaptational behavior caused by some stimulation, from the most basic drives and sense perception to emotions, moods, dispositions, attitudes, preferences, desires, motives, and ritualized behavior-patterns.

It largely depends on context and also on text-reader interaction which particular aspect of the complex concept of qing is meant. And meaning is negotiable within certain constraints.\footnote{See my Resexualizing the Desexualized, 32–33.} For example, the zooming in on “love” and, especially, “erotic love” in the concept of qing intends to bring out the high “passion component” (i.e., sexual component) involved in a specific type of interactive encounter. It further refers to a low degree of stability with a tendency to come and go on a somewhat unpredictable basis. In addition, the passion component contains a low degree of control over arousal. Playing a major role in short-term relationships, it is typically of high degree with respect to conscious awareness of affect and psychophysiological involvement.\footnote{Ibid., 19–20.} The term qing thus is very well suited to characterize the complex concept of erotic love, although – from the standpoint of the reader or the audience – it does so very vaguely. And, indeed, the word ai, “to love,” would cover the concept as well. So it seems that the broader or narrower meaning of qing and its different, often slight nuances in particular collocations and locutions, depends on a tacit consensus between authors and readers (or audiences) and hence on given discourse practices. These practices reflect the overall socio-psychological matrix of a society at a particular point of time in historical development and the knowledge and competence of social agents to verbalize internal states.

The problem of what is meant when an author speaks of qing (or the qing of something or somebody) is even more complicated when it comes to translation. Here the main problem is lack of expertise knowledge that would facilitate our understanding of how exactly early Chinese conceptualized psychic processes and behavioral life. The broad discussion about human nature and qing during the Warring States period reflects the discovery that many phenomena, ranging from individual cognitive processing to social and collective behavior, cannot be understood without taking into account affective determinants, and there is no mistake about that. A similar conclusion was reached again, in the West, some decades ago when the emerging field of the affective sciences began to bring together the various disciplines that study the biological, psychological, and social dimensions of affect, covering a wide range of subject areas, including psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, philosophy, education, sociology, economics, political science, law, criminology, history, ethnology, anthropology, and literature.

The last item, literature, came to be one of the main foci of the semantics of affect and affect-related terms in intra- and intercultural projects. The study of qing is clearly within that scope. So the remainder of this section is devoted to a summary of the characteristics of qing against the background of insights from the interdisciplinary domain of the affective sciences. On the other hand, it is a contribution to this quickly developing field that integrates disciplines which from very different perspectives, theoretical backgrounds, and levels of analysis focus on the same phenomenon – all kinds of affective processes in human beings and among them, most importantly, the emotions.
1 The Conceptual Matrix and Meaning of Qing

The problem of qing is inextricably linked with that of xing, “human nature.” Graham asserted that down to the fourth century BCE xing was no philosophical term, and only with the emergence of the views commonly attributed to the “egoist” Yang Zhu (5th – 4th century BCE) it became a major subject of controversy. There is, however, some evidence that talk about xing, or the question of what it is to be human, predates this time, a point made by Fu Sinian, Xu Fuguan, and Benjamin I. Schwartz. Schwartz noticed that

[…] to the extent that we have at a very early point the emergence of the concept of a normative socio-political order with its prescribed codes of behavior, the problem of why individuals do or do not conform to that order is already posted. More precisely, the question of the general relationship of this order to “innate” human propensities is already laterally present.

In order to avoid confusion about the English term “human nature,” which indeed — contra Roger T. Ames — is an appropriate rendering for the notion of xing 性 (renxing 人性, ren zhi xing 人之性), I suggest to take a short look at recent occidental debates on the notion of human nature whose meaning is far from universally agreed upon. The plurality of views reflects different assumptions about what makes humans human and special. In an attempt to bring some methodological rigor to the jumbled debate, contemporary philosopher Neil Roughley defined four sets of distinctions from which four usages of the term human nature emerge. He alerts us that all too often these are lost sight of, resulting in confusion “as to what precisely is being debated when the term ‘human nature’ is invoked, whether positively or negatively.” To distinguish these senses is not only imperative for a better understanding of debates about human nature in Western culture, but also for justifying that the early Chinese notion of xing (renxing, ren

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187 Schwartz, World of Thought, 176.

188 Roger T. Ames claims that the Western term “human nature” is an inappropriate equivalent for the early Chinese term xing. This is, because the Western term “has come to be understood as what we generally mean in our tradition by ‘human nature’ — the genetically given” (“The Mencian Conception of Ren xing 人性: Does it Mean ‘Human Nature?’” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. [La Salle: Open Court, 1991], 144, emphasis in original). Ames takes issue with Donald Munro’s position that xing, “human nature,” in traditional Chinese view is something “given” that exists from birth and “cannot be altered through human action” (The Concept of Man in Contemporary China [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979], 19). The “anti-biological” view of Ames has been contested by Irene Bloom in her “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (jen-hsing),” Philosophy East and West 44.1 (1994), 19–53; and “Human Nature and Biological Nature in Mencius,” ibid., 47.1 (1997), 21–32.


zhì xìng, no matter whether we look at the Mencius’, Xunzi’s or other authors’ way of using the term, is conceptually equivalent to the English term of “human nature.”

Being located in a conceptual space, Roughley’s first distinction, then, in notions of human nature is that between description and evaluation: the early Chinese dispute as to whether or not xìng is “good” (shàn 善) or “evil” (“bad”) (bù shàn 不善) clearly foregrounds the evaluative dimension.

A second distinction pertains to the status of properties that are commonly ascribed to humans: these might be regarded as a characteristic common to both humans and other animals or as a property seen as specific to humans. One might consider Xunzi’s scala naturae in which “having morality” is seen as a distinctively human property.191 Or the claim might be that “to have qìng” is in some sense the “essence” of what it is to be human.

A third distinction has to do with the fact that speaking of human nature implicitly includes universal quantification of two sorts with regard to its objects. In the case of quantification over members of a species claims to strict universality are likely to be very rare and, moreover, unlikely to be true. So it would seem that Mencius’s theory of the “four beginnings (germinations)” (siduàn 四端) (2A.6) located in man – i.e., a sense of compassion for others (on legitimate moral grounds), a sense of shame, a sense of modesty and courtesy, and a sense of right and wrong – must be seen as a claim to generality, understood in terms of statistical near-universality, to be true. As for entities, who being quantified over may not be individual members of the species, but particular kinds of subgroups to which members of the species necessarily belong, we find claims to transcontextuality, often made by cultural anthropologists. These claims have the form: “every group of type g instantiates property x.”192 An example of this kind would be Xunzi’s claim, “The children of Han and Yue and of the Yi and Mo [barbarians] are [all] born making the same sound, but they grow up having different customs; it is [the process of] teaching which makes them so.”193 Xunzi here makes a strong case for the achievement concept of human nature,194 very similar to XZMC and other (mostly Confucian) texts that insist on the maturation and development of initial defining conditions of human beings over their lifetime within particular personal and social contexts marked by certain constraints.195 However, transcontextual statements, as Roughley emphasizes, “do tend conversationally to imply that the reason for the transcontextual distribution of the property in question is that humans universally, or at least generally, have the disposition to instantiate it.”196

Finally, a fourth distinction to be observed in notions of human nature is pre-givenness. This parameter implies that nature is something independent of human intervention and opposed to

191 The Xunzi says: “Water and fire have qi but have no life (shēng). Grasses and trees have life but have no awareness (consciousness/knowledge, zhì). Birds and beasts have awareness (consciousness/knowledge) but have no morality (yì). Human beings have qi, have life, have awareness (consciousness/knowledge), and, what’s more, they also have morality. Therefore they are the most valuable [creatures] Under-Heaven” (水火有氣而無生，草木有生而無知，禽獸有知而無義，人有氣、有生、有知，亦且有義，故最為天下貴也); Xunzi, 9/5.104 (“Wangzhi” 王制); cf. Knoblock, Xunzi, 2:103–104.


193 Xunzi 1/1.1 (“Quanxue” 勤學); cf. Knoblock, Xunzi, 1:136.


196 Roughley, “Human Nature,” 381.
nurture or culture, i.e., artifice or technology. This genetic sense of human nature—referring to some innate endowment present in us from birth, suggested by the etymological derivation of the word \textit{xìng} 'xing' from the word \textit{shēng} 'sheng', ‘to procreate,’ ‘to produce,’ ‘to be born,’ ‘to grow,’ and, nominally, ‘life,’ whose striking affinities to the etymologies of the Greek \textit{physis} 'phuo,' ‘to grow,’ and Latin \textit{natura}, from \textit{nascor}, ‘to be born,’ have been pointed out by Graham\textsuperscript{197}—vis-à-vis conscientious ‘artificial’ effort to develop it is in fact at the core of the early Chinese debates of both \textit{xìng} and \textit{qing}.

In view of the above four distinctions, we can, with Roughley, discriminate four senses of human nature. The first sense is pre-givenness that is not only constituted by all those pre-given biological properties, which are at least general among members of the species and actually instantiated, but also includes developmental dispositions. That means, there are pre-given programs which determine, for example, bodily changes during adolescence or some modular (hard-wired or at least pre-wired) affective processes, such as reflexes, drives, desires, appraisals, and basic emotions. Consider, again, the “Liyun” passage: “Joy and anger, grief and fear, liking and disliking, and desire—these seven, we are capable of without having learned them.”\textsuperscript{198} With regard to what belongs to human essence (by this I mean the intrinsic or indispensable properties that serve to characterize or identify something) three other senses can be separated: first, conceptual centrality, which denotes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification; second, predicative centrality, which refers to those properties of an entity that are in some way characteristic features of that entity, although they may be missing in individual cases; and, third, axiological centrality, which delineates those characteristic features of an entity that have particular value or are of particular importance.\textsuperscript{199} It should be noted that in the cases of predicative centrality and axiological centrality the features in question do not require to be exclusive to the entity. Moreover, it is likely that they will be generally, rather than universally instantiated, despite the possibility merely being instantiated by particular individuals.

Let me illustrate these four senses of human nature by some examples from the early Chinese record to show that Roughley’s conceptual matrix is generally applicable, even with regard to talk about human nature in early Chinese settings. And what’s more, Roughley’s matrix allows for the differentiation of various senses of \textit{xìng} in one and the same Chinese author so that forced interpretations or misleading generalizations may be avoided.

1.1 Pre-givenness (and the development of human potentialities):

\begin{quote}
\textit{告子曰：生之謂性。} \textsuperscript{200}
\end{quote}

Gaozi said: “[The quality] ‘live’ (‘grow,’ ‘procreate’) is what I call nature.”\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{198} For references, see n. 119 above.
\textsuperscript{199} Roughley, “Human Nature,” 381–382.
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Mengzi,} 11/22.737 (6A.3) (“Gaozi, shang” 告子上); W.A.C.H. Dobson, \textit{Mencius} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 111, translates: “Kao Tzu said, ‘What I mean by nature is the thing that gives life,’” which brings out the life-giving force in human nature. Cf. Harbsmeier, “\textit{Qíng} in Pre-Buddhist Chinese,” 121 (104).
\textsuperscript{201} Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821–1907) and D.C. Lau notice that the two significant words here, \textit{shēng} 'sheng' and \textit{xìng} 'xing' are written alike and actually pronounced very similar. See Lau’s “On Mencius’ Use of the Method of Analogy in Argument” (1963), reprinted in his \textit{Mencius} (New York: Penguin OE 47 (2008)
Here Gaozi, according to his early interpreters, refers to the idea that things generated from the same kind (class, category) all have the same nature. From the conversation with Mencius it appears that his proposition is a general one which holds for human beings and inanimate things alike. Particular properties characteristic of an entity are (re)produced and may be similar across classes or categories. But, as David S. Nivison pointed out, Gaozi’s proposal concerns the quality “live,” that is “the quality we ascribe to a thing when we speak of it as a live-*ADJ* thing of some kind or other.”

While Nivison’s reading foregrounds the sense of conceptual centrality, the paronymy of the words *sheng* and *xing* linguistically highlights the idea of pre-givenness and development. Although Mencius, in sophist fashion, seemingly reduces Gaozi’s statement ad absurdum by saying that it could be stretched to assert that “a dog’s nature and an ox’s nature are comparable, and [in extension] an ox’s nature and human nature are comparable,” he does not really invalidate Gaozi’s point – the holistic notion of a universal, animating force, present in all living beings, that gives them their respective nature, found likewise in Xunzi’s *scala naturae*.

1.2 Conceptual centrality:

孟子曰: 形色, 天性也。

Mencius said: “[Our] shape (body) and complexion are Heavenly nature (i.e., Heavenly endowment).”

In this example, again, both senses, that of pre-givenness and that of conceptual centrality, are implied. Shape and complexion are the necessary and sufficient properties for the identification as a human being, and they are Heaven-given. Heaven here in Mencius and elsewhere is the source of the animating power which gives human beings their typical form and look. When Mencius continues to say that “it is only the sage who after all can [properly] manipulate them,” he switches to the sense of axiological centrality: the quality of being able to perform in a proper way and to cultivate the person is a characteristic feature of the sage which has particular value and importance in Confucian ethics and body consciousness.

1.3 Predicative centrality:

孔子曰: 何謂始乎故, 長乎性, 成乎命? 曰: 吾生於陵而安於陵, 故也。長於水而安於水, 性也。不知吾所以然而然, 命也。

Confucius asked [a skilful swimmer]: “What do you mean by ‘I began with what I was used to, grew up with my nature, and [let things] come to completion with [Heaven’s] decree?’” [The swimmer] replied: “I was born on [dry] land and felt secure on [dry] land, that’s what I’m used to. I grew up with the water and felt secure in the water, that’s my nature. I don’t know why I do what I do, that’s decree.”

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202 Ibid., 152.

203 Ibid., 153.


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The *Zhuangzi* example of predicative centrality concerns characteristic features of a human being, that is, the development of particular skills which enable the swimmer to move in water so as to meet maximum potential important in adaptation to environment. This particular feature may be missing in other human beings.

1.4 Axiological centrality:

齧缺之為人也, 聰明叡知, 徵數以敏。其性過人, 而又乃以人受天。208

As a person, Nie Que (Gnaw Gap) is of keen intelligence and superb understanding, nibble-witted and sharp, quick-witted and clever. His *nature surpasses (is of higher value, more special than) that of other men*, and, moreover, he knows to exploit through human [devices] what he received from Heaven.

Nie Que is described as a person with particular gifts received from Heaven of which he takes advantage in a profitable way. In the eyes of *Zhuangzi*, these features of human nature have a particular value and make Nie Que a remarkable human being. However, there is no claim that these features are exclusive to him. The example shows, however, that evaluative centrality makes conceptual room for talk about “individual natures.”

As suggested above, the elaboration of a conceptual matrix of the meaning of *qing*, when applied to human agents, needs as a first step some specification regarding the “inventory” of human nature. Some features are included in the above examples, selected and ordered with reference to the analytic space in which the notion of human nature is located. However, for practical reasons it seems useful to provide a comprehensive list of descriptive features mentioned in the sources. Since such a task falls outside the scope of this paper,209 I tentatively include a short list, which partly draws on Ames’s typology for Mencius.210 Thus, *xing* is:

1. a dynamic process which covers reflexes, drives, basic emotions, initial dispositions (including affect dispositions), desires, growth (inter alia sex differentiation), life, and death;
2. holistic, inclusive of both psychical (perception, cognition, emotion) and physical conditions (bodily shape, complexion) which are distinctively human;
3. a dynamic process prone to destructiveness and self-annihilation;
4. describable in genetic terms as an emergent order which, from initial dispositions, either positively (Mencius) or negatively (Xunzi) evaluated from the moral point of view, is cultivated by appeal to historical models to constitute oneself (the person) through enculturation as the center of a centripetal field of unique, particular, and concrete circumstances;
5. in ideal an “inspirational” rather than “aspirational” process that involves an appeal to the achieved quality of historical models and internalization of past values rather than the realization of abstract ideals and principles, and hence biased towards re-production of systemic elements;
6. describable in morphological terms as an interpersonal entity within a relationally defined matrix of conditions;


209 For a list of selected examples from various pre-Qin sources, see Harbsmeier, “*Qíng* in Pre-Buddhist Chinese,” 121–131 (102)–(136).

an achieved order which pursues harmony (balance) and appropriate action defined through the maximization of the participating conditions;

correlative with socio-political and, ultimately, cosmic order;

generalizable (like a surname), to identify the participation and contribution of a group of similar particulars.

If qing is a sub-concept of xing, and both with regard to their characteristics entertain a part-whole relationship, then, what are the distinguishing features of qing vis-à-vis xing?211 Is the main distinguishing feature that qing is “nowhere” conceived as distinctively predicated on some biophysical base, as Christoph Harbsmeier claims?212 And, second: does the concept of qing reflect the motivational-affective system, which due to its sensitivity and responsiveness to local circumstances allows for adaptation to changeable conditions that impinge in differing ways on survival, reproduction, and wellbeing, and is connected with the experiential content of human nature?

Concerning the first question, namely, the distinguishing features of qing vis-à-vis xing, it would seem that one can make the case for qing being a psychophysical substrate. It seems to have been used as a synonym for jing 精, “finest essence,” although the etymological relationship between the two words is by far not clear.213 The Han dynasty Huang Di neijing 素問 (Plain Questions) links jing 精, or jingqi 精氣, to the accumulation of emotional energy in the five orbs, producing there the five emotions “delight and anger, sadness and anxiety (worry), and fear.”214 Further, some sources confuse jing 精 and qing 情.215 Moreover, the “Yueji” says “qing is moving within the [mind].”216 The same is said with reference to particular instantiations of emotions in numerous passages of the Shijing. This strongly suggests a bodily substrate of qing.

Finally, Xunzi's “Tianlun” 天論 (“Discourse on Heaven/Nature”) indicates that shen 神, “spirit” (“psyche”), constituted of “finest essence,” is somehow connected with the affect system:

211 Harbsmeier observes that qing is always the qing of something and does not exist in statu absolute. “Qíng in Pre-Buddhist Chinese,” 78.

212 Ibid., 115.


214 Xuewen jiezi 說文解字, by Xu Shen 許慎 (ca. 55 – ca. 149), ed. Duan Yucai 段玉裁 (1735–1815) (rpt., Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1981), 10B.24a, construes qíng 情 as “Qíng is the yin energy in humans that has desires; derived from 心 and 青 as phonophoric” (情,人之陰气,有欲者。从心,青聲).


216 陸賛, 19/37.1527c (“Yueji”). That zhong does not simply refer to the body is obvious from Kong Yingda’s 孔穎達 (Zhang Zhicong 張志聰) (1610–1695) (Shanghai: Kexue, 1959), 23/4:99 (“Xuanming wuqi pian” 宣明五気篇).
Form becomes whole and spirit is born. Liking and disliking, delight and anger, grief and joy are stored within. These are the so-called natural qing.217

Due to the close association between jing 精, qi 氣, and qing 情, all of which denote dynamic concepts, it comes without surprise that in Warring States basic emotion term sequences qing and qi are used interchangeably, and both in rare cases are substituted by the overarching concept of xing 人, human nature.218 Compare, for example, XZMC, “The qi of delight and anger, grief and sadness is human nature,”219 and Xunzi, “Human nature’s liking and disliking, delight and anger, grief and pleasure are called qing.”220 Qì and qìng are both treated here in psychobiological terms as genetic,221 and, implicitly, as genealogical properties of human beings, which makes it possible to conceive of a human nature in the sense of conceptual centrality.

Both terms, qi and qing, never refer to something external, but rather to something internal, vital, active, and experiential in human beings as responses to stimulus events outside the boundaries of the body or located within it, as the dream examples of Section I suggest. Although these responses are “invisible,” taking part in the depth of the organismic subsystems (the orbs, or in modern terms: the central nervous system; neuro-endocrine system; autonomic nervous system; and somatic nervous system), their motor expression component, especially in emotion, can be observed either in speech, vocal and facial expression or body movement (compare Section I, examples 1.5–1.10).

With regard to the second of the above raised questions, namely, whether the concept of qing reflects the motivational-affective system, I would answer yes. The complex concept of qing clearly refers to the human motivational-affective system, the sensitivity and responsiveness of the human body, including sensation, perception, reflexes, drives, appraisals (preferences), dispositions, attitudes (desires, beliefs, judgments), moods, interpersonal stances, emotions, and higher-order functions of the motivational-affective system (aesthetic emotions, morality) all of which are of pivotal importance to motivation, action, and human expressiveness. Humans are plausibly endowed with properties that regulate the interaction between external and internal states—the this is the way human beings act, the “human way” (rendao 人道). XZMC puts the complexity of qing in a nutshell, locating it in the macrocosmic and microcosmic space. “[Human] nature from decree issues, decree from Heaven comes down. The Way begins in qing, qing is born of [human] nature. In the beginning, one is close to qing; in the end one is close to morality.”222 Relevant passages from pre-Qin sources hence suggest that qing is:

(1) a dynamic process which covers reflexes, drives as well as all affective phenomena distinguished from each other and defined in Section I. It also includes higher-order desires and complex emotions;

218 See my “Basic Emotion Terms,” 131.
219 喜怒哀悲之氣，性也。XZMC, S2, 179; Appendix, 1.1.
222 性自命出，命自天降。道始於情，情生於性。始者近情，終者近義。XZMC, SS2–3, 179; Appendix, 1.2.
(2) connected with the innate capacity of peculiar organs (organ systems) to be automatically and temporarily activated in response to stimulation, a process which according to the hierarchy of bodily structures and functions requires the receptiveness, attentiveness, and readiness of the "mind" (心心) and the sense organs;

(3) describable as motivational-affective system with behavior that is energetic and always goal-directed, if not impeded by psychical or physical constraints;

(4) defined as something Heaven-given, an inborn quality of human beings. Although it is part of the natural response system, it is malleable through education and self-regulation.

The aspect of sensitivity in the concept ofqingis most obvious with sensation and perception. The sense organs, linguistically constructed as a set of two dyads – ears and eyes (aural and visual sensation and perception), nose and mouth (olfactory and taste sensation and perception) – are thought to be endowed with particular “desires” (yu欲). Besides these four sense organs, there are two others: the skin and the mind (heart). While the skin (touch sensation and perception) is invested with a sense for feeling and hurting, the mind is endowed with a sensitivity to all mental awareness and consciousness (both intentional and non-intentional), emotion experience and cognition, and desires.

Automatically and temporarily elicited through external stimuli, discrimination of sensations is based on biphasic (是–非) appraisals that may either activate the appetitive (好, yu欲) motivational system (which primes approach behaviors) or the aversive (惡) motivational system (which primes defensive and protective behaviors).

Sometimes the active aspect of perceptual cognition and judgment is emphasized; in other instances, the passivity of the senses is highlighted. Out of control, they would be indiscriminately open to all objects in the environment. Sensory overstimulation or deprivation would easily lead to mental and bodily dysfunction and cause inaccuracy or even failure of perception.

The concept of desire is important in person theory, philosophy of mind, value theory and ethics, decision theory, and sexual motivation. As a sub-category, “desires” refers to the physiological drives (or appetites), the inborn, vital adaptive resources of human beings. In this context, yu specifically means the hunger, thirst, and sex drives that meet homeostatic needs crucial to survival and reproduction as well as the curiosity drive that satisfies our “hunger for knowledge.”

A passage from the吕氏春秋呂氏春秋indicates thatyu– similar to the Freudian creative and destructive energetic forces Eros and Thanatos – also includes the “desire for life” and “desire for death.” Metaphorically, yu is conceptualized as滋味滋味, “juiciness and flavor” (re-
ferring to nutrition), and *sheng se* 声色, “sounds and colors (visual appearance, sex).”229 This kind of linguistic conceptualization strongly suggests that early Chinese thinkers recognized, in modern parlance, the involvement of metabolic, neuropsychological, neurochemical, and psychophysiological processes. Desires so typically are:

1. hardwired, or at least pre-wired, and responses to environment stimuli; having desires is an inborn quality with which the sense organs and the mind are endowed from birth on.230 They participate in knowledge acquisition (evidential and experiential knowledge), motivation, action, and emotion;231
2. linked to sensation where they refer to the passive process of receiving information from the outside world by responding to environment stimuli. These sensations are transmitted into the body and to the mind (brain) through the sense organs that function as “registrars”;232
3. linked to perception where they refer to the discriminating capacity of the mind, organizing the information and translating it into something meaningful;233
4. at the heart of human exploration and go together with the curiosity drive. The sense organs’ desires for hearing, seeing, tasting, and so forth are instrumental in motivating humans to gather information about the environment and to go for a goal.234

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229 Lüshi chunqiu, 1.2.21 (“Bensheng”); 2.2.74 (“Guisheng”). John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel seem to take the expression *sheng se* 声色 literally and translate it as “sounds and colors” (Lü Buwei, 65, 80).


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basic dynamic goal-directed forces in human beings as fundamental parts of the appetitive motivational “seeking” (求) system that energized not only seeking out and approaching the material sources needed for survival and gratification, but also “getting” (得) and interacting with them to gain the desired satisfaction;235

seen as an essential intentional and value-creating mental state “in resonance with” (應情),236 involving expressive motivational dimensions that played a functional role in determining and issuing action which seeks to satisfy a need of the organism.237 Action in this process is always oriented towards future (personal) benefit (welfare and utility) and the pleasure that gratification gives;238

negatively, characterizable as “greed (avarice)” at the bottom of ethical egoism,239 yet amenable to influences. Humans as rational and moral agents in ideal should have the capacity for producing meta-desires through reflection and self-evaluation within the scope of the Confucian education project. Precisely this capacity, ultimately rooted in human morality (義), make man essentially different from animals. The cognitive faculties of the intelligent mind to control “desires” through higher-order desires asserts that besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do certain things, human agents should also want to have (or not have) certain desires and motives.240

235 A prominent example of a human agent, who seeks to “get” the yearned for object of desire, is found in the Shijing poem “Guan ju” (Man 1/2–2–6). For extended discussion of this point, see my Resexualizing the Desexualized, 125–127.
236 Xunzi 22/16.284 (“Zhengming”). For the translation, see Sec. I, example 7.1 with n. 68 above.
237 See, e.g., Xunzi, 5/3.50 (“Fei xiang”); Knoblock, Xunzi, 1:206.
239 Well known is the axiomatic belief, expressed in the Xunzi, that “desires” for material goods and wealth, and also for sex as a commodity, must cause social disorder, expressed in his statement: “[All people] desire and dislike the same things; since desires are many but things are few, this scarcity must lead to strife” (欲惡同物, 欲多而物寡, 寡則必爭矣); Xunzi, 10/6.113 (“Fuguo” 富國); cf. Knoblock, Xunzi, 2:121; also see Xunzi, 19/13.231 (“Lihan” 聘論); Knoblock, Xunzi, 3:55. Xunzi further observes that when indulging in desires, unruly behavior would be the result, so that ritual and morality, proper form and ordering principles would get lost. Hence, when one simply “follows human nature and complies with human affective [tendencies]” (從人之性, 順人之情), strife and aggression must arise which eventually leads to tyranny; Xunzi, 23/17.289 (“Xing’è”); cf. Knoblock, Xunzi, 3:151.
240 The notion of meta-desire and the kindred idea of meta-volition has been discussed by Harry G. Frankfurt as a distinguishing mark of the human condition, see his “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68.1 (1971), 6–17. In some subsequent studies Frankfurt came to reject the simple higher-order characterization as the right account of the desires with which the agent identified. On this, see Frankfurt’s later pieces collected in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. “Identification and Wholesomeness,” 159–176; and Necessity, Volition and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. “The Faintest Passion,” 95–107. For commentary, see the contributions in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton’s collection Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), which includes replies by Frankfurt. For a more technical account
Satisfaction (gratification), the ultimate goal of a desire, needs not necessarily be a mental state, though desire itself always is. Desire, then, is seen in a particularly close relation, first, to active goal-directed states, such as intending, trying, and willing, second, to other desire-related influences on the will, such as wanting, wishing, preferring, longing, and third, to related notions of intending, such as tending, inclining, and finding oneself drawn towards an object. The active goal-directedness of desire is also what it shares in particular with “liking” (hao), appetitive appraisals or preferences.241 This leads to qing with motivation and action.

According to XZMC and Lüshi chunqiu, it would seem that balan ced, positive dispositions (moods, emotions) have a positive effect on the motivation to strike for a goal. While the former speaks of yue 悅, the later has le/yue 愉,242 with a meaning range between the poles “gratification of the senses” (including sexual gratification) and “gratification of the mind,” referring to a state of contentment that is characterized by an agreeable feeling or condition of the mind arising from good fortune or propitious happening of any kind. These positive mental states, often generated through positive appraisals of elicting events, activate the appetitive motivational system. Positive emotions clearly have both important adaptational functions. Arguably, they serve as breathers, sustainers, and restorers in the struggle of survival and social interaction; their action tendency, namely, expansiveness and outgoingness, is in positive correlation with motivation and its core relational theme: exploration and gaining what one desires.

Qing with preferences refers to evaluation of something as an object of attraction or attention. This complex process does not only include purely aesthetical, purely ethical, or purely emotive judgment, but is also influenced by desire. Analysis and interpretation of such evaluations requires particular attentive perception of contextual cues to fathom their place and significance in particular cultural discourses.243 Shi – fei distinctions, which Zhuangzi calls qing, refer to...

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241 The place of desire in contemporary emotion theory is discussed in Green, The Emotions, 69–75; 77–104; cf. Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 146–163. Robert Solomon sees desire as part of emotion and basis for all intentions and commitments to evolve in order to reach a certain goal. He proposes that “the ultimate end of all of our desires … is personal dignity and self-esteem!” (The Passions, 280). The Xunzi says, “Explanations and reasons, delight and anger, grief and joy, love and hate (linking and disliking), and the desires are discriminated by the mind” (說故喜怒哀樂愛惡欲以心異); Xunzi, 22/16.277 (“Zhengming”); cf. Knoblock, Xunzi, 3.129.


243 A good example which epitomizes the polarization of views about the issue of objectivity and subjectivity in aesthetical judgment comes from the Zhuangzi: an innkeeper had two waitresses, one beautiful, the other ugly. The ugly one he valued highly, while the beautiful one he treated as a menial. When Yang Zhu 杨朱 (ca. 395 – ca. 335 BCE) asked the reason, the young fellow of the inn said: “The beautiful one thinks she’s beautiful (i.e., is too conscious of her beauty); we don’t notice her beauty. The ugly one thinks she’s ugly (i.e., is too conscious of her ugliness); we don’t notice her ugliness.” See Zhuangzi, 20/7A.699 (“Shanmu” 山木); cf. Watson, Chuang Tzu, 220. For slightly different parallels, see Hanfeizi, 22/7.486 (“Shoulin, shan” 說林上); Liao, Han Fei Tzu, 241–242; Liezi 列子, attr. to Lie Yukou 列禦寇 (4th century BCE), commentary by Zhang Zhan 張湛 (4th century), ZZJC, 2.25–26 (“Huang Di” 黃帝); Angus C. Graham (trans.), The Book of Lieh-tzu (London: Murray, 1960), 52.
evaluative judgments based on one’s preferences or on a belief or a decision about something’s or someone’s “being right or wrong.” In any case, these kinds of judgments, or appraisals in contemporary emotion theory, are constituents of the emotion process. When Zhuangzi tells us that the sage “does not by liking (appetite) or disliking (aversion) inwardly hurt his person,” he clearly refers to cognitive appraisals in affective phenomena, including the emotions about which he says:

旦暮得此，其所由以生乎。非彼無我，非我無所取。是亦近矣，而不知其所爲使。若有真宰，而特不得其眹。可行己信，而不見其形，有情而無形。

The same holds, too, for the early Chinese case: The component of arousal and bodily symptoms is described as event-focused “stimulation” (gan 感) by external “objects” (wu 物) which “set” the mind “into motion” (dong 動). The invisible, formless (wu xing 無形) emotion feeling (qing 情) is “moving within the mind” and has vocal and facial expression, i.e., is externalized as a particular “form” (xing 形) of sound, coloration of face or by other bodily manifestations, and often, but not necessarily followed by motor-movement. However, one should keep in mind that the feeling component in emotion, i.e., the subjective responses of acceptability and nonac-

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245 Cf. Solomon, The Passions, 186–187. In her critique of Solomon, Jenefer Robinson showed that there are two kinds of judgment, dispassionate judgments and passionate judgments, central to emotion. On Robinson’s view, the same judgment can be made either impartially or emotionally. Fundamental to emotional judgments and for emotional conceptions are desires (goals, values, interests). See Robinson’s “Emotion, Judgment, and Desire,” Journal of Philosophy 80.11 (1983), 733, 738–740.

246 Zhuangzi, 2/1B.51 (“Qiwulun” 齊物論); cf. Watson, Chuang Tzu, 37–38.

247 Liji, 19/37.1527a, 1527b (“Yuci”); Legge, Li chi, 292, 93.
ceptability, is also a complex phenomenon that integrates the central representation of appraisal-driven response organization in emotion. The elicitation of action tendencies and the preparation of action must be regarded as motivational consequence. Although the inclusion of a cognitive, information processing component in form of evaluation of objects and events is debated among contemporary emotion theorists, for the early Chinese situation this item indeed belongs to the emotion process in form of desires, preferences, and beliefs about the intentional object of emotion. Overall, qing as internal feeling episode that, if not universally, is generally observable in motor expression (the emotional expression in face, body, and voice which serve to communicate an individual’s emotional reaction and intended action) as part of the componential emotion process can be said to be:

(1) a hardwired, or at least pre-wired, cosmologically grounded innate quality, hence unlearned, unconditioned, and preconventional;

(2) a response elicited by environment stimuli which at the most basic level are related to survival and the task of promoting one’s genes to the next generation (i.e., motivated behavior such as escape, attack, etc. in the presence of hostile stimuli, and grooming, sexual consummation, etc., in the presence of hospitable stimuli. This explains why qing is used to refer to “sexual love” (“erotic love”) which is invoked by seeing, smelling and/or touching a certain object that triggers desire and the emotion experience by zooming in on the object and moving it into sensory and perceptual consciousness;

(3) an energetic, activated (dong), ephemeral, inconstant, variable, and inconsistent (wu chang) episode, in contrast to the relatively constant and “still” (jing) human nature. While xing includes all “Heaven-given” properties of human nature at birth, qing reflects human beings’ interaction, or relational-adaptational encounter, with the world;

(4) prompted by initial appraisals of aversion vs. appetite (based on the biphasic motivational organization of emotion), reflected in the hierarchically organized language of emotion in the fundamental dimensions of pleasure and displeasure (valence);

(5) characterized by rapidity of change, interrupting ongoing behavior sequences and generating new goals and plans, by differing in intensity (responding to the urgency of the event), by varying in duration (responding to the economy of the response system and subordinated systems);

(6) malleable in all particulars of the above item through emotion regulation and education.

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250 “[T]he senses are born instigating desire,” Jane Geaney says (*Epistemology of the Senses*, 21), and their distraction and excesses are barely controllable. They are the receptors of “things” (environment stimuli), such as an attractive look or a sensual scent, which set qing into motion. See, e.g., *Liji*, 19/37.1527a, (“Yueji”); Legge, *Li chi*, 2:94, 96.


252 See my discussion of the first stanza of the *Shijing* poem “Juan er” (卷耳) (“Curly Ears”) (Mao 3/1) in “Ecssasis, Recession, Pain,” 95. Here the female protagonist, who has a divided mind, is unable to fill her basket with curly ears because she is distracted by her concern for the beloved one far away on duty. The woman’s ongoing behavior sequence is interrupted. For this explanation, see also Xunzi, 21/15.265 (“Jiebi” 解蔽); Knoblock, *Xunzi*, 3:105–106.
The item of malleability is of greatest importance, also from the contemporary perspective, regarding the question of the morality of *qing*, an issue raised in *Mencius*, *Xing zì mìng zhu*, *Xunzi*, and other early works. While in the much discussed Mencius passage on the Four Beginnings of human virtues *qing* is conceived as that element in human nature due to which “it is possible to become good” (*ke yì wei shàn* 可以爲善), 253 the author(s) of *Xing zì mìng zhu*, who would agree with Mencius, and *Xunzi*, who would disagree with Mencius, talk about *mei* 美, “beautifying it,” “making it appealing, lovely.” 254 *Liji* and *Hanfeizi* 韓非子 use the word *shi* 饣, “adorning it.” 255 Although the words *mei* and *shi* imply an aesthetic rather than an ethical appeal that one finds with *shàn*, the overarching concept which unites all three approaches is the idea of self-cultivation as a development process that moves from something incipient and crude to an attitude fully humane and refined, ultimately in accord with the Way. *Xunzi*, who claims that human *qing* is “not beautiful” or “unlovely,” insists on ritual principles to “nurture” (*yang* 養) it. 256 He reports the following dialogue between the ancient sages Yao and Shun who complains about the unruly nature of human affects in general, while the worthies are exceptional individuals:

253 *Mengzi*, 11/22.752 (6A.6) (“Gaozi, shang”). The passage *ke yì wei shàn* 可以爲善 with reference to *qing* has been translated differently by various scholars. James Legge renders the whole sentence in question as: “From the feelings proper to it, it is constituted for the practice of what is good” (*The Chinese Classics*, vol. 2, *The Works of Mencius* [1895; rpt., Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960], 402; Dobson translates: “It is the essence of man’s nature that he do good” (*Mencius*, 113). Kwong-loi Shun, *Mencius*, 219, 260n. 77, prefers the reading “is capable of becoming good,” and criticizes Chai and Chai, Giles, and Ware, for taking *ke yì wei shàn* to mean “can be considered good,” a reading which according to Shun avoids the true issue of Mencius’s claim that *qing* is malleable to become good. For the above named sinologists’ translations, see Lionel Giles (trans.), *The Book of Mencius* (Abridged) (1942; rpt., London: Murray, 1949), 94, James R. Ware (trans.), *The Sayings of Mencius* (New York: New American Library, 1960), 133, and Chai Ch’u and Winberg Chai (eds. and trans.), *The Sacred Books of Confucius and Other Confucian Classics* (New Hyde Park, NY: University Books, 1965), 96. In his discussion of the grammatical construction *ke yì wei* 可以為, Edwin G. Pulleyblank emphasizes that the use of *wei* 為 in the sense of “to become” implies an element of potential change through time and not just the timeless equation that is involved in verbless noun predication when translating *wei* 為 as “to be.” See his *Outline of Classical Chinese Grammar* (Vancouver: University of Columbia Press, 1995), 21.


255 The *Liji* contains a passage where Zengzi 曾子 (5th – 4th century BCE) asked the Master: “Wearing the three year’s mourning [for a parent], may one go to condole with others?” Confucius replied: “On the completion of the first of the three years, one should not be seen in company with others and not travel along. The noble man by means of ritual adorns his *qing*: to go and condole and wail with others while wearing the three year’s mourning, would it not be empty [form]?” (曾子問曰：三年之喪，弔乎？孔子曰：三年之喪練，不群立，不旅行。君子禮以飾情，三年之喪而弔哭，不亦虛乎）*Liji*, 7/19.1397b (“Zengzi wen” 曾子問); cf. Legge, *Li chi*, 1:331. *Hanfeizi*, 20/6.379–380 (“Jie Lao” 解老); Liao, *Han Fei Tzu*, 1:173.

Yao asked Shun: “What about human qiing?” Shun said: “Human qiing is very unlovely. How can you ask about it? When a man has both wife and children his feelings of piety towards his parents decrease. When he has satisfied his cravings and desires his trustworthiness towards his friends decreases. When he is satisfied with rank and emolument his feelings of loyalty towards his lord decrease. Oh human qiing! Oh human qiing! How very unlovely it is! How can you ask about it? It is only with the worthies that this is not so.

The passage shows that qiing, here coming very close to the sense of “attitude,” may undergo changes during one’s lifetime and is contingent with the satisfaction of particular desires. Despite Xunzi’s pessimistic attitude towards the domain of human affects, qiing positively, is malleable and can be educated within certain constraints, a matter which depends on the capacity of a person to use her mind, the governing faculty of all mental processes and seat of psychic experiences, as a controlling instance. Education of qiing, then, does not only mean channeling justified qiing towards moral ends, but also moderation of affect intensity and duration. Ritual principles and higher order devices, such as wen, “form,” “elegant/patterned form,” “expression,” are particularly appropriate to influence and modulate inner states to cultivate qiing. Only after adding appropriate, socially wanted design features to the process of qiing, modified through cognitive appraisals that give appreciable shape to otherwise formless affects and desires, humans’ expressive behavior and action tendency would be brought to completion.

Xunzi’s student Han Fei 韓非 (d. 233 BCE) in his explanation of Laozi’s proposition that “Ritual [principles reflect] a lack of faithfulness and trustworthiness and are the beginning of [social] disorder,” polemically replied to the embellishment of human affective nature:

258 Compare the following passage from the Xunzi “Rongru” (榮辱 (“Of Honor and Disgrace”) chapter: “The qiing of man [is such that] for food he desires [the meat of] pastured and grain-fed animals; for clothing he desires patterned and brocade robes; for traveling he desires horses and carriages; furthermore, he desires wealth of surplus money and hoards of provisions so that even in lean years over many decades he will not know insufficiency. This is the qiing of man” (人之情,食欲有芻豢,衣欲有文繡,行欲有駈馬,又欲夫餘財蓄積之富也,然而窮年累世不知不足。是人之情也); Xunzi, 4/2.42; cf. Knoblock, Xunzi, 1:193.
259 In this regard, the XZMC says: “Those who use their qiing to the utmost, will feel either very grieved or very joyful” (用情之至者,哀樂為甚); SS42–43, 180; Appendix, 6.0.
Ritual [principles] are disguises of qing form is adornment of substance. The noble man chooses qing and rejects disguise; he loves substance and hates adornment. Whoever trusting in disguise talks about qing, will find it hateful; whoever calling on adornment talks about substance, will find it rotten.

The association of qing with “trustworthiness” (xin 信心) that we saw in Xunzi is preserved in folk etymology that links qing’s phonophoric element qing 青 to that particular notion in the set phrase “the trustworthiness of cinnabar and bluegreen” (danying qizixin 丹青之信心), which refers to something “necessarily being so” (biran 必然).264 That is to say, something appears to be so, and turns out to be so in contrast to something that appears to be so, but may not be so. This, in fact, takes us back to the initial question of the basic meaning of qing when applied to human beings. We plausibly may say that qing refers to the affective makeup of human beings with all the properties described above. The idea of genuineness and authenticity connected with the actualization of qing, the former with emphasis on possessing the claimed or attributed character, quality, or cause, the latter with stress on unquestionable evidence and acceptance or belief because of agreement with known experiences, raises the moral issue and that of “our love of the truth about ourselves.”265 What about pretending affection from ulterior motives, what about insincere, calculated tears or laughter? The uneasiness with which the question of qing is discussed in some early Chinese texts has to do with the notion that lying (or pretense) undermines the cohesion of human society, just as Kant claimed that “without truth social intercourse and conversation become valueless.”266 But, as Harry G. Frankfurt pointed out, although Kant and others certainly have a point, they exaggerate. “Profitable social intercourse,” Frankfurt says, “does not really depend … upon people telling each other the truth; nor does conversation lose its value when people lie.”267 Indeed, the actual quantity of lying is enormous today, as it was in ancient times, but social life goes on. The worries of the early Chinese thinkers were with the ambivalence of determination from which deception could possibly arise. Moved by incompatible preferences or attitudes regarding affects and desires or other elements of the psychic life the human agent was kept from settling upon or from tolerating any coherent affective or motivational identity. Because of this volitional division he did not know what he really wanted. The Hanfeizi passage brings up the problem of volitional conflict that may lead to self-betrayal and self-defeat. If ritual provides our affective system with a second nature to, then, how can it still be called genuine? And if we wait for the dead during funerul because ritual principles want us to do so, how can this be called authentic? Moreover, if control of human affective nature has as its goal to improve the basic properties which are genuine in human beings, then the affective system necessarily must be regarded as deficient, while logically all kinds of improvement must be considered as pretense. The point could be further radicalized which would challenge the whole ideology of manipulating human affective responses, but this is an issue that will not be pursued further here.

264 For references, see n. 213 above.
265 Frankfurt, “Faintest Passion,” 95.
266 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 224; also see Frankfurt, “Faintest Passion,” 95.
267 Ibid., 96.
The Contribution of XZMC to the Understanding of Early Moral Psychology from the Viewpoint of Contemporary Affective and Behavioral Sciences

The claim of authenticity and trustworthiness in *qing* in opposition to falsity and pretense is a major concern of XZMC, which makes it, albeit aphoristic and generalizing in nature, one of the key texts of pre-Qin moral psychology. A summary of the most important aspects of the text will be given here in order to highlight its value from the viewpoint of contemporary affective and behavioral sciences. Needless to say, the notion of *qing* will again be my main focus.

None of the ideas presented in XZMC is particularly new. Actually, most of them – those concerning human nature, its development and maturation, affective phenomena, self-cultivation, education and the role music plays therein, and, last but not least, social interaction among human beings – are similarly or nearly identically expressed in the received texts. However, due to the compactness of the piece, which would seem to be a digest of relevant passages from various kindred sources, XZMC can be regarded as a unique state-of-the-art review of the above issues and thus contributes considerably to our understanding of the place of motivation and action in human behavior as reflected in ancient Chinese texts.

Part 1 starts with the claim that the mind of human beings does not develop a definite determination or intentionality (i.e., the property of being about or directed toward a subject, as inherent in conscious states, beliefs, or creations of the mind) without some stimulation, positive appraisal (*yue* 悅) that motivates goal-directed action, and experiential, practical knowledge (S1–2). Basic emotions are introduced as energetic *qi* 氣 constellations – a concept of emotion with which we are familiar from other texts of the period. Emotions are described as inherent property of human nature, being hardwired or pre-wired, relational, and adaptational, and having observable motor expression (S2).

In holistic fashion, human nature is conceived as decreed by Heaven, and the particular “human Way” (*rendao* 人道) begins with *qing*, the affective makeup that serves a couple of purposes, from basic needs of survival to self-monitoring in social contexts. And it is meant to experience oneself as being human. Controlled expression of “affective knowledge” (the capacity of “knowing *qing*,” *zhi qing* 知情) as an inner, primary, and genuine feature is juxtaposed with “moral knowledge” (the capacity of “knowing morality,” *zhi yi* 知義) as a secondary feature whose governing rules are socially established outside the person, acquired through learning, and then internalized in order to become part of one’s motivation to action (SS2–4). Here preferences and beliefs which are likewise defining parameters of human nature, come into play, contingent on things and circumstances, respectively (SS4–5). An important aspect, also found in

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268 XZMC is part of the Guodian find that has been discussed in “Jingmen Guodian yihao Chumu” 荊門郭店一號楚墓, *Wenwu* 文物 1997.7, 35–48; the text material is collected in *Guodian Chumu zhiqian*. For some important single and multi-authored studies, see the contributions in the two volumes of *Guodian Chu jian* 郭店楚簡, *Zhongguo zhexue* 中國哲學 20 (1999); and in *The Guodian Laozi: Proceedings of the International Conference, Dartmouth College, May 1998*, ed. Sarah Allan and Crispin Williams (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China, and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2000). Most useful for the understanding of XZMC are Liao Mingchun’s 廖名春 “Guodian Chu jian Xing zi ming chu pian jianshi.” Both studies are quoted in Ding Yuanzhi’s *Guodian Chu jian shixi*. 269 Goldin thinks that the philosophical positions sketchily attributed to Gaozi 告子 and Gongsun Nizi 公孫尼子, both active during the late fifth to early fourth century BCE, correspond well to the content of the Guodian manuscripts. See “Xunzi,” 139–145, esp. 145.
Mozi, is the comparison of human nature with a vibrating system in which resonance can occur like in musical instruments (bells or lithophones) which do not emit a sound if not struck (S5). So the defining feature in human nature, the authors of XZMC seem to assert, is that it is relational, that things out there “get hold of it,” i.e., capture its attention and by this evoke action (SS5–6). This feature is plausibly associated with the malleability of human nature, its being able to be influenced, easily managed (controlled or taught or molded), and adaptable to changing circumstances. On the criterion of conceptual centrality, human beings need “to learn” (xue 學) in order to give their minds a specific direction, which contrasts sharply with much of what is said about the nature of other animal species (such as birds or mammals) who develop typical features of their natures due to pre-given programs (SS5–8). Although not explicitly stated, the distinguishing features of being human vis-à-vis other animals, according to XZMC, are intentionality and language acquired through learning (SS5–7). On the criterion of axiological centrality, human intelligence, affectivity, and mental capacity (all of which are covered by the term yongxin 用心, “using the mind”) is different through education, even though on the principle of pre-givenness and conceptual centrality human nature is generally the same (S9). The authors of XZMC thus concede that individual difference among human beings emerges with their development.

The importance of education and practice among other factors that contribute to the development of human nature (SS9–14), especially the mind (SS14–15), is emphasized by the institutionalization of a curriculum taken from the record of human experience, critically edited, and meaningfully revised by the ancient sages. It re-enters the human realm to serve as the basis of moral and affective education (SS15–18). With Roger T. Ames, this curriculum, embracing the Poems and Documents, Rites and Music, is “inspirational” rather than “aspirational.” It involves an appeal to the achieved quality of historical models and internalization of past values, also regarding affective behavior. Among the four textbooks Rites and Music stand out for their subject matter: the former because of its connection with morality (yi), the latter because of its intimate relationship with qing (SS17–18, 19–20).

Like ritual propriety, morality denotes an essentially social virtue. It materializes in action, and its ethical notion resides in appropriate conduct and decorum. So, according to XZMC, when rituals were first set up, these fitted the matter at hand and were in accordance with some methods or, based on a slightly different interpretation, particular innate affective tendencies in human beings (SS18–19).

270 Goldin points out that the XZMC sees morality as something external juxtaposed with ren 仁, “beneveness,” “benevolence,” which is something internal, an idea that “is common to Gaozi, Xunzi, and the Guodian manuscripts – and to virtually no other known members of the Confucian school” (“Xunzi,” 120). However, Mencius’s morality is not necessarily seen as something internal. Actually, it stands at the end of a development from a “sense of shame and dislike” (xiuwu zhi xin 羞惡之心) for the improper which according to Mencius is not identical with morality. Shame and dislike are part of human nature, and with regard to our topic at hand, a kind of qing. For a comprehensive survey of the use of the term in pre-Qin sources, see Hermann Tessenow, Der chinesische Moralbegriff “义”: Analysis von Texten aus Philosophie und Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 1991). Also see Rune Svarverud, Methods of the Way: Early Chinese Ethical Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 291–295. Svarverud shows that the Former Han scholar Jia Yi’s distinction between ren and yi is one of internal vs. external or mind (xin 心) vs. action (xing 行) (ibid., 176, 294).

271 “Ritual is created from qing” (禮作於情); XZMC, S18, 179; Appendix, 3.0. Cf. Yucong er shiwen zhushi 育叒二釋文注釋, S1, in Guodian Chumu zhiqian, 203, “qing is born from nature; ritual is born from qing” (情生於性，禮生於情).
Again on *Qing*: With a Translation of the Guodian Xing zi ming chu

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society — is called the “moral Way” (*yidao* **義道**) (S19), and the “noble man” (*junzi* **君子**) works on his affective nature to comply with the rules and obligations of the moral Way: he “beautifies his *qing*.” This indicates that *qing*, in the view of the authors of *XZMC*, is somehow deficient in its pristine state and, therefore, must be improved, a claim well known from Xunzi. Apart from esteeming morality (S20), the noble man values positively (*shan* **善**, *hao* **好**, *le* **業**, *yue* **悦**) virtues such as moderation, demeanor, the Way, and education. These virtues serve as the foundation of politeness and trustworthiness in interpersonal encounter and as guiding principles for appropriate response and display of affect in daily ritual behavior that may oscillate between superficial and ephemeral laughter in conversation and deep-seated pleasure gained in a state of serenity (SS21–23).

A major concern of *XZMC* is with music (including dance) and emotion (SS23–35), a question that has occupied human beings ever since a very early period, both in the oriental and in the occidental tradition. In late Warring States debates on statecraft, it is especially Xunzi who points out the pre-eminent importance of music as harmonizer and balancer of cosmos, state, body, and mind. Music was claimed to be the vehicle of emotion, for the composer, the performer, and the listener alike. There are two possible and plausible interpretations to this claim. First, music provides an iconic representation of the affective movements of the mind which is more appropriate to the dynamic flow of emotional experience than symbolic description through verbal labels which often imply steady states. Second, it is virtually impossible to compose, perform or listen to music without affective involvement. Both claims are implied in the *XZMC* material on music which is, similar to other pre-Qin texts, at the same time strongly colored by moral considerations about music as a tool of education in combination with ritual (SS26–28).

Four points are of particular interest regarding the issue of *qing* as emotion and its relation to sound. The first concerns the “trustworthiness” (*xin* **信**) of “sound” (*sheng* **聲**) — the vocal expression of true laughter, the faithfulness of the singing voice, the authentic sound of an instrument, and the audio-visual symbiosis of sound and motor movement in dance, free from affectation or hypocrisy. The idea banks on the above mentioned folk etymology that connects *qing* and *xin*. Trustworthiness of sound is the precondition for a profound influence on the listener (SS23–26).

The second point relates to the power of music to teach moral values and to be able to change people’s affective states (attitudes, moods, emotions, etc.) in both positive and negative directions (SS26–28). So listening to the “Music of Zheng and Wei” (*Zheng Wei zhi yue* **鄭衛之樂**) is discouraged (S27), a stereotype repeated many times in Confucian discussion on the respective value of various kinds of music, whereas listening to “ancient music” (*guyue* **古樂**), such as the Lai and Wu, Shao and Xia dances, is recommended (S28).

A third point concerns prototypical scripts of the two most energy consuming emotions: “grief” (*ai* **哀**, used interchangeably with “sadness” *bei* **悲**) in mourning, with the typical vocal expression of “wailing” (*ku* **哭**), and highest “pleasure” or “joy” (*le* **樂**) (SS28–31 and, similarly, SS42–43) in positive events of all sorts. Their relation to each other is one of polar opposition. Like other passages in the received texts, *XZMC* claims that “after utmost pleasure there must be sadness” (S29). Almost in the manner of the *Changes* there is a turn from one emotional experience when it has reached the extreme to the other in polar opposition. That, in effect, grief and joy are very similar in nature, and therefore the subjectively experienced “mental state” (*xin* **心**) quite close, comes a bit as a surprise, given the different arousal and control levels of these emotions and their generally different dimensional structure (negative/positive) in the semantic space of affective experience. Remarkably, *XZMC* provides a rationale why utmost pleasure turns into grief: when positive emotions move the mind, the sounds are profound and will pour out in...
apprehension, tending to become sad. The feeling of distress, then, leads to deep thought and longing (SS30–31).

Finally, a fourth point is made which pertains to the psychological phenomenon of enforcement of an affective state by pondering about it, namely, that anxious “thoughts” (思) may result in sadness, and joyous thought in delight. This observation is based on the perception that the process of thinking plays a crucial role in the operation of emotion regulation. Due to the responsiveness of the mind, its “(ever-)changing” (變) states, we find that when sounds are changing, the mind is changing too and, vice versa, when the mind is changing, sounds are changing as well (SS32–33). The emotion process of “delight” (喜) and “misery” (憵) highlights changes in its progress, moving from the initial affective state to higher order states and then to vocal and motor behavior (SS34–35).

Part 2 of XZMC turns to the big question of learning and “seeking one’s mind” (求心) (SS36–42). The term 求心 is difficult but seems to imply the search after the nature of one’s self through self-reflection and the development of the human capacity of self-recognition, self-referential behavior, and thinking about oneself in highly abstract and symbolic ways. In this process that through musical education seems to be facilitated (SS36) again “trustworthiness” (信) – the “orientation of 情” (情之方) (S40) – is an eminent factor. Authenticity of the person is discernible from outside (S38). A catalog of ethical virtues conveys the idea that learning of particular behavioral patterns with these particular virtues at the center is an active and social process and an important feature of self-regulation and interaction with others (SS38–40). As for the concept of 情 the remainder of Part 2 emphasizes the energizing and motivating force in human affective nature (SS46–47) that, if absolutely genuine, can be tolerated even though action may be deficient (S50). In contrast, the authors of the XZMC warn of the negative consequences of 偽, “falsity,” “pretence,” “counterfeit,”272 that ultimately causes individual and social damage (SS48–49).

The statement that human 情 is something we “can positively accept” (可悦) (SS50) becomes essentially of importance in the area of value theory. Again the idea of genuineness and faithfulness are highlighted, and the text moves higher in hierarchy from within-person level to group level, especially leader-member exchange and superior-subordinate communication (SS51–53). Here mention is made of someone with an “appealing 情” (美情), who is trustworthy even before saying a word;273 and someone whose “nature is good” (性善), who gives constancy to the people even before teaching them (SS51–52). Although the author(s) of XZMC do not expand on the particulars of persons with 美情, the expression would seem to imply having a self which is pleasing to others, i.e., having a determination firmly rooted in the “moral Way” and hold fast to it. Such a state of mind permits to evoke emotions in oneself by imagining self-relevant events, to react affectively to abstract and symbolic images of oneself in one’s own mind, and to consciously contemplate the cause of one’s affects. It further means to experience affects by thinking about how they are perceived by other people and to deliberately regulate one’s own affects. This acquired, cultivated capacity, then, may serve as one of the pillars that sustain the actualization of human nature in communication (SS56–59), the realization of a

272 Cf. XZMC, SS37–40, 180; Appendix, 5.0; Goldin, “Xunzi,” 130; Antilio Andreini, “The Meaning of 情 in Texts from Guodian 郭店 Tomb No. 1,” in Love, Hatred and Other Passions, 160. Consider Graham’s example from the Zuozhuan: “The people’s true feelings and [their] pretended [ones], he fully knows,” or, taking the truth-falsity polarity into consideration, “The truth and falsity of the people, he fully knows” (民之情偽，盡知之矣); Zuozhuan, Xi 28 (632 BCE), 16.1824c; cf. Legge, Tso Chuen, 209.

273 Cf. Harbsmeier’s examples in “Qíng in Pre-Buddhist Chinese,” 100 (57), 109 (80), 133 (141).
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hedonic “politics of pleasure” in interpersonal communication (SS59–60), flawless conduct in office and privacy (SS60–61), and optimal fulfillment of desires (requirements) without transgression (SS62–65). Finally, the ability to comply with moral duties (SS65–67) distinguishes the noble man whose main concern consists in cultivating his person (S67).

V Conclusion

Due to fast, dynamic changes during the Late Chunqiu and Warring States periods with an evolving market economy, mass production, remarkable cultural progress, and considerable social mobility, personality assessment and issues of social psychology became of central importance for government policy, in the civil as well as in the military realm. Type theory (including aspects such as human physique, physiology, and behavior) as well as trait, learning, and developmental theories, including proto-forms of today’s behavior genetics, became important issues in sociopolitical, military, philosophical, and medical discourses. Theoretical deliberations and practical applications in form of psychological techniques aimed at stabilization of social hierarchy, leadership selection, civil and army recruitment, ultimately aiming at guidance and surveillance of both the individual and the group. While arguably all talk about human nature and its affective side has its place in early Chinese ethics, its eminent practical character should not be forgotten.

After the discovery of *qing* as an overarching concept which describes the highly sensitive, reactive, and malleable motivational-affective system in human nature which gives human beings the unique ability of sensation, perception, emotion, and other affective types, the idea gained much popularity that all negative, anti-social elements in individual *qing* could easily be dealt with once the right measures for regulation were chosen. The socio-political attractiveness of this idea, especially elaborated in the Confucian camp, is largely based on the observation that regulation of *qing* does not only have implications for the self (development of heightened self-awareness, internal self-talk, etc.) and the affective economy of the person, but also affect a change in the nature and operation of the self: affective experiences exert influence where people focus their attention, how they make decisions, and how they act. Subject-object relations through hearing with the ears, seeing with the eyes, tasting with the palate, and touching with the hands give a direct awareness of the body as the cause of perception in the mode of presentational immediacy experience – in the very moment when things, truths, beliefs, and values are constituted for humans and from which a common cultural identity is created. Emotions and desires as actualizations of *qing* play a central role in significant events of human life. Since much of what people do and how they do it is mediated by affective experiences and the conditions that generate them, it was the task of the moral ruler to control them and develop models of affectivity for emulation.274

Finally, two points deserve our attention: the first is the question of the relation between morality and emotion and the second concerns the responsibility of persons for their emotions and other kinds of affective types discussed in the beginning. David S. Nivison maintains that even in Mencius the “‘over-simple you can do it’ position of the moral agent (referring to the “true

274 Yang Zhu is said to have advised: “What issues from within and is answered from outside, this is plainly *qing*. Therefore, the worthy man is careful of what he issues forth” (發於此而應於外者，唯*請*。是故賢者慎所出); *Lieh-tzu*, 8.98 (“Shuofu” 說符); cf. Graham, *Lieh-tzu*, 174. Graham translates *qing* with “passion.” Also see *Li ji*, 19/37.1527b, 1528c, 1529c, 1530b (“Yueji”).

king’ in 1A.7) and the stance of “being good at extending what one does” not necessarily in-
cludes to extend one’s “compassion” to all and everyone. It would be not “just a matter of ‘pick-
ing up’ this ‘heart’ and putting it down over there, as one might move a chess piece.”276 On the
contrary, the ability to respond in an emotional way to stimulus events needs “nurture” (養
yang) and cultivation. And this, then, for the Confucians, is done by learning ritual. “It seems plausi-
ble,” Nivison says, “that one could, and should, approach one’s participation in a funeral by
getting oneself into the right frame of mind and feeling.”277 This sort of orienting oneself toward
a certain role in ritual – the concept of 里 was broad enough as to easily include the actions of
special and everyday routines – implied control of emotion through the higher-order agency of
cognitively knowing what one should do. And in enjoying action along this line, the person
would “grow.” XZMC clearly states that the way of acting rightly and experiencing the proper
emotion falls together with what Nivison characterized as “extending” embryonic emotions in
directions that are delimited by their own, and hence a particular human being’s, nature.278

In as much as a human agent can choose the emotions he shall have to a significant extent,
apart from reflex-like reactions (such as the flight-and-fight response that in time of danger is
almost automatically activated), he must be considered responsible for his emotions or “feel-
ings.” Regarding the responsibility of persons for their emotions, moral motivation plays a crucial
role. Manipulating one’s emotions or other affective states then hinges on value judgments or
appraisals of how one ought to extend some root-affect into a moral affect.279

The problem here is that moral judgments, according to expressivists in the province of
moral philosophy (e.g., Alfred J. Ayer, Simon Blackburn, and Allan Gibbard), include certain
affective states: desires, preferences, or pro-con-attitudes of some other kind. Michel Foucault
notes that “you can say, in general, that in our society the main field of morality, the part of
ourselves which is most relevant for morality, is our feelings”280 – referring in casual fashion to
the affective states. When early Chinese thinkers of the Warring States period arrived at a similar
conclusion, they were well aware of the impact of such feedback processes in which moral con-
cerns have an impact on the affective states on the one hand, and affective states influence moral
consciousness on the other. These processes would directly and indirectly affect human action and
motivate human beings to feel responsible for their affective experience and expression as a main
regulating factor in human adaptive behavior.

276 Ibid., 109.
277 Ibid., 105.
278 Ibid., 109.
279 Cf. ibid., 111, 113.
Appendix: Translation of the Guodian Xing zi ming chu (Nature from Decree Issues)\textsuperscript{281}

The translation of Xing zi ming chu (XZMC) is based on the transcription of the text with notes in Guodian Chumu zhujian (179–184), Li Ling’s collation in “Guodian Chujian jiandu ji” (504–511), subsequent emendations of the same author in GIJDJ (105–120), and additional notes by Ding Yuanzhi in his Guodian Chujian rijia yi ji zhehong shici (15–119). Ding includes also other readings, most importantly, those of Liao Mingchun, found in “Guodian Chu jian Xing zi ming chu pian jiaoshi” (28–67), and Liu Xinlan, presented in “Guodian Chujian Xing zi ming chu pian jianshi,” 227–259. In a few cases, I suggested some changes, mainly based on parallelism. A separate study on intertextuality in XZMC, based on comparison with other archaeologically recovered manuscripts and the corpus of received texts, is in preparation. The word qing is left untranslated throughout the text; the most general, colloquial token translation would probably be “affective makeup [of human beings].” Note that the tentative division of the text in subsections differs from previous critical text studies, although the two-part division of strips 1–35 and 36–67 is maintained. For reasons of space limitation, no colometrical arrangement of the text is given (though such an arrangement would bring out more clearly textual symmetries as well as asymmetries in terms of semantic, syntactic, rhythmic-metric, and phonological structures not immediately obvious to the eye of the reader from the running text). The following editorial conventions are observed throughout the text and the notes:

\textbf{【X】} Enclosed graph should be inserted into the text either on the basis of reading of a parallel text or on the basis of meaning or of parallelism.

\textbf{〖X〗} Enclosed graph is added by me on the basis of parallelism.

\textbf{(X)} Enclosed graph should be deleted from the text.

\textbf{(X >)} Enclosed graph should be understood as the graph that follows, with LC = loan character; SF = short form.

\textbf{□} The symbol indicates a lacuna of one character or one component of a character in the text.

The alphanumerical subscript refers to the strips, e.g., S1 = strip 1.

\textbf{/S1} Slash preceding the alphanumerical subscript indicates end of the strip.

\textbf{() Round brackets in the translation are used to add explanations and examples.}

Part 1

1.0 凡人雖有性，心無定志，待物而後作，待悦而後行，待習而後定。

In general, although human beings have a nature, the mind has no fixed determination. It depends on things and only then becomes operative; it depends on pleasure (positive appraisal) and only then becomes active; it depends on practice and only then becomes fixed.\textsuperscript{281}

\textsuperscript{281} Partial translations are included in Goldin, “Xunzi,” 118 (S9), 119 (S3–4), 121–122 (S12–18), 125 (S18–19), 130 (S23, S36–37), 132 (S23–26); Puett, “Ethics of Responding Properly,” 44 (S1), 45 (S2–3, S3), 46 (S3–4), 47 (S4–5, S9), 48 (S89–12, 12–14, 14–15), 49 (S15–16), 50 (S16–18); and Andreini, “The Meaning of Qing,” 154 (S1–2), 155 (S2–3), 156 (S3–4, S19–20), 157 (S4), 158 (S18), 159 (S20), 160 (S29, S42–43), 160–161 (S37–40), 161 (S50, S23), 162 (SS31–52). Full references of all works cited in the Appendix are given in the notes to the main text, except for those works adduced here for the first time.
1.1 The energetic [constellations] of delight and anger, grief and sadness are [part of human] nature. When it comes to their external manifestation, then it is because things (took hold of) evoked them.

1.2 [Human] nature from decree issues, decree /S2 from Heaven comes down. The Way begins in qing, qing is born of [human] nature. In the beginning, one is close to qing; in the end one is close to morality. Those who know their qing [are able] /S3 to externalize it; those who know morality are able to internalize it.

1.3 Liking (preference) and disliking (dispreference) are [part of human] nature. What one likes and what one dislikes are things. [Believing that things are] good or [believing that things are] not good is [part of human] nature. /S4 What is [believed to be] good and what is [believed to be] not good are circumstances (which accompany act A and are essential for the performance of act A').

2.0 In general, that the mind has a destination without any guidance [from others] is [impossible. The mind cannot] /S6 engage independently in [cognitive and affective] activity, just as the mouth cannot say words independent (of another person). Oxen are born and grow [fat], wild geese are born and stretch out [necks and wings], their [respective] natures [make it so. Human beings are born] /S7 and [must] learn, someone makes them to do so.

2.1 In general, among things there are [significant] differences: hard [ones] are [used as] posts; [it's because of] their hardness that one chooses them. Soft [ones] /S8 are [used as] binding [material]; [it's because of] their softness that one chooses them.

2.2 In general, most things have a nature that is distinct from others [and is impossible]. The mind cannot /S6 engage independently in [cognitive and affective] activity, just as the mouth cannot say words independent (of another person). Oxen are born and grow [fat], wild geese are born and stretch out [necks and wings], their [respective] natures [make it so. Human beings are born] /S7 and [must] learn, someone makes them to do so.
者之謂勢,有為也者之謂故。義也者,群善之藩也。習也,道者,羣物之道。\footnote{OE 47 (2008)}

In general, as for [human] nature, some things move it, some conform with it, some interact with it, some discipline it, some confine it, some nurture it, some let it grow.

In general, what moves [human] nature are things; what conforms with [human] nature is pleasure; what interacts with [human] nature are causes; what disciplines [human] nature is morality; what confines [human] nature are circumstances; what nurtures [human] nature is practice; what causes [human] nature to grow is the Way.

In general, what is visible/seen is called "things"; what gives hedonic quality to oneself is called "pleasure"; the special conditions of things are called "circumstances"; what acts upon [human nature] is called "cause"; "morality" is the sum of the myriad good; "practice" is what one uses to train one's nature; the "Way" refers to the ways of the myriad things.\footnote{S14}

2.3 凡道,心術為主。道四術,唯人道為可道也。其三術者,道之而已。\footnote{S15}

In general, as for the Way, mental techniques are the main thing. Regarding the Way's four techniques,\footnote{288} it is only the human way that can be taken as the way. As for the [other] three techniques, one does only speak of them, that's all.\footnote{S15}

2.4 詩書禮樂,其始出皆生於人。詩,有為為之也。書,有為言之也。禮樂,有為舉之也。聖人比其類而論會之,觀其先後,而逆順之,體其義而節文之,理其情而出入之,然後復以教。教,所以生德於中者也。\footnote{S18}

The Poems and Documents, Rituals and Music, when first issued, were all produced by human beings.\footnote{S15} The Poems engage in [inter]action; the Documents engage in words; Rites and Music engage in deportment. The sages compared the Poem's categories, expounded and matched them, observed the Documents' sequence and arranged it properly, embodied Rituals' morality and made regulations and forms, ordered Music's affective content and fixed what to express and what to internalize. Then, again, they used the canonical selection for education. Education is the means by which one generates virtue within.\footnote{S18}

3.0 禮作於情,於言興之也。當事因方而制之。其先後之序,則義也。有序為之節,則度也。致容貌所以文,節也。君子美其情,貴其義,善其節,好其容,...

\footnote{288} It is by far not clear what the "four techniques" (\textit{si shu} 四術) of the Way are. Liu Xinlan suspects that the expression refers to the handling of the "way of the people" (\textit{min zhi dao} 民之道), the "way of the waters" (\textit{shui zhi dao} 水之道), the "way of the horses" (\textit{ma zhi dao} 馬之道), and the "way of the earth" (\textit{di zhi dao} 地之道), mentioned in \textit{Zun de yi shi wen zu shi} 尊德義釋文注釋, SS5–6, in \textit{Guodian Chumu zhujian}, 173. See Liu's "Xing zi ming chu pian jianshi," 234n. 30; and Ding Yuanzhi, \textit{Guodian Chujian shixi}, 44.

\footnote{289} Different from "Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji," 505, where Li Ling has the reading \textit{du} 度, he later insists on the reading \textit{wen} 文 (\textit{GDJD}J, 106, 112), co-occurring with \textit{ji} 節 in a couple of the received texts. The reading is also adopted for S20 in which Li had originally \textit{du}. Cf. Ding Yuanzhi, \textit{Guodian Chujian shixi}, 51, who finds no particular difference between \textit{ji} 節 and \textit{wen} 文 節, both referring to "moderation" and "further regulations," a view which ignores that \textit{du} and \textit{wen} are different notions, though there may be overlapping aspects.

\footnote{290} Li Ling reads \textit{ji} 節, "right," "aligning," "proper" (\textit{GDJD}J, 106). Also see S22. However, from the context \textit{ji} 節 is preferable.

\footnote{291} Li Ling reads \textit{wen} 文 (\textit{GDJD}J, 106). But with regard to the next sentence this would lead to circularity.

\footnote{292} See n. 289 above.
Rituals are created from qing, and someone sets them up. They are devised to fit the matter and rely on [some] method. The order of their sequence is the moral Way. To have [proper] order and provide restraints for them, is [by means of due] measure. That by which perfect demeanor and appearance is given [proper] form (expression), is restraint. The noble man beautifies his qing, esteems [morality], improves moderation, loves [good] demeanor, finds pleasure in the Way, and thus is respectful therein. [The noble man's] paying obedience is the means by which [he shows his submission]. As for his praise [of others], it has [appropriate] form. [Presents of] silk are the means by which he gives evidence of his trustworthiness. As for his words, they are [in accord with] the moral Way. Laughter is a shallow benefit of ritual (i.e., something superficial and ephemeral); pleasure is a profound benefit of ritual (i.e., something deep and enduring).
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refracted and thus delighted. If one hears singing with and without accompaniment, then one will be as though jolly and thus excited. If one listens to the sounds of small and large zithers, then one will be as though perturbed and thus full of sighing. If one observes the Lai and Wu [dances], then one will be as though balanced and thus creative. If one observes the Shao and Xia [dances], then one will be as though assiduous and thus frugal. When singing of one’s thoughts with a moved mind, then one will sigh deeply. When [in dancing the performers] stay with the rhythm for a long time, when they are careful to return to the good and to resume the beginning, when their entrance and exit comply with each other, then there is the beginning of virtue. As for the Music of Zheng and Wei, it is not [the music] one ought to listen to and follow.

303 According to Liao Mingchun, yi yue 益樂 refers to a sort of “added” or “augmented music” after the creation of “ancient music” by the sages. See his “Xing qì ming chu pian jianshi,” 46. This explanation is unconvincing. Likewise far-fetched is the idea that zhi 指 denotes the “pointers” or “instructions” of the ruler. Instead I prefer the reading yin 音, “excessive;” “fascious,” for yi 益, and the reading shi 聲, “strong desire;” “lust,” for zhi 指. For these transcriptions, see Lu Xinran, “Xing qì ming chu pian jianshi,” 240n. 68. I also do not agree with the gloss le 和, “to harmonize,” “to be concordant,” for long 龍 (here with Li Ling transcribed as dong 動). Although the Mao commentary to the Zhou hymn “Zhao” 郑 ("Pouring out Liquor"), “We concordantly received it” (Mao 293) (Mausole, 19ID.604b), construes long 龍 as le 和, Zheng Xuan explains the same word by chong 龍, “favor,” which yields the translation “We were favored and received it.” Cf. Karlgren, Odes, 252, and his “Glosses on the Ta ya and Sung Odes,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 18 (1946), 169, no. 1137.

304 The meaning of the sentence is not completely clear. It may be explained with reference to Lunyu 魯語 (attrib. to Kong Qi 孔丘, 551–479 BCE), ed. Cheng Shude 騰樹德 (20th century) (XBZZJC: Beijing: Zhonghua, 1997), 3/6.222 (3.25) ("Bai xia" 八佾下); D.C. Lau (trans.), The Analects (London: Penguin, 1979), 71. Confucius here says of the Shao that it is “perfectly beautiful” and “perfectly good,” but of the Wu that it is “perfectly beautiful” but yet not “perfectly good.” He Yan 何晏 (190–249) and other commentators felt obliged to qualify “good” which clearly has no symbolic meaning in this context but serves another function: it is an “emotive sign” (Charles K. Ogden) expressing a particular attitude toward the Shao and the Wu and perhaps evokes similar attitudes in other persons. So He Yan asserts that the civil song and dance suite Shao is called “perfectly good” because Shun through sagely virtue received (shou 獲) the abidation from his predecessor (see Lunyu, 3/6.223, commentary). In contrast, the martial song and dance suite Wu is called “not yet perfectly good” because King Wu by punitive expedition received (pu 得) the world (ibid.). Cf. Ding Yuanzhi, Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji, 69, who quotes Zhi Xi's explanation based on He Yan's commentary.

305 The “Yueji” says, “When pleasure is extreme, then there is anxiety (distress)” (樂極則憂); Lji, 19/37:1530b; cf. Fu Shuangyi 防 暖 (20th century) (12/14b) ("Daoying xun" 道應訓).

306 Li Ling reads 哀. See “Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji,” 506. In GDJDJ, 106, Li has 哀. Ding Yuanzhi reads 哀 (Guodian Chujian shica, 72–73), which according to the author represents the character le 聲 in the sense of shen 甚, “very (much),” “intense.” However, comparison with S19 of the Shanghai Xingqing lun, which has

OE 47 (2008)
In general, after utmost pleasure there must be sadness – the practice of wailing (in mourning) is a form of sadness as well – and both (pleasure and grief) are highest expression of qing. The nature of grief (in mourning) and pleasure is close; therefore these states of mind are not far from each other. When wailing moves the mind, the sounds are all-absorbing and dying; they stir up pensive thoughts, and one is grieved because of the dead. When pleasure moves the mind, the sounds are deep and profound, perturbing and exciting; they stir up excessive apprehension, and one becomes sad and distressed because of longing.  

4.3 凡憂思而後悲，凡樂思而後忻。凡思之用心為甚。歎，思之方也，其聲變，則心從之；其心變，則其聲亦然。吟，由樂也。噪，由悲也。嘔，由心也。哀斯猶，喜斯騐，憂斯嘔，忻斯吟。吟，由心也。歎，由悲也。嘔，由哀也。哀，由心也。注音（29）

Part 2

5.0 凡學者求其心為難。從其所為，近得之矣。不如以樂之速也。雖能其事，不能其心，不貴。求其心有僞也，弗得之矣。人之不能以僞也，可知也。義，敬之方也。敬，物之節

bo 博， suggests that the character should be understood in the sense of “to poke,” “to provoke,” “to stir up.”

307 In GDJDJ, 106, Li Ling adopts the variant qi 慼. Apart from the cases of lan 嘆 (默) and yong 踏 (味), this is another example of the partly arbitrariness in the choice of graphs for transcription. 308 See n. 306 above.

311 See n. 306 above.

312 See n. 299 above.

314 The reading qi 慼 follows “Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji,” 506. In GDJDJ, 107, 110, Li has bu 不.

315 Li Ling does not reconstruct the adjacent right-side element of the graph. See “Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji,” 506. In GDJDJ, 107, he gives the original character without transcription. On the basis of the Wuxing 五行 (Five Conducts) manuscript, Pang Pu 龐樸 and Chen Lai 陳来 suspect that the graph should be read jian 戒.
Again on Qing: With a Translation of the Guodian Xíng zì míng chu

In general, as for learning, seeking one’s mind is [the most] difficult. Freely following one’s [natural] propensities, one will come close to obtaining it. [But this] is not as fast as [obtaining it] through musical [training] (i.e., the pleasurable approach to learning and self-cultivation). Even though someone is able to manage her affairs, but unable [to manage] his mind, he is not esteemed. When in seeking one’s mind there is falsity, one will not obtain it. That someone is unable [to obtain it] by means of falsity, can be known (and there are plenty of examples). When he commits the same transgressions [ten times] again and again, his mind certainly hangs on to these. When scrutinizing what is observable [of someone], how can one miss his qíng? Bestowal is the orientation of morality. Morality is the orientation of respect. Respect is moderation in things. Reliability is the orientation of humanity. Humanity is the orientation of [human] nature.

In general, as for agitation when using one’s mind, with thinking it is extreme; as for tension when using one’s cognition, with worries it is extreme; as for culmination when using one’s affects, with grief and pleasure it is extreme; as for comfort when using one’s body, with pleasantness it is extreme; as for exhaustion when using one’s strength, with benefit it is extreme. The eye’s fondness for beauty, the ear’s love of sound evokes perturbing and exciting kinds of vital energy from which people easily die. [Thus, even] if he as a person seems to be moderate, but has no plain mind, then there will be [mere showy] adornment. [Even] if he as a person seems to have a plain mind, but has no constant and positive determination of the mind, then there will be dissolution. As for someone’s skillful words and sharp speech, when he has no truthful mind, there will be [empty] talk. As for someone who may happily go along with others in harmony and ease, if his qíng lacks enthusiasm but interest in culti-
vating the Way, then he will [eventually] fall in disgrace. When someone as a person seems to be positively [motivated to learn], it is impermissible not to care for [him]. When someone as a person seems to be resourceful, it is not enough not to tutor [him].

6.1 凡人僞為可惡也。僞斯吝矣，吝斯慮矣，慮斯莫與之結矣。慎，仁之方也。然而其過不惡。速，謀之方也，有過則咎。人不慎，斯有過，信矣。

In general, people's falsity is something hated. [When someone] is false, thereon is reluctance; [when there] is reluctance, thereon is scheming; [when there] is scheming, thereon nobody wants to associate with [that person]. Care is the orientation of humanity, and even if there is transgression, there is no hatred. Rapidity is the orientation of planning, if there is transgression, then there will be calamity. [When] someone is not careful (even in minor things), thereon will be transgression, that's for sure.

6.2 凡人情為可悅也。苟以其情，雖過不惡。不以其情，雖難不貴。苟有其情，雖未之為，斯人信之矣。未言而信，有美情者也。未教而民，性善者也。未賞而民勸，貪富者也。未刑而民畏，有心畏者也。賤而民貴之，有德者也。貧而民聚焉，有道者也。獨處而樂，有入禮者也。恶之而不可非者，達於義者也。非之而不可惡者，篤於仁者也。行之不過，知道者也。

In general, human qing [is something what] we can positively accept. If [someone acts] according to his qing, even though he may commit faults, he will not be hated. [But] if [he] does not [act] according to his qing, even though he may [overcome] difficulties, he will not be esteemed. If one has [true] qing, then even before he acts, he is trusted. He, who without saying a word is trusted [by the people], is one who has appealing qing. He, who has not yet [spread his] teachings, but the people follow a constant course, is one whose nature is good. He, who has not yet offered rewards, but the people are forced to action, is one who is yearning for riches. He, who has not yet employed corporal punishment, but the people are awesome, is one whose mind is awe-inspiring. He, who makes himself humble [and unassuming], but the people are esteem him, is one who embodies virtue. He, who has a thorough understanding of morality. He, who has a thorough understanding of morality. He, whose actions do not transgress [decency], is one who knows the Way.

6.3 開道反上，上交者也。開道反下，下交者也。開道反己，修身者也。上交近事君，下交近交政；修身近至仁。同方而交，以道者也。不同方而交，以故者也。門內之治，欲其逸也。門外之治，欲其制也。

He, who makes known the Way bringing it back to those above, is one who communicates upward. He, who makes known the Way bringing it back to those below, is one who communicates downward. He, who makes known the Way bringing it back to himself, is one who cultivates his person. Upward communication is close to serving the lord (ruler); downward communication and getting the masses is close to complying with government; cultivating the person is close to humanitarianism. Communication [among those] of the same orientation is by means of the Way; communication [among those] of different orientation is for some cause (reason). Communication [among those who] find pleasure in the same [things] is by means of virtue; communication [among those who] do not find pleasure in the

319 Lü 處, “to think,” “to ponder,” “to ruminate,” which especially in Xunzi has very positive connotations, here seems to refer to deceitful scheming, cunning, and craftiness, that is, deliberate deceptiveness, in particular by pretending one set of feelings and acting under the influence of another.

320 GDJDJ, 107, reads 肉 (flesh).

321 “Guodian Chujian jiaodu jì,” S07, reads 异, “morality.”
same [things] is by means of wise counsel. Order within the household requires ease; order outside the household requires regulation.

6.4 凡悅人，勿吝也。身必從之，言及則/明舉之而毋僞。
In general, when [wishing] to please other people, let there be no parsimony. The body (i.e., conduct and behavior) must comply with it, and words, then, should be clear and well chosen without deceit.

6.5 凡交毋央，必使有末。
In general, in communication [with other people] do not be impetuous, so that success is certainly achieved.

6.6 凡于徵毋畏，毋獨言。獨處，則習父兄之所樂。
In general, when summoned [by the lord], do not be timid, and [also] do not soliloquize. When [not summoned by the lord and] dwelling in solitude, then practice [those things] which give pleasure to your father and elder brother. If you want to avoid great harm, be prepared to endure a little injustice. When over, then do not talk about it again.

6.7 凡憂患之事欲任，樂事欲後。身欲靜而毋言欠，慮欲淵而毋僞。
In general, matters of concern and worry require attention; matters of pleasure require to put [one's own person] in the background. The body requires stillness without restlessness, pondering requires profundity free of falsity. Action requires courage and must reach its goal; appearance requires vigor without [signs of] decay; [the mind] requires fasting and tranquility. Delight requires wisdom without [focus on] trifles; pleasure requires optimism and has a determination. Anxiously requires self-restraint without depression; anger requires full [energy] without fading. Entering [upon service] requires obedience without pretense; retiring [from service] requires compliance without becoming careless. All these requirements should be moderate and be free of falsity.

6.8 君子執志必有夫廣廣之心，出言必有夫柬柬之信，賓客之禮必有夫齊齊之容，祭祀之禮必有夫齊齊之敬，居喪必有夫戀戀之哀。
When the noble man holds fast to his determination, he must have a broad mind; when he issues words, he must have genuine trustworthiness; as regards the guest ritual, he must be exact in demeanor; as regards sacrificial ritual, he must have a grave respect for [religious values and worship]; as regards dwelling in mourning, he must [show signs of] deep grief. The noble man, in his person, takes the mind as the main thing.

322 See n. 306 above.
323 GDJDZ, 108, 111, reads 令 路. I provisionally keep the reading 彼 彼, which makes better sense.
324 GDJDZ, 108, 111, has 有 資, “to cover,” “to crave for,” “to be covetous.”
325 According to Liao Mingchun, “Xing zi ming chu pian jiaoshi,” 63, 63–64, with n. 226, 彼 should be read 有 資, “to devote attention to,” “to apply oneself to.” Cf. Ding Yuanzhi, Guodian Chujian shixi, 114. The parallelism, however, suggests that the graph is superfluous and should be deleted from the text.
326 Li Ling reads 有 資. See GDJDZ, 108. Following Liu Xinfang 劉信芳, Ding Yuanzhi explains 有 資, “to be confused,” “to be dull,” “to be depressed.” See Guodian Chujian shixi, 115.
327 Here and in the following 彼 資, “to desire,” “to want,” “wish to have,” “have the need of,” is translated as “to require.”